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PREFACE 
In early June, 1989, the Communist Party of China and its 
government used force to suppress the growing student democracy 
movement in Beijing. Hundreds of tanks and thousands of troops 
were deployed on the streets and around the city's central square, 
Tiananmen. It was the "people's army" against the people. When the 
smoke cleared, hundreds of students and others lay dead. 
This book, consisting of previously published and unpublished ar-
ticles, offers a comprehensive account of China's recent pro-democ-
racy movement, its prelude, unfolding of events, brutal suppression 
and aftermath, and analyses of political, economic, and diplomatic set-
backs suffered by China following the massacre. The articles, au-
thored by prominent journalists and eminent scholars, offer not only 
eyewitness accounts of the events in China in the April-June period of 
1989 by the Beijing correspondents of Time, Newsweek, and The New 
York Times, but also critical analyses of the democracy movement by 
China experts. Even though several books on Tiananmen have been 
published, ours remains the first and only one that provides both eye-
witness accounts and scholarly analyses. A definitive work on the 
events leading up to the brutal killings in Beijing in early June, 1989, 
this book offers an insightful look at why it happened, how the world 
has responded, and what the future holds for China, the world's most 
populous nation. 
Obviously, a book of this magnitude could not have been pub-
lished without the assistance and cooperation of many institutions and 
individuals. We are grateful to all the contributors who either pre-
pared original articles, granted us permission to use their published 
essays, or revised and updated their previously published articles for 
this book. Thanks are also due to Time, Newsweek, The New York 
Times, the University of Maryland, Seton Hall University, and the 
Council on Foreign Relations for their generous support and coopera-
tion. In particular, we wish to thank Jill F. O'Connell, Judy Pearl-
man, Stephanie A. Terry, Joanne A. Pello, John Brewer, Peter 
Hutberg, and Tracy Jaros. Thanks are also due to Erik Gartzke, Mar-
garet Chiang, Louisa Perimenis, and Dawn Dall for their efficient typ-
ing, editing, and proofreading. Last but not least, we wish to express 
our profound gratitude to Professor Hungdah Chiu, without whose 
assistance this book could not have been prepared or published. 
The Tiananmen tragedy has changed the history of China. Even 
(ix) 
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though the incident is now part of the history of mankind, China's 
democracy movement is not yet dead; it cannot be suppressed forever. 
Those who perished during China's struggle for democracy did not die 
in vain; their efforts have now been carried on by millions of others in 
China and other parts of the world. The democracy movement is con-
tinuing. To all those who sacrificed their lives for this historic move-
ment, this book is humbly dedicated on the first anniversary of 
Tiananmen. 
Winston L. Y. Yang 
Marsha L. Wagner 
June 4, 1990 
INTRODUCI'ION 
Winston L. Y. Yang 
Since the return of Deng Xiaoping to power in 1977 following the 
death of Mao Zedong in 1976, China has made, despite occasional 
setbacks, steady progress in its economic reforms. 1 Although little 
political liberalization has been achieved, the economic life of the Chi-
nese, especially those in rural areas, has greatly improved. Economic 
advances, however, have failed to meet the growing demands of Chi-
nese students and intellectuals for political reforms. The Communist 
Party of China (CPC) and the Communist government of the People's 
Republic of China (PRC) have adamantly refused to respond to such 
demands. 
Thus, an ever-growing democracy movement began to emerge in 
the mid-1980s and reached its peak in April-June of 1989 following 
the death of ousted CPC General Secretary Hu Yaobang on April15. 
Thousands of Chinese college students demonstrated by occupying 
Tiananmen Square, a symbol of China's political power, for well over 
one month to dramatically demonstrate their demands for democracy 
and freedom. Instead of engaging in a genuine dialogue with the 
students and instituting fundamental political reforms, the Beijing 
government imposed martial law on May 20 and used troops and 
tanks to suppress the movement on June 4. As a result, hundreds of 
students and others died and thousands were injured. A great historic 
tragedy had taken place. 
Following the bloody June 4th Beijing massacre, many countries, 
including the United States and Japan, adopted economic and diplo-
matic sanctions against China. Almost overnight China suffered un-
precedented diplomatic setbacks. At home, the Communist 
authorities intensified their suppression of the democracy movement 
by arresting, sentencing, or executing a very large but unknown 
number of those involved in the movement. A new leadership headed 
l. Numerous studies of China's post-Mao Zedong economic reforms have been pub-
lished. Among the earlier books is Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough, eds., Modernizing 
China: Post-Mao Reform and Development, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986. 
More recent books on the subject include Stephen Feuchtwang, ed., Transforming China's 
Economy in the Eighties, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 2 vols.; Peter P. 
Cheng, Marxism and Capitalism in the People's Republic of China, Lanham, Md.: Univ. 
Press of America, 1989; and David Wen-Wei Chang, China Under Deng Xiaoping, New 
York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. 
(1) 
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by Jiang Zemin replaced the purged leader Zhao Ziyang as CPC Gen-
eral Secretary on June 24.2 
China's political, economic and other problems have not been re-
solved, however, by the new leadership and its crackdown policy. A 
great majority of the Chinese people have lost confidence in the CPC 
and the PRC government. Under tight government control and sup-
pression, Chinese students, intellectuals, and others have carried on a 
passive resistance movement at home and formed various organiza-
tions, including the Federation for a Democratic China (FDC) with its 
headquarters in Paris, to continue the pro-democracy movement. 
The PRC government is obviously confronted with massive 
problems and difficulties both at home and abroad. China is indeed 
facing a crisis. 
The June 4th massacre in Beijing was undoubtedly a great trag-
edy of historic dimensions. Until today, however, many aspects of the 
massacre remain unknown. While Chinese official announcements 
and statements that characterize the democracy movement as "tur-
moil" or "counter-revolutionary rebellion"3 are biased and cannot be 
relied on, reports and accounts by Western and Chinese correspon-
dents from Hong Kong and Taiwan are often incomplete, contradic-
tory, and filled with serious gaps. The decision process of the Chinese 
leadership in dealing with the student democracy movement remains a 
mystery.4 Very few in-depth scholarly studies and analyses of the 
Tiananmen incident, its prelude and aftermath have been published. 
It will probably take years for a fully documented picture of the vari-
ous aspects of the Tiananmen tragedy to emerge. The incident is too 
recent for scholars or historians to view in perspective. 
In order to help interested readers around the world develop a 
better understanding of the incident, we have invited several highly 
experienced correspondents stationed in Beijing in April-June, 1989 to 
offer first-hand eyewitness accounts and a few prominent China ex-
perts to prepare scholarly, in-depth analyses of the Tiananmen inci-
dent, its prelude, aftermath, and impact. They have either written 
2. "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Commit-
tee," Beijing Review, Vol. 32, No. 27 (July 3-9, 1989), pp. 13-14. 
3. Ibid., p. 13. 
4. Nicholas D. Kristof's article, "China Update: How the Hardliners Won," The 
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 12, 1989, pp. 39-41, 66-71, explains China's decision pro-
cess with considerable, though not fully documented, detail. Up to the present, Kristof's 
article remains probably the most thorough source on this subject even though much re-
mains unknown. 
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original articles, revised their previously published reports, or gr~ted 
us permission to reprint their articles that require little or no revtston. 
It is a well known fact that China's democracy movement began 
long before the 1989 student demonstrations. In December, 1978, Wei 
Jingsheng, an electrician at the Beijing Zoo, launched an underground 
publication, Exploration (Tan-shuo), and posted it on Xidan Wall, also 
known as "Democracy Wall," to advocate democratization and funda-
mental political change. Three months later, he was arrested and sen-
tenced to 15 years of imprisonment by a Beijing court for his alleged 
crimes of providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and 
carrying out "counterrevolutionary agitation.''5 His pioneer democ-
racy movement was thus brought to an abrupt end. 6 Professor 
Hungdah Chiu of the University of Maryland provides, in his article, 
the basic facts of the Wei Jingsheng case and an analysis of the trial 
and the sentence. The author has reached the conclusion that the Wei 
case is clearly a political one, in which the substance of the alleged 
criminal acts and the applicable law cannot meet the minimum stan-
dard of administration of criminal justice for civilized nations. The 
purpose of the conviction and sentence by the Beijing authorities was 
apparently to halt Wei's pioneer pro-democracy movement. 
After Wei Jingsheng, Fang Lizhi, a noted Chinese scientist, be-
came a leading advocate of democracy and freedom in China in the 
mid-1980s. Orville Schell's article on Fang is included here to help the 
reader develop a better understanding of Fang's crusade following the 
destruction of Wei Jingsheng's democracy campaign. 
In his "Prelude to the Tiananmen Incident," Nicholas D. Kristof, 
the New York Times Beijing Bureau Chief, provides an account of the 
events that led to the 1989 student uprising. He offers a considerable 
number of reasons why China erupted in mid-1989. It is obvious from 
Mr. Kristof's account that the Communist Party's power had been 
eroding long before the 1989 uprising, which marked a turning point 
in China's post-Mao political developments. 
5. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The 
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Moderniza-
tion-Democracy and Others," is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The 
Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "~ei 
and the Fifth Modernization," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 22-
23. 
6. The official Chinese view on the Wei case is offered in "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," 
Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1979), pp. 6-7. A good source on China's 
human rights violations is Yuan-li Wu and others, Human Rights in the People's Republic 
of China, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 
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Our knowledge of the strategies of the student democracy move-
ment has been rather limited because they have not been fully studied 
in the West. Dr. Marsha Wagner of Columbia University, a sinologist 
researcher living at Beijing University during the uprising who had 
extensive contact with student activists, provides an in-depth account 
and analysis of their strategies with an emphasis on the hunger strike. 
Since there have been many different and often contradictory ac-
counts of the 1989 student movement and its subsequent suppression, 
three first-hand reports by veteran reporters stationed in Beijing have 
been selected to provide a more objective, accurate and balanced view. 
David Aikman, a former chief of Time's Beijing Bureau, offers a full 
account of the events in Beijing on June 2-4, including details on an 
hour-to-hour basis on June 3-4. Russell Watson and his Newsweek 
colleagues in Beijing and Washington offer a survey of the Beijing 
bloodbath. In addition, Sandra Burton, the present Beijing Bureau 
Chief of Time, presents a thorough report on the Communist crack-
down. The careful reader may compare these reports and develop a 
better understanding of the movement and its suppression. 
Through an astonishing coincidence, Harrison Salisbury, a for-
mer New York Times reporter and editor, spent the first thirteen days 
of June, 1989 in Beijing and later published his firsthand account of 
the massacre in a book entitled Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in 
June (Little, Brown, 1989). An excerpt, written at his Connecticut 
home a fortnight after his return to the U.S. from China, records his 
analysis of the Tiananmen events. 
In his second article, entitled "How the Hardliners Won," the 
veteran New York Times correspondent, Nicholas D. Kristof, offers a 
full explanation of and considerable insight into the developments that 
led to the hardliners' use of force to suppress the student democracy 
movement. Professor John Fincher of the Australian National Uni-
versity, who is currently a visiting faculty member at Harvard Univer-
sity, views the downfall of Communist Party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang as a great loss to China, and discusses the impact of the purge 
of Zhao. Stanley Rosen, an expert on China's 1966-76 Cultural 
Revolution from the University of Southern California, points out that 
China's youth faced highly indefinite prospects in 1978, relying on the 
party to expand educational opportunities, provide jobs and integrate 
them into the still uncertain post-Cultural Revolution society, but by 
1989 the expectations of China's young people had risen beyond the 
abilities--not to mention the inclination-of the CPC to meet them. 
In the aftermath of June 4, hardline party leaders have reverted to a 
INTRODUCTION 5 
concentration on control, forsaking, at least for now, the erstwhile 
strategy of reaching out to the young. 
Winston Lord, former U.S. Ambassador to China, who played an 
important role in assisting Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 
their 1972 historic opening of China, discusses, in his lengthy article, 
the effect of the Chinese crackdown on U.S.-China relations. Looking 
beyond the 1989 chill in U.S.-China relations, he summarizes impor-
tant criteria to guide United States policy and offers to the Chinese 
authorities suggestions for advances that might invite positive re-
sponses from the United States. 
Professor Chu-yuan Cheng of Ball State University, in his analy-
sis of the impact of Tiananmen on the Chinese economy, discusses 
China's economic conditions prior to Tiananmen and assesses both the 
short-term and long-term impact of the Tiananmen uprising and its 
subsequent crackdown. He concludes that if China's contradictory 
economic program is not untangled, and if the people's incentive and 
productivity are not revived, stagnation, inflation and shortages will 
grow worse. As a result, the rising popular discontent may precipitate 
the downfall of the hardline government. 
In the last article, Winston L.Y. Yang of Seton Hall University 
discusses Tiananmen's profound impact on China's reforms, foreign 
relations, political and economic developments, the Hong Kong ques-
tion, and Beijing-Taipei relations. He also describes China's grim 
prospects in various fields, and points out that a decade of reform in 
China is now in shambles. 
Included in this book are several news reports written during the 
days following the June 4 killings which may contain information 
based on unconfirmed reports that could not later be verified. How-
ever, even if they are somewhat questionable--especially about the 
crucial controversy over whether or not there was actual mass killing 
inside Tiananman Square-they are valuable, first-hand, eye-witness 
accounts. They are included here because they so vividly record the 
sensations, the fear and the anger experienced by people on the streets 
of Beijing that night. Analytic accounts written later question the ini-
tial magnified reports of the casulties, but they lack the immediacy and 
the drama conveyed in the pieces by David Aikman, Sandra Burton, 
and others. 
The fourteen reports and articles included in this book will pro-
vide the reader with comprehensive and balanced accounts and objec-
tive and in-depth analyses of the struggle for democracy centered 
around Tiananmen, its prelude, aftermath, and impact. The informed 
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reader should be able to judge for himself what the future holds for 
China, the most populous nation in the world. 
1. THE CASE OF WEI JINGSHENG, THE PIONEER OF 
THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT 
Hungdah Chiu 
THE FACTS 
Wei Jingsheng was a native of Anhui Province, in Central China, 
where he was born in 1950. Both of his parents were party officials, 
and he was intensively indoctrinated with Communist theories from 
his childhood on. During the Cultural Revolution, he joined the Red 
Guards in 1966, but was jailed for four months early in 1967. With 
the gradual waning of the Cultural Revolution in 1969, Wei enlisted in 
the People's Liberation Army, which enabled him to travel widely 
through China. Demobilized in 1973, he turned down an offer to be-
come an official and took a job as an electrician in the Peking Zoo. 1 
In December 1978 Wei began an underground publication called 
Tanshuo (Exploration) and posted it on Xidan Wall, the now-abol-
ished "Democracy Wall," in Peking. It included an essay bearing his 
signature and calling on the Communist leaders to add a fifth item to 
their official list of modernizations the country should achieve in agri-
culture, industry, science, and defense. The fifth and most necessary, 
he wrote, is democracy. 2 
Later Exploration became a mimeographed magazine and pub-
lished many articles exposing the human rights situation in China. 
For instance, in the March, 1979 issue of Exploration, an article enti-
tled "The Bastille of the Twentieth Century-Qincheng No. 1 
Prison"3 vividly described the inhumane treatment and torture of 
political prisoners in China. On March 29, 1979, Wei was arrested. 
THE TRIAL AND THE SENTENCE 
On October 16, 1979, more than six months after his arrest, Wei 
1. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The 
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. 
2. Ibid. Part of Wei's article, "The Fifth Modernization- Democracy and Others," 
is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street Journal 
Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "Wei and the Fifth Moderniza-
tion," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 22-23. 
3. At pp. 14-20. English excerpts from the article are published in The New York 
Times, May 7, 1979, pp. AI, AlO. See also Fox Butterfield, "Peking Dissident, in Rare 
Account, Tells of Political Prisoners' Torture,'' ibid. 
(7) 
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was brought to trial by the Beijing (Peking) Municipal Intermediate 
People's Court and sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment, with depriva-
tion of political rights for a further three years. Wei was convicted of 
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying 
out counterrevolutionary agitation. 4 
The prosecution, debates and sentencing altogether lasted for 6 
hours and 35 minutes (8:40a.m. to noon and 2:00p.m. to 5:15p.m.; it 
is a custom of the PRC's officials to take a nap after lunch). The basis 
of the charge was the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, of which the 
following articles were cited by the court: 
Article 2. "All counterrevolutionary criminals whose goal 
is to overthrow the people's democratic regime or to under-
mine the undertaking of the people's democracy shall be 
punished in accordance with the Act." 
Article 6, paragraph 1. "Those who engage in any one of 
the following acts of espionage or of aiding the enemy shall 
be punished by death or life imprisonment; where the cir-
cumstances of their cases are relatively minor they shall be 
punished by not less than five years of imprisonment: 
"(1) Stealing or searching for state secrets or supply-
ing intelligence to a domestic or foreign enemy." 
Article 10, paragraphs 2 and 3. "Those who, with a counter-
revolutionary purpose, commit any one of the following acts 
of provocation or incitement shall be punished by not less 
than three years of imprisonment; where the circumstances 
of their cases are major they shall be punished by death or 
life imprisonment: 
"(2) Provoking dissension among the various nation-
alities, democratic parties and groups, people's organi-
zations or between the people and the government; 
"(3) Conducting counterrevolutionary propaganda 
and agitation and making and spreading rumors." 
Article 16. "Persons who have committed other crimes 
with counterrevolutionary intent that are not specified in the 
Act shall be punished according to analogous specified 
crimes in the Act." 
Article 17. "Those who commit crimes enumerated in this 
Act may be deprived of their political rights. . . . " 5 
4. "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1979), 
pp. 6-7. 
5. Translation of the Act in Shao-chuan Leng and Hungdah Chiu, Criminal Justice in 
CASE OF WEI JINGSHENG 9 
The Chinese authorities did not reveal the transcript of the pro-
ceedings, but later an unofficial transcript of the proceedings was cir-
culated in Beijing and subsequently published in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan.6 According to this source, Wei conducted his own defense, 
but the official account neither revealed any of his arguments, nor pub-
lished the complete text of the judgment, it simply announced the 
following: 
In order to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
. safeguard the socialist system, ensure the smooth progress of 
socialist modernization and punish counterrevolutionary 
criminals, the chief judge said, the court had sentenced Wei 
Jingsheng to 15 years' imprisonment, depriving him of polit-
ical rights for an additional three years in accordance with 
the provisions of article 2, item 1, under article 6, items 2 
and 3, under article 10, article 16 and article 17 of the Act 
for the Punishment of Counter-revolution. 7 
Wei Jingsheng lodged an appeal against the court's judgment to the 
Beijing Municipal Higher People's Court. On November 6, 1979, in 
one day's time, this court concluded the debate between the prosecutor 
and Wei and rejected the appeal.8 Under the PRC's legal process, the 
case was thus affirmed; no further appeal to the Supreme People's 
Court is permitted. 9 
ANALYSIS OF THE TRIAL AND THE SENTENCE 
A thorough analysis of the merits of the prosecution and Wei's 
defense is beyond the scope of this paper; a summary of the charges 
and defense will appear in the appendix to this paper. 10 Here, the fo-
cus will remain primarily on the procedural aspects of the case. First, 
although a notice on the wall of the court on 16 October had said that 
the trial of Wei would be open to the public, none of Wei's family 
Post-Mao China: Analysis and Documents, Albany, New York: State University of New 
York Press, 1985, pp. 177-182. 
6. E.g., see Xie Hua, Wei Jingsheng Qishi Lu (Apocalypse of Wei Jingsheng), Taipei: 
United Asia Press, 1981. 
7. Amnesty International, China, Violations of Human Rights, London: Amnesty In-
ternational Publications, 1984, p. 25. 
8. "The People's Verdict-Wei Jingsheng's appeal rejected," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, 
No. 46 (November 16, 1979), pp. 15-16. 
9. See Xing Zhong, "Judicial Organs and Judicial Procedure in China,'' Beijing Re-
view, Vol. 22, No. 2 (January 12, 1979), p. 32. 
10. Excerpts of the trial proceedings can be found in The New York Times, November 
15, 1979, p. A22. 
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members or friends were allowed to enter the court room. Foreign 
correspondents were turned away. Several hundred spectators were 
taken in, but a woman who attended said afterward that she had re-
ceived her ticket the day before the trial at her work place and had 
been instructed to attend. 11 
Second, the Court apparently was not confident of the legal basis, 
under the 1951 Counterrevolutionary Act, upon which the charge and 
sentence against Wei were based. The court therefore invoked the 
catch-all Article 16 provision allowing for punishment for crime by 
analogy (quoted above). The principle of crime by analogy is specifi-
cally prohibited by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
which provides in Article 11, paragraph 2: "No one shall be held 
guilty of any penal offense on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a penal offense, under national or international law, 
at the time when it was committed." 
Third, one of the charges against Wei was that he supplied mili-
tary secrets regarding the Sino-Vietnamese War to a foreigner. In re-
gard to the question of proof required for a conviction, it is instructive 
to note that the foreigner to whom the secrets were allegedly supplied 
was neither called to testify nor identified. However, one spectator 
said that the prosecutor, during the reading of the two-hour indict-
ment, had mentioned several countries, including Great Britain and 
France. 12 If the recipient was indeed a national of one of these coun-
tries, then Article 6, paragraph 1 of the 1951 Counterrevolutionary 
Act was certainly not applicable, because Great Britain and France 
definitely were not "enemies" of the PRC at that time. Ironically, the 
day before Wei's trial, Hua Guofeng, the PRC's then Communist 
Party Chairman and Prime Minister, began his three-week visit to four 
European countries, including France and Great Britain. Moreover, 
Wei was only an average citizen and held a low level job--electrician 
at a zoo; it is unlikely that he was privy to top secrets of the state. The 
alleged "military secrets" of the names of the commanders and the 
number of Chinese troops, battle developments and the number of cas-
ualties, were already released in the Chinese newspaper Cankao Xiaoxi 
(Reference News, 13 which has a circulation of several million) and for-
eign newspapers. 14 Furthermore, one of the· elements of a counterrev-
olutionary crime is that it was carried out intentionally, but the court 
11. See Fox Butterfield, "Leading Chinese Dissident gets 15-year Prison Term," The 
New York Times, October 17, 1979, p. AJ. 
12. Ibid. 
13. China, Violations of Human Rights, supra note 7, p. 24. 
14. Jorg-Meinhard Rudolph, Cankao-Xiaoxi· Foreign news in the Propaganda System 
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had not proven a motive of betraying the country when Wei talked 
about the war with a foreigner. 15 
Fourth, whether or not Wei's case was handled in accordance 
with the system of "deciding a case by the Secretary," i.e., by the 
Party Committee of the area, is a question that cannot be ignored. 
According to an article in the Dadi (Great Earth, published on No-
vember 4, 1979), 16 the Beijing City Revolutionary Committee, i.e., the 
municipal government, and the Beijing Party Committee both played 
a dominant role in the arrest and sentencing of Wei. It is reported that 
Wei was arrested by the Public Security Bureau on telephoned instruc-
tions from the Deputy Director of the Beijing City Revolutionary 
Committee, Wang Xiaoyi. When Wei demanded that the public se-
curity personnel show their arrest warrant, 17 they replied: "We want 
to arrest you, why do we need an arrest warrant!" A week later, the 
arrest warrant was issued by the court. However, before the issuance 
of the warrant, the court, apparently referring to the Beijing City In-
termediate People's Court, expressed the view that it should wait for 
instructions from the Beijing Higher People's Court. The City Party 
Committee, however, instructed the court to issue an arrest warrant to 
the Public Security Bureau. Later, according to the same report, the 
representatives of Beijing City at the National People's Congress re-
quested the procuracy and the court to explain the process of handling 
Wei''i case, but the City Party Committee instructed the procuracy 
and the court not to do so. Only after a deputy chairman of the Stand-
ing Committee of the National People's Congress, Tan Zhenling, criti-
cized the City Party Committee and the City Revolutionary 
Committee, was a cadre from the Organization Department of the 
City Party Committee-not from the procuracy or the court-sent to 
explain the process of handling the Wei case to the representatives 
from Beijing at the National People's Congress. 18 In view of the pro-
cess of handling Wei's case, it seems clear that Wei's sentence had 
already been decided before the trial, so this is not an independent 
judicial trial. 
I 
of the People's Republic of China, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Series in Contem-
porary Asian Studies, No. 6-1984 (65), p. 5. 
15. Carlos Wing-hung Lo, The Legal System and Criminal Responsibility of Intellectu-
als in the People's Republic of China, 1949-82, Baltimore: Occasional Papers/Reprints Se-
ries in Contemporary Asian Studies, No. 2-1985 (67), p. 103. 
16. Information supplied by a visitor to China. 
17. Wei was arrested after the promulgation of the 1979 Arrest and Detention Act. 
Both the new law and the 1954 Act require a warrant for arresting a person. 
18. Information supplied by a visitor to China. 
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Finally, Wei was accused of writing and publishing reactionary 
articles as a means to instigate the overthrow of the so-called "dicta-
torship of the proletariat." But, looking at the alleged "evidence" 
used by the Court to render the sentence, Wei only launched criti-
cisms, and had not taken or advocated any violent action to overthrow 
the Chinese Communist government. Article 19 of the 1948 Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights guarantees such freedom of criticism by 
stating: "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference 
and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any 
media and regardless of frontiers." In this connection, an overseas 
scholar of Chinese origin commented: 
The expression of opinions contrary to the socialist system 
was not equivalent to conducting subversive activities. In 
fact, there were constant demands for the abolition of "guilty 
derived from speech" in socialist law since this contradicted 
free exercise of the freedom of speech as protected by the 
Constitution. Wei's speeches might have had a harmful ef-
fect on political and social unity and stability which are in-
dispensable for the modernization. On that ground Wei 
could be found guilty. But still the degree of severity could 
not justify the verdict of a counterrevolutionary crime. The 
unreasonable principle of "guilt derived from speeches and 
writings" cannot be removed although Deng has claimed the 
abolition of such a practice many times. The trial of Wei 
was thus "pure formality" and "he was presumed to be 
guilty."l9 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the above analysis, the Wei Jingsheng case is clearly a 
political case and the trial process, the substance of the alleged crimi-
nal acts and the applicable law cannot meet the minimum standard of 
administration of criminal justice of civilized nations. The purpose of 
the conviction and sentence by the Beijing authorities is obviously to 
bring an abrupt end to his pioneering democracy movement. 
19. Lo, The Legal System, supra note 15, p. 104. 
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APPENDIX A 
TEXT OF ARTICLE USED IN EVIDENCE 
'Democracy of a New Dictatorship' 
by Wei Jingsheng 
(Abbreviated Translation) 
This article by Wei Jingsheng was published in a special issue 
of the unofficial journal Exploration in Beijing in March 
1979. Wei Jingsheng was a"ested shortly after its publica-
tion. The article was cited by the prosecution at his trial in 
October 1979 as one of the writings for which he was accused 
of "inciting the overthrow of the Dictatorship of the Proleta-
riat" and "carrying out counte"evolutionary agitation and 
propaganda. " The text below is an abbreviated version of the 
translation of the article by John Scott and Pamela Barnsley 
which was published in the March 1980 issue of Harpers and 
Queen (London).* 
13 
"Everyone in China is well aware that the Chinese social system 
is not democratic and that this lack of democracy has severely stunted 
every aspect of the country's social development over the past 30 
years. In the face of this hard fact there are two choices before the 
Chinese people. Either to reform the social system if they want to 
develop their society and seek a swift increase in the prosperity of their 
livelihood and economic resources; or, if they are content with a con-
tinuation of the Mao Zedong brand of proletarian dictatorship then 
they cannot even talk of democracy, nor will they be able to realise the 
modernization of their lives and resources. ( ... ) 
"Where is China heading and in what sort of society do the peo-
ple hope to live and work? 
"The answer can be seen in the mood of the majority of the peo-
ple. It is this mood amongst the people that brought about the present 
democratic movement. With the denial of Mao Zedong's style of dic-
tatorship as its very prerequisite, the aim of this movement is to re-
form the social system and thereby enable the Chinese people to 
increase production and develop their lives to the full in a democratic 
social environment. This aim is not just the aim of a few isolated indi-
viduals but represents a whole trend in the development of Chinese 
society. ( ... ) Those who doubt this need only recall the [April 5], 
Movement in 1976, for those who were judged by the court in the 
• Reprinted by permission. 
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minds of the people then, even when they were some of the most pow-
erful in the country have not escaped its ultimate verdict. 
"But are there people who remain unafraid of such a judgment? 
Of course there are--and more than a few of them. Several of those at 
the top who are drunk with the wielding of power often forget such 
niceties as the people's judgment, and others out of their personal am-
bition and despotic inclinations abuse people's credulity. For example, 
the speech that Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping made to leading cadres 
of the Central Committee on [March 16, 1979] was an attempt to take 
advantage of the people's past confidence in him to oppose the demo-
cratic movement itself. He levelled all sorts of charges at the demo-
cratic movement and ·tried to lay on it the blame for the failure of 
China's production and economy when it was Hua and Deng's polit-
ical system that was at fault. Thus the people are made the scapegoats 
for the failure of their leaders' policies. Does Deng Xiaoping really 
deserve the people's trust? No political leader as an individual has a 
right to expect the people's unconditional trust. If he carries out poli-
cies beneficial to the people along the road to peace and prosperity, 
then we should trust him. Our trust in him is for his policies and the 
means to apply these policies. On the other hand, should he carry out 
policies harmful to the people's interests, the path he is treading is a 
dictator's path running counter to the people's will, and this should be 
opposed. The people are as much opposed to this path ... as they are 
to measures harmful to their interests and to policies undermining 
their legitimate rights. According to the principles of democracy any 
authority must give way to opposition from the people. 
"But Deng Xiaoping does not give way. When the people are 
demanding a widespread inquiry into the reasons for China's back-
wardness over the last 30 years and into Mao Zedong's crimes against 
the people, Deng is the first to rush and declare: 'With no Mao 
Zedong there would be no New China.' Furthermore, in his speech of 
[March 16, 1979] he stubbornly adhered to this and even flattered 
Mao Zedong's ghost when he called him 'the banner of the Chinese 
people' and claimed that Mao's weaknesses and mistakes were so in-
significant as to be unworthy of mention. 
"Is he afraid that an investigation into Mao's mistakes would lead 
to an investigation into those who were his collaborators? Or is Deng 
simply preparing to continue the Mao Zedong brand of dictatorial so-
cialist government? If the former is the case, then Deng has nothing 
to fear, since the tolerance of the Chinese people is great enough to 
forgive him his past mistakes provided that from now on he leads the 
country towards democracy and prosperity. But if the latter is the 
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case, we will never forgive him, even if recently he has been the best 
[of the leaders]. If his aim is to continue the Mao Zedong style of 
dictatorship, inevitably his course of action could only lead to eco· 
nomic ruin and the abuse of the people's interests. Anyone forgiving 
such a criminal would himself be indirectly guilty of committing 
crimes against the people. 
"Does Deng Xiaoping want democracy? No, he does not. He is 
unwilling to comprehend the utter misery of the common people. He 
is unwilling to allow the people to regain those powers usurped by an 
ambitious bunch of careerists. He describes the struggle for demo· 
cratic rights-a movement launched spontaneously by the people-as 
the actions of troublemakers and of people who want to destroy nor· 
mal public order which must therefore be repressed. To resort to such 
measures to deal with people who criticize mistaken policies and with 
people who demand social development reveals the government's great 
fear of this popular movement. 
"We cannot help asking Mr. Deng what his idea of democracy is. 
If the people have no right to express freely their opinions or to enjoy 
freedom of speech and criticism, then how can one talk of democracy? 
If his idea of democracy is a democracy which does not allow others to 
criticize those in power, then how is such a democracy in the end any 
different from Mao Zedong's tyranny concealed behind the slogan 
'The Democracy of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat'? 
"The people want to appeal against injustice, want to vent their 
grievances, and want democracy, and so they hold meetings. The peo· 
pie oppose famine and dictatorship and so they demonstrate. This 
clearly shows that without democracy their very livelihood lacks any 
safeguard. Is it possible, when the people have no power and are so 
much at the mercy of others . . . that such a situation can be called 
'normal public order'? If such ·normal public order' is one that gives 
to the careerist dictators the right to wreak havoc with the people's 
interests, then does it benefit the careerists or the people to safeguard 
such an order? Is the answer not painfully obvious? We consider that 
normal public order is not total uniformity; particularly in politics, 
where a normal state of affairs only functions when there exists a great 
diversity of opinion. When there are no divergent opinions, no diverse 
discussion and publications, then it is clear that a dictatorship is in 
existence. Thus, when there is total uniformity, this must surely be 
called 'abnormal order'. When social phenomena are interpreted as 
the occasion for criminal elements to make trouble and are used as an 
ex~u~e to d~ away with the people's right to express their opinions, 
thts ts the ttme·honoured practice of fascist dictators both new and 
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old. Remember the [Tiananmen] Square incident, when the Gang of 
Four used the pretext that certain people had burnt cars as an excuse 
to crush the popular revolutionary movement. Above all else the peo-
ple should be forever wary of placing unqualified trust in any one ruler 
invested with their authority. 
"The people should ensure that Deng Xiaoping does not degener-
ate into a dictator. After he was reinstated in 1975, it seemed he was 
unwilling to follow Mao Zedong's dictatorial system and would, in-
stead, care for the interests of the people. So the people eagerly looked 
up to him in the hope that he would realize their aspirations. They 
were even ready to shed their blood for him-as the [Tiananmen] 
Square incident showed. But was such support vested in his person 
alone? Certainly not. ( ... ) If he now wants to discard his mask of 
protecting the people and take steps to suppress their democratic 
movement ... then he certainly does not merit the people's trust and 
support. From his behaviour it is clear that he is neither concerned 
with democracy nor does he any longer protect the people's interests. 
By deceiving the people to win their confidence he is actually following 
the path to dictatorship. 
"It has been demonstrated countless times throughout China's 
past history that once the confidence of the people has been gained by 
deception, the dictators work without restraint-for as the ancients 
said: 'He who can win the people's minds, can win the empire'. Once 
masters of the whole nation, their private interests inevitably conflict 
with those of the people, and they must perforce use repression against 
those very men who are struggling for the interests of the people them-
selves. So the crux of the matter is not who becomes master of the 
nation, but rather that . . . the people must maintain a firm control 
over their own nation, for this is the very essence of democracy. Peo-
ple entrusted with governmental positions . . . must be controlled by 
the people and be responsible to the people. According to the Consti-
tution of the People's Republic of China, organizations and individu-
als in the administration must be elected by the people, empowered 
and controlled by an elected government under the supervision of the 
people and responsible to the people; only then does there exist a legal-
ity for executive powers. 
"We would like to ask the high officials who instigate the arrest of 
individuals-is the power you exercise legal or not? We would like to 
ask Chairman Hua and Vice-Chairman Deng-is your occupation of 
the highest offices of state based on any form of legality? Further, we 
would like some elucidation as to why it is the Vice-Chairman and the 
Vice-Premier and not the courts or organizations representing the peo-
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pie who announce who is to be arrested. Is this state of affairs legal or 
not? 
"And again we would like to ask, according to Chinese law, does 
the label 'bad element' constitute a criminal per se. In fact by what 
criterion does one define a 'bad element'? And on whose judgment is 
such a criterion made? If these simple questions are not clearly an-
swered there is no point in talking about rule by law in China. 
"The experience of history tells us that there must be a limit to 
the amount of trust conferred upon any individual. Anyone seeking 
the unrestricted and unconditional trust of the people is a man of un-
bridled ambition. The important problem is to select the right sort of 
person to put one's trust in, and even more important is how such a 
person is to be supervised in carrying out the will of the majority.( ... ) 
We can only trust those representatives who are supervised by us and 
responsible to us. Moreover such representatives should be chosen by 
us and not simply thrust upon us. ( ... ) 
"Only a genuine general election can create a government and 
leaders ready to serve the interests of the electorate. If the government 
and its leaders are truly subject to the people's mandate and supervi-
sion, those two afftictions that leadership is prone to--personal ambi-
tion and megalomania--can be avoided. No one should blame leaders 
for being prone to a touch of power fever.( ... ) Nor should we blame 
the people for their ignorance in not daring to strike a single blow in 
their own interests. This may happen because we are without a social 
system in which a wise people supervises and counterbalances equally 
sagacious and worthy functionaries. 
"Furthering reforms within the social system and moving Chi-
nese politics towards democracy are the prerequisites necessary to 
solve all the social and economic problems that confront China today. 
Only by being elected by the people can the leadership gain their vol-
untary cooperation and bring their initiative into play. Only when the 
people enjoy complete freedom of expression can they help their lead-
ers to analyze and solve problems . . . Cooperation, together with poli-
cies formulated and carried out by the people, are necessary for the 
highest degree of working efficiency and the achievement of ideal 
results. 
"This is the only road along which present-day China can make 
progress. Under present-day conditions, it is an extremely difficult 
path." 
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APPENDIX B 
EXCERPTS FROM A PEKING TRIAL TRANSCRIPT 
Special to The New York Times • 
November 15, 1979, p. A22. 
PEKING, Nov. 14-Following are translated excerpts from a 
transcript of the indictment against Wei Jingsheng, editor of 
the Chinese dissident journal Explorations, as read by the 
prosecutor, Gao Wenyu, in the Peking Intermediate People's 
Court on Oct. 16, and of Mr. Wei's defense. The transcript 
was published by the underground journal Fifth of April Fo-
rum and sold at Democracy Wall. 
By the Prosecutor 
Chief Judge, People's Assessors: There is no denying that Wei Jing-
sheng carried out an enormous amount of counterrevolutionary activi-
ties, given the amount of evidence. 
First, the defendant betrayed his motherland by supplying mili-
tary intelligence to a foreigner. Shortly after our country launched the 
counterattack in self-defense against the Vietnamese aggressors to de-
fend our border area, the defendant Wei Jingsheng arranged secret 
meetings with foreign agents in Peking and supplied foreigner [blank] 
with important military intelligence including the names of the com-
manders of the Chinese troops, the number of such troops, battle de-
velopments and the number of casualties. The defendant willingly 
became the running dog of Vietnam. Thus he is merely a scum of the 
nation. 
Charge Regarding Publication 
Second, the defendant wrote many reactionary articles to carry out his 
counter-revolutionary propaganda and agitation for the overthrow of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat and the socialist system. Between 
December 1978 and March 1979, the defendant wrote over 10 reac-
tionary articles such as the "Fifth Modernization," and put them up in 
such places as Xidan Street [the location of Democracy Wall] or 
printed them in the reactionary journal Explorations. 
In these articles he tried his best to vilify Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong thought as a prescription only slightly better than the 
medicine peddled by charlatans. He also slandered our socialist sys-
• © 1979 by The New York Times Company. Reprinted by permission. 
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tern as an autocratic system that oppresses democracy. He said it is 
nothing but a feudal monarchy disguised as socialism. 
The above-mentioned counterrevolutionary crimes of Wei Jing-
sheng are directly in violation of Article 56 of our Constitution, which 
stipulates that "citizens must support the leadership of the Communist 
Party of China, support the socialist system and safeguard the unity of 
the motherland." 
Our Constitution clearly stipulates extensive democratic rights. 
However, our democracy should be a democracy protected by law. It 
does not mean absolute freedom for one to do as one likes. Freedom 
of speech of the individual citizen must be based on the four basic 
principles of insisting on the socialist road, the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat, the leadership of the party and Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
Zedong thought. The citizen has only the freedom to support these 
principles and not the freedom to oppose them. 
The defendant hid his criminal aim of overthrowing the dictator-
ship of the proletariat and changing the socialist system under the 
guise of democracy. If such individualistic freedom of the minority is 
allowed to run rampant, the freedom of the majority will be lost. The 
people will sink into misery and the nation will be doomed. 
By Wei Jingsheng 
I believe the charges enumerated in the prosecutor's indictment are 
untenable. I published articles and wrote big-character posters on the 
basis of Article 45 of the Constitution, which says that citizens have 
the freedom of speech, correspondence, assembly, publication, associa-
tion, parade, demonstration and strike as well as freedom to write big-
character posters and hold big debates. 
We published our journal for the purpose of exploring China and 
making it rich and powerful. We believe that only by free, unre-
strained and practical exploration is it possible to achieve this purpose. 
On the first charge, the indictment states that a counterrevolu-
tionary crime is committed when our country's military intelligence is 
given to a foreigner. The word military intelligence is a very broad 
concept. Citizens have the duty to keep secrets, but the premise is that 
citizens must know what secrets are to be kept. 
Question of What Is a Secret 
I was never told of the secrets I must keep. After the outbreak of the 
Chinese-Vietnamese war, I had no access to anything classified as 
secret. 
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I am an ordinary man in the street and my source of information 
was hearsay and not any official government documents. The news I 
talked about could not cause any harm to the situation on the front 
line. I took this into account beforehand. For instance, I mentioned 
the name of the commander in chief at the front. Who has ever heard 
that one side ever lost a battle because the other side [knew] the name 
of the commander? 
Of course, the prosecutor might say that according to law this is a 
military secret. But during the time of the Gang of Four, anything 
was taken as a secret and any random talk with foreigners could be 
construed as illicit relations with foreign countries. 
Does the prosecutor want people to follow the practice of the 
time of the Gang of Four? 
If the prosecutor thinks I have committed errors because the con-
tent of my talks included things that the Government did not wish me 
to tell, I will totally accept it, since this is the duty of every citizen. 
But I still hope the Government can specify more clearly the scope of 
the secrets that should be kept by the people. 
The Meaning of Revolution 
Second, the indictment states that I carried out counterrevolutionary 
propaganda and agitation. If this is so, we should first clarify what is 
revolution and what is counterrevolution. Because of the policy of 
hoodwinking the people adopted by the Gang of Four, some people 
have the following view: It is revolutionary to act in accordance with 
the will of the leaders in power and counterrevolutionary to oppose 
the will of the people in power. 
I cannot agree with this debasing of the concept of revolution. 
Revolution is the struggle between the old and the new. 
Since the revolutionary tides are different in different historical 
periods, the targets of the phrase "counterrevolutionary" are also dif-
ferent. The current historical tide is a democratic one, which opposes 
feudal, fascist dictatorship. The central theme in my articles such as 
the "Fifth Modernization" is that without democracy there will be no 
four modernizations. [The Four modernizations-agriculture, indus-
try, science and defense-are China's official goals.] 
How can such a theme be counterrevolutionary? People that op-
pose it should justly be labeled counterrevolutionary. 
Marxism Is Said to Change 
Third, the indictment says I "slandered Marxism-Leninism-Mao 
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Zedong thought as a prescription only slightly better than the 
medicine peddled by charlatans." I did not. No things exist in the 
world that never change from beginning to end. Marxism is no excep-
tion. After 100 years of development, Marxism has been successively 
changed into many different branches, for example, Kautskyism, Len-
inism, Trotskyism, Stalinism, Mao Zedong thought and 
Eurocommunism. 
We find that some governments organized under the dictatorship 
of the proletariat in which power is concentrated in a few hands, such 
as the Soviet Union and Vietnam, and China before the Gang of Four 
was smashed, have degenerated into fascist governments, with a mi-
nority of the leading class exercising dictatorship over the broad 
masses of the working people. 
The fate of Marxism is like that of many schools of thought in 
history. Its revolutionary essence was emasculated after its second 
and third generations. Some of the ideals of its teachings have been 
used by rulers as the pretext for enslaving people. Is this not a pre-
scription that is only slightly better than medicine peddled by 
charlatans? 
Constitutional Provision Oted 
Fourth, the indictment states that I "put forth the banner of so-called 
freedom of speech and the demand for democracy and human rights 
to agitate for the overthrow of the dictatorship of the proletariat." I 
must point out that freedom of speech is not a wild allegation, but is 
guaranteed in black and white in the Constitution. The tone in which 
the prosecutor talks about that right shows not only that he is 
prejudiced in his thinking, but that he has forgotten his responsibility 
to protect the democratic rights of citizens. 
The prosecutor accuses me of trying to overthrow the socialist 
system. In the course of my editing, our publication Explorations has 
never engaged in conspiracy of violence. Explorations is a journal of 
theoretical investigation on public sale. It has never taken the over-
throw of the government as its aim. 
The prosecutors perhaps do not agree with my theories. In my 
several conversations with them we have talked about this. I would 
just like to add a point. The Constitution gives the people the right to 
criticize leaders because they are human beings and not deities. Only 
through criticism and supervision by the people can they reduce their 
errors. 
Criticism cannot possibly be nice and appealing to the ear or all 
correct. To require criticism to be entirely correct and to inflict pun-
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ishment if it is not is the same as prohibiting criticism and reforms and 
elevating the leaders to the position of deities. Is it really true that we 
must again take the path of superstition of the Gang of Four? 
The above is my defense. 
2. FANG LIZHI AND HIS ACI' OF DEFIANCE* 
Orville Schell** 
On Feb. 22, 1989, a representative from the American Embassy 
in Beijing arrived at a bleak apartment building in the Zhongguancun 
suburbs of the capital and pressed a bell on the 11th floor. When it 
finished ringing out an electronic rendition of "Happy Birthday" and 
the door opened, he delivered two crisp envelopes for the astrophysi-
cist Fang Lizhi and his wife, Li Shu:xian, a professor of physics. They 
were not a little surprised to discover that the envelopes contained 
invitations to a Texas-style barbecue banquet, to be given by President 
George Bush four days hence in the grand ballroom of the Great Wall 
Sheraton Hotel. Their surprise was understandable; since January 
1987, when Fang was dismissed from his job as vice president of the 
prestigious University of Science and Technology and expelled from 
the Chinese Communist Party for his advocacy of democracy and 
human rights, he had been an official nonentity in China. (In his new 
job, as a researcher at the Beijing Astronomical Observatory, he has 
been allowed to retain his membership in the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences.) 
"I had simply not imagined that we would be invited to such an 
occasion," he told me later, his boyish face registering delight and his 
voice still tinged with incredulity. 
For the last decade, Fang, now 53, has been recognized for his 
work in cosmology as one of China's most brilliant scientists. It was 
not until 1986, however, when he traveled around the country speak-
ing out at major universities on the need for the party to democratize 
its reform program, that he also began to emerge as China's best-
known and most respected dissident political thinker. But unlike 
many Chinese intellectuals, who in the past had been silenced by party 
censure and persecution, Fang, after his defrocking in 1987, broadened 
• Reprinted by permission of ICM, Inc., dated March 28, 1990, from The New York 
Times Magazine, April 16, 1989. 
•• The author prepared this article before the 1989 student uprising. After the June 4, 
1989 crackdown of the democracy movement, Fang Lizhi and his wife took refuge at the 
American Embassy in Beijing, where they stayed until their departure for London on June 
25, 1990. For details, see Sheila Rule, "China Dissident to Study in U.S. and to Speak 
Out," The New York Times, July 14, 1990, p. 5. 
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his critique of the undemocratic nature of Communist Party rule and 
of socialism's failure in China. 
By doing so, he earned not only the adulation of students and 
many members of the intelligentsia, but the ire of ranking officials, 
including that of senior leader Deng Xiaoping, whose notions of re-
form do not embrace the kind of freewheeling political dialogue es-
poused by Fang. Given his vulnerable position within China, it is 
understandable that Fang welcomed Bush's invitation, both as a form 
of personal protection and as a means of helping focus worldwide at-
tention on the fledgling democracy movement which, during the 
months preceding the President's visit, had been gathering new 
momentum. 
On Feb. 25, the day before the banquet, Fang discovered that 
Perry Link, an American professor of Chinese literature and director 
of an office that conducts scholarly communications between the 
United States and China, had also been invited. Because Link knew 
Fang and lived nearby, the two decided to drive to the event together. 
As Fang would soon appreciate, this was a fateful decision. 
When Fang and his wife emerged from their building the next 
evening around sunset, he in a dark Western suit and tie, she in a 
white-and-black checkered evening dress and heels, they were in high 
spirits. They stepped into the Datsun in which Perry Link and his 
wife, Jean Wong, had just arrived with their driver, and set off. 
But 20 minutes later, as they came within a few blocks of the 
Great Wall Sheraton, they found their car suddenly halted and omi-
nously surrounded by a phalanx of armed police. Thinking at first 
they had been stopped for a routine security check, they did not try to 
get out. But when their driver was told to pull across the street next to 
the Kunlun Hotel-which is reported to have been built and run by 
the Public Security Bureau-and then suddenly charged with an unex-
plained traffic violation, the two couples found themselves obstructed 
from getting out of the car so that they could walk to the Sheraton. 
As Fang, ever the logician, later recalled: "Since we were not 
driving, I said, 'All right. If the driver has violated traffic laws, why 
don't you keep him and let us go?' " The police did not respond, how-
ever, nor did they respond to attempts by Fang and Link to show 
them their official invitations. 
When the four finally did succeed in getting out of the car, Fang 
and his wife were suddenly shouldered off by a serum [sic] of police. 
Only after Fang's repeated requests to speak to someone in authority 
did a man step forward and identify himself, according to Fang, as the 
"main person in charge of the security for President Bush's visit." He 
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told Fang that because neither his nor his wife's name was on "the list 
provided to us by American security," they would not be allowed to 
proceed. 
"I thought this was quite an amazing statement," recalled Fang, 
"for the truth was that they had not yet even asked us our names!" 
Shortly thereafter, the two couples finally managed to join up 
again and they decided to go to the American Embassy, where they 
hoped someone would be able to confirm their invitations. At this 
point, they discovered their car had disappeared. 
Mindful that Fang might well have been destined for detention 
inside the Kunlun Hotel had the Links not been accompanying him, 
the two couples found themselves with no choice but to head over to 
its main entrance, where a few cabs were waiting. Finally getting a 
car, they had gone no more than a few blocks when they were again 
halted by police, who this time declared that the taxi could not con· 
tinue because of an allegedly defective rear light. 
Leaving their second impounded vehicle, this "strange little 
band," as Fang referred to them, next tried to board a series of public 
buses. But each of these, in tum, was directed away from the bus stop 
by agitated police. By this time, it was nearing 8 o'clock-an hour 
after the banquet had begun-and with no alternative left, they set off 
on foot, a retinue of police cars and plainclothesmen with walkie-talk-
ies following along behind. 
Later, Fang expressed his unalloyed gratitude for the way the 
Links had stood by him and his wife: "There was never any question 
about what they would do. Again and again they reassured us that 
under no circumstance would they leave us, that we would all stay 
together throughout." 
"If Fang had been alone in his own car, I don't know what the 
police would have done with him," said Link. "But the unanticipated 
presence of my white face probably made it 'inconvenient' for them to 
do what they had originally planned." 
After an hour wandering around trying to find a phone in the 
back streets of Beijing, the four finally reached the residence of the 
United States Ambassador. Unable to raise anyone inside, they were 
considering what to do next when David Horley, a Canadian diplo-
mat, happened to walk by on an evening stroll with his wife. Recog-
nizing Fang immediately from photographs, the Horleys invited the 
wanderers to take refuge in their nearby apartment. 
Meanwhile, in t~e banquet hall, Chinese President Yang 
Shangkun stood up, facmg an enormous flag of Texas, and delivered a 
speech which was utterly out of synch with what was going on outside. 
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"We are most delighted tonight to be able to meet again joyously 
and to chat freely at this grand dinner given by President and Mrs. 
Bush," he intoned, then declared that the President's visit had "added 
another chapter to the annals of friendship between the Chinese and 
American peoples." 
President Yang had entered the ballroom with Prime Minister Li 
Peng only after Fang, whose activities had been particularly galling to 
Party leaders in the weeks before the banquet, had been waylaid. 
Although the state-controlled media has tried to embargo almost 
all news about him since his defrocking two years ago, word of Fang's 
outspoken views has still managed to spread through the grapevine. 
In fact, his reputation seemed to grow exponentially in proportion to 
the Party's efforts to suppress it, so that few educated people in China 
are now unfamiliar with his name. 
This is not to say that all Chinese intellectuals agree with Fang's 
uncompromising views. Over the last two years, however, more and 
more of them have come to sympathize not just with what he was 
saying, but with the fact that he dared speak out so forthrightly. Like 
a volatile new chemical element which is capable of transforming a 
stable compound, Fang's voice was becoming an ever more powerful 
catalyst in changing the once-fearful attitude in intellectuals toward 
the Communist Party. 
Particularly alarming to the leadership about this change was 
their recognition that in the past it was precisely the alienation of the 
educated elite which had prefigured the downfall of so many other 
Chinese governments. It had been just such alienation, in fact, that 
sent intellectuals into the streets in 1919 during the May 4 Movement, 
in effect launching the Chinese Communists revolution itself. 
Before the much-publicized student demonstrations of 1986, 
Fang was already describing socialism as a "failure" and human rights 
as "a critical component" of China's reforms. In May 1988, while 
Party officials were busy celebrating the 90th anniversary of Beijing 
University in a nearby stadium, Fang suddenly appeared elsewhere on 
campus, and before a crowd of several hundred enthusiastic students 
spoke of the "urgency" of stressing "freedom of the press, of ideas and 
speech." On a trip to Australia and Hong Kong that summer, he pro-
claimed the necessity of a two-party system in China, and repeatedly 
criticized party officials-including the children of high-ranking lead-
ers-for using their privileged positions to bilk the state and then de-
posit their ill-gotten wealth in foreign bank accounts. Shortly 
thereafter-reportedly on direct orders from Deng Xiaoping-his exit 
visa for a trip to the United States, where he had applied to lecture at 
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several universities and engage in six months of cosmological research, 
was cancelled. 
Undaunted, on January 6, 1989, Fang made his boldest move yet. 
With the same calm rationalism that distinguishes his scientific work 
on the origins of the universe, he wrote an open appeal to Deng, 
which, though appearing abroad and circulated among Chinese intel-
lectuals, was never officially published in China. 
"Dear Chairman Deng," he began, "1989 is both the 40th anni-
versary of the People's Republic of China and the 70th anniversary of 
the May 4 Movement . . . . Therefore, I would like to sincerely suggest 
that a general amnesty be declared, and what is more, that Wei Jing-
sheng and all other political prisoners be released. Regardless of how 
one might view Wei Jingsheng, to release someone such as him who 
has already served nearly a decade in prison would, in my view, be a 
humanitarian gesture which could not but have a beneficial effect on 
the morale of society . . . . " 
Wei Jingsheng is, of course, the Democracy Wall activist who in 
1978-79 protested that Deng's vaunted Four Modernizations- agri-
culture, industry, science and technology and national defense-
should have included a fifth, namely, democracy. Arrested on a con-
trived charge of having given military secrets to a foreigner, he was 
ultimately sentenced as a "counterrevolutionary" to 15 years in jail. 
In spite of the fact China continues to deny that it has any "political 
prisoners," Wei remains in prison-along with other Democracy Wall 
activists such as Liu Qing, Xu Wenli and Wang Xizhe. 
Until Fang's letter, no concerted effort had been made in China to 
protest their arrests or their treatment in jail, never mind to make an 
appeal to China's paramount leader to set them and all other "political 
prisoners" free. By publicly raising this question, Fang's letter, with 
its electrifying simplicity and directness, had succeeded not only in 
resurrecting the names of these prisoners from oblivion, but in forcing 
forward the boundaries of permissible discourse in China by one more 
giant step. 
As if in antiphonal response, a second public letter was released 
to foreign correspondents in Beijing on Feb. 16, this time addressed to 
the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and writ-
ten by the short-story writer and poet Bei Dao: 
"Mter having learned of Mr. Fang Lizhi's open letter of January 
6th to Chairman Deng Xiaoping, we are deeply concerned. We be-
lieve that the release of political prisoners, especially Wei Jingsheng 
and others on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the People's 
Republic of China and the 70th anniversary of the May 4 Movement 
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would be a salutary move, and would create a more harmonious at-
mosphere which would be good for reform, and which would conform 
to the universal trend toward human rights in the world today." 
The letter was signed by 33 intellectuals, not just the handful of 
already disaffected cultural figures whom the Party might have ex-
pected, but a host of new people, who had much to lose and little to 
gain. Their support was a clear indication that levels of alienation 
among intellectuals had now reached a new and dangerous high-water 
mark. As Fang noted at the time, "There will be more events like this, 
because they are part of a larger trend that will be hard to stop." In-
deed, before the month was out, yet another letter of support calling 
on China's leaders to guarantee freedom of speech, publication and 
information had been signed by 42 prominent scientists. 
On Feb. 22, the Chinese Government responded in a way as con-
fusing as it was hapless. Using a convoluted form of quasi-legalese 
which has become typical of recent Party efforts to stifle its adversa-
ries, an unnamed Justice Ministry official declared, "It is against 
China's legal principles for the writers of this letter to stir up public 
opinion in an attempt to overturn an independent jurisdiction by solic-
iting signatures." 
Thus, on Feb. 25, when Bush arrived for his 40-hour visit in Bei-
jing (from Tokyo, where he had attended the funeral of Emperor Hiro-
hito ), he found himself in a country not only transformed since his 
days as head of the United States Liaison Office in 1974-75, but also 
steeped in political dissent. 
From the outside, there were conflicting agendas on the Ameri-
can side. On the one hand, Bush's trip had been conceived as a nostal-
gic homecoming which would help cement Chinese-American ties, in 
advance of the summit between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev scheduled for mid-May. On the other hand, as a State De-
partment official who was closely involved with the trip later ex-
plained: "Mindful of the whole precedent of Reagan's trip to the 
Soviet Union, where he had met with dissidents in 1988, Bush wanted 
to include some of the people who had been speaking out in China." 
United States officials seemed only dimly aware of how Chinese 
intellectuals, lacking the ability to make themselves heard at home, 
looked toward the President's visit as a way to help focus world atten-
tion on China's continuing lack of freedom and democracy. It should 
hardly have been surprising that these intellectuals would be inclined 
to place some hope in Bush, the self-proclaimed heir, after all, to Ron-
ald Reagan's legacy of uncompromising anti-Communism. 
As it turned out, however, the original list of invitees- which 
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included several other politically controversial Chinese figures-had 
not been prepared in Washington, but by Bette Bao Lord, Ambassador 
Winston Lord's Shanghai-born wife. Having long taken a keen inter-
est in China's new and more independent intelligentsia, Bette Lord 
had frequently entertained large numbers of intellectuals at Western-
style gatherings in the Ambassador's residence. In fact, not since "lib-
eration" in 1949 had Beijing seen such an energetic social hostess, and 
her soirees-complete with disco dancing-had turned the residence 
into a kind of liberated zone of United States culture in the middle of 
the People's Republic. 
The list had finally been approved by Washington, but how far 
Bush would be willing to take his symbolic gestures of solidarity with 
dissidents was unknown, and how the Chinese Government would re-
act never seemed to have been adequately considered by American 
officials. 
"I knew that the Chinese probably would be irritated," admitted 
one United States official involved in arranging the trip. "But I did 
not anticipate a major reaction." 
As soon as the guest list became public, however, there was in-
deed a "major reaction." Chinese officials began insinuating that the 
United States had violated protocol by not having "checked" the list 
with them before issuing invitations. They also let it be known that 
under the circumstances, Prime Minister Li Peng and President Yang 
Shangkun might refuse to attend President Bush's farewell banquet. 
After hailing China's "courageous" economic reforms at the wel-
coming banquet in the Great Hall of the People, Bush managed only 
to allude to certain "areas of disagreement" between the United States 
and China, and spoke only in passing of the need to base future rela-
tions "on respect for the individual as well as the integrity of the 
state." And the next day, when he met with Prime Minister Li and 
Deng Xiaoping, he said nothing more about China's distinctly un-
democratic political system, or the human rights violations in Tibet. 
Nor did he challenge General Secretary Zhao Ziyang that afternoon 
when he found himself being sternly lectured about the "serious conse-
quences" of "some elements in American society who support people 
who are dissatisfied with the Chinese Government .... " 
It was not until just hours before the banquet that Bush's silence 
seemed to be rewarded. Protocol officials on both sides reached a 
compromise: the Prime Minister and the President of China would 
attend the Bush barbecue if the Americans promised there would be 
no mingling during the sit-down dinner, and if those at the head table 
agreed not to proffer toasts to guests on the floor. 
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Indeed, even at 8:30 that evening, as Perry Link was trying to call 
the Great Wall Sheraton from David Horley's apartment, the Ameri-
cans, having not yet noticed Fang's absence, thought the compromise 
had succeeded. It was only after duty officers at the Citizens Services 
Section of the United States Consulate, where Link had finally gone in 
desperation, reached the Great Wall Hotel a half-hour later that the 
White House realized something had gone wrong. By this time, the 
banquet was ending. 
Returning to the Horleys' apartment, Fang and Link decided 
that, since members of the foreign press had now frantically begun 
telephoning around the city to try to ascertain what had happened to 
the banquet's most celebrated guest, they should immediately go to the 
White House press briefing room, which had been set up at the Shan-
gri-La Hotel on the other side of the city. 
At about 10:30 P.M., hungry, tired and slightly dazed, Fang en-
tered the glittering lobby of the luxurious hotel. It was as if he had 
crossed a symbolic line. Outside lay the world of the Chinese Commu-
nist Party and its minions from the Public Security Bureau; inside, like 
the interior of a Faberge egg, lay a miniature and elegant Western 
world, which tonight was filled with media representatives from every 
television network in the United States and most major news 
magazines, wire services and newspapers in the world. It was, in 
short, an authoritarian government's most nightmarish vision made 
incarnate: an articulate political dissident loose in the sanctuary of a 
Western hotel with 300 members of the free press. 
Ushered to the podium in the grand ballroom, Fang stood bathed 
in klieg lights between Chinese and American flags, and in broken but 
steady English responded to questions shouted out to him from the 
floor. Then, rushed upstairs, he was shuttled back and forth from 
ABC to NBC, and from CBS to CNN. Responding to questions can-
didly and with great dignity, he held up his Presidential invitation for 
the cameras, told the world what had happened, spoke both of the 
humiliation he felt his country had inflicted on itself that night and of 
his hopes for a new and more democratic China. 
"What we are calling for is extremely basic, namely, freedom of 
speech, press, assembly and travel . . . . However, it is easy to see from 
this incident what the human rights situation is like here in China .... 
How can I tell you I was not afraid? But since such human rights 
violations have happened so often here, I am by now somewhat used 
to them . . . . concepts of human rights and democracy, although the 
founding principles of the U.S. government, should not be viewed as 
something exclusively Western. Actually, they are a legacy to the 
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world. Only if we view them in this way can progress toward democ-
racy be made around the world. And only if the U.S. acts as a leader 
can such progress take place." 
It was strange to watch Fang as he made these rounds, sheltered 
by an army of interested foreign reporters inside this brightly lit, warm 
and comfortable hotel. It was momentarily almost possible to forget 
the reality outside against which Fang was making his protest. But by 
2:30 that morning, the brouhaha was over, and Fang once again found 
himself back in his own precarious world, eating a bowl of noodles in 
his small, cold, dimly lit apartment. 
Like many others, Fang waited the next day to see what President 
Bush's reaction would be to the bizarre hegira which had been forced 
on him and the Links the night before. But at the airport that morn-
ing, Bush did nothing more than briefly to express "regret" over the 
affair, ask the United States Ambassador in Beijing to look into the 
matter, and then fly off to Korea. He left the rest to his press secre-
tary, Marlin Fitzwater, who later that day on board Air Force One 
told querulous reporters that when it came to China, as far as the 
United States was concerned, "Human rights is one aspect of the rela-
tionship ... we wouldn't want to say that it is the cornerstone .... " 
Later on, Bush himself would finally be confronted at a Washing-
ton press conference by a reporter who wondered if the incident meant 
that the United States would henceforth adopt a policy toward other 
countries of seeking "harmony rather than confrontation over human 
rights." 
"But you know," Bush replied, "there's two schools of how you 
do the human rights agenda. So, it all depends, you know, what ap-
proach you take. But I think quiet discussion is a good approach to 
try to effect the human rights objectives that I feel very strongly 
about." 
As the President's plane was making its way home, however, 
scores of reporters back in Beijing trooped up to Fang's apartment for 
their own post-mortem of the night's events. When they asked a 
weary Fang if he had been contacted yet by United States diplomats, 
he said that he had not, admitting that their failure to do so did im-
press him as "a little strange." When informed of Bush's evasive ex-
pression of "regret" at the airport, he said simply, "It is not enough." 
And then, in his straightforward but understated way, Fang said: 
"Some say that Bush was too soft .... I will only say that the 
West should not operate on a double standard by criticizing human 
rights in the Soviet Union but not in China." 

3. PRELUDE TO TIANANMEN-THE REASONS WHY 
CHINA ERUPTS* 
Nicholas D. Kristof 
Emperors and eunuchs, warlords and revolutionaries - all have 
presided over Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Last month was the turn 
of the hunger strikers. 
Beginning in late April, 3,000 young people lay nearly comatose 
on the ground, feeble and sunburned, but galvanizing all of China with 
their threat to kill themselves rather than live without democracy. 
Oceans of protesters, more than a million bobbing heads, jostled in 
and around the vast square, fighting their way forward to read more of 
the angry red banners calling for the resignation of the senior leader, 
Deng Xiaoping, and the Prime Minister, Li Peng. 
When Mr. Deng and Mr. Li responded by imposing martial law, 
citizens flung themselves in front of army trucks and tanks, stopping 
and often reversing the long convoys. The soldiers retreated, some of 
them sobbing as they abandoned their orders to quell the uprising. 
"Our Government is too harsh to the students," snarled Sun Yong, an 
army engineer who marched against the government. "The People's 
Liberation Army belongs to the people, and it is time for every Chi-
nese to speak out." 
The outlook for China's immediate future is murky, but most 
Chinese seem to expect that whatever the near-term setbacks, the na-
tion has been set on the road toward less control by the Communist 
Party. The uprising of the last six weeks, whether it is renewed or 
repressed, seems to mark a turning point, and it happened with star-
tling, and seemingly inexplicable swiftness. No one predicted that the 
convulsions would happen when they did, and not even China's most 
famous savants can safely predict what will happen next. 
But if the timing and scale of earthquakes is uncertain, at least the 
fault lines can be mapped. In China, for most of the population, these 
fault lines - the immediate causes of public dissatisfaction - relate 
not only to vague yearnings for democracy but, more importantly, to 
profound economic frustrations and disgust over social inequities and 
corruption. 
• Reprinted by permission of New York Times, Inc., dated November 2, 1989, from 
The New York Times Magazine, June 4, 1989. 
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Before the turbulence, experts looked at China and saw an eco-
nomic miracle - a society that in little more than a decade has man-
aged to propel itself from the bland egalitarian poverty of Maoism to 
the new-found consumerism of color television sets, earrings and disco 
dancing. During the last 10 years, the average income in China has 
more than doubled. 
But the expectations of the Chinese have risen even more. For-
eign analysts see double-digit growth, but the Chinese tend to focus on 
the washing machine that they can now dream of but still can't afford, 
the rising prices that seem to cheat them out of their higher salaries, 
the bribes that they must pay in order to change apartments or, in 
defiance of official policy, to have a second child. The result is dissatis-
faction and anger, mixed with bitterness at the advantages that high 
officials enjoy. In April and May, these subterranean pressures finally 
erupted in the volcano of protest that, whatever happens, has pro-
foundly changed the way China will be governed. 
If the proximate cause of the rebellion was this festering discon-
tent, the underlying reason was that the Communist Party has been 
losing its grip on the country. This began long before the demonstra-
tions, and it did not happen overnight; the Party has suffered a pro-
longed erosion of its moral authority - and its ability to intimidate. 
Throughout the country, the love, fear and awe that the Commu-
nist Party once aroused have collapsed into something closer to dis-
dain or even contempt. Young people used to dream of joining the 
party; now they often speak condescendingly of their peers who join. 
"Me? A Party member?" Cheng Lin, a 22-year-old woman who is 
one of China's best-known pop singers, responded to a reporter's ques-
tion. "Nobody joins the Party now, among young people," she cheer-
fully exaggerated. 
But it is not only young people who disdain the Party. Just as 
often it is ordinary working Chinese who undermine its authority, 
sometimes with an extra dash of daring, or even cruelty - people like 
Lei Xiding. A small-town peddler, Mr. Lei had tax evasion rather 
than rebellion on his mind when he took on the Government. Four 
officials went to his village to make him pay taxes on 46 pigs he had 
purchased, but Mr. Lei and his family tore up the men's legal papers, 
robbed them of their watches and locked them in cages with the pigs. 
Then, according to China's official press, Mr. Lei and his relatives beat 
the tax collectors for five hours, urinated on them, and paraded them 
blindfolded through the streets. 
Eventually, the four men were released, alive - which makes 
them luckier than some of their colleagues. Since 1985, according to 
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The People's Daily, 13 tax collectors have been murdered, 27 crippled 
and 6,400 beaten up. 
Dissidents and student demonstrators have received most of the 
attention abroad, but among ordinary Chinese the practice of ignoring 
or defying the Party has become nearly universal. For example, China 
propounds a "one couple one child" birth-control policy, but in 1987 
and 1988, according to Beijing University's Institute of Population Re-
search, Chinese couples could be expected to have an average of 2.45 
children. The law also says women must be 20 and men 22 to marry, 
but as of 1986 (the last year for which the State Family Planning Com-
mission has figures), more than a fifth of all marriages involved at least 
one partner who was underage; and in some remote areas these illegal 
marriages account for 90 percent of the total. 
Though Chinese must have permission to move to another city, 
Shanghai officials acknowledge that fully 2.5 million of the city's 14.5 
million residents have no permission to live there. Waves of illegal 
migrant laborers are sweeping across China, workers who search for 
new jobs without waiting to get permission. In February and early 
March [1989], more than 2.5 million laborers flooded into Canton, 
ignoring sharp warnings from the Government. Suddenly, the city 
center was packed with sun-weathered peasants, huddled beside sacks 
of their belongings -mute testimony, two months before the demon-
strations, to the diminishing control of the Government over the 
population. 
Of course, during the last six weeks it was the students who were 
in the vanguard - as they have been so many times in recent Chinese 
history. But after they showed the way, many others flocked to fol-
low. Workers defied their bosses to walk alongside the students, citi-
zens from all over Beijing came out to help block the soldiers' entry 
into the city, and thousands of Chinese journalists signed their names 
to a petition calling for more press freedom. 
"The students have shown that the will of the people can't be 
resisted," said Y an Jiaqi, one of the country's most prominent political 
scientists. "This is now a dominant idea in Chinese politics." 
But even as exhilaration swept through the captial in May, 
among intellectuals and officials especially there was also a lurking 
tension, a fear that flits in the comers of the mind but takes no obvious 
shape. To some it is the specter of nationwide anarchy and the disinte-
gration of China as a coherent unit, to others a vision of soaring crime 
and inflation that might finally shred China's social fabric, transform-
ing the country into an oversized, Oriental Bolivia. It is these fears of 
spiraling unrest and chaos that seemed to inspire Mr. Deng and Mr. Li 
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to crack down on the protests; even for many ordinary Chinese there 
is an apprehension of luan, or chaos. 
Perhaps it is the pessimism of smart young Chinese, their obvious 
lack of appreciation for the regime that in the last decade has so palpa-
bly increased their opportunities and material comforts, that most 
strikes foreigners. Many Chinese hold the somewhat surprising per-
ception that China is in the middle of an economic crisis. 
True, China's annual inflation rate has passed 25 percent a year, 
and the country has seen such unfamiliar problems as bank runs and 
cash shortages. Bribes and abuse of power are no longer peripheral to 
the economy; they are the fuel that makes it run. 
But all countries have graft and economic problems; indeed, some 
people who have lived on both sides of the Taiwan Straits say that 
corruption is even more massive on Taiwan. What is more worrying 
than the economy itself is the perception of crisis. Inflation and cor-
ruption have fueled a sense of economic frustration that lets people 
convince themselves that they are becoming worse and worse off finan-
cially. Statistically, this is nonsense; even after inflation, the economy 
is growing at 11 percent a year, and the overwhelming majority is bet-
ter off than it used to be. In strict economic terms, China arguably is 
modernizing more successfully than any other undeveloped or socialist 
nation in the world today. But it is suffering a crisis of confidence. 
The diminishing role of the Communist Party has exacerbated 
and magnified some of China's economic problems. There is neither a 
planned economy nor a market economy, but an economy that dis-
plays some of the vices of both. Growth is unplanned, so that invest-
ment in energy and infrastructure is inadequate; the result is power 
cuts and long delays in transporting goods. The lack of planning has 
led to absurdities. During the last two years, for example, managers at 
a number of Chinese companies heard that because of the AIDS epi-
demic, there would be a huge growth in world demand for the disposa-
ble rubber gloves used by health-care workers. Though many other 
countries were already producing such gloves, companies all over 
China rushed to manufacture them. Today, China alone makes more 
rubber gloves than the world needs. 
If there is no planning, neither is there much of a market. Raw 
materials do not go to the most efficient operator - the one that pre-
sumably would be able to pay the highest price - but to the enterprise 
with the best connections. Provinces have begun to compete with one 
another, refusing to allow their raw materials to be processed else-
where. Xinjiang Province, for example, used to produce fine wool and 
cashmere for processing in Shanghai's mills, but now Xinjiang refuses 
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to let the wool go, processing it in its own newly-opened, crude facto-
ries. Some provinces have stationed armed guards at their borders to 
prevent raw materials from leaving. 
Even before the demonstrations, the Party's decline had led to a 
marked expansion in what Chinese could openly say. People were still 
afraid, but far less so than before. 
"In China today, if you don't directly challenge the Party author-
ities, you are basically left alone," said Joseph Y.S. Cheng, a senior 
lecturer at the Chinese University in Hong Kong. "You can condemn 
the Party after a couple of glasses of wine and it's all right. As long as 
you don't take active steps, as long as you're not a threat to the Gov-
ernment, you're left alone." 
Now, after the demonstrations have shown that massive numbers 
of people are willing to take on the Government, the difficulty in in-
timidating the masses may become more acute. "There will be a less-
totalitarian society," Mr. Cheng predicts. "People will have more 
freedom." 
As the Party's power declines, some Chinese find historic paral-
lels in the disintegrating dynasties of imperial China, such as the cor-
rupt Qing Dynasty early in this century, which stubbornly refused to 
modernize until it was too late. Perhaps there is something to those 
parallels, but there are other scenarios: the rise of Taiwan just when 
its leadership was most discredited; the rise of Hong Kong just as the 
Korean War embargo of China seemed about to extinguish the col-
ony's economy. 
It is clear, in short, that, whatever the result of struggles at the 
top, the Party is losing control, and many Chinese intellectuals despair 
that the worst is yet to come. But though such despair may well have 
its own consequences, it is not yet clear if it is warranted. 
The withering of the Party can be seen most poignantly in the 
generation gap that has emerged in China today. Many successful 
young Chinese business executives and Government officials are. chil-
dren of "old revolutionaries," men and women who joined the Com-
munist Party in the 1930's or 40's and fought their way to power. The 
parents devoted their lives to the Party, but the children are ideologi-
cal atheists. Over dinner recently, in the company of an old revolu-
tionary and his American-educated son, the son was asked if he was a 
Party member. The son laughed, his expression a mixture of horror 
and astonishment. "Which Party?" he asked. His father laughed too, 
but there was pain in his eyes. 
It is not just the younger generation that sees things differently. 
Consider Zhang Hanzhi, a former English teacher and interpreter for 
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Mao Zedong and the widow of former Foreign Minister Qiao 
Guanhua. In 1976, in a speech to the United Nations, Mr. Qiao 
earned fame for his stinging attack on the United States. 
But Ms. Zhang surprises anyone expecting to meet a genuine fire-
breathing Maoist. Behind the charming conversationalist is a 
thoughtful woman profoundly aware of the quandaries of Chinese 
Communism. 
"My generation was very inspired by the revolution," Ms. Zhang 
recalled. "When my friends and I get together, we miss the good old 
days. Life then wasn't so comfortable, but there was a tremendous 
sense of honesty and pitching in for the common good." 
Yet if Ms. Zhang can wax nostalgic for the exhilarating days in 
the early 1950's, when Communism really did seem to be the answer, 
not the problem, she also acknowledges that those days are past. 
Many Chinese, she says, now dream of a future that is not necessarily 
socialist, and they want a more democratic atmosphere. Looking at 
the state of Communism in China today, she has misgivings. 
"I'm worried about whether all this corruption will be difficult to 
correct without big change," she said. And then she spoke most 
poignantly about the drift to America of many of China's young peo-
ple. Her own daughter, sent to the United States in the mid-1970's by 
Mao Zedong to learn English and help the motherland, now lives in 
New York. 
"To see them all settling down over there and not coming back is 
somewhat depressing," Ms. Zhang said. "My daughter, my niece, and 
the children of almost all my friends. Almost every time a young per-
son comes by my house to say goodbye, I have the feeling they're not 
coming back." 
Throughout Chinese history there has been an ebb and flow of 
central control. Typically, a vigorous leader proclaimed himself em-
peror and established a dynasty. He pulled the country together, 
strengthened central authority, eliminated rivals for power; but, just as 
typically, his descendants proved less adept at maintaining it and the 
nation gradually disintegrated again until - perhaps hundreds of 
years later - a new strongman emerged as emperor and founded an-
other dynasty. 
Some see the same process happening now. They liken Mao 
Zedong - who founded the People's Republic in 1949 and changed 
more people's lives in more ways than perhaps anyone else in this cen-
tury- to the first man to rule unified China, the first Qin emperor. 
Known as Qin Shi Huang Di, he was one of the greatest and 
fiercest of them all. He unified China in 221 B.C., protecting it by 
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linking various short segments of a wall into the Great Wall. that still 
stands. He standardized China's system of laws and of wetghts and 
measures burned books, and buried Confucian scholars alive. Ac-
cording to legend, he defied his advisers and tried to build a bridge 
across the Pacific Ocean. The first Qin emperor predicted that his dy-
nasty would last 10,000 generations; instead, less than four years after 
his death, his dynasty collapsed. 
Mao Zedong was not opposed to comparisons with the first Qin 
emperor, and the similarities are indeed striking. Both were great, im-
petuous and brutal leaders, and the work of both men's lives began to 
be rapidly undone soon after their deaths. The question now is 
whether the Communist dynasty will crumble like the Qin or whether 
it will evolve into something more humane and practical. 
Mao said that "political power grows from the barrel of a gun," 
but in Chinese history it has also grown out of the "mandate of 
heaven" - a kind of moral authority to rule. In the long run, the 
Communist Party relies not only on guns but also on some consensus 
that it provides a legitimate government. 
In recent years this moral legitimacy dissipated, not only because 
ordinary people became embittered by the inflation, corruption and 
injustice around them, but because fewer and fewer people believed in 
Marxism. The Cultural Revolution of the late 1960's and early 70's 
turned much of the nation away from Communism, and though many 
were willing to give it a second chance when Mr. Deng took the helm 
in 1978, in China today there is remarkably little faith in Communism. 
Even Party members do not usually believe in it in any traditional or 
meaningful way; rather, the believers talk about the need for social 
justice[,] equal opportunity and populist rule. They sound more like 
American democrats than communists. The result is an ideological 
vacuum. 
Ironically, these are the same factors that led to the collapse of 
the Nationalist regime in 1949, when the Communists emerged victo-
rious in China's civil war. It was also corruption and inability to mod-
ernize that doomed the Qing Dynasty, forcing the last emperor to 
abdicate early in 1912. 
Many intellectuals see a common thread in the disintegration of 
the three regimes: "Absolute power corrupts absolutely," as a poster 
in a demonstration last month noted, quoting Lord Acton. China has 
never had any independent institution, such as a strong parliament or 
a free press, or even an organized church, that could dilute this abso-
lute power, that could supervise the country's leaders and check their 
hubris. That is one reason intellectuals are so enthusiastic about free-
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dom of the press: they see it as an independent mechanism that can 
restore some balance and control to the exercise of power in China. 
The Party's decline has been hastened by structural changes in 
the economy and society that have given people more room to maneu-
ver. Before, every Chinese was under the strict supervision of the 
"work units" and "neighborhood committees" that regulated every as-
pect of life, to the point of charting women's menstrual cycles to get 
early warning of a pregnancy. Now, independent business people have 
no "work unit" to control them, and in the countryside the communes 
have been disbanded, so there is less authority over peasants as well. 
All this has fostered a new sense of freedom, a giddy sense of liberty; 
Big Brother is no longer peering over one's shoulder. 
This breakdown of authority could worsen as a new generation 
takes power. Mr. Deng, the senior leader, was no longer regarded by 
most Chinese as a hero or savior, even before the declaration of mar-
tial law. But to many people that hardline step rendered him a tragic 
figure whose enormous achievements have now been undermined by 
his inclination to whim and hubris and repression. Even so, this 5-
foot, 84-year-old bridge player, probably the only world statesman in 
recent years with a taste for dog meat, remains a giant, the last Chi-
nese leader of the revolutionary generation, and the last civilian to 
have enjoyed unequivocal military support, although now he may have 
lost even that. 
As events unfold, more and more young Chinese fear a return of 
the chaos and weakness that plagued China from the First Opium War 
in 1840 to the collapse of the Nationalist regime in 1949. Wu Jialang, 
a prominent Communist Party theorist, is blunt about the risks: 
"I think China is falling into chaos," he said during a recent in-
terview. Mr. Wu's prescription to avoid the plunge is "neo-authorita-
rianism," a theory that many Chinese officals, including Mr. Deng, 
endorsed. Supporters of neo-authoritarianism emphasize the need for 
order and stability, and point to the economic miracles achieved by 
the authoritarian regimes in Taiwan and South Korea. Mr Wu's ver-
sion also emphasizes the need for the Government to respect individ-
ual human rights, but the style of government would amount to 
enlightened and benevolent despotism. 
Mr. Wu and others prescribe such a system partly because they 
see a growing risk of urban unrest. As China's labor unions become 
more independent and workers more indignant, their discontent could 
boil over. One immediate challenge is the desperate shortage of cash 
in the hands of the central Government and state-owned companies. 
The official press has already acknowledged that some larger state 
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companies are unable to pay workers more than 40 percent of their 
wages. According to a People's Daily report in April, workers in a 
large Sichuan Province factory responded by beating their bowls in the 
factory cafeteria and singing the "lnternationale," the song of revolu-
tion. During the May demonstrations, many workers went on strike 
to support the students, and it may be only a matter of time before 
workers stage walkouts to back their economic demands as well. 
Further urban unrest might also be triggered by young workers 
and the unemployed who congregate in many cities, looking . for 
trouble. On April 22, in the cities of Changsha and Xian, they took 
advantage of student protests to riot, burning and looting whatever 
they could find. A Shanghai diplomat said that city, too, was combus-
tible, and noted that the authorities had recently moved hundreds of 
thousands of young migrant laborers away from the city to reduce the 
danger of clashes. 
The risks of rural unrest are probably lower, but in a country 
with a tradition of peasant revolts, they cannot be ignored. The im-
poverished Government has recently been unable to pay peasants for 
their grain, pork and other products, and instead has been giving them 
white slips of paper as i.o.u.'s. Peasants in several areas have vowed 
that they will not sell their produce to the Government again, except 
for cash, and there could be confrontations during the summer 
harvest. 
Some young Chinese expect the country to fragment, sometime 
during the next century, into competing provinces or military regions. 
Most foreign China watchers are not so pessimistic; they think it far 
more likely that China will thrive and become a strong and essential 
member of the international community. 
"My problem is that I cut my teeth on China during the Cultural 
Revolution," says Harry Harding, a China scholar at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington. "There was tremendous social and polit-
ical unrest in society, you had even stronger regional fragmentation, 
and yet it held together." Mr. Harding argues that many Chinese tend 
to overdramatize the risks, noting that the inflation rate of about 27 
percent would inspire jealousy in Brazil, and that the student protes-
ters are apple-polishing school-children, compared to the South Ko-
rean militants. 
Not everything is known about what Soviet President Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev discussed with Mr. Deng during their summit meeting in 
mid-May, but they could have commiserated with each other over the 
difficulties of opening up socialist systems. By any normal standard 
Mr. Gorbachev's problems are greater: Russians number only halfth~ 
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Soviet population, several republics probably would like to go their 
own way, and the economy has been so numbed by state controls that 
it is scarcely responding to restructuring. In China, on the other hand, 
the economic problems are not those of stagnation, but of dynamism 
- overheated growth, to be more precise - and separatist tendencies 
are confined to peripheral regions, such as Tibet and Xinjiang. 
Perhaps the most startling difference, however, is that the glasnost 
and perestroika in the Soviet Union seemed to trickle down mostly 
from above, but in China they bubbled up mostly from the grass roots. 
Beginning in the late 1970's, for example, peasants themselves divided 
up the vast communes before the Government could get around to the 
task. In recent years, entrepreneurs started up tens of thousands of 
small businesses even before it was clear that they were legal. In the 
Soviet Union, political change came at the initiative of Mr. 
Gorbachev; in China, such changes came at the initiative of intellectu-
als inside and outside of the party who forced the leadership grudg-
ingly to retreat. This process will be extremely difficult to reverse. 
It would be difficult for the Party to get a grip even on its own 
scattered units. Today, the Party central committee makes pro-
nouncements in Beijing, and local Party organizations look the other 
way. When people talk about the Party losing power, in part what 
they mean is that the Communist Party as a coherent, centralized or-
gan has lost power. Indeed, the local units have in some cases in-
creased their power by snapping up the decision-making authority that 
Beijing was trying vainly to pass on to individual industrial companies. 
China's leaders may try to recover a measure of their economic 
and political authority, but it will be extremely difficult. Wang Dan, a 
student leader at Beijing University, says that even if he is eventually 
arrested, others will take his place. 
Perhaps he is right, for the student protests have exacerbated the 
sense of weakness in the Party, while emboldening people throughout 
China who are embittered by corruption and lack of control over their 
own lives. During one recent demonstration, a young Government 
official emerged from his office to stand with the students and support 
them. He gazed at the endless river of young men and women, as 
mighty as the Yangtze and as central to the nation's future. "Now," 
he murmured, "the Chinese have minds of their own." 
4. THE STRATEGIES OF THE STUDENT DEMOCRACY 
MOVEMENT IN BEIJING 
Marsha L. Wagner• 
I. THE CAMPUS MOOD BEFORE APRIL 15, 1989 
China's college students knew in advance that 1989 would be an 
important year, but they did not anticipate that it would be a major 
turning point in Chinese history. None of the issues that sparked the 
December 1986 student demonstrations had been resolved; in fact, 
with steeply rising double-digit inflation, conditions on China's univer-
sity campuses had worsened. Pleas to the central government for ad-
ditional support for higher education seemed to fall on deaf ears; in 
fall 1988 rumors circulated that Chinese Communist Party General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang and his economic reform policies were in disfa-
vor among the increasingly powerful hardliners in the Politburo of the 
Communist Party. Economic reform was associated with cultural lib-
eralization; a signal of the impending crackdown on intellectual free-
dom was the public attack in September, 1988, by conservatives such 
as Vice President Wang Zhen on the six-part television film series 
Heshang ("River Elegy"), by Su Xiaokang and others, which had been 
aired twice during the summer on national television with Zhao 
Ziyang's personal approval. 
Intellectuals and students, along with others on fixed salaries, 
bore the brunt of the economic hardship. Their bitterness was exacer-
bated by watching government leaders enjoy free access to luxurious 
transportation and commodities, as well as privileges for their family 
members; private entrepreneurs get rich from profiteering on the black 
market; and guandao-Party officials obtaining goods, often illicitly, 
at an artificially low fixed state price and reselling them at a high profit 
on the open market. In his "New May Fourth Manifesto," student 
leader Wuer Kaixi represented general student opinion in identifying 
the following grievances: 
At present, our country is plagued with problems such as a 
bloated government bureaucracy, serious corruption, the de-
• The author is a sinologist who spent the 1988-89 academic year, with support of the 
Committee for Scholarly Exchange with the People's Republic of China, researching a 
book on contemporary Chinese fiction. She lived on the campus of Beijing University and 
had daily contact with university students and faculty from August 25, 1988, until June 6, 
1989. 
(43) 
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valuation of intellectual work, and inflation, all of which se-
verely impede us from intensifying the reforms and carrying 
out modernization. 1 
In the eyes of the students, corruption represented a barrier to the 
development of democracy in China. 
The graduate student dropout rate took a dramatic jump in fall 
1988; faced with a future of barely subsistence wages and nearly intol-
erable living conditions as college teachers, many of China's best and 
brightest chose instead to strike out on their own, devoting their ener-
gies to wrangling visas to the United States, using "back doors" to 
secure positions in international companies in China, or simply arous-
ing the envy of their classmates by turning a tidy profit selling blue 
jeans and sunglasses from roadside carts. Selfishness, corruption, 
petty thievery and dishonesty seemed rampant; older Chinese la-
mented that the sterling revolutionary values of the 1940s and 1950s 
had become so gravely tarnished. 
The students who remained on campus were largely apathetic 
and cynical. They joked that the most popular "factions" were those 
who played cards and mahjong all the time (the mapai, a pun on 
"Marxist faction") and those who did nothing but study for the 
TOEFL exam as an escape route (the tuopai, a pun on "Trotskyite 
faction"). Depression verging on suicidal paralysis was very common: 
unable to believe in the nationalistic and Maoist myths of China's 
greatness, despairing about the future, many students wondered 
whether life was worth living. The lyrics to popular rock singer Cui 
Jian's songs, such as "Nothing to my Name," captured this mood. 
Other students felt that only a major change in Chinese society would 
make life worthwhile, and a few of these students were willing to risk 
their status at prestigious universities to organize political activities. 
They set as their goal a student demonstration on the seventieth anni-
versary of the May Fourth Movement, the 1919 patriotic, anti-imperi-
alist street protests by students at Beijing University demanding 
modernization of China through science and democracy. 
Wang Dan, a history major at Beijing University, was one of the 
young student leaders who in late 1988 and early 1989 organized "de-
mocracy salons," informal gatherings of students on a lawn of the uni-
versity campus to discuss such topics as school conditions, 
1. Wuer Kaixi's speech, read at Tiananmen Square on May 4, 1989, is translated in 
full in Han Minzhu and Hua Sheng, eds., Cries for Democracy: Writings and Speeches from 
the 1989 Chinese Democracy Movement, Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1990, pp. 135-137. 
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modernization in Taiwan and Hong Kong, western political systems 
and individual rights. Other universities in Beijing-including 
Qinghua, People's University, and Beijing Normal University, held 
similar activities, though on a smaller scale. Some "salons" to which 
foreign visitors were explicitly invited were deliberately held off cam-
pus because the foreign involvement made them even more sensitive. 
But the organizers felt it was vital for their classmates to be exposed to 
new ideas and to learn about living under alternative political systems. 
The speakers at these meetings might be students or intellectuals in-
vited from off-campus; they would be encircled by dozens of students 
who would eagerly ask them questions or counter their arguments. 
Early in 1989, government and Party officials-also anticipating 
illegal activities on May Fourth-acted both constructively and 
preventively. Attempting to co-opt student enthusiasm, they organ-
ized a series of official commemorations of the 1919 student protests. 
At the same time, they stepped up security, including checking passes 
of visitors entering the university gates and denying permission for 
certain dissidents to speak on campus. On April3, Wang Dan and 55 
other students boldly put up on the bulletin board in the central "Tri-
angle" area on the Beijing University campus a poster responding to 
university officials' harassment of their activities. 
Addressed to the university president, Party secretary, Party 
committee, department of student affairs and youth league committee, 
the students' open letter began affirmatively, in patriotic language that 
would characterize much of the democracy movement: 
This year marks the seventieth anniversary of the May 
Fourth Movement. As the birthplace of this extraordinary 
movement of democratic enlightenment, Beijing University 
has always held high the banners of democracy and science 
and marched at the very forefront of our nation's progress. 
Today, as Chinese commemorate the May Fourth Move-
ment, we, students of Beijing University, the hallowed 
ground of democracy, continue to hope that we will be able 
to carry on the distinguished tradition of Beijing University. 2 
Couched in conciliatory terms emphasizing the continuity of a proud 
national revolutionary tradition and the importance of maintaining 
"school stability and unity," the open letter went on to propose only 
local liberalization, not sweeping political change: 
We should begin by working hard to improve the democratic 
2. Translation from Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 16-17, with commentary. 
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environment in school. It is our belief that in institutions of 
higher learning, such as Beijing University, there should be 
full freedom of speech and academic freedom. . . . Beginning 
last semester and continuing today, from Activity Room 430 
in Building 43 to the "democracy lawn" in front of the statue 
of Cervantes, thirteen democracy salons have been spontane-
ously organized by students concerned with the future of the 
country and the Chinese nation. These salons have provided 
the students with excellent opportunities for the exchange of 
ideas as well as for theoretical discussions. Recently, how-
ever, a few salons have run into interference from the Beijing 
Municipal Party committee, the Party Committee of the 
University, the Security Department, and the Party branch 
in every academic department. Some students have also 
been personally subject to considerable pressure from au-
thorities. We believe that these salons offer an opportunity 
to explore spontaneously various ideas; such forums greatly 
help to enliven the academic atmosphere and promote the 
exchange of ideas. 3 
Finally, the students requested the university to take steps to protect 
their freedom of speech, such as removing all types of pressure, grant-
ing them freedom to invite P.articipants, allowing them the use of the 
regular meeting place, and not preventing the student organizers from 
receiving diplomas. Though polite in tone, the April 3 poster was a 
direct challenge to the authorities that foreshadowed the confronta-
tions to come in the next few weeks: the Party's surveillance of the 
democracy salons and of the students' activism indicates they were 
intolerant of this kind of open discussion. The students must have 
known how much the broader political climate would have to change 
before their demands for freedom of speech could be granted, yet the 
relative success of the first thirteen democracy salons, support from 
their teachers, sympathy of the university president, and reinforce-
ment from leading intellectuals from outside the university gave them 
some grounds for optimism. 
Inspiration for students to boldly demand these freedoms was 
provided by some distinguished older and middle-aged intellectuals. 
In January, word spread like wildfire that respected astrophysicist and 
audacious anti-Marxist Fang Lizhi, who had been expelled from the 
Party in January 1987, had written a public letter to Deng Xiaoping, 
asking that in this year of the fortieth anniversary of the founding of 
3. Ibid., pp. 17-18. 
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the PRC, the seventieth anniversary of the May Fourth Movement, 
and the two hundredth anniversary of the French Revolution, a gen-
eral national pardon be granted to Wei Jingsheng and other political 
prisoners.4 Wei Jingsheng was the author of several famous essays 
from the Democracy Wall period, including "The Fifth Moderniza-
tion- Democracy," who was arrested in March 1979 and was re-
ported to be suffering from mental illness after serving ten years of his 
fifteen-year prison sentence under particularly harsh conditions. 5 
Fang Lizhi's appeal was especially disturbing to Deng Xiaoping and 
other officials for several reasons: it asserted the existence (which the 
government denies) of Chinese political prisoners; it emphasized hu-
manitarian action and human rights (which the government claims are 
culturally relative) as a universal concern of mankind; and it men-
tioned by name the activist Wei Jingsheng for whom Deng Xiaoping is 
reported to have a special antipathy. Moreover, since Fang Lizhi and 
his wife Li Shuxian had been speakers at the Beijing University de-
mocracy salons, their relationship with the students was particularly 
close, and thus their influence on students alarmed the government. 6 
To underscore the significant impact of Fang Lizhi's open letter, 
in February a group of thirty-three leading intellectuals, mostly from 
literary circles-six of whom (Wu Zuxiang, Tang Yijie, Yue Daiyun, 
Zhang Dainian, Huang Ziping, and Chen Pingyuan) were faculty at 
Beijing University, organized by the well-known poet Bei Dao, signed 
4. The translation of the full text of Fang Lizhi's letter appears in Han and Hua, supra 
note 2, pp. 24-25. The original is reprinted in Jiushi Niandai (The Nineties), no. 229, 
1989.2, p. 18. Copies of this and other intellectuals' petitions are in the China 1989 De-
mocracy Movement Archive at the C.V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University 
and in similar archives at Chicago, Harvard, and other universities. 
5. On Fang Lizhi, see the essay by Orville Schell in this volume; on Wei Jingsheng, see 
Hungdah Chiu's essay in this volume. 
6. In the Chinese political system, certain kinds of executive and administrative power 
are granted to the state government, while the Party's power is in ideological guidance and 
policy setting. In reality, however, the Party influences and dominates virtually all state 
matters. Therefore, in this paper I shall use the term "government" loosely-as do most 
Chinese students--to indicate the entire central political power structure, including both 
Party and state. 
Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong gave a speech to the Eighth Session of the Seventh Na-
tional People's Congress Standing Committee on June 30, 1989, in which he presented the 
official version of the history of the students' "turmoil." He placed particular blame on 
Fang Lizhi as instigator, and indicated that the government had meticulously collected 
data on Fang's activities, including his close relationship to the Beijing University "democ-
racy salons." The speech was published in Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), July 7, 1989, pp. 
2-3; a full translation appears in Yi Mu and Mark V. Thompson, Crisis at Tiananmen: 
Reform and Reality in Modem China, San Francisco: China Books and Periodicals, 1989, 
pp. 194-233. 
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a petition which echoed Fang's. 7 Copies of these petitions were pub-
lished in Hong Kong and elsewhere, and they were posted on the "Tri-
angle" bulletin boards at Beijing University and on other university 
campuses, though they were summarily removed by university offi-
cials. At various points during the history of the PRC, individual 
writers have called on the government to offer more freedom or to 
change a policy, but this was the first time since 1949 that a group of 
intellectuals had joined together to petition the government. The Feb-
ruary 13 petition was followed two weeks later by a long petition from 
forty-two Beijing scientists, and in March by an open letter signed by 
forty-three humanists (deliberately one more than the scientists' signa-
tories, to symbolize the snowball effect), primarily from the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences. 8 
II. APRIL 15-25: RESPONSE TO mE DEAm 
OF HU YAOBANG 
Thus, by early April, tensions were mounting and resentment was 
seething on university campuses and in intellectual and cultural circles 
in Beijing. But no one anticipated that the ferment among small 
groups of students and scholars would quickly be transformed into a 
national protest movement of unprecedented scope and intensity. The 
catalyst was the sudden death on Saturday, April15, of Hu Yaobang, 
former head of the Party, who in January, 1987, had been forced by 
Deng Xiaoping to resign because of his tolerant attitude toward recent 
student demonstrations. The students regarded Hu Yaobang not only 
as a champion of liberalization but also as one of the few top govern-
ment leaders not tainted by official corruption. Within hours of the 
death of this beloved figure, before official announcements had been 
made, students on campuses had begun posting elegies. One of the 
most frequently quoted poems began with the haunting couplet: 
Those who should have died live, 
Those who should have lived have died. 9 
7. Jiushi Niandai, no. 229, 1989.2, text, p. 18; discussion, pp. 18-27; signatories identi-
fied, p. 19. For a translation of the full text ofthe February 13, 1989, petition, see Han and 
Hua, supra note 1, p. 25. 
8. On the scientists' February 26, 1989, petition see Qian Linzhao et al., "The Open 
Letter of Forty-two People from Beijing Science Circles," Jiushi Nandai, no. 231, 1989.4, 
pp. 20ff; on the March 14, 1989, letter initiated by Dai Qing and Su Wei, see "The Open 
Letter of Forty-three People from Cultural Circles," Jiushi Niandai, no. 231, 1989.4, pp. 
25ff. 
9. The full text of this long poem, posted at Beijing University, is translated in Han 
and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 6-8. 
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By late afternoon, mourners began to appear in Tiananmen Square 
bringing wreaths of white paper flowers and streamers of elegiac cou-
plets. This spontaneous gathering at the Monument to the People's 
Heroes resembled the April 4, 1976, mass demonstrations to mourn 
the death of Zhou Enlai-an event later interpreted as a popular pro-
test against Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, and the end of the 
Cultural Revolution. In April, 1989, those who gathered not only 
mourned Hu Yaobang but also shouted slogans and waved banners 
calling for more democracy and an end to government corruption. 
On Monday, April 17, Beijing University students organized a 
large march to Tiananmen Square that would set off just after mid-
night on the 18th to avoid the interference of authorities; three thou-
sand Beijing University students were joined by several thousand from 
People's University and elsewhere. In the early morning of the 18th, 
they attempted to deliver a petition containing seven student demands 
to a representative of the Standing Committee of the National People's 
Congress, China's nominal parliament. 10 The seven demands were: 
1) reevaluate Hu Yaobang, 2) renounce the 1987 anti-bourgeois liber-
alization campaign and the 1983 anti-spiritual pollution campaign, 
3) increase freedom of the press, 4) reveal the salaries and net worth of 
Party and government leaders and their families, 5) rescind the Beijing 
municipal government's ban on public demonstrations; 6) increase 
state funding for higher education, and 7) provide objective news cov-
erage of the current student demonstrations. 11 The students were frus-
trated and angry when only a deputy bureau chief was willing to 
appear and accept their petition-agreeing to convey it to the higher 
bodies. This event was important in that it established a pattern to be 
repeated again and again in the weeks to come: the students appeal to 
the government, following constitutionally sanctioned channels but 
asking for more than the officials are willing to grant, and the leaders 
refuse to meet with the students or acquiesce to any of their demands. 
Many of the students' suspicions that the government was not acting 
in good faith also date from this occasion of unresponsiveness. 
During the week of April 17-21 there were daily gatherings at 
Tiananmen. On the nights of April 19 and 20, student demonstrators 
assembled at Xinhuamen, the main gate of the Chinese Communist 
Party compound, Zhongnanhai, demanding democracy and freedom. 
Their demands this week were radical, and included "Down with die-
10. An account of this early-morning march is translated from a big-character poster 
by a student eye-witness at People's University, in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 11-12. 
11. For more details on these demands, see Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 9-10. 
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tatorship!" "Oppose tyranny!" "Strictly punish government profiteer-
ing by officials!" and "Long live rule by law!" As in the case of the 
seven demands, freedom of the press was a major concern of the stu-
dents, and many of their slogans attacked government control of the 
media: "People's Daily cheats the people!" "Beijing Daily tells lies!" 
Enlightenment Daily is not enlightened!" "CCTV [Chinese Central 
Television] reverses black and white!" 12 Students claimed that they 
were beaten by police wielding clubs in the early morning of April 
20th; the government denied this and counter-claimed that only po-
licemen were injured by unruly protestors. Angry at the reports of 
police brutality, posters with red characters "blood"-reportedly writ-
ten with blood-began to appear at Beijing University, and a boycott 
of classes began on Friday, April 21, and gathered momentum over 
the weekend, until a full-fledged strike against classes had been organ-
ized in every department by Monday, the 24th. 13 
The official memorial service for Hu Yaobang was scheduled for 
Saturday morning, April 22, and the authorities, wanting Tiananmen 
Square to be free of demonstrators for this event, declared that the 
Square would be sealed off by early morning. However, thousands of 
students streamed from the university district in the northwest of the 
city to Tiananmen Square on Friday night and succeeded in occupying 
the Square before the security forces had prepared to remove them. 
Thousands of older residents who lined the neighborhood streets and 
watched the students courageously marching into likely confrontation 
with the police recalled the brutal dispersal of crowds during the 
"Tiananmen Incident" of 1976 and were deeply moved. Ordinary citi-
zens showed their support by providing the students with tea, soda, ice 
cream sticks, cigarettes, bread and donations of money. At 
Tiananmen Square, an uneasy truce was arranged, and the 200,000 
demonstrators who had gathered were allowed to occupy a section of 
the Square during the official memorial ceremony, in effect holding an 
alternative "people's memorial" outside the Great Hall of the People. 
Thus another precedent was set, establishing a credibility gap that 
would affect the students' strategy in the ensuing weeks: the govern-
ment was not able to carry out its threat of preventing an action when 
they were overwhelmed by large numbers of demonstrators. 
After the termination of the state memorial service, students in 
the Square chanted for Li Peng, the head of the government, to come 
12. A photograph of a poster listing these witty slogans is reprinted, with a caption 
translating the wordplay, in Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, following p. 54. 
13. Photographs by the author of big-character posters, now in the China 1989 Democ-
racy Movement Archive of the C.V. Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University. 
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out and recognize them. He never appeared, but three students passed 
through the lines of police guards and knelt for about forty-five min-
utes on the steps of the Great Hall of the People in a dramatic gesture 
echoing the manner in which petitions were presented to China's em-
perors in the dynastic periods. As on April 18, there was no response 
from the leadership to this humble appeal. Student reaction was 
mixed, and the differing views prefigured some of the controversy over 
tactics which would follow during the next weeks. Some found the 
students' gesture solemn and moving, and the cold unresponsiveness 
of the leaders provided evidence that they no longer had any con-
science or desire to serve the people. Others found the entire event a 
charade; they believed the grieving of top officials like Deng Xiaoping 
who had ousted Hu Yaobang hypocritical, and declared the students' 
act of kneeling to them futile. A more radical group felt the students' 
petitioning was humiliating, a sacrifice of self-respect and human dig-
nity not appropriate in the 1980s: "What a self-mockery to use a feu-
dal method of expression in a struggle for democracy in present-day 
China! And what powerlessness and impotence it implies!"14 
After the outpouring of support for the April 22 alternative me-
morial for Hu Yaobang, events took on a momentum of their own. In 
fact, the students were faced with a social movement that had sprung 
up spontaneously, which they had not entirely created or controlled. 
There was no clear leadership, and the goals-such as more democ-
racy and freedom of speech-were vague. During the week before the 
Hu Yaobang memorial service, the official student unions, with repre-
sentatives appointed by the Party to oversee official student activities, 
had been attacked as nonrepresentative, and on April 20 an announce-
ment was made that the autonomous Beijing University Students' Soli-
darity Committee had been established. Announcements of similar 
autonomous student unions at People's University, Qinghua, Beijing 
Aeronautics Institute and other campuses soon followed. On April 22 
the citywide autonomous Provisional Students' Federation of Capital 
Universities and Colleges was established. It in turn transmitted a let-
ter to schools across the country, and a National Federation of Auton-
14. April22, 1989, poster of the Geology Department, in Han and Hua, supra note 1, 
pp. 64-65. The same book also includes a translation of a big-character poster written by 
graduate students of Beijing University honoring the moving spectacle of the students sub-
mitting the petition, and attacking the government: "Your actions have deeply wounded 
the hearts of a generation. Your actions have demonstrated to the entire world that you are 
a bureaucracy opposed to democracy and freedom. But there will come a day when history 
will mete out just punishment for your ruthless actions" (pp. 63-64). 
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omous Students Unions of Universities and Colleges was formed. 15 
However, these hastily organized federations were initially preca-
rious, and none of them achieved enduring stability. Leaders were 
necessarily self-appointed because only a small group of students were 
actually willing to be nominated to take the spotlight, since they knew 
that this kind of illegal organizing meant risking their university de-
grees, job assignments, chances of travel abroad, and personal freedom 
for as long as there was an individual dossier to follow them through 
life. Not all the self-styled leaders had the strong support of the stu-
dents, and there was throughout the movement sporadic jockeying for 
position. Moreover, most of the communication among campuses 
took place through the inefficient means of student messengers riding 
bicycles; the significant coordination that was achieved overcame 
daunting obstacles, including unavoidable delays, crossed communica-
tions, inexperience, and interference from Party watchdogs. 
On April 24, students at Beijing University called for a mass 
meeting of all the students at the school, at the appropriately named 
May Fourth Athletic Field. Mass gatherings at stadiums and athletic 
fields were common phenomena during the Cultural Revolution; wav-
ing little red books and shouting quotations of Chairman Mao, huge 
crowds were whipped into a frenzy of unified revolutionary fervor. If 
such unity was the goal of the students who organized the May 24 
mass meeting, they could not have been more disappointed. The mill-
ing crowds could not hear or would not listen to the speakers; various 
self-appointed student leaders vied for control of the bullhorns; soon 
the students dispersed in dissatisfaction or disgust or at the factional-
ized in-fighting and lack of clear leadership. This was an important 
turning point, for it was the last time such a mass meeting was held on 
campus--except for the gatherings of hunger strikers later at 
Tiananmen Square, alternative means of organization took their place. 
The new student leaders, who themselves had been brought up to be 
passive and obedient, not to take initiative or to lead, rapidly devel-
15. The precise dates of the founding of the students' autonomous organizations is diffi-
cult to pinpoint. One source records that as early as April 22, it was reported in 
Tiananmen Square that the previous evening, April 21, a Beijing Students' Federation had 
been established, see Wu Muran et al., eds., 89 Zhongguo Minyun Jishi (Daily Reports on 
the Movement for Democracy in China: April15-June 24, 1989, Hong Kong: 1989, Vol. 
1, p. 27. The editorial commentary interspersed among translations of primary documents 
in Han and Hua, supra note 1, gives a good account of the development and modification of 
student organization and leadership during the movement. Lee Feigon's China Rising: 
The Meaning ofTiananmen (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, Inc., 1990) points out interesting con-
trasts in style and ideology among student organizations from different campuses, espe-
cially People's University and Beijing University. 
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oped leadership skills and learned quickly that a democratic move-
ment needed new strategies. Yet inexperience and inadequate 
preparation time plagued the movement relentlessly. 
The next day, students met to elect representatives from each de-
partment. The practice of assigning dormitory rooms by department 
facilitates classmates' assembling by discipline, and many of these stu-
dent gatherings in the dormitories resembled mini-town meetings or 
spontaneous study groups. The theory was that student representa-
tives from each department could in tum elect representatives for the 
entire campus. This ratification process gave more authority to the 
newly formed autonomous student group, and similar procedures were 
followed at other campuses. However, there were many forces work-
ing against a systematic execution of this model. Not all students were 
willing to even attend a meeting that would unofficially "elect" "repre-
sentatives" to an illegal group; since assuming leadership was so per-
sonally dangerous, many "candidates" "ran" unopposed, and in some 
cases anyone who dared to make a speech automatically became rec-
ognized as a "leader." The intense external pressure, fear of spies, 
emotionalism, and lack of agreed-upon procedural guidelines caused 
more than one of these meetings to degenerate into chaos. At Qinghua 
students openly split over whether or not to accept a government offer 
to meet with selected students. 
It is not difficult to find explanations for passivity, disorganiza-
tion, internal conflicts, and leadership crisis in the spring 1989 student 
democracy movement; what is actually more challenging is to account 
for how-under these extremely trying and threatening circum-
stances-the students were able to organize themselves as effectively 
as they did. By Wednesday, April 26, the autonomous Provisional 
Students Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges announced at 
their initial press conference that forty universities and institutes in the 
capital of Beijing had joined their umbrella group. They proposed 
three new demands, saying that students would return to class as soon 
as the government would discuss and give reasonable answers to these 
key points: 1) a dialogue between students and government leaders, 
2) an investigation of the April 20 police beating of students, and 3) an 
apology from the official news agency for the distorted reporting of the 
student movement and a guarantee "that the press will speak the truth 
and report fairly from now on."16 
16. A big-character poster signed by the Provisional Students' Federation of Capital 
Universities and Colleges and dated April26, that appeared at People's University, summa-
rized this press conference (see Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 72-73). 
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Meanwhile, many of the striking students were out in the streets, 
putting up posters and passing out handbills to the citizens of Beijing 
explaining the goals of the student movement and offering the stu-
dents' own version of events that had taken place and had been mis-
construed in the official media. In approaching the common citizens, 
students instinctively stressed issues and attitudes that would be most 
likely to gain their support: non-violence, selfless idealism, patriotism, 
and loyalty to the Four Cardinal Principles. 17 From soliciting finan-
cial donations, students knew how deep was their support from the 
ordinary people, who were also angry about official corruption and 
economic hardships. On one streetcorner in the Haidian district, for 
example, on April 24 students who were explaining the goals of their 
movement to passersby collected 2,464.38 yuan in a four-hour period, 
including three 100-yuan notes: this is a huge sum (equivalent to U.S. 
$665) for a population with virtually no disposable income and often 
unable to meet escalating prices of fruit and vegetables. 18 Thus, in 
spring 1989 the students managed to bridge the gap between China's 
well-educated elite and the masses of the people-a gap that persisted 
through the centuries of traditional imperial Chinese society, and con-
tinued as a problem Mao Zedong tried repeatedly to resolve, through 
extreme but ultimately futile measures. 
III. APRIL 26-MAY 11: RESPONSE TO THE APRIL 26 
EDITORIAL AND THE MAY FOURTH 
MOVEMENT ANNIVERSARY 
On April 22, the day of Hu Yaobang's memorial service, not only 
17. The Four Cardinal Principles are adherence to the socialist path, the leadership of 
the Communist Party, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, and the people's demo-
cratic dictatorship. 
The students accurately assessed the common concerns of the ordinary people, as con-
firmed by an informal survey conducted in early May by young teachers in the psychology 
department at Beijing Normal University of 865 Beijing residents, which found that 95.4% 
either "strongly supported" or were sympathetic to the student demonstrations, while only 
4.7% believed the government assertions that a handful of troublemakers "behind the 
scenes" were causing instability. (Elsewhere, citizens expressed support for the students 
because they believed their goals were unselfish.) The demands the students emphasized 
were well received by the largely young, well-educated people polled: 85% felt a dialogue 
with the government was both reasonable and important, 69% expressed confidence the 
demonstrations would stimulate democratic reform, and 71% believed corruption was the 
main cause of instability in China. See Seth Faison, "Poll Shows Support for Demonstra-
tions," South China Morning Post, May 12, 1989, pp. 1, 12. 
18. Reported in a big-character poster at Beijing University; from a photograph by the 
author, now in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive ofthe C.V. Starr East Asian 
Library at Columbia University. 
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were 200,000 Beijing students and residents demonstrating ~n 
Tiananmen Square, but smaller demonstrations had taken place m 
Shanghai, Nanjing, Wuhan, Xian, and other cities around the country. 
Party leaders felt they could no longer ignore the students' movement 
or wait for it to die out. The Standing Committee of the Politburo 
convened a meeting on April 24 at which they ordered that telephone 
lines to Beijing University dormitories be cut and telegrams from cam-
pus to campus across the country be blocked. The next day, Li Peng 
and Yang Shangkun met with Deng Xiaoping, who insisted that they 
must "take a firm stand ... in opposing and ending this turmoil." 19 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang, away on a state visit to North Korea, did not 
attend this meeting, and there was apparently no objection to Deng's 
directive. 
On April 26, the official Renmin Ribao (People's Daily) ran a 
front-page editorial which became solidified as the official government 
position for the duration of the movement and its suppression. The 
language of the editorial is important not only because the Party rig-
idly adhered to it for the following months, but also because students' 
opposition to and resolve to contradict the editorial determined their 
strategy from its publication until mid-May. According to the Peo-
ple's Daily, there had been no peaceful, patriotic student appeal for 
democratic reform in the government. On the contrary, "an extremely 
small number of people with ulterior motives" used deceit and rumors 
"to slander, insult, and attack leaders of the Party and state." They 
"blatantly violated the Constitution, and encouraged opposition to the 
leadership of the Communist Party and to the socialist system." They 
used force on campuses to take power from the official student unions, 
to use the public address systems and to prevent students from going 
to class. This "extremely small group of people" was 
trying to destroy the democratic legal system. Their goal 
was to poison people's minds, to create turmoil throughout 
the country, to destroy political stability and unity. This was 
a planned conspiracy, a riot, whose real nature was to funda-
mentally negate the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
Party and to negate the socialist system. 
The editorial concluded with dire warnings: all such illegal organiza-
tion must be halted; illegal demonstrations are forbidden, "those who 
deliberately create rumors and spread slander must be held criminally 
responsible in accordance with the law. "20 
19. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 83. 
20. From the translation of major excerpts of the April 26 front-page People's Daily 
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If Party leaders expected that an attack on the students' demon-
strations and appeals for reform, as well as firm threats of reprisal, 
would end the movement, they badly miscalculated. The People's 
Daily editorial had the opposite effect: it aroused the students and 
citizens of Beijing in opposition to the government. The newly organ-
ized autonomous student unions vowed to go ahead with the march to 
Tiananmen Square planned for the following day, April 27, although 
they had heard rumors that the 38th Army had already been sum-
moned to remain on the alert outside the city of Beijing. The evening 
television news showed grimly solemn meetings of Party members in 
Beijing and Shanghai resolving to carry out Deng's crackdown. The 
students' apprehension ironically increased their determination to defy 
the government; they persuaded each other they could prevail if the 
demonstrators were numerous and united. Parents and teachers came 
to the student dormitories the night of April 26th. They had heard the 
government's dire warnings and they were afraid of bloodshed; they 
tried, often unsuccessfully, to persuade the students to protect their 
lives by staying on campus. Many students feared the worst and wrote 
out their wills. At least one carried a small packet of gasoline in his 
pocket, vowing to immolate himself if he were arrested. 
On the morning of the 27th, campus loudspeakers ominously 
blared more warnings: "Stay on campus. Do not go out. Demon-
strating is wrong." "Think of your parents, your teachers, how you 
will hurt them. Punishments will be severe." "Most students want to 
go to class. Do not continue the strike. Your duty is to study." 
Meanwhile, thousands of students prepared to take to the streets. 
Although the autonomous Qinghua Students Union had broken away 
from the citywide students' federation in opposition to this demonstra-
tion, thousands of Qinghua students marched south to join students 
from Beijing University, red flags flying, student monitors holding 
hands along the sides of the columns to protect the students inside and 
to keep agent provocateurs out. As these groups merged, their ranks 
were swollen by representatives from other schools to the northwest; 
they passed People's University and their numbers increased again. 
Their lead banner read: "The people love the police. The police love 
the people." Just beyond People's University, they encountered their 
first police roadblock. Students gently pressed against the rows of po-
lice with linked arms; crowds of local residents, including workers, 
who had turned out in support, pushed somewhat less gently, and the 
editorial in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 84-85. The complete text is translated in Yi Mu 
and Thompson, supra note 6, pp. 155-157. 
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police lines yielded without a fight. At every major intersection all the 
way to Tiananmen this tactic was repeated; as the students broke 
through successive police barriers, they felt a jubilant sense of tri-
umph. Only later did it become known that on the evening of the 26th 
the chief of the Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau had 
threatened to step down rather than use force, and finally had insisted 
that his men not bear arms against the student demonstrators. 
In a surprise manoeuver, when they arrived at Tiananmen, the 
demonstrators from thirty-two colleges did not allow themselves to be 
herded into the Square where they might be surrounded; instead, they 
continued marching to the east, and circled back along the Second 
Ring Road to complete a 25-mile course. Crowds of Beijing citizens 
and workers supported them all the way, with cheers and food. The 
government was humiliated: the students had refused to be intimi-
dated, and with mass support they had successfully defied the authori-
ties. When the Beijing University students arrived back at the campus 
about midnight that night, their classmates who had stayed behind 
gave them a heroes' welcome at the campus gate, with cheering and 
singing, firecrackers and banging on pots and pans; the official dining 
halls were opened and the university food staff served the victors a hot 
meal at 1 a.m. By the next morning, triumphant banners proclaimed 
"History will never forget April 27."21 
Several factors in the students' strategy-along with a lack of 
willingness of the local police to use force against peaceful demonstra-
tors-account for the success of the April 27 demonstration. The stu-
dents' determination and defiance were daunting in themselves; this 
courage was palpable and inspired respect among the onlookers. The 
citizens had already been persuaded by handbills and streetcorner dis-
cussions to sympathize with the students; watching them audaciously 
take the streets reinforced the spectators' admiration for their move-
ment. The marchers were also extremely well organized and self-disci-
plined, with rows of arm-banded monitors stretching along both sides 
of the column to maintain security and order. The Provisional Stu-
dents Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges had earlier an-
nounced strict guidelines. According to one spokesman, 
We have decided to avoid at all costs direct confronta-
tion with the authorities, including the police. We have 
asked more students to take ,up the responsibility of main-
taining order during demonstrations. Special attention is 
21. Author's photograph in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive in the C.V. 
Starr East Asian Library at Columbia University. 
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paid to weeding out from our ranks hooligans who have infil-
trated demonstrations for ulterior motives. 22 
Moreover, the students were deliberately charming. They over-
whelmed the police "as much with courtesy as with force," and after 
pushing through a police blockade, 
... the demonstrators pause to say, "Thank you, police." A 
few students are assigned to pick up any shoes lost in the 
shoving and return them to their owners, be they police or 
protestors. 23 
The students set a moral example of civility that was soon emulated by 
most of the citizens of Beijing, creating a general atmosphere of public 
courtesy and mutual respect in sharp contrast to the self-centered hos-
tility that was palpable on Beijing streets before the student movement 
began. 
But above all, the students were protected with their highly patri-
otic slogans on April 27. Gone were the radical chants such as "Down 
with dictatorship!" Instead, the slogans of the day were politically 
correct, almost as if dictated by the People's Daily April 26th editorial: 
"Oppose turmoil!" "Oppose violence!" The Provisional Students' 
Federation had assigned patriotic slogans, including "Support the 
Communist Party and socialism!" "Pledge to defend the Constitution 
to the deathl"24 Even chants such as "The people's army protects the 
people" and "the people love the police"-while obviously serving the 
immediate interests of the demonstrators-were politically unobjec-
tionable. Moreover, these proper slogans avoided alienating or alarm-
ing the bystanders; on the contrary, many citizens were moved by the 
students' innocent claim, "Patriotism is not a crime!" 
For some of the demonstrators, these patriotic slogans were sim-
ply interpreted at face value. They had been brought up to love the 
Communist Party and though they may have doubted certain policies 
or practices, most still had not broken their faith. For others, the use 
of patriotic slogans was a deliberate tactic, a mere shield to hide be-
hind.25 For many, there was probably a certain ironic edge, but they 
22. Quoted anonymously in Willy Wo-lap Law, "New Tactics to Cope with Unrest," 
South China Morning Post, April 22, 1989, p. 8. 
23. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights," New York 
Times, rpt. in International Herald Tribune, May 8, 1989, p. 1. 
24. The Provisional Students Federation of Capital Universities and Colleges "unified 
slogan" list for the April 27 demonstration is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 
73. 
25. With increased pressure just before the crackdown, some students again began to 
use suggestion rather than uttering a taboo phrase. Michael S. Duke reports that on May 
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felt no need to analyze the degree of irony. Nicholas Kristof reported 
in early May that after two weeks of interviews with dozens of stu-
dents, he concluded that student comments in favor of Communist 
rule are partly tactical and partly sincere. They wanted to deny the 
charges of the People's Daily editorial that they intended to overthrow 
the socialist system and Communist rule, and they "began to wave 
pro-Communist banners like amulets to ward off the police."26 Fur-
thermore, many Chinese students supported the Communist Party be-
cause they felt there was no viable alternative, that a transition to a 
multi-party system that they abstractly might favor was unfeasible or 
premature. Even Wang Dan, organizer of "democracy salons," when 
asked if he supported the leading role of the Communist Party in 
China, replied, " 'You can say I support correct leadership by the 
Communist Party,' emphasizing the word 'correct.' "27 (When Beijing 
University students carrying a banner that read, "We resolutely sup-
port the correct leadership inside the Party," were asked which leaders 
were correct, one of them responded, "None."28) Nevertheless, most 
students interviewed insisted that they still had faith in the Commu-
nist Party, they just wanted to encourage it to reform itself. In a group 
interview at Qinghua University, one student said, 
"We're not against the government, just against the way it is 
run. It's a question of the Party atmosphere, of corruption 
and of the bureaucracy." Then the students looked a bit un-
easy, as if they might be giving the wrong idea about their 
goals. One said, "Remember, though, we can't always say 
what we think."29 
Thus, a dominating strategy from April 26 until about May 15 was to 
avoid directly challenging the Party or any specific leaders. In an in-
terview with a western reporter, even Wuer Kaixi acknowledged he 
hoped to join the Party: "It has internal problems [such as bureau-
cracy, lack of democracy and corruption], but if they are solved the 
27 on the unofficial loudspeaker at the "Triangle .. area at Beijing University a woman 
"read out a dangerous poem that was both a riddle and a warning." It began, "There is one 
sentence,/ Spoken aloud it brings calamity," but it never states what that powerful sentence 
is. "The sentence that youth did not disclose, though undoubtedly many thought it, was 
Dadao gongchandang! "Down with the Communist Party!" See The Iron House: A Mem-
oir of the Chinese Democracy Movement and the Tiananmen Massacre, Layton, Utah: Per-
egrine Smith Books, 1990, pp. 65-66. 
26. "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights,'" supra note 23, p. 1. 
27. Ibid., p. 5. 
28. Sandra Burton and Jaime A. FlorCruz, "China: Spring of Discontent," Time, May 
8, 1989, p. 16. 
29. Kristof, "Beijing Students Keep Doctrine in Their Sights," supra note 23, p. 5. 
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Party is still good," he said. 30 
After the April27 victory, the first of many changes was made in 
the leadership of the student movement. On April 28, the Provisional 
Students Federation became the permanent Federation of Autono-
mous Students Unions of Beijing Universities and Colleges. Zhou 
Yongjun, from the University of Politics and Law, who had been its 
chair for its mere five days of existence, was relieved of his position for 
having prematurely decided to cancel the April 27 march without con-
sulting members of the steering committee. He was replaced by 
twenty-one-year-old Wuer Kaixi, a first-year student in education at 
Beijing Normal University.31 The movement began to emphasize two 
related goals: government recognition of the autonomous Beijing Stu-
dents' Federation and an open dialogue with top government leaders. 
At this point, the government seemed willing to hold a dialogue, 
but they could not recognize an unofficial organization; student activ-
ists, on the other hand, claimed that only the autonomous Federation 
was truly representative. When government spokesmen led by Yuan 
Mu held a televised "dialogue" on April 29, big character posters at-
tacked the gesture as bad faith. In an essay entitled "Was it Dia-
logue-or a Lecture?" Beijing Normal University students protested 
that the "dialogue" consisted of leaders talking for 90% of the three 
hours with grandfatherly condescension to a hand-picked group of 
"student representatives" who "were completely unable to represent 
the masses of progressive young students who have been active in the 
student movement. " 32 A second dialogue on April 30 with invited 
student representatives was also an occasion for the government to 
clarify its position and run logistical and rhetorical circles around the 
inexperienced and uncoached students. On May 1 the Beijing Stu-
dents' Federation denounced these dialogue gestures as a ploy to split 
the student groups, and the following day they presented a more spe-
cific set of guidelines for "equal dialogue:" that it be broadcast live, 
witnessed by Chinese and foreign journalists, and include the highest 
government leaders as well as elected student representatives who 
would suffer no reprisals afterwards. The government once again 
procrastinated in responding. 
By May Fourth much of the momentum of the democracy move-
ment was diminishing, and this long-anticipated anniversary 
threatened to be a final anti-climax to three weeks of demonstrations. 
30. Dorinda Elliott," 'We Have Enthusiasm and Daring,'" Newsweek, May 8, 1989, p. 
16. 
31. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 70, 111. 
32. Translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 2, pp. 112-114. 
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However, many students did once again perform the arduous long 
march from their campuses to Tiananmen, both out of a sense of his-
torical duty and as a sort of festival observance. It would have been 
difficult for the police to interfere with a student march on a national 
holiday commemorating student marches. The mood was relaxed and 
festive, though the turnout of approximately 100,000 students was 
only about half that of the victorious April 27 demonstration, and 
many of the participants in the May Fourth demonstration were from 
out of town. In his upbeat speech to the demonstrators assembled in 
Tiananmen Square, Wuer Kaixi listed a series of vague moralistic de-
mands, including more rule by law, press freedom, and support for 
education; he concluded, "our views are not in conflict with those of 
the government. "33 
As many students wavered in early May, unsure of whether or 
not to return to class, lively debate was continuing on campuses and in 
editorial offices all around Beijing. Numerous big- and small-charac-
ter posters and position papers began to appear arguing against one-
party rule and autocracy, or discussing comparative political theory.34 
Editors of People's Daily gave balanced coverage to the unofficial dem-
onstrations on page 1 of the May 5 issue covering May Fourth activi-
ties; over one thousand journalists jeopardized their careers by signing 
a May 9 petition demanding more freedom to report the news accu-
rately.35 On that day, most weary students failed to appear for a rally 
to support the journalists, but about 10,000 demonstrators did turn 
out the following day in response to a clever change in tactics: rather 
than walking to Tiananmen Square, students were organized to ride 
their bicycles there. 
By this point, student leaders were quite divided. Mter the re-
turn of Zhao Ziyang to the capital on May 1, there were signs the 
government might be more conciliatory. Moderate students saw no 
reason not to return to classes. Wang Dan announced that students 
would return to class, and said the end of the class strike was not an 
admission of failure: 
"The student movement has realized two goals that have 
33. See the "New May Fourth Manifesto," Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 135-137. 
34. See, for examples, Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 139-176. 
35. The May 5 issue of People's Daily featured, next to the official schoolgirls dancing 
to commemorate the May Fourth Movement, an equally prominent photograph of the de-
mocracy demonstrations with the large banner of the outlawed autonomous Beijing Stu-
dents' Federation as the striking focal point. 
The May 9 journalists' petition is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 190-
192. 
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never been achieved before," he said. "The first is the crea-
tion of a student organization, which was badly needed. The 
second achievement is the huge amount of public support 
we've received. " 36 
The more radical leaders did not want to yield too soon, however, 
because the government had not satisfied their demands for a sincere 
and equal dialogue. This conflict foreshadowed the future contention 
over whether or not hunger strikers should withdraw from Tiananmen 
Square, a decision with much higher stakes. Some hoped that their 
movement could regain momentum by coinciding with the May 15 
arrival of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing. Most stu-
dents at Beijing University and some at other schools were still on 
strike37 and might be persuaded to continue until Gorbachev's visit. 
Thus, both the government and the student leaders were stalling for 
time, the government hoping the movement would gradually peter 
out, the students hoping they could draw attention away from the in-
ternational interest in the state visit that was to symbolize the reconcil-
iation of China and the Soviet Union after thirty years of tensions. 
Among the more moderate student leaders were a group who on 
May 3 had formed a new student organization, the Students' Dialogue 
Delegation of Beijing Universities, chaired by Xiang Xiaoji of the Uni-
versity of Politics and Law and Shen Tong of Beijing University. On 
May 6 they submitted a petition to the government stipulating only 
two basic conditions to an "equal dialogue": that the students select 
their own representatives and that the meeting be broadcast live on 
television and radio. 38 The government did not respond until May 12, 
and then the concessions it offered were minimal at best. 39 The ulti-
mate result was that no meaningful dialogue was ever held. One ses-
sion that was finally organized on May 14 was aborted; the Dialogue 
Delegation walked out when they discovered the proceedings could 
36. Daniel Southerland, Washington Post, rpt. in International Herald Tribune, May 6-
7, 1989, pp. 1, 5. 
37. A May 8 informal survey at Beijing University showed 67% of the students wanted 
to continue to strike, 24% wanted to return to class, and 8% abstained. 
38. See the report on the Beijing Students' Dialogue Delegation as published in the 
students' Xinwen Daobao (News Herald), No. 3, May 12, 1989; translated in Han and Hua, 
supra note 1, pp. 187-188. The original Chinese versions of many of these documents and 
handbills are collected in the China 1989 Democracy Movement Archive at Columbia and 
similar archives at other universities. 
39. See the People's University Students' Autonomous Union's protest of this "cheap 
trick" on the part of the government, translated in Han and Hua, supra note l, pp. 193-194. 
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not be broadcast as previously agreed.40 And the May 18 meeting be-
tween Li Peng and hunger striking students was merely a significant 
dramatization of the failure of communication and compromise, for it 
took place after decisions to invoke martial law and use troops against 
the students had apparently already been made.41 
IV. MAY 12-19: THE HUNGER STRIKE 
The students' democracy movement had gradually decreased its 
demands from seven to three to an eventual emphasis on one: a dia-
logue representing its autonomous organizations. Yet the government 
would not even accede to this single demand. A group of radical stu-
dents were frustrated and angry; they had no more patience to wait for 
a government concession, and they did not want to lose the momen-
tum of what had become a nationwide student movement. It seemed 
to them necessary to regain the initiative, to escalate the confrontation 
and force the slow-moving government to respond. So on the evening 
of May 12, they posted at the Beijing University "Triangle" a list of 
forty-odd students who intended to undertake a hunger strike. An 
early declaration articulated three reasons for the hunger strike: 
First, to protest the indifferent and cold attitude the 
government has taken toward the boycott of classes by Bei-
jing students. 
Second, to protest the government's foot-dragging in 
[arranging] a dialogue with the Beijing Students' Dialogue 
Delegation. 
Third, to protest the government's continuing tactic of 
branding this patriotic, student Democracy Movement as 
"turmoil," and to protest a series of distorted news reports.42 
One of the original group, Chai Ling, later explained that she em-
barked on the hunger strike to test the government: "to see whether it 
intends to suppress the movement or to ignore it, to see whether the 
people have a conscience or not, to see if China still has a conscience 
or not, if it has hope or not. "43 Many student leaders such as Wang 
40. See "Record of the Aborted 'May 14 Dialogue'" in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 
204-206. 
41. See "Transcript of May 18 Meeting between Premier Li Peng and Students," in 
Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 242-246, and for a slightly different version, "Li Peng's 
Conversation with Student Leaders," in Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, pp. 168-176. 
42. See "Hunger Strike Declaration," in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 202. 
43. See translation of taped interview with Chai Ling in late May in Han and Hua, 
supra note 1, pp. 197-199. 
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Dan and Wuer Kaixi were at first skeptical about this strategy, but 
were eventually persuaded by Chai Ling to add their names to the list 
of hunger strikers.44 By Saturday, May 13, the number of students 
committed to the hunger strike was about 300, mostly from Beijing 
University and Beijing Normal University. They took an oath, tied on 
red headbands, ate one last meal with supportive teachers who took 
them out to a restaurant for lunch, and at 2:00 p.m. departed for 
Tiananmen Square. There they settled down at the foot of the Monu-
ment to the People's Heroes, encircled by a protective ring of 
thousands of supporting classmates, and waiting for a government re-
sponse- which most expected to precede Gorbachev's arrival in Bei-
jing on Monday, May 15. 
The strategy of a mass hunger strike of indefinite length was un-
precedented in China. 45 Three thousand years ago, two loyal martyrs, 
Bo Yi and Shu Qi, refused to eat the grain of the conquering dy-
nasty.46 Mao Zedong himself cited examples of ancient and modem 
individual heroes who starved rather than eat food handed out in con-
tempt.47 The students' hunger strike also echoed the tradition of pa-
triotic officials like Qu Yuan who risked their own lives to boldly 
remonstrate with the emperor over incorrect policies. However, the 
students' predecessors were individuals; the hunger strike that began 
on May 13 was historically significant because it was a mass action; it 
eventually included over three thousand fasters plus tens of thousands 
of supporters who provided physical, medical and political assistance. 
The individuals who refused food on principle in China's past 
were rejecting food that originated from a tainted source. One impli-
cation of the 1989 student hunger strike was that the food provided 
44. See Lee Feigon, supra note 15, p. 195. 
45. There are reports of many short-term hunger strikes during the Cultural Revolu-
tion and of a two-day hunger strike in 1980 among more than fifty student activists at 
Hunan Teachers' College in Changsha to protest school authorities' interference in elec-
tions for a representative to the local National People's Congress, but these events are not 
well known among young students in China. 
46. Bo Yi and Shu Qi died on Shouyang Mountain because they considered it unright-
eous to eat the grain provided by the Zhou conqueror King Wu, who had waged war to 
aggrandize his power before the mourning period for his father, King Wen, was completed. 
See Shiji (Historical Records) #60, translated by Burton Watson in Cyril Birch, ed., An-
thology of Chinese Literature from Early Times to the Fourteenth Century (New York: 
Grove Press, 1965), pp. 103-105. 
47. In his essay in memoriam to Stuart Leyton, Mao Zedong praised Qinghua Univer-
sity professor Zhu Ziqing, who in the late 1940s died from illness after he had refused on 
principle to eat "relief" wheat flour because it was shipped by imperialist America. See 
Mao Zedong, Mao Zedong Xuanji (Selected Works of Mao Zedong), vol. 4, Beijing: 
Renmin chubanshe, 1960; rpt. 1969, p. 1384 and note 8, p. 1387. 
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them-directly by the state-subsidized university dining halls, and ul-
timately by the Chinese government-came from such a compromised 
source that they would not swallow it. They were thus acting out a 
gross insult to the Chinese Communist state, particularly since govern-
ment leaders are so proud that an undisputed accomplishment of com-
munist rule since 1949 is its virtual elimination of the threat of 
starvation so prevalent before "liberation." The "iron rice bowl," gov-
ernment grain coupons and subsidized staple foods even now provide 
security from hunger for each member of society. The hunger strikers 
no longer wanted to participate in this contract with the government, 
a contract which suggested a reciprocal obligation: the government 
feeds the people, and in tum the people obey the government. 
The philosophic foundation of the People's Republic of China 
rests on the government's love and concern for the people. Like par-
ents, rulers are responsible for nurturing and providing for their citi-
zens, who thus assume the role of their children. The notion of 
reciprocal obligations between parents and children, government and 
governed, goes back to Confucius, who preached that children and 
subjects should respect and obey their parents and rulers, who should 
in tum provide for their needs. When the students refused food, they 
were rejecting this bond of reciprocal obligation; they would rather 
starve than participate in the system. By rejecting what was provided 
by the government, they were also making a statement that the leaders 
had failed to satisfy their basic needs. These students had studied de-
mocracy, they had tasted freedom, and they were no longer willing to 
swallow the meager rations they were offered. By refusing to eat, they 
removed themselves from the social structure the government had es-
tablished, and caused the leaders a profound loss of face for having 
failed as good parents. This rupture in the reciprocal bond partially 
explains the violence of the government's reaction. The students, infu-
riated by the luxurie~pecially the elaborate banquets and imported 
cigarettes and liquor~njoyed by the political leaders who benefit 
from official profiteering and corruption, demonstrated they would 
rather die than eat out of the hands of those officials who fed them-
selves first. 
The rhetoric of the hunger strikers and of their supporters em-
phasized parent-child relationships. A prevalent slogan throughout 
the spring 1989 democracy movement, especially after the April 26 
People's Daily editorial, was "Mama, I am not wrong." This plea was 
both personal and political. The nation is one's motherland; a protest 
outlawed by the government would be a defiance of one's mother 
country unless the protest appealed to a higher principle on behalf of 
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the nation. The May 13 Beijing University Hunger Strikers' State-
ment says, "In the spirit of sacrificing our lives, we fight for life. But 
we are children, we are still children! Mother China, look earnestly 
upon your sons and daughters!"48 The Communist Party is also often 
referred to as "the mother of the people" and opposition to the Party 
could be considered a betrayal of one's "mother." Thus, in an allusion 
to the appeals to "mama," one big-character poster at Beijing Univer-
sity was entitled, "Party, I am not wrong." 
On the personal level, many mothers tried desperately to per-
suade their children not to risk their futures or their lives by partici-
pating in this student movement; when a student decided that patriotic 
loyalty, idealism, or sacrifice for the future of China was a higher call-
ing than obedience to. one's own parent, he or she would attempt to 
justify this choice with banners and posters headed, "Mama, I am not 
wrong."49 But the protestors were still betraying their parents' trust; 
Chinese parents typically make enormous sacrifices for their children, 
but it is expected that the children will live on to repay them by caring 
for them in their old age, and a premature death-especially of an only 
child-would affect the entire family structure. The Beijing Univer-
sity Hunger Strikers' own statement reads: 
As we suffer from hunger, Papa and Mama, do not grieve ... 
Farewell, mother and father! Please forgive me, your child 
who cannot be loyal [to the country] and [meet the demands 
of] filial piety at the same timel50 
Many of the hunger strikers did not dare to confront their parents 
with this cause for anxiety. One of the primary duties of the room-
mates of some hunger striking students was to receive phone calls 
from worried parents and to lie reassuringly about the activities of 
their son or daughter. 
48. Translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 201. See Han and Hua's discussion of 
this theme on p. 199. Other variations are the poem, "Mama, We're Not Wrong," trans-
lated on pp. 127-128, and the intellectuals' responsive slogan, ''The children are not 
wrong." 
49. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 126-128. 
50. Translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 210. 
Another statement, "Parting Words [of a Hunger Striker]," echoes this concern: 
Perhaps I will not be able to fulfill my filial duty. For thousands and 
thousands of parents and their children, I have tearfully made the choice to go on 
this hunger strike. . . . 
Since time immemorial, it has been impossible to satisfy the demands of both 
loyalty [to one's nation] and filial duty to one's parents. Papa, Mama, please 
understand why your son takes this action! 
(translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 1. pp. 202-203). 
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Determined to employ only nonviolent means, earnestly hoping 
to persuade the government their movement was not one of "turmoil," 
the students were inspired by Gandhi's method of passive resistance, 
perhaps even by hunger striking political prisoners in South Africa or 
Northern Ireland. But more importantly, the drama of young people 
refusing food tapped deep Chinese nerves. Eating is central to Chinese 
culture; according to a common Chinese proverb, "The people con-
sider eating of prime importance" (min yi shi wei tian ). In a country 
where the population is so great and the proportion of arable land is so 
small, where floods and famines occur with devastating frequency, 
hunger and starvation are the most primal fears. In China, cuisine is a 
highly developed art form, a basic societal element, and a source of 
both national and regional pride. One of the hunger strikers' banners 
read: "We love to eat, but we love freedom more." 
The hunger strike was extremely effective, and deadly serious, as 
political theater. In Beijing, tens of thousands of citizens flocked to 
Tiananmen Square around the clock after May 13, out of curiosity and 
concern, to see the spectacle. Moreover, with television now widely 
available throughout China, the image on the screen has an over-
whelming power to move the population. The hunger strike coincided 
with an expanded international media presence in Beijing for 
Gorbachev's visit and also with three days (May 16-19) of extraordi-
narily bold press freedom within China, before the government began 
its vengeful repression. National Chinese television featured inter-
views with medical workers, teachers, and students prepared to die for 
democracy. The coverage was charged with intense emotion, espe-
cially striking in contrast to the sterility and cheeriness of normal Chi-
nese television news. One evening a weeping mother appeared on the 
television screen; she had donned a headband like those the hunger 
strikers wore and had gone to Tiananmen Square to visit her fasting 
son. Through her sobs, she explained she supported her son's ideals, 
but he looked so weak, and she could not bear to watch him die. 
Nightly Central Television brought the ominous pictures of uncon-
scious youths on hospital stretchers, intravenous drips, exhausted 
white-coated medics, and wailing ambulances into viewers' homes, as 
the hours of waiting for a compassionate government response ticked 
away. The students had sacrificed their health and strength for their 
country. Surely, the people believed, the government could sacrifice a 
bit of its mighty strength to achieve a resolution. How could a govern-
ment that claimed to love the people leave its most promising children 
to die? 
After several days it became clear that the hardline leaders re-
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fused to make concessions to the students' modest demands. As Chai 
Ling had predicted, this inaction exposed the coldness of the Party 
officials. The moralistic drama juxtaposed innocent victims against 
cruel tormentors, and it galvanized the population. To the extent that 
the citizens were moved by the self-sacrificing children, they were en-
raged by the selfish government leaders. They poured out into the 
streets in outraged defiance, over a million strong. They not only 
wanted to oppose the bad rulers; they also had to compensate for 
them, to act as foster parents, supporting and nurturing the idealistic 
children abandoned by the government. Moved by deep generalized 
parental love to fight for an end to spiritual and political starvation, 
they resisted courageously and defiantly until they were literally 
crushed by the government's tanks. 
Each day during the week of May 15 the crowds at Tiananmen 
grew larger, the walks of life represented broadened, the number of 
supporters from outside the city of Beijing increased. A common ac-
tivity at the Square was counting signs of new work units making a 
public appearance for the first time: groups of workers and journal-
ists, Party members and students at the Central Party School, private 
entrepreneurs and cadres from government ministries. Throughout 
the week, more and more open letters were sent to the government 
leaders, and reported in the press, supporting the students: these came 
from ten university presidents, the All China Women's Federation, 
managers of nine Beijing factories, journalists at the major media, and 
individuals, including Party members. The slogans on banners be-
came more radical with each passing day; early in the week, most 
avoided using proper names, for example; then mid-week small bottles 
were broken symbolically, because the words "small bottle" (xiaoping) 
sound like Deng's name; but by Thursday and Friday Li Peng and 
Deng Xiaoping were often attacked directly. The naming of Li Peng 
and Deng Xiaoping of course intensified after the declaration of mar-
tial law. 
Although the hunger strike was a brilliant strategy for arousing 
nearly all the population of Beijing and much of the rest of China to 
sympathize with the hunger striking students, the unresponsiveness of 
the government placed those students in a very difficult position. The 
hunger strike played upon a deep Chinese cultural penchant for mar-
tyrdom, but it was also constrained by the limitations of self-destruc-
tion. The rhetoric and much of the galvanizing power of the hunger 
strike was connected to death: "Without democracy, we would rather 
die!" read the hunger strikers' shirts; "Bloodshed in a just cause" and 
"The people do not fear death" appeared on some of their headbands. 
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Having so dramatically vowed victory or death, it was very difficult 
for the hunger strikers to compromise. 
Some of the inherent problems with the hunger strike strategy 
were practical. The student leaders could hardly avoid joining the 
hunger strike, yet no one is at his best in planning moves and making 
rational decisions after several days of starvation. Naturally, tempers 
were short and creativity was diminished. Even during the first week, 
medical supplies were insufficient, hygiene conditions were poor, and 
hundreds of students were hospitalized. Perhaps for these reasons, en-
dorsement of the hunger strike was at first shaky: the autonomous 
Beijing Students' Federation originally opposed the idea, but later sup-
ported it. 
Moreover, beginning with the second day of the hunger strike 
there was conflict about how the students might withdraw voluntarily 
without admitting defeat. There were four major decision-making 
points in the controversy over whether or not to abandon Tiananmen 
Square: May 14-16, May 19, May 27-29, and before dawn on June 4. 
On May 14, in the aborted dialogue meeting, some moderate student 
representatives suggested the hunger strikers heed the pleas of Yan 
Mingfu, Secretary to the Party's Central Committee Secretariat, to 
abandon the Square, while "hardline" student leaders insisted on a 
struggle to the death. On the same afternoon, a group of twelve prom-
inent intellectual leaders met to compose a statement supporting the 
students' goals, but they also had trouble agreeing on whether or how 
strongly to urge the hunger strikers to withdraw from the Square; 
largely because they ended up urging the students to leave, their visit 
to the hunger strikers was perceived as more antagonistic than sup-
portive. 51 At 5:00 on the afternoon of May 16, Yan Mingfu went to 
the square by himself to try to negotiate with the hunger strikers, mak-
ing several accommodations to the students' demands but not recog-
nizing the legitimacy of their autonomous organizations or 
repudiating the People's Daily's editorial of April 26, 1989. Some of 
the student leaders, such as Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi, and Wang 
Chaohua, fearing that continuation of the hunger strike would unnec-
essarily lead to bloodshed, were inclined to accept the offer, and tried 
to persuade hunger strikers to terminate. But the hunger strikers 
voted several times to continue until the government was forced to 
make concessions. At that point most of the hunger strikers felt that 
with so many people from all walks of life out on the streets demon-
51. The two-edged statement ofthe twelve intellectuals, as reported by the Guangming 
Daily News Service, is translated in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 207-208. 
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strating in support of them, the government would not dare to use 
force against them.52 And as Wuer Kaixi explained in the meeting 
with Li Peng, the decision-making system in the Square was not ma-
jority rule, but rather "one in which 99.9 percent follow 0.1 percent-
so if a single hunger striker refuses to leave the Square, then the other 
several thousand will not leave either."53 
When rumors circulated on Friday, May 19 that Li Peng was 
about to declare martial law, many of the hunger strikers began to 
contemplate strategic withdrawal. At 9:00 p.m. the Hunger Strikers' 
Group declared that the hunger strike had been converted into a sit-in 
protest; this decision was reported on national television. One hour 
later, Li Peng and Yang Shangkun announced to a special meeting of 
high Party and army officials that martial law would be formally de-
clared at 10 am on Saturday, May 20; this meeting was broadcast on 
national television just after midnight. Soon large numbers of citizens 
rushed to the outskirts of town to form human barricades to prevent 
army vehicles from entering the city. At the same time, students 
bravely rushed from their campuses back to Tiananmen to protect 
their weakened, hunger striking comrades. 
V. MAY 20-JUNE 4: MARTIAL LAW 
After May 20, the student movement was geographically and 
strategically split. The hardliners who remained in occupation of 
Tiananmen Square were reinforced by groups of visitors from out-of-
town, who established a "tent city" and seemed prepared to camp out 
indefinitely. The majority of the students from Beijing universities re-
turned to their campuses. From there, they encouraged citizen resist-
ance to the troops, helped erect barricades, and continued to press for 
democratic reforms. A primary activity was "educating the soldiers." 
Student speakers on the unofficial loudspeaker at Beijing University 
urged classmates to go ask the soldiers how they felt about not having 
been told where they were being sent or why, to explain to them that 
the movement was non-violent, patriotic, and supported by most of 
the citizens of Beijing, and to entreat them not to hurt the people. 
During the week of May 15, city police had virtually disappeared from 
sight; the same students who had effectively maintained order and 
smooth traffic flow around Tiananmen Square during the hunger 
52. See Scott Simmie and Bob Nixon, Tiananmen Square, Vancouver and Toronto: 
Douglas & Mcintyre, 1989, p. 109. 
53. See Han and Hua, supra note 1, p. 243; compare Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 
6, p. 169. 
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strike continued to assume responsibility for crowd control and traffic 
regulation around the campuses and throughout the city after the dec-
laration of martial law. They set up roadblocks on the major arteries 
at the outskirts of the city, and all drivers heeded their polite requests 
to show nonmilitary identification before entering the city limits. The 
students succeeded in persuading classmates and city residents to exer-
cise restraint and avoid provocation of the army. 
Individual students still were self-consciously charming, polite, 
nonviolent, and well organized, but the student organizations contin-
ued to be plagued by internal dissention, unstable leadership, and lack 
of institutionalized decisionmaking processes. The students' vague no-
tions of democracy were rivaled by more familiar concepts of unity. 
Slogans such as the one on a public bus banner, "The entire country of 
one mind," hardly supported democratic pluralism. Under the battle-
field stress of the conditions of late May, pluralism of any sort was 
probably felt to verge on anarchy and chaos. On May 23 Wuer Kaixi 
lost favor with the students after announcing on May 22-without 
prior consultation with other student leaders-that they should retreat 
from the square to the embassy district. He was a spokesman at their 
press conference four days later, however. At the same time, sixty-
nine schools represented in the square voted to transfer leadership 
from the Beijing Students' Federation to a temporary group, which 
was on May 24 named the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters and 
headed by Chai Ling. By this time, the Hunger Strikers Group, which 
had earlier replaced the Beijing Students' Federation, had been re-
placed by the non-Beijing students group. As leadership shifted, the 
debate about how to end the occupation of the square continued. On 
May 27 Wang Dan, Wuer Kaixi and Chai Ling announced the stu-
dents would leave the square May 30. 
"It is very difficult to continue our sit-in," ... Wuer Kaixi 
told a press conference. "As leaders, we have responsibility 
for the students' health, and the difficulties are obvious. Hy-
giene is extremely bad and the food is insufficient."54 
Other students said the terrible conditions were injurious to their 
health, and it was not worth enduring them when the government con-
tinued to ignore the students' demands. Various alternative activities 
were suggested, including talking with workers in factories, distribut-
ing leaflets, building a network of student organizations around the 
54. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Students Urging End to the Siege of Beijing Square," New 
York Times, May 28, 1989, p. l. 
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country, and opening "Democracy University" on the Square.ss 
But the next day, May 28, the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters 
and other groups in Tiananmen declared they would stay at least until 
June 20 when the National People's Congress was scheduled to meet 
in regular session. Chai Ling resigned from her post as commander of 
the Protect Tiananmen Headquarters on the 29th, though she re-
turned within a few days. The reasons for staying were mixed, and 
may not have been the same for the Beijing students who had been 
demonstrating for over a month and the more recent arrivals from far 
away. A 23-year-old student from Shenyang named Chen Di gave a 
western reporter an idealistic explanation on May 29, "Tiananmen 
Square has become a symbol of democracy in China. We can't aban-
don it. "s6 On the other hand, a classmate of hers named Liu Gang 
had calculated the risks and gave a strategic explanation: 
If we left, the student movement would certainly lose. And 
if we stay, the Government will be forced to make a choice. 
Either it will agree to a dialogue with students, or it will 
stage a crackdown. And if it chooses the crackdown, it will 
lose support. s? 
Thus, one motive of continued occupation of the square was to force 
the government into a comer, no longer to press it to capitulate to the 
students, but rather to provoke it to discredit itself by resorting to 
violence. 
Amidst this debate, morale was boosted on May 30 with the arri-
val of the Goddess of Democracy statue created by students at the 
Central Art Academy. The planning for the inauguration of Democ-
racy University, to be opened at 8 pm on June 3, continued until the 
last minute. On June 2, four new hunger strikers arrived for the first 
shift of a planned rotation of short-term fasts by younger intellectuals. 
Up until the very end, the student movement was remarkable for 
its creativity. Earlier, these students had drawn cartoons, written 
poems and songs, made up riddles and jokes to support the movement. 
In late May and early June, the government began to pay workers to 
participate in pro-government demonstrations. A group of students 
promptly organized a parody of those demonstrations: wearing stu-
dent clothes but covering their faces with masks, on June 2 they rode 
their bicycles through the city's streets offering ten-yuan notes to citi-
55. Ibid., p. 16. 
56. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Chinese Students, in About-Face, Will Continue Occupying 
Square," New York Times, May 30, 1989, p. AlO. 
57. Ibid. 
STUDENT DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT 73 
zens who would join them, shouting sarcastic slogans such as "Down 
with democracy!" "Down with students!" "Down with America!" 
and "Support dictatorship!" "Support tyranny!" "Support the em-
peror!" Some feared that even this kind of activity was too provoca-
tive, and a number of male students invented a way to protest silently: 
by shaving their heads, they made a statement wufa ("no hair"), which 
is a homonym in Chinese for wufa ("lawless," as in the phrase wufa 
wutian, "no law and no justice"). This kind of creative maneuvering 
and persistence is one of the brightest signs of hope for the re-emer-
gence of the next phase of the Chinese students' democracy movement 
in the future. 
Finally, the students who remained in Tiananmen Square coura-
geously held their ground even when confronted by Army troops. 
Though they were all willing to die, they negotiated a strategic with-
drawal to minimize pointless loss to their forces just before dawn on 
June 4. By that time hundreds of citizens of Beijing had already been 
killed, and thousands more injured, in the People's Liberation Army's 
excessive use of force in moving into position at Tiananmen Square. 
VI. REFLEcriONS ON THE STUDENTS' STRATEGIES 
Of the student leaders mentioned in this article, Wang Dan was 
reportedly arrested in July, 1989, and there are unconfirmed rumors 
that Zhou Y ongjun was also arrested; his whereabouts are unknown. 
Shen Tong legally traveled to the United States as a student; Xiang 
Xiaoji and Wuer Kaixi escaped from China to the West illegally, and 
reemerged in summer 1989. Chai Ling and Wang Chaohua amazingly 
eluded capture within China for ten months, with the support of an 
underground network, then escaped to the West in the spring of 1990. 
Many other student demonstrators were arrested, and some of them 
have been released; others were punished by poor job assignments, de-
nial of permission to study abroad, or repeated writing of self-criti-
cisms. All of the students, within and outside of China, are still 
reflecting on the strengths and weaknesses of the student democracy 
movement, and on China's future prospects. 
Some of the harshest criticism of the movement has come from 
sympathetic comrades. The four intellectuals who organized a sev-
enty-two-hour hunger strike beginning on June 2-popular singer 
(originally from Taiwan) Hou Dejian, Beijing Normal University As-
sistant Professor Liu Xiaobo, former Beijing University sociologist 
and Stone Computer Corporation executive Zhou Duo, and Commu-
nist Party member and former editor Gao Xin-issued a "Hunger 
Strike Manifesto" which pointed out that in "the present movement, 
74 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
both the government and the students have made mistakes," though 
"the greater fault for the present situation lies with the government." 
However, they specified, 
The students' mistakes are mainly manifested in the in-
ternal chaos of their organizations and the lack of efficient 
and democratic procedures. Although their goal is democ-
racy, their means and procedures for achieving democracy 
are not democratic. Their lack of cooperative spirit and the 
sectarianism that has caused their forces to neutralize each 
other have resulted in all their policies coming to naught. 
More faults can be named: financial chaos, material waste, 
an excess of emotion and a lack of reason; too much of the 
attitude that they are privileged, and not enough of the belief 
in equality; and so on. 58 
Liu Xiaobo's bold analysis of the need to transform "empty democ-
racy" into "democracy of action," to move from abstract idealism to 
concrete implementation, was more sophisticated than the vision of 
most of the young student leaders. His "Manifesto" also rejected 
Maoist notions of class struggle and violence and advocated pluralism 
and peaceful democracy, in which each citizen would play a responsi-
ble role. In its emphasis on the need for fundamental structural 
change in Chinese politics to establish a system of checks and balances 
and abolish absolute power, the "Manifesto" indicates how far and 
how rapidly the democracy movement had progressed in the two 
months since Wang Dan's April 3 big-character poster. It also sug-
gests that if the next movement begins where this 1989 movement 
ended, even more progress toward democracy and a new "political 
culture" will be made. 
But most of the student leaders did not regard fundamental struc-
tural change of the Chinese political system as their goal. On the con-
trary, they regarded themselves more in the traditional role of loyal 
remonstrators; like the scholar-officials of ancient China, or the patri-
otic Beijing University students of 1919, they assumed the responsibil-
ity of encouraging more moral behavior on the part of the Chinese 
government leaders. The conspicuously public actions the students 
chose-marching through the streets and writing big-character pos-
ters, erecting a statue and kneeling in petition, hunger striking and 
occupation of the square at the heart of China's government build-
58. The "Manifesto" is translated in full in Han and Hua, supra note 1, pp. 349-354; 
this passage is from page 352. For more information on Hou Dejian's background and the 
hunger strike, see Simmie and Nixon, supra note 52, pp. 163-167. 
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ings--conveyed the moral force of their demands, and left procedures 
for practical implementation up to others. Moreover, their moralistic 
demands emphasized ending corruption and telling the truth: rather 
than alter the system, they proposed replacing dishonest officials with 
men of integrity; the focus on freedom of the press did not suggest a 
competitive free enterprise media system but rather the journalists' ob-
ligation to avoid distortion and lies. Other demands also involved 
moral pleas to tell the truth: for example, by re-evaluating Hu 
Yaobang and others who had been attacked by the 1983 anti-spiritual 
pollution campaign and the 1987 anti-bourgeois liberalization cam-
paign. Confucian ethics were invoked in the students' demands for a 
"rectification of names": to restore the correct leadership of the Party, 
or for the people's police, government, and army to serve the people. 
A large banner in the April 27 demonstration proclaimed that the stu-
dents were the "soul" (hun) of China; they appealed to the govern-
ment for moral leadership, and this principled idealism aroused the 
consciences of the Beijing citizens who supported the students. The 
students felt that by risking their futures in public demonstrations, 
they could save China. The populace trusted them because they had 
no selfish motives; even the demand for increased state funding for 
higher education was dropped soon after April 22. The impact of the 
students' moral persuasion was evident in the sharp decline in theft 
during the period the students dominated the streets of Beijing. 
This moralism not only unified the people's support for the stu-
dents, it also made the government look even more untrustworthy in 
contrast. The government was exposed in its use of methods of au-
thoritarian dictatorship, including lies and brute force. While the stu-
dents looked idealistically to the future of China, the government took 
desperate measures to avoid losing what it had gained in the 1930s and 
1940s. Government leaders not only tried to turn the clock back-
wards, they also revealed the extent to which they were out of touch 
with the humanistic yearnings of both the students and large portions 
of the population of China. 
However, although the notion of ethical integrity in government 
is deeply embedded in Chinese traditional and modern attitudes to 
politics, it has also served for centuries as a spotlight on the moral 
character of individual leaders, and as an obstacle to the development 
of impersonal political institutions to protect individual rights and in-
sure justice, or rule by law. When the students' moderate patriotic 
demands were ignored, they began to attack specific leaders, as if re-
placing them with different personalities would solve the problem of 
the students' fundamental powerlessness. The student movement did 
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not have time to prepare a plan for systematic alternatives to China's 
political structure, nor did they even have an outstanding leader who 
remained in favor with the students for the entire nine weeks the 
movement lasted. Indeed, as the movement developed, the emotional-
ism of its moral appeal intensified with the spectacle of the hunger 
strike and the Beijing citizens' outpouring of support for it. 
In fact, the students' movement did have a central practical, con-
crete demand of profound institutional significance, but this implica-
tion was generally eclipsed by the moral rhetoric in which it was 
cloaked. The students claimed the right to organize their own autono-
mous representative group, outside the control of the Communist 
Party's monopoly of power. If the government had granted recogni-
tion of this autonomous students' federation, it would have meant the 
"legalization of the first completely independent political organization 
in PRC history, and the effective negation of Deng Xiaoping's four 
basic principles, as Deng understood them. " 59 The formation of this 
representative autonomous federation-as well as similar ones by Bei-
jing workers, intellectuals and other groups-establishes a highly sig-
nificant model of unprecedented autonomous political organizing in 
China. But the students vacillated, ideologically and rhetorically, on 
the issue of how hard to press for legalization of their unauthorized 
organization. Many of them may not have been audacious enough to 
want to push this demand to its full logical extent of defying the 
Party's ultimate control. On the other hand, recognition of the stu-
dents' own federation, and holding a publicly broadcast dialogue with 
its members, were their two most consistent demands. 
The student demonstrators agreed they wanted a more honest 
and truthful government; but they were internally split on whether or 
not they opposed the current government. The People's Daily editorial 
had attacked them for being anti-socialist and anti-Party, and many 
students wanted to prove these accusations were false. For example, 
in an essay published in America as an op-ed piece, Wang Dan was 
very careful to avoid saying his movement intended to overthrow the 
government of China. He only went so far as to say their aim "is to 
exert pressure on the government to promote the progress of democ-
racy. Nor do we wish to hide the fact that our political views differ on 
some points from those of the government and the Party." But he 
ends with a dramatic rhetorical flourish: "We assure you that we will 
59. Andrew J. Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform and Prospects for Democ-
racy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 185. 
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fight to the very end for the realization of democracy in China. "60 
This vacillation between caution and flamboyance, the juxtaposition of 
moderate restraint and absolute ultimatum, was one of the internal 
contradictions of the movement. 
The students' use of official language sometimes placed them in a 
similar double-bind. When student leaders realized that the radical 
language used in slogans during the week of April 15 made the move-
ment too vulnerable, they cleverly demanded that the demonstrators 
tone down their rhetoric. They demanded only rights guaranteed 
them by the PRC Constitution, "appealing to the authorities to live up 
to the values they themselves had articulated."61 This echoing of po-
litically correct language was successful in encouraging moderates to 
join the movement and in warding off government attacks. However, 
by emphasizing a nonadversarial position, it sometimes prevented the 
students from clarifying their position. For example, the students' 
meaning in asking for a dialogue was very different from the govern-
ment's meaning in arranging one, yet they used the same word. 
Therefore, even while Li Peng was declaring martial law, he reiterated 
that the Party and Government would "continue" [sic] to hold dia-
logues with "students and people from all walks oflife."62 The lines of 
communication initiated by both sides did not intersect. 
Given the ambiguity that arose from both sides' claiming to be-
lieve in the same values, language became devalued. For example, it 
was impossible to negotiate a settlement, for the two sides could not 
state their opposing positions and then gradually hammer out a com-
promise solution. Instead, actions often spoke louder than words. 
Acting out replaced negotiation. Though Li Peng may have domi-
nated at the May 18 meeting with the students, he was upstaged by 
Wuer Kaixi who accused him of arriving late and attacked him for 
wasting time. Furthermore, Wuer Kaixi's appearance in striped hos-
pital pajamas, his use of a nurse-assisted oxygen inhaling apparatus 
during the "dialogue," and his dramatic fainting after having declared 
that the government was insincere and the meeting was useless made a 
stronger impact than any speeches. The government's eventual de-
ployment of the People's Liberation Army against peaceful demon-
strators also spoke louder than any previous verbal reprimands or 
threats. 
60. Wang Dan, "China: Students Will 'Fight to the Very End' for Democracy," Wash-
ington Post, rpt. International Herald Tribune, May 17, 1989. 
61. Nathan, supra note 59, p. 183. 
62. See Yi Mu and Thompson, supra note 6, p. 179, for a translation of Li Peng's 
speech declaring martial law. 
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A significant and unprecedented feature of China's 1989 popular 
movement was the major role played by the media. Television viewers 
reacted more strongly to Li Peng's tone of rage in declaring martial 
law than to the words of his speech, they were more moved by the 
sight of unconscious bodies of hunger strikers on stretchers than by 
their speeches, slogans and banners. No previous Chinese movement 
had been so public, internally or internationally. Some of the actions 
of the main players-the Politburo members' visit to weakened hunger 
striking students in the hospital on the morning of May 18, or the 
students' demand for a live broadcast of their "dialogue," for exam-
ple-expressed an awareness that they were playing to a mass audi-
ence and they were calculating visual effectiveness. The heady 
experience of hearing their interviews quoted over Voice of America 
or BBC radio, or published in western newspapers, also affected the 
way student leaders presented themselves. 
The leadership of the students' movement showed awesome cour-
age. Their strategic planning was flexible, innovative, and creatively 
responsive to changes in the environment. They created an image of 
patriotic student demonstrators that won the hearts of the populace. 
And they were brilliantly successful at an orderly mobilization of over 
a million people, crowd control, systematic assignments and rotations 
of monitors and traffic controllers, and maintenance of non-violence. 
But because leaders were often in effect self-appointed and their 
positions were only vaguely institutionalized, an individual's personal-
ity and support network could be more important than accountability 
to an office, a constituency, or a legal code. Bureaucratic problems 
that arose, including authoritarian decision making, lack of compro-
mise, and indecisiveness, are readily understandable when one consid-
ers the CPC models these students had known; they had no personal 
or organizational experience with democratic processes or rules of or-
der, pluralism or majority rule--not to mention financial management 
of large amounts of cash. Some wanted more unity, and less voting 
and re-voting, while others favored more pluralism and debate. Fi-
nally, the absence of an institutionalized, agreed-upon way to handle 
conflicts or differences of opinion sometimes resulted in internal splits 
and hesitation to act. 
Moreover, the movement was largely spontaneous and reactive; 
there was no time to plan ahead to establish institutions of governance 
or to prioritize goals and demands. The students reacted to a rapid 
succession of events: to Hu Yaobang's death; to the People's Daily's 
editorial of April 26, 1989; to the anniversary of the May Fourth 
Movement; to the government's foot-dragging in arranging a dialogue. 
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In the absence of recognized far-sighted leadership, much of the time 
and energy students might have devoted to political discussions and 
creation of long-term procedures and principles was instead spent on 
tactical debate about short-term issues of symbolic importance such as 
whether or not to withdraw from the square. 
Nevertheless, the 1989 student democracy movement was much 
more than a learning experience. The truly significant accomplish-
ment of the students was to mobilize around common concerns and 
demands millions of Chinese in at least eighty cities throughout the 
country. The students inspired these people to break their silence, 
and- often for the first time in their lives-to speak out for the princi-
ples they most cared about, to take personal risks for the goal of free-
dom in China. Not only did intellectuals bravely step forward, but 
also workers and government officials, private entrepreneurs and Party 
cadres, people from all walks of life. These people crossed a line by 
following their consciences, and though since the crackdown they 
have been forced to confess and self-criticize, to deny and repudiate, 
they will not forget how it felt, during those euphoric days of mid-
May, to tell the truth. Beijing citizens will remember the acts of hero-
ism they witnessed as old ladies defied army trucks: "If you enter the 
city, you will have to crush me first." In their minds they will re-
create the sense of satisfaction that came from doing what was right, 
not what one was told to do, and discovering that hundreds and 
thousands of fellow citizens felt the same way. 
The galvanizing of support for the Chinese students' democracy 
movement also crossed China's borders. The international press pres-
ence for the Gorbachev state visit facilitated the transmission of news 
of the movement to the entire world. Massive demonstrations took 
place in Hong Kong and elsewhere. The Chinese students' courage 
inspired people in many other nations, from Eastern Europe to 
Mongolia, to carry on their own struggles for democratic government. 
Overseas Chinese were moved to initiate a wide variety of ongoing 
support activities. 
On the government side, not only the current government leaders 
but the Chinese Communist Party, the People's Liberation Army, and 
the entire political system lost credibility as a result of the violent and 
excessive crackdown on the student movement. The Chinese people 
had excused many "errors" committed under this system of govern-
ment in the past, but the massacre of June 4, 1989, went too far for 
most to tolerate. The leaders' self-interested response in order to hang 
onto their own power discredited themselves as individuals and dis-
credited the entire political system which would allow such unpopular 
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brutality. Most urban people in China today do not believe the gov-
ernment's version of what happened on June 3-4. 
In the year that has elapsed since June 4, 1989, it is clear that the 
China democracy movement is not dead. Part of it has gone under-
ground within China, part of it has emerged overseas. Students are 
still a major force, and they are still agitating on campuses in Beijing. 
The "gang of elders" who remain in power are paralyzed; they cannot 
move forward and they cannot move backward due to internal splits 
and lack of popular support. Many Chinese citizens feel a sense of 
emptiness and anticipation; they ask not if but when the democracy 
movement will arise again. In the meantime, the number of student 
leaders and intellectuals on the government's "most wanted list" who 
have managed to hide safely or to escape from the country is clear 
evidence of support for an unprecedented underground organization 
from all levels of society. China has for centuries been governed by 
one-man rule, whether by an emperor, warlord or Communist Party 
leader. The spring 1989 democracy movement will be a permanent 
landmark of the moment in Chinese history when millions of people 
proclaimed they would no longer tolerate such an autocratic system, 
and demanded freedom and democracy. 
5. THE BATI'LE OF BEIJING* 
David Aikman 
JUNE2 
For days, many of Beijing's 10 million residents had slept fitfully. 
Ever since the first giant student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square 
on April 16, following the death of China's reform-minded former 
Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, the warm spring 
air had carried a heady fragrance of excitement. The new mood was 
one part exhilaration, one part uncertainty and a large dose of fear. 
Not since th'e Communists came to power in 1949 had there been such 
huge protests in the Chinese capital in favor of freedom and democ-
racy. Not since teenage Red Guards turned China upside down in the 
first three years of the 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution had young peo-
ple so unceremoniously disrupted normal life in the city. But the Cul-
tural Revolution's chaos had been deliberately fermented for political 
purposes by China's Communist Party Chairman, Mao Zedong, and it 
was he who decided when the demonstrations would end. Now, on 
the night of June 2, 1989, nearly two weeks had elapsed since an angry 
Premier Li Peng had declared martial law in sections of Beijing. Dur-
ing this period, China's military commanders had embarrassingly 
failed to get their troops anywhere near the center of Beijing. 
For the few hundred students still camping out in army tents in 
the center of Tiananmen Square, the sense of victory was mixed with a 
feeling of disquiet. True, convoys of troop-laden trucks that had en-
tered the city when martial law was declared had been turned back to 
the outskirts by vigilant citizens determined to protect "their" stu-
dents. Crowds of shoppers, off-shift workers and students corralled 
the troops in their trucks, lectured them on the need to "love the peo-
ple" and respect democracy, plied them with cigarettes, refreshments 
and food, then, almost condescendingly, sent them back in the direc-
tion they came. Even at the Beijing railroad station, where thousands 
of troops from the suburbs and distant provinces had later tried to 
disembark, students seemed to have succeeded in blocking them. Was 
it really possible that the 3.2 million-strong People's Liberation 
• Reprinted by permission of Time, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from Massacre in 
Beijing: China~ Struggle for Democracy (New York: Warner Books, 1989). 
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Army-the world's second largest military force, obedient to Commu-
nist Party leaders who were themselves hardened by years of combat 
and civil war-would meekly succumb to civics lessons by 20-year-
olds and hectoring by middle-aged housewives? 
Some of those 20-year-olds dozing and chatting in the insurrec-
tionary Tiananmen encampment may have believed so---especially the 
out-of-town students, who had poured into Beijing in the last days of 
May and now outnumbered the increasingly weary local students. For 
the newcomers, the atmosphere of the square was intoxicating. Pen-
nants and flags from campuses all over the country fluttered bravely 
from atop the lines of tents in the stiff spring breeze. The Goddess of 
Democracy, a 30-foot statue of plaster-covered styrofoam, faced north 
toward the portrait of Mao Zedong on the Gate of Heavenly Peace. 
The statue was surrounded by a circle of blue and white pup tents 
provided by Hong Kong supporters of the pro-democracy movement. 
Piles of garbage, make-shift tents, student leaders and Western televi-
sion crews had long since taken over the upper balustrade area of the 
Monument to the People's Heroes. Student marshals prevented 
crowds of well-wishers and passersby from ducking under a barrier 
rope on the bottom level. Large banners strung across the monument 
indicated the new boldness that was infecting students, and indeed all 
of China's intelligentsia, in the past seven weeks. CONVENE THE 
NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, IMPLEMENT DEMOC-
RACY, DISMISS LI PENG, BRING AN END TO MARTIAL 
LAW, they said in huge yellow letters on a red background. Lower 
down, another message declaimed, WE ARE ON HUNGER 
STRIKE, WE PROTEST, WE CRY OUT, WE REPENT. Even 
jaded Western journalists could not but be touched by the naive opti-
mism of China's youth at Tiananmen Square. 
The more experienced among Beijing student leaders, however, 
were nervous. Among them was Uerkesh Daolet, 21, an Uighur edu-
cation major at Beijing Normal University who was better known by 
his Chinese name, Wuer Kaixi. A dynamic, elfiike figure, Uerkesh 
had been voted out of the leadership of the Autonomous Students' 
Union of Beijing Universities, in part for proposing to end the occupa-
tion of the square on grounds that the military was about to take it 
over by force. Chai Ling, an electrifying orator also from Beijing Nor-
mal University, had taped a tearful interview with ABC News an-
nouncing that she would go into hiding because the entire protest 
movement, she prophesied, would soon be put down in a bloodbath. 
Other Beijing students were concerned about a more mundane matter: 
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the "movement," as they called their occupation, was so physically 
fatigued that it was in danger of breaking up. 
JUNE3 
Not long after midnight on June 3, word swept through the 
square that the army was on the move again. Convoys of trucks had 
been spotted in the north of Beijing, in the south and in the west. 
Oddest of all, thousands of soldiers, unarmed and wearing khaki pants 
and standard white shirts, were attempting to jog in ranks ten abreast 
down Changan Avenue, from a starting point in Tongxian County 
some six miles away from Tiananmen. From the opposite direction, 
trucks and military buses were gingerly approaching Tiananmen with 
the rifles, ammunition and other equipment that the jogging troops 
would need when they reached the city center. 
In no time, students and sympathizers on bicycles and 
motorcycles roused Beijing's by now politically savvy citizenry. Peo-
ple swarmed in their shorts and undershirts out of apartment blocks 
and the city's hutongs (alleyways) to surround the invading forces and 
demonstrate the same extraordinary "people power" that had kept the 
military at bay for the previous two weeks. Road blocks of hastily 
commandeered buses and trucks were set up at key intersections. At 
the Yanjing Hotel, on Changan Avenue three miles to the west of 
Tiananmen, the first group of marching uniformed soldiers was sur-
rounded by crowds and searched for weapons. Some of the military 
vehicles were overturned by citizens on the Y ongdingmen Bridge in 
southern Beijing. Out west of Muxidi, where the dead straight 
Changan A venue crosses a canal in its sweep from west to east, tires of 
military trucks were slashed. If the army wanted a fight, it now had a 
justification for one. 
7 a.m. 
The last body of foot soldiers, who had jogged into the city, re-
treated eastward down Changan. Sweaty, exhausted and in some 
cases weeping, they presented a pitiful sight. They had run a gauntlet 
of invective, abuse, argument and even physical assault on their way 
into the city. Many had become separated from their officers and were 
completely disoriented. They had been halted at 3 a.m. just in front of 
the Beijing Hotel, a sprawling blocklong complex east of Tiananmen 
Square. Most were teenage peasant recruits who seemed quite unsure 
why they had been sent into the city. "We came here to restore or-
der," a soldier told the crowd that had surrounded his unit on the 
eastern part of Changan. "We were obeying orders. Beijing people 
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don't understand us." Crouching in the road nearby, a woman re-
torted, "We do understand you. We do not need you here." 
Some of the soldiers were cruelly mocked by the crowds who 
tried to block or taunt them as they moved into town. In some cases 
refreshments were thrust into their faces as they jogged or staggered 
along. On both sides-army and citizenry-nerves were stretched 
taut by the bizarre, cat-and-mouse approach that the military seemed 
to be taking toward implementing the martial-law decrees. 
Now, by first light on June 3, an ominous souring of relations 
between the people of Beijing and the army seemed to be setting in. 
No one had attempted to steal guns or ammunition from the army on 
any of the military's previous forays into the city, and the troops them-
selves had in general been treated correctly, sometimes quite well. By 
7 a.m., though, students and young workers outside Zhongnanhai 
were smashing their way into two military buses filled with AK-47s, 
light machine guns and crates of ammunition. "We are peaceful stu-
dents who love our country," shouted a young man with a white head-
band. "Why must the People's Army threaten the people with guns?" 
As for the isolated pockets of troops hemmed in at intersections and 
overpasses around the city, the crowd was not in a mood merely to 
lecture them. In some places, soldiers were stripped almost naked, 
chased or struck by angry citizens. Other injured troops had difficulty 
getting to hospitals as mobs deflated or slashed the tires of military 
ambulances. 
Incidents such as these were used by the authorities to justify the 
mobilization of the army. "Beginning in the small hours of June 3," 
said Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong in a statement released after the mas-
sacre, "a band of counterrevolutionary thugs incited some people to 
illegally set up roadblocks, steal the troops' arms and equipment, de-
stroy and bum military vehicles and stop and block martial-law troops 
from taking up their positions." Time and again, continued the 
mayor, his charges wildly belying the facts, "they frenziedly stormed 
Zhongnanhai, the Great Hall of the People, broadcasting stations and 
other key departments, and looted shops." 
Wisely, the student leaders had anticipated government attempts 
to provoke violence, and had kept tight control over their own rank 
and file, lest they unwittingly abet them. In Chai Ling's taped ac-
count, smuggled out of China to Hong Kong one week after the mas-
sacre, she described how the military had tried to bait the dissidents. 
"Several army trucks were put deliberately in our hands," she said. 
"In the trucks, there were weapons and soldiers' coats." On learning 
that protesters were helping themselves to the contents of the truck, 
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student leaders took action. "We handed all the weapons to the Pub-
lic Security," she stated. "We still have the receipt." 
By the time Beijing had eaten its early breakfast and set off to 
work June 3, its people came upon some startling scenes throughout 
the city: disabled military buses and trucks, their windows smashed 
and their tires deflated; barricades of buses, trolleys and comman-
deered trucks parked across intersections; and pockets of demoralized 
soldiers, some of them injured, either trapped by intransigent crowds 
or wandering around aimlessly in small groups, trying to find their 
officers. Chinese student leader Wang Dan commented on this latest 
in a series of military fiascos: "The awareness of the public was very 
high. That was the reason they couldn't get us." 
But "they" had not stopped trying. The efforts of China's mili-
tary leaders to penetrate the city had foundered ignominiously so far, 
but there was no sign at all that the overall strategy was going to be 
modified. Meanwhile, the first fatalities from the army's latest push 
occurred. A jeep that formed part of a nine-vehicle convoy racing into 
town from the east in the early hours of Saturday had skidded out of 
control on the rain-drenched streets and run into four pedestrians. 
Three were killed, one of them dragged along under the jeep's bumper 
as the driver struggled to bring his vehicle under control. When the 
jeep careened to a halt, the driver jumped out and tried to get away, 
but was caught and barely escaped a severe beating at the hands of an 
enraged crowd. 
Until that moment, the seven weeks of swirling demonstrations in 
China's capital had produced only a handful of injuries and not a sin-
gle known death. Hours later, China Central Television came forward 
to accept blame for the incident, saying that the jeep had been bor-
rowed from the police for a film being prepared for the 40th anniver-
sary of the founding of the People's Republic. But the semi-apology 
did little to soothe angry emotions. An ugly genie seemed to have 
been let out of the bottle. 
On Tiananmen Square, the morning hours of Saturday passed by 
much as they had during the previous week. One thing was new, 
though. In a khaki army tent on the upper level of the Monument to 
the People's Heroes, a new hunger strike was under way. It had 
started the previous afternoon, and was something of a last-ditch effort 
by student organizers to rekindle the enthusiasm for protest that had 
characterized the pro-democracy demonstrations during the first few 
weeks. Though all four strikers would be considered intellectuals, 
none was a student. The most prominent of them was Hou Dejian, a 
well-known songwriter and vocalist who had dramatically defected to 
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Beijing from Taiwan in 1983. The other three were Liu Xiaobo, a 
lecturer in the Chinese department of Beijing Normal University; 
Zhou Tuo, a lecturer in sociology at Peking University; and Gao Xin, 
former editor of the Beijing Normal University Gazette and a Commu-
nist Party member. 
Hou had been ambivalent about becoming so visibly involved in 
the student demonstrations, though he had actively supported them 
from behind the scenes. The strike was scheduled for 72 hours, but 
Hou's recording schedule in Hong Kong required him to limit his own 
involvement to 48 hours. He agreed to take part, he told a friend in 
Beijing Friday, because he saw no other way to keep up the momen-
tum of the protest movement. "The problem with Chinese intellectu-
als," he said, "is that they are all talk and no action. That is the 
reason I think I should do [the hunger strike]." 
At a Friday press conference, the four strikers had told journal-
ists that they had four "basic slogans." In light of the violence that 
descended upon Beijing less than a day later, they make interesting 
reading today. "1. We are not against anybody and do not let hatred 
and violence poison our fight for democracy. 2. We are all responsible 
for our own past backwardness. 3. We are Chinese citizens. 4. We are 
not seeking death, but a real and better life." 
Hou and his three fellow hunger strikers sat inside the darkened 
tent Saturday as throngs of student supporters and the just plain curi-
ous crowded up to a rope on the lower steps to gape at the scene. 
White-clad medics occasionally came and went, ensuring that none of 
the four was in medical danger. From different parts of the square, 
loudspeakers relaying pro-democracy sentiments from student leaders 
kept up a cacophony over the heads of the thousands of young people, 
sightseers and even occasional foreign tourists treading their way 
through tents and parked bicycles. 
On Changan A venue on the north side of the square, there were 
far more bicycles than usual, meandering along to look at the mayhem 
from the early morning hours. Normal traffic had a hard time mov-
ing. Vehicles traveling west across the square, in fact, were diverted 
by traffic police south in front of the Great Hall of the People. West of 
the square, Changan was now closed for a few blocks because the ave-
nue was still obstructed by the weapons and ammunition buses that 
students had broken into earlier in the morning. Glass and rocks lit-
tered the street, and Beijing's bicyclists wove slowly in and out of 
groups of pedestrians who also wanted to see the latest evidence of the 
clash of wills between the army and the people. Further west along 
Changan, there were still isolated groups of soldiers trapped inside, or 
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alongside, their trucks, and subjected now to almost constant barrack-
ing and harassment by the cocky citizenry. 
2 p.m. 
The students and the curious youth of Beijing bicycling slowly 
from one bottleneck to another might have thought at this point that 
life could possibly continue in this manner almost indefinitely: the 
army would try, the citizens would react, the army would try again, 
the citizens would stop them a second time, and so on until, perhaps 
the government stepped down. 
But two things had changed. First, as Beijing's inhabitants would 
find out to their horror later, a military plan was already afoot to 
crush the pro-democracy movement with full lethal force. Second, 
both China's military and the People's Armed Police, who are under 
the control of the Ministry of Public Security and the Defense Minis-
try, had become almost paranoid about the busload of weapons and 
ammunition that had been broken into earlier in the morning just half 
a block away from the main entrance to the Zhongnanhai compound 
on the north side of Changan Avenue. What might happen, the au-
thorities worried, if the peace-loving students lost control of the situa-
tion and mobs of angry workers tried to storm the political heart of 
Beijing with AK-47s and machine guns? 
The bus the authorities most worried about was at Liubukou, 
where Fuyou Street intersects Changan, on the western end of the 
Zhongnanhai block. Shortly before 2 p.m., loudspeakers operated by 
the army broadcast orders for students and ordinary citizens to return 
the guns and ammunition they had taken from the smashed bus and 
hand over the bus itself. In the milling crowd, there were jeers and 
snickers. Suddenly, at 2:10 p.m. fear swept through the thousands of 
people around the buses. Wearing helmets and wielding nightsticks, 
some 3,000 People's Armed Police stormed out of Zhongnanhai's 
main entrance and blocked off Changan A venue. They then tore into 
the crowd around the Liubukou weapons bus. Rocks were thrown, 
people started running and tear-gas shells were fired directly into the 
crowd. It was the first known occasion in the 40-year history of the 
People's Republic that tear gas had been employed in Beijing against 
the city's inhabitants. Later, an angry student showed an American 
reporter a discarded tear-gas shell stained with blood where it had 
smashed into someone. "Metak 38m MN-05" was written on the shell 
casing. 
For several minutes the crowd fought back. But the Armed Po-
lice displayed greater resolution than security forces had at any time in 
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the seven previous weeks of demonstrations. Men, women, young and 
old were clubbed or smashed openly by tear-gas canisters if they got in 
the way. Ambulances roared up, sirens wailing and blue lights flash-
ing, to remove the first casualties of the battle for Beijing. Furious 
now, young people gathered up any bricks and rocks they could find to 
hurl back at the riot police, who seemed to be changing the equation in 
the struggle. The crowds thickened and began smashing street lamps 
and the windows of army buses parked on the south side of the street. 
Several rocks were hurled at the very gate of the Zhongnanhai 
compound. 
Overwhelmed by numbers, the riot police fell back down Fuyou 
Street, finally taking refuge inside Zhongnanhai via the compound's 
west gate. Possibly fearing that the crowds might attempt a frontal 
assault on Zhongnanhai, about 40 soldiers with clubs came out of the 
main gate and stood shoulder to shoulder in front of the entrance. 
Though jeered and insulted, they made no effort to attack the swirling 
mobs in front of them. A young rock thrower who came too close to 
the gate was smashed to the ground by the troops before managing to 
wriggle free and make his escape. 
3 p.m. 
Within less than an hour, a large crowd had surrounded a mili-
tary bus at the Xidan intersection, one long block to the west of 
Zhongnanhai along Changan. The bus, containing military supplies 
and weapons, held about 80 troops. The crowd lectured the troops, 
admonishing them not to kill the people. For their part, the soldiers 
replied politely that they were only following orders. Later in the day 
the bus remained at the intersection but all its windows had been 
smashed. Inside, the frightened soldiers had stuffed bedrolls into the 
windows to keep out the mob. After the massacre, the bus was found 
empty and burned. 
Meanwhile, a new locus of tension between troops and students 
had come into existence outside the western side, that is, the back, of 
the Great Hall of the People. Just as the People's Armed Police were 
surging out of Zhongnanhai, 2,000 or so helmeted and backpacked 
troops had come marching out of a ground floor side entrance to the 
Great Hall, which has long been known to have underground passages 
that connect it with the Zhongnanhai compound on the other side of 
Changan. The troops may have been secreted into the Great Hall via 
Zhongnanhai, and it is possible that they had even made their way to 
Zhongnanhai itself via Beijing's underground network of bomb-shelter 
tunnels built under the orders of Mao Zedong in the late 1960s. For-
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eigners had occasionally been shown a glimpse of the tunnels, one of 
which was entered through a secret, electrically operated sliding door 
in a clothing store on Da Sha La Street. The tunnels were said by 
Chinese officials to extend for miles under the city's streets and to be 
capable of protecting much of the city's population from all but a nu-
clear direct hit. 
The Great Hall troops may not have intended to proceed very far, 
but from the perspective of the Tiananmen students and the Beijing 
citizenry now supporting them, the only obstacle separating them 
from the square was the Great Hall itself. The soldiers were already 
worryingly close to the political heart of the pro-democracy move-
ment. Within minutes, thousands of students and citizens had gath-
ered from the square and nearby streets to block the movement of the 
soldiers, who were from the 67th Army. Two city buses were also 
driven up and parked near the Great Hall, cutting off the soldiers from 
Changan A venue. Thousands of people now surrounded the troops, 
who were instructed by their officers to sit down on the sidewalk and 
roadway in the shade. There was a lot of shouting, and many young 
men climbed atop the commandeered buses for a better view and to 
observe the troops more closely. When an American network camera 
crew arrived on the scene, the crowd cheered lustily. 
But it was already a hot day, and the officers were in a sour mood. 
As some of the students pushed too close to the edge of the sitting 
troops, some of their commanders took off their belts and swung them 
into the students' faces, drawing blood and infuriating the crowd. 
Groups of students, in tum, would from time to time snatch a helmet 
from a sitting soldier and run off with it, to a roar of delight from 
those nearby. On Tiananmen Square for much of the afternoon, stu-
dents triumphantly wheeled around flatbed bicycles with trophies of 
their various confrontations with the army mounted atop them: hel-
mets, J.D. cards, officers' caps, even an occasional rifle. 
5 p.m. 
Spectators on the western steps of the Great Hall watched the 
slow-moving confrontation between the crowd and the Hebei troops 
with interest, occasionally shouting insults up at staff workers who 
were looking out of second-story windows in the hall. "Li Peng, step 
down!" was one popular demand hurled upward in unison by a group 
of young people. Then, impatient at the ugly reaction of the belt-
wielding officers, angrier members of the crowd picked up stones and 
began throwing them into the ground floor compound areas of the 
Great Hall, smashing windows in a small guard booth and in the hall 
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itself. A few students with headbands tried to reason with the troops 
and their officers, and white-coated students from the Beijing Union 
Medical College set up a temporary first-aid station right in a patch of 
the roadway amid the besieged troops. Bloody-faced students contin-
ued to stagger out, victims of the belt buckles of an increasingly angry 
officer corps. 
The rising anger of crowds at intersections along Changan all the 
way to the Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution was 
now being expressed in rock throwing at the People's Armed Police 
and several government buildings. Windows were smashed not just in 
the Great Hall, but also in the Propaganda Department of the Com-
munist Party Central Committee and the Ministry of Radio, Film and 
Television. Several guards at these buildings, as well as Zhongnanhai, 
had by late afternoon been injured by flying rocks. 
One reason for the crowd's fury was the violence employed by the 
riot police attempting to clear Changan in front of Zhongnanhai and 
to recover the blockaded weapons and supply buses. A woman caught 
by riot troops at the Xidan intersection in mid-afternoon, for example, 
was kicked to the ground by five policemen, then beaten with trunche-
ons as one held her hair. Nearby, a man was cornered by three police-
men who beat him about the face and chest for a full minute before 
letting him go. His face and upper body streaming with blood, he 
staggered off, barely conscious. 
News of these ferocious incidents flashed back and forth from 
crowd to crowd in a one-mile radius of Tiananmen Square, along with 
scattered and panicky accounts of yet another troop movement in 
some part or other of the city. Around 5 p.m., several hundred young 
workers donned their yellow construction helmets and headed for 
Tiananmen with makeshift pikes and clubs, as though preparing for a 
violent confrontation with the military. A crowd of about 1,000 ordi-
nary citizens, meanwhile, pushed down the wall of a construction site 
near the Xidan intersection and made off with tools, bricks, reinforc-
ing bars and anything else that seemed usable as a weapon. 
To the beleaguered authorities of both Beijing municipality and 
the Communist Party Central Committee, the new developments were 
the stuff of every Communist leadership's nightmare: the "people" 
turning against the "people's leadership." Though the pro-democracy 
movement had meticulously avoided any public attacks on the Com-
munist Party, or indeed upon socialism itself throughout most of the 
long weeks of escalating protest, such self-restraint was evaporating 
fast. The June 14 official government report on the massacre asserts 
that Tiananmen loudspeakers in the hands of the Autonomous Work-
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ers' Union were broadcasting appeals "to take up arms and overthrow 
the government." It is unlikely that the union was saying anything of 
the sort, but it is possible that some individual workers were calling for 
extreme action against the authorities. Some of the many worker and 
student rallies proceeding on the square in late afternoon had their 
own independent bullhorns. Who knows what was said in the flush of 
antipolice anger? 
Words, though, are seldom merely words in the dense legal my-
thology of Communist power. Even a whispered yearning for weap-
ons by a hunger-striking student in the comer of a dark tent would 
have been seized upon as evidence of anti-Communist intent. For the 
martial-law authorities in Beijing, whatever insurrectionary sentiments 
were publicly voiced around 5 p.m. at Tiananmen Square on Saturday 
seemed to serve as the judicial trigger for much that happened in the 
next few hours. 
The Plan 
Just how many troops were outside Beijing may never be pre-
cisely known. Nonetheless, a source in close touch with the White 
House throughout the crisis said flatly that there were as many as 
350,000, drawn from all seven of China's military region commands. 
Deng Xiaoping had summoned the regional commanders to a meeting 
in Wuhan to obtain their support for the crackdown. Western intelli-
gence was not privy to those confidential discussions, but once the 
troops began to actually enter Beijing, it was a relatively simple matter 
to keep track of them. Makeshift tactical orders were being transmit-
ted by radio in the clear, without scrambling or encryption. As are-
sult, U.S. intelligence agencies using satellites could listen in on radio 
communications right down to the battalion level. 
Deng himself was kept informed of all the major troop move-
ments and decisions, and had insisted that elements of all Chinese mil-
itary regions take part in the final crackdown on the students. This 
was a precautionary measure both to prevent the emergence of an all-
powerful military warlord should the military operation prove a strik-
ing success, and to spread the responsibility among as many units as 
possible should it be a failure. On his return from Wuhan, Deng re-
mained in the Beijing area for a few days, but then left once more, on 
May 28, for the Yellow Sea resort of Beidaihe. Equipped with com-
fortable villas for the use of high Chinese officials on vacation, 
Beidaihe had several times in the past served as the locale of important 
Chinese policy gatherings when Deng-and before him Mao 
Zedong-needed to forge agreement at high levels in a less formal and 
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more confidential setting than was possible in Beijing. During the last 
days of May and the first one or two days of June, Deng presided over 
the planning for the military operation and double-checked the polit-
ical allegiances of both his military commanders and the political lead-
ership at Politburo level. Deng, despite his semi-retirement in 1987 
from day-to-day administration, still held the one vital lever for con-
trolling political power in the People's Republic: chairmanship of the 
Central Military Commission. 
The last details in place, Deng evidently returned to the Beijing 
area before June 3. He did not, however, go back to his official resi-
dence. Instead, he went to the Western Hills, where some senior Party 
officials have villas in a well-guarded area away from the prying eyes 
of foreigners or ordinary Chinese. A temporary military command 
post appears to have been set up nearby when the assault on Beijing 
began. It is possible that most of China's top leadership still consid-
ered loyal to Deng also met there, until it was apparent that the mili-
tary would gain the upper hand in Beijing. Then, on June 6, three 
days after the crackdown began, the martial-law authorities moved the 
tactical military command post into the Great Hall of the People. 
Even with a determined effort to involve every major military re-
gion in the Beijing assault, Deng left nothing to chance in his delega-
tion of authority. His primary conduit was President Yang Shangkun, 
who, along with the already disgraced party General Secretary Zhao 
Ziyang, was a vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission. 
Yang, in tum, was related by blood or marriage to at least three of the 
key personnel entrusted with completing the takeover of Tiananmen 
Square: 
• His son-in-law, Chi Haotian, chief of the general staff of 
the P.L.A. and thus the one man in a position to coordi-
nate all military deployments within China. 
• His younger brother, Yang Baibing, chief of the general 
political department of the P.L.A. 
• His nephew (and Yang Baibing's son), Yang Jianhua, 
commander of the 27th Army, a unit within the Beijing 
military region that is based in Shijiazhuang in Hebei 
province. 
The detailed operational planning of the troop movements into 
Beijing was in the hands of Chi Haotian, whose final instructions from 
Deng Xiaoping could probably be summarized as follows: use 
whatever force necessary to complete the suppression of the student 
movement. As Chief of Staff, Chi bears major responsibility for the 
violence unleashed upon Beijing's citizenry by his troops. Yet he al-
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most certainly hoped that firepower would not be necessary during the 
operation. For one thing, there was profound unease throughout the 
officer corps at the use of the military for purposes of political control. 
For another, China's field commanders, like the field commanders of 
virtually any other regular army in the world, probably dreaded the 
prospect of subjecting their troops to the serious logistical problems of 
moving around within a densely populated city, and especially of ex-
posing them to the fury of the aroused and politically radicalized 
populace. 
In retrospect, it is obvious that the operational plan to take 
Tiananmen Square envisaged the use of a tough and heavily armed 
field army as a last resort. None of the military units deployed in the 
initial probing forays into the city on the night of June 2 had been 
provided with ammunition. Some of them, as noted earlier, did not 
even have weapons. There were sound military and political reasons 
for that caution. The 38th Army, based at Baoding, 90 miles from 
Beijing, was composed of officers and troops native to the Beijing area. 
A number of the students demonstrating in Tiananmen Square had 
even done their reserve training in the 38th. Many officers of the unit 
had relatives or friends who were students. Politically, the 38th Army 
may have been the P.L.A. unit most sympathetic to student arguments 
and thus least psychologically suited to carry out the task of sup-
pressing them. In fact, tanks from the 38th Army were used early on 
in the approach to Tiananmen, but they were not armed and their 
turret-mounted heavy machine guns were never used against demon-
strators. Several unit commanders were later reported to have been 
removed, and some even executed, for refusing to move aggressively 
against Beijing. Had any of their soldiers been armed, these officers 
might have turned the guns against the troops that were prepared to 
suppress the population. 
Low motivation was apparent in other units brought into the vi-
cinity of Beijing from China's seven military regions. From Chengdu 
in Sichuan Province, home of Deng Xiaoping, came elements of the 
70th Army; from Shenyang, elements of the 40th and the 65th (with 
the 65th containing some troops from Inner Mongolia). From Datong 
came elements of the 28th Army. These units, as well as others that 
have not been identified, formed part of the military stranglehold that 
Chi Haotian hoped to put into place on the center of Beijing during 
the afternoon and evening of June 3. Some had made their way to 
Beijing by road, but the bulk of troop movements evidently took place 
by air, with the Nanyuan military airfield south of Beijing being heav-
ily used in the final hours before the June 3 assault. As for the Chinese 
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air force, responsible for troop movement by air, there were repeated 
though unconfirmed reports that its commander, Wang Hai, had been 
opposed to the initial declaration of martial law in Beijing. "The air 
force had nothing to do with this," Wang Hai supposedly said when 
the scope of the Beijing massacre became apparent. 
It is not clear exactly how many of China's armies were in place 
around Beijing when the final assault took place, but it could have 
been as many as ten, even if not all were at full strength. Besides the 
27th, 28th, 38th and 65th, there were divisions or smaller units from 
the 16th, 17th and 69th. To add real combat muscle to these forces, at 
least one regiment of the 15th airborne division, from the Wuhan mili-
tary district, was also on hand. Troops from most or perhaps all of 
these units were involved in the military occupation of Beijing that 
took place once Tiananmen Square had been taken. But one field 
army behaved with particular ferocity and brutality on the night of 
June 3--4: the 27th Army under the command of Yang Jianhua, Yang 
Shangkun's nephew. Some of its troops had been recruited into the 
army only as a last resort to avoid prison sentences. Many were com-
bat-toughened veterans of China's 1979 battle with Vietnam. The men 
of the 27th, generally older than the teenage recruits who had so dis-
mally failed to penetrate Beijing in convoys or in jogging units, were 
mostly of peasant background, and they seemed to feel nothing in 
common with the young people of the Chinese capital. No doubt be-
cause of their presumed impermeability to propaganda blandishments 
within Beijing proper, they were entrusted with the task of ensuring 
that, whatever else happened, China's military would secure a tactical 
victory on Tiananmen Square. 
Chi Haotian's plan called for the 27th to be held in reserve to the 
east and west of the city, in case other units failed to secure the square 
and real shooting was needed. But the unfolding operation was a 
lengthy one, additionally complicated by uncertainty over which 
troops would be able to reach the center of Beijing from which axis of 
approach. From the south, for example, troops moving toward 
Tiananmen from Nanyuan airfield had a more difficult task than those 
scheduled to make the approach from the west or the east. That is 
because none of the north-south streets of Beijing offer the broad and 
uninterrupted axis of approach to Tiananmen provided by Changan 
Avenue. Navigating through crooked intersections around the Tem-
ple of Heaven Park, troop trucks and armored personnel carriers were 
easily blocked by commandeered buses and other vehicles in the 
Y ongdingmen area, south of Tiananmen. 
On Dongzhimenwai Street, which leads into Beijing from the air-
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port, a convoy of some 50 trucks was finally halted around 5:30p.m. 
when students and local citizens overturned a vehicle and completely 
blocked the relatively narrow road. As the crowd grew and citizens 
surrounded the halted trucks to talk to the troops within them, several 
buses were placed across the main Dongzhimen intersection to prevent 
any further efforts to bring in troops from this sector. 
6 p.m. 
A strange quiet now came over the center of Beijing, as though 
each side in the approaching clash was sizing up the other. There 
were still thousands of people and bicycles in and around Tiananmen 
Square itself. Changan remained closed off in front of Zhongnanhai. 
But there had been no more tear gas or fighting since early afternoon. 
Behind the Great Hall of the People, crowds of students and citizens 
continued to hector each other and clash in small ways with the 
thousands of troops hemmed in on the roadway. Nonetheless, it now 
seemed clear that the soldiers were unlikely to attempt any aggressive 
action for the remainder of the evening. Pockets of stranded troops 
and trucks continued to fidget amid humming crowds in different 
parts of the city, though with little sign that violence was about to 
erupt. 
Meanwhile, the authorities in Beijing were preparing to warn the 
city that matters had now reached the point of no return. At 6:30 
p.m., the municipal government and the martial-law authorities issued 
a new emergency statement. Broadcast repeatedly on radio and televi-
sion, it called on residents of the city to "heighten their vigilance" and 
to stay off the streets and away from Tiananmen Square. Workers 
were urged to stay at their jobs or remain in their homes. The stu-
dents in the square almost certainly paid little attention to the emer-
gency statement, any more than did Beijing residents caught up in the 
all-consuming task of keeping the army at bay. After all, had not 
there been one "serious warning" after another ever since the original 
martial-law declaration on May 20? Why should this one be any 
different? 
The tear gasings, beatings and other injuries on Saturday after-
noon had all occurred in the vicinity of Zhongnanhai. Yet it was the 
presence of fully armed troops so close to Tiananmen Square that 
~ee'?ed to have students and citizens most worried. The belt lashings 
tnfttcted on some of the students by officers went on intermittently 
until evening, and sometimes bricks and bottles were thrown back and 
forth. Whenever things seemed to be getting out of hand or the troops 
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looked as though they were about to fight back, the crowd would 
shout out in unison, "Don't fight! Don't fight!" 
8:30p.m. 
Suddenly the orders seemed to have changed. At about 8:30 
p.m., some 2,000 men clambered to their feet, formed up in ranks, 
then marched uneventfully back into the ground-floor gate of the 
Great Hall from which they had originally emerged. At least one cri-
sis now appeared resolved. Perhaps others might be defused in the 
same nonviolent way. 
That was not to be. Possibly as part of the decision made around 
5 p.m. by the martial-law authorities, new waves of troops began surg-
ing into the city along whatever axes were not already blocked. When 
about 40 trucks filled with troops came down the first ring road to the 
Jianguomenwai overpass, just two miles to the east of the square along 
Changan, they were also stopped by citizens. This time the soldiers 
sensed the mood was not at all friendly and clutched their rifles ner-
vously. Some of the crowd clambered over the halted trucks or tried 
to disable them by removing parts of the engines. As diplomats 
brought their families out onto the balconies of the Jianguomenwai 
foreign compound to watch, a tense standoff developed. 
Meanwhile, the military was not giving up. Yet another contin-
gent of about 1,200 men, helmeted and armed, had somehow ap-
proached undetected along Qianmen West Road, just to the southwest 
of Tiananmen. Once again, thousands of young people streamed to-
ward it from the square, which was now illuminated brightly by the 
floodlights on huge lamp standards surrounding Tiananmen. An ar-
ticulated bus, jammed to capacity with young people, 50 to 60 of them 
perched dangerously on the roof, lurched out of its temporary location 
in front of the eastern steps of the Great Hall-that is, facing the 
squar~traight toward the intersection of Qianmen West with the 
square itself. As TV crews turned their own lights on the bewildered 
and hemmed-in troops, the bus shuddered to a halt diagonally across 
Qianmen West, the newest sally in the people's guerrilla traffic block-
ade. Harangued, squeezed between the crowd and obviously ex-
hausted, the soldiers waited passively for new orders against a 
background din of shouts, the tinkling of bicycle bells and the now 
more sinister, consistent ee-aw, ee-aw of arriving and departing ambu-
lances. Finally, the officers ordered the men to line up and march 
back down Qianmen to the west. As they did so, there was a roar of 
approval from the crowd, which once again drifted back to the square. 
Not long after this, yet another group of troops, this time un-
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armed, tried to double-time into the square from the east. It is not 
clear from where they had come, but they were literally collared by 
hundreds of angry citizens just in front of the Beijing Hotel. Several of 
the soldiers were beaten on the spot, while others retreated north. 
Probably no one in Beijing at this moment could have grasped 
exactly what was taking place all over town. Great caravans of trucks, 
with armored personnel carriers behind them, lay backed up along at 
least four axes into town: east along Changan; west along Changan 
(with about seven miles separating the two main pincer arms of the 
approaching 27th Army); south along Yongdingmen Street that, for 
about seven long blocks, heads due north into Qianmen guarding the 
south of Tiananmen; and from the airport to the northeast. Tires had 
been slashed, bottles and rocks thrown and the troops often beaten up 
and chased away from their trucks. Commandeered city buses and 
trucks had been jammed into dozens of intersections by angry and 
frightened citizens in the desperate hope that they would somehow 
keep the army out of the city center. Broken glass, rocks and pieces of 
brick covered the usually litter-free streets in the center of the Chinese 
capital. 
Yet the military was inexorably closing in, coiling itself for the 
final strike against the pro-democracy movement. As if temporarily 
flitting in from another universe-though he was probably at the 
Western Hills command post at this time-Premier Li Peng appeared 
on television late in the evening to give a speech on environmental 
problems. He had not been seen or heard from in public for nine days. 
In Tiananmen Square, the final target of the advancing troops, an 
eerie calm prevailed. Several thousand students and their supporters 
were milling around, listening to speeches, catching snatches of news 
from around the city from the student-controlled loudspeakers, gazing 
at the Goddess of Democracy or at the tent containing the hunger 
strikers on the Monument to the People's Heroes. BBC senior corre-
spondent Kate Adie remembered being impressed by the confident 
mood of the bystanders. "It was a real atmosphere of a Saturday night 
on the town," she recalled. "It was not tense. There was a sort of I-
think-we've-done-it feeling." 
Hawkers selling meat on skewers unconcernedly plied their trade 
in the southwest of the square, not far from the malodorous assem-
blage of temporary outdoor toilets. Couples wandered about, hand in 
hand. A ceremony--small but, in the context of the pro-democracy 
movement, important-was unfolding. Y an Jiaqi, then the director of 
the Political Science Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sci-
ences, was delivering a speech in honor of the formal opening of the 
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University of Democracy, a sort of unofficial colloquium of Chinese 
academics who support political and social pluralism and want to ex-
pose Chinese young people to the underlying philosophical concepts. 
(Y an, a supporter of Zhao Ziyang, later escaped from China and took 
his campaign for democracy education among Chinese abroad with 
him.) His remarks were brief, as befitted an evening that was still rap-
idly unfolding. When he finished speaking firecrackers were set off to 
honor the occasion. They were the last nonlethal explosions heard in 
Beijing that night. 
10 p.m. 
The killing began less than four miles west of Tiananmen Square, 
along Changan. Without warning, the 27th Army opened fire on dem-
onstrators at Muxidi Bridge. That landmark, over a canal that drains 
the lake in Yuyuantan Park, a few blocks to the north, is the second 
and last major bridge before Changan reaches Tiananmen. Earlier in 
the evening, it had become a junkyard of trolleys and buses as group 
after group of citizens had sought to make the way into the city center 
impassable. West of the bridge, long lines of trucks and armored per-
sonnel carriers (APCs) belonging to the 27th waited impatiently to 
move on. 
Shortly before 10 p.m., the troops were given the order to clear 
the obstacles, disperse the crowds using whatever means necessary and 
keep moving. First, tear-gas shells were fired into the crowds, and 
soldiers with truncheons ran forward on foot, beating anyone who got 
in the way. The troops ran around or between the blockading buses, 
looking for people to hit. Then, infuriated, the crowd rallied and 
started fighting back, hurling rocks and bottles at the soldiers and 
forcing them to retreat. Molotov cocktails started smashing into the 
buses and the troop trucks trying to nudge forward. Some youths 
brought rugs from nearby apartments, doused them with gasoline, 
placed them on or in the buses and ignited them, attempting to create 
a wall of flame through which the incoming troops would have to 
move. As the rain of bottles, rocks and Molotov cocktails intensified, 
the first shots rang out. At the beginning, the troops did not seem to 
be shooting at people so much as over their heads, but the distinction 
quickly vanished. Within minutes, AK-47 barrels were lowered and 
bodies began falling on Changan A venue and on the side streets 
nearby. 
The troops pushed forward again and the crowds once more fell 
back. Heavy equipment was moved up to push the burning buses and 
trucks out of the way. This too was attacked. So were municipal fire 
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trucks that were summoned to douse the blazing buses but that had to 
retreat when they themselves became the targets of a withering bar-
rage of fire bombs and rocks. Gas tanks exploded and the sky turned 
into an orange inferno sliced through by occasional tracer bullets. 
"Fascists! Fascists!" the crowd chanted after a volley of gunfire would 
crackle and ricocheting AK-47 rounds smashed into walls, pavement 
and people. 
As the advance proceeded, one troop truck or APC after another 
was set on fire. Within an hour of the assault on Muxidi Bridge, 
twelve army vehicles had been burned out in a four-mile stretch of 
Changan. Meanwhile, virtually every military vehicle crawling slowly 
into the city from the west had to fight off attacks by Molotov cock-
tails. The troops themselves were no longer aiming simply at rioters 
but in virtually every direction where there was a crowd of people. 
Ordinary citizens were cut down in apartment buildings lining 
Changan. In Nos. 22 and 23, residences reserved for senior govern-
ment officials or retired Party leaders, there were several deaths and 
injuries, including at least one official at the vice-ministerial level. An 
old woman was struck in the head and died instantly while she was 
cleaning her teeth. A travel agent from Oregon staying at the nearby 
Minzu Hotel watched the carnage in disbelief from his balcony, but he 
had to duck as bullets smacked into the hotel near his room. He was 
then warned by public security officials that anyone observing the 
scene from the balcony might be shot at. 
The warning was no bluff. When the American went downstairs 
into the lobby, plainclothes officers from the Ministry of State Security 
darted into the hotel and shot in cold blood a Chinese who had taken 
refuge there. The body was dragged across the carpet, leaving a dark 
stream of blood in its wake. Shortly afterward, army sharpshooters 
took up positions in several of the Minzu Hotel's windows, firing both 
into the street and into buildings they suspected might be used by 
demonstrators to fire on the army. After the military had taken com-
plete control of the city, the authorities repeatedly maintained that 
some of the automatic rifles and machine guns stolen from army buses 
early Saturday morning had been used against the military coming 
into the city. That was possible, though there was no independent 
evidence to support the assertion. 
Firing from trucks and in the street, the incoming troops were 
now aiming low. As a student near him was hit in the leg, Associated 
Press correspondent John Pomfret heard the youth cry out as he col-
lapsed, "Live fire! Live fire!" Many of the students were slow to grasp 
that message, though blood was now thick on the streets and side-
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walks. Determined pedicab or freight bicyclists were frantically pedal-
ing back and forth to nearby hospitals with the latest victims of the 
mayhem. The cacophony was uninterrupted: deafening volleys of 
AK-47 rounds, the heavy pop of tear-gas canisters, the crunch of 
metal against metal as tracked military vehicles pushed blazing wreck-
age out of the path of the incoming trucks and APCs, the downpour of 
bottles and rocks smashing into military vehicles and immobilized 
buses, shouts of anger and abuse at the troops, screams of the 
wounded, the wail of ambulances and the whoomph of gasoline 
explosions. 
Just east of the square, several thousand people had gathered on 
and around the pedestrian overpass at the intersection of Dongdan 
Street and Changan. There was no violence or shooting here, but 
three rows of buses had already been parked across the avenue to 
block any vehicles coming in from the east. The crowd, aware of the 
fighting now going on west of the square, clearly expected the troops 
to come into town from the east at any point. John Landy, New Delhi 
bureau chief for· United Press International, was surprised to come 
across about 800 soldiers, surrounded by crowds who were now 
screaming at them, sitting in the middle of Beijingzhan Street, the 
broad road leading perpendicularly off Changan to the Beijing railroad 
station. The soldiers were armed with automatic rifles and had obvi-
ously been there a long time. But they looked befuddled and unsure of 
themselves. Landy and some journalist colleagues, exhausted from a 
long day's reporting, ducked into a Korean restaurant in an alley off 
Beijingzhan Street. The proprietor offered the reporters beer, food and 
soft drinks. The vague presence of attractive young women in the 
background soon became apparent to the reporters: in the midst of 
the battle for Beijing, they had wandered into a brothel. 
11 p.m. 
Back at Muxidi, the battle was raging. Incredibly, the troops had 
made little forward progress. Pierre Hurel, a correspondent for the 
French magazine Paris-Match, watched as a noncommissioned officer 
stood up in a jeep and bellowed at his troops through a megaphone, 
"Charge, you bunch of cowards! Clear away all that!" Some of the 
soldiers then hurled strange grenades that exploded as they hit the 
ground but failed to produce much noise. As the troops charged 
clumsily forward, the crowd briefly retreated, then regrouped amid a 
new hail of bottles and rocks from all across the road. "Fascists! Fas-
cists!" the crowd kept shouting as a group of four students, stripped to 
the waist and standing to face the soldiers alone in front of a blazing 
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barricade, banged together the poles on which the scarlet banners ?f 
their universities were flying. Around 11:30 p.m., Hurel watched m 
astonishment as hundreds of new troops jumped out of trucks backed 
up along Changan and riflemen coolly fanned out to take up firing 
positions against the stone throwers. Next to Hurel, and close to the 
canal flowing under Muxidi Bridge, the T shirt of a 15-year-old ex-
ploded in red as an AK -4 7 round smashed into his chest. From be-
hind a tree, Hurel caught sight of the army sniper leaning against the 
side of a bus and calmly taking aim again. As Hurel took off with the 
screaming crowd away from the deadly volleys, a bullet slammed 
across his lower back, drawing blood but miraculously missing both 
his kidneys and his liver. After a quick swig of bourbon and some 
stitches inserted by a German doctor, the journalist went back to the 
streets. 
Hurel, like the majority of Western reporters, had concentrated 
on the fierce fighting along the western sector of Changan as the 27th 
Army slugged its way toward Tiananmen Square. The focus made 
sense. As the Chinese authorities would later admit, more than 300 
military vehicles-tanks, trucks, APCs and jeeps-were "obstructed 
or besieged" along Changan A venue west of Tiananmen. But the con-
voys trying to approach the city center from Nanyuan airfield in the 
south were having a nightmare too. The intersections were obstructed 
by buses, trucks, bicycles, even furniture. Moreover, the narrower 
streets in this part of town made it easier for demonstrators to attack 
the trucks at close range. Dozens of trucks and APCs were hit by 
Molotov cocktails and burned. The troops fired at the demonstrators, 
and shortly before midnight some of the fiercest encounters anywhere 
in the city were taking place on the roads north from the Temple of 
Heaven. Journalists observing events from balconies on the upper 
floors of the Beijing Hotel watched orange machine-gun tracer fire 
crisscrossing the sky about half a mile south of the square. Several 
civilians were shot down not far from the Kentucky Fried Chicken 
franchise south of the square. 
JUNE4 
The four hunger strikers in the tent and the other students still 
gathered around Tiananmen Square's Monument to the People's He-
roes had begun to hear reports of the killings that had been taking 
place at Muxidi to the west. A young woman covered in blood came 
rushing from Changan and spoke in a loud emotional voice to the stu-
dents and supporters gathered around the monument. The blood-
stains were not her own, she explained, but came from wounded 
102 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
victims she had helped carry away from the line of fire. Her listeners 
were horrified. Some students nearby had armed themselves with 
makeshift bamboo spears, and several workers had already banded to-
gether to resist the military with whatever puny weapons they could 
find. But political scientist Y an Jiaqi, still perhaps hopeful of some 
miraculously peaceful end to the day's violence, appealed for a concili-
atory approach. "Ifthe soldiers leave Beijing," he said, "we can forget 
the rest [of what they have done]." 
What "rest"? his listeners may have wondered. The indiscrimi-
nate shooting, the beatings, the headlong destruction wrought by ad-
vancing Chinese troops? One of the most gruesome events of the night 
was about to occur a few miles east along Changan, where some 40 
army trucks, each with about ten soldiers, had been blocked on the 
Jianguomenwai overpass for nearly four hours. They had tried to 
move onto Changan from the ring road, which passes under the over-
pass in a north-south direction. More than 5,000 students and citizens 
had gathered on the bridge, and they had already pushed seven of the 
trucks, complete with troops in them, onto the middle of the overpass 
to serve as an obstacle for military convoys that might be coming from 
the east. Just after midnight, a lone armored recovery vehicle--essen-
tially a tank without a turret that is used to tow disabled armored 
vehicles-roared eastward toward the overpass from the direction of 
Tiananmen, though no one was quite sure where it had started. As the 
crowds scampered to safety, the driver managed to negotiate thenar-
row space still left between vehicles on the overpass, then roared to-
ward the Jianguo Hotel, a popular, Western-managed watering hole 
conveniently close to the Jianguomenwai and Qijiayuan foreign 
compounds. 
Then, to everyone's amazement, the vehicle swung around and 
headed back toward the overpass. As it approached, it accelerated to 
about 50 m.p.h. Once more the thick crowds on the overpass scat-
tered to either side of the road. Less fortunate were the students and 
soldiers sitting and squatting atop the trucks in the middle of the over-
pass. This time the armored recovery vehicle made no effort to steer 
through the parked trucks. Crunching relentlessly over hastily aban-
doned bicycles, it smashed at full speed into one of the parked army 
trucks. That vehicle toppled instantly, sending flying from its canvas 
roof about a dozen soldiers and civilians who had been perched there 
discussing the immorality of the army's assault on the square. One of 
the civilians, a short young man with matching pale jacket and pants 
and black cotton shoes, was smashed into the pavement with such vio-
lence that his brains spilled out on the road. The body lay curled in a 
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pool of blood for four days before the military finally allowed its re-
moval. A soldier with a serious head injury was quickly placed on a 
flatbed pickup truck and taken to the hospital, still clutching his AK-
47 rifle. 
The crowd reaction to this ramming of one military vehicle by 
another was immediate. "This is the most terrible scene I've ever seen 
in my whole life," said a visibly shaken Mao Xiangdong, 25, a former 
computer salesman. "The leaders don't care about our lives at all." 
Angry groups from the crowd then dragged several of the frightened 
and equally horrified soldiers, all from the Shenyang-based 39th 
Army, out of the trucks to view the civilian corpse. "Look at what 
they've done to your brother!" one screamed. "How can you bear 
this?" A third kept shouting, "Shameless! Inhuman!" Several of the 
troops unashamedly started crying as the crowd pleaded with them to 
abandon their positions. "Down with Li Peng!" the crowd chanted. 
"Bum Li Peng to death!" Beside the truck not far from the bridge, a 
tall, lean Chinese man in his 60s lectured a junior officer sitting in the 
passenger seat of a truck. "I was a soldier for 40 years," he bellowed 
in a thick, provincial accent. "Watching what you've been doing these 
days, I cannot find any place to hide and cry. In 1949, when we 
moved into Beijing, the people offered us water to drink. Can you 
expect them to do the same now?" 
Joe Kahn, a reporter for the Dallas Morning News, was following 
the murderous armored recovery vehicle on his bicycle as it careened 
down Changan back toward Tiananmen. Just after the vehicle left the 
scene of the ramming on the overpass, it crushed a row of abandoned 
bicycles by the roadside and seriously injured an old woman who was 
too slow getting out of the way. Then it vanished as mysteriously as it 
had first appeared. 
Just minutes earlier, not long after midnight, a lone APC had 
broken through the obstacle course along Changan into Tiananmen 
Square from the west, roared across the north of the square, then dis-
appeared in an easterly direction. Less than half an hour later, an-
other APC rolled into the square, this time from the southeast. It 
drove north alongside the museums of the Chinese Revolution and 
Chinese History, then hit a metal barrier that the students had erected 
for the purpose of halting just such vehicles. It stopped momentarily, 
got its tracks caught, then tried to back away. But the crowd was onto 
it in a fury. Smashing metal bars against its side and further entan-
gling its tracks, the mob then piled clothing and other material atop 
the hull, doused it with gasoline and set it on fire. When some of the 
students objected that the driver would be incinerated if he was not 
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permitted to get out, the crowd shouted back, "It's okay. He's not a 
human being." The driver and whoever else was inside the APC 
quickly burned to death. The vehicle, No. 003 painted in white atop 
the camouflage pattern on its hull, was the first Chinese military vehi-
cle to come to a halt in the square, and the first to be destroyed. 
Not long afterward, another APC came up from the south toward 
Changan. A bus was driven into it to prevent it from moving back 
toward the west. Then it too was set afire, but the crew jumped out. 
They had barely got a few yards from their blazing vehicle before be-
ing set upon by the mob and savagely beaten. An American student 
who was close to the incident and tried to prevent the mob from kill-
ing the soldiers was himself badly beaten. An hour later the APC was 
still burning. The fate of its occupants was unknown. 
Other youths in the crowd were trying to pull down or otherwise 
disable the remote video cameras mounted on lamp standards up and 
down Changan A venue in the vicinity of the square. Their instinct 
was correct. Footage from the cameras, which had been installed os-
tensibly for traffic monitoring, was later screened again and again on 
television by the authorities, both to construct an image of the pro-
democracy demonstrators as wanton rioters and to identify those the 
authorities sought to arrest. 
1 a.m. 
As the truck and APC columns from the south fought their way 
toward Tiananmen, laying down a blanket of tear gas and rifle fire, the 
first regular infantry troops moved into the square from the south. 
They were sweaty and exhausted, and many of them were injured. 
They slumped down to rest in front of Chairman Mao's Memorial 
Hall. But they had little respite. Crowds quickly formed, and a rain 
of bottles and rocks fell upon them. Some of the soldiers were badly 
injured in this new barrage, but there were apparently no medics 
among them, and it was impossible for military ambulances to get 
through into the square. A squad of riot police that arrived to clear 
away the mob came under a deadly hail of bottles and rocks. 
By now, however, troops were beginning to move into the out-
skirts of the square from all sides. Several hundred of them, armed 
with long sticks but equipped with neither rifles nor bayonets, came 
into the square from the southeast. They walked between the Museum 
of the Chinese Revolution and the Hong Kong material supply sta-
tion, a temporary assemblage of tents and tables on the square that 
Hong Kong students had been using as a base to supply the material 
needs of the pro-democracy students. Hong Kong students who 
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watched the soldiers walk by to take up positions in front of the mu-
seum said they looked calm and unwarlike. Some of the troops, they 
reported, even promised not to harm the students in the square. There 
was handshaking between the two groups. It may have been the last 
gesture of friendship of the whole night between the People's Army 
and "the people." 
Now the noise of the hard fighting along the western portion of 
Changan was becoming threateningly close. Paul Caccamo of Garden 
City, N.Y., who was teaching English in the northern city of 
Changchun, had come into Beijing two days earlier. He left the square 
at the north end around 12:30 a.m. and moved with some Chinese 
friends toward where the noise of strife was loudest, about a mile away 
to the west. "Suddenly the crowd in front of me halted," he recalls. 
"I thought the troops in front of us would move and tum back. There 
was this faith in the People's Army. Some people even told me that 
the soldiers were using only plastic bullets. The people in front of me 
had linked arms. But the soldiers facing them were kneeling down 
and were spraying the crowd with bullets. In the first second, every-
body turned and ran. I thought I was never going to stop running." 
Eventually, a Chinese grabbed Caccamo by the arm and told him 
he could stop: the immediate danger was past. A man came up to 
him and shouted, "Foreigner, foreigner, come and look at this!" "I 
walked over to where he was," Caccamo says, "and there on a bicycle 
rack was an 18-year-old girl with a bullet through her chest. That 
changed my mind about everything." 
As the crowd retreated to another intersection blocked by buses, 
there were frantic shouts to set the vehicles on fire. But the troops 
were moving fast now and had already jogged around the buses and 
were taking aim again at the swirling mob in front of them. Caccamo 
and several Chinese raced down Fuyou Street, next to Zhongnanhai, 
but a squad of the troops followed, shooting indiscriminately. Cac-
camo dived to the ground. When he thought there was a safe moment, 
he sprinted to the Zhongnanhai wall. Looking round, he saw dozens 
of bodies lying in the street. Some of the victims were probably still 
alive, but he could not stop to check: He and many others raced north 
to escape pursuit. 
Meanwhile, BBC's Kate Adie had persuaded her driver to leave 
the relative safety of the Palace Hotel and circumnavigate the Forbid-
den City. After midnight, this was the only reasonably safe way to 
approach Changan A venue to the west of Tiananmen. The car took 
the first ring road and approached the overpass at Fuxingmen. Long 
before reaching it, Adie was suprised by the number of roadblocks that 
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citizens had put up at almost every major intersection. The car 
stopped some 400 yards from the overpass, and Adie and her crew got 
out to take a look. "We couldn't believe it," she said. "The whole of 
the top of the overpass on Changan had blazing trucks on it. Soldiers 
were silhouetted against them and were firing at people. There were 
heavy trucks and APCs pushing through. We were at the bottom of 
the exit ramp from the ring road and were crawling on the grass. I 
saw about five people fall to the ground nearby. Others were just 
standing there in disbelief. There were a lot of people who didn't seem 
to realize how lethal the shooting was." 
At the intersection of Xidan and Changan, four buses were on 
fire. There was hand-to-hand combat all around the intersection, with 
the demonstrators and units of the 27th Army mingling in a furious, 
running melee. A Chinese photographer of the liberal intellectual 
magazine Nexus was aiming her camera at the scenes of violence 
around her. A junior officer approached her from behind and shot her 
in the back with his pistol. The bullet passed through her body and 
left a gaping wound in her stomach. Astonishingly, she survived. 
Just west of the intersection, the mob began rocking an officer's 
jeep and succeeded in overturning it. Furious, the officer crawled out 
and fired several times into the crowd, killing four people. When he 
had stopped firing--either for lack of ammunition or because his gun 
jammed-the mob jumped him and beat him to death. Then they 
stripped him, castrated him, slit open his stomach and disemboweled 
him. They hung his body by the neck against the side of a gutted city 
bus, an officer's cap placed contemptuously on his disfigured head. A 
crudely written slogan placed near the corpse read, "The people will 
be victorious." 
At about the same time, near Qianmen, another officer fell into 
the hands of the enraged mob after shooting several women to death. 
He too was beaten to a pulp, then hung by the neck from the overpass 
at Qianmen and the eastern side of Tiananmen. Other soldiers caught 
by demonstrators after assaulting civilians were thrown from over-
passes, set on fire, castrated or thrown into Beijing's canals. In an 
attempt to vilify the demonstrators, Chinese television for several days 
subjected its audience to grisly shots of the disemboweled Xidan of-
ficer. Even nearly two weeks after the massacre, it was airing horrify-
ing footage of incinerated cadavers of soldiers literally being shoveled 
out of the charred remains of burned out trucks and APCs. 
Tracer fire over the square was becoming almost constant. Gun-
fire was lapping at the very edges of Tiananmen from the south, partic-
ularly around the Kentucky Fried Chicken franchise, and the western 
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end of the square on Changan. Nick Griffin, a correspondent with 
Asia Television in Hong Kong, decided with his crew that the monu-
ment, stuck in the middle of the square, was both a dangerous place to 
be based and a difficult spot from which to observe the swirling cur-
rent of events. So along with his team of two cameramen, two report-
ers, a technician, his boss and a personal assistant, Griffin moved to 
the side of the square just south of the Great Hall and climbed to the 
roof of the public lavatory. "It gave us a great view of Tiananmen," 
he said. 
What he saw was not encouraging for the students. Some 5,000 
troops had infiltrated the square from the south, in addition to those 
already resting on the ground by Mao's Tomb or lined up with sticks 
in front of the museum. The crowds shouted, "Leave, leave, you 
mustn't kill them [the students]!" But the troops marched impassively 
down the side street at the south end of the Great Hall, then entered 
the large building. Later, along with other troops already inside the 
Great Hall, they were to emerge through the main doors on the east 
front and move down the steps into the square. Meanwhile, ambu-
lances were coming and going into the square to pick up critically 
injured demonstrators who had been treated at a temporary first-aid 
station. Many of the wounded had serious gunshot wounds and were 
close to death. Volunteer Chinese doctors from nearby hospitals, as 
well as medical students and some medics from Hong Kong, worked 
in desperate conditions-no running water, no proper medical sup-
plies, no sterilization-to save what lives they could. "These are the 
children of China," a Chinese physician told a Western reporter. "I 
will be the last to leave." If he was, he almost certainly suffered the 
fate of several Chinese doctors in the square, who were bayoneted or 
shot to death as the 27th Army advanced. 
Perhaps no group in Beijing behaved more heroically during the 
night of June 3-4 than the doctors who worked to save lives and limbs 
in the hospitals close to the center of Beijing. Several doctors from the 
Beijing Union Medical College Hospital and other institutions took 
turns providing basic first aid on the square. Many were either killed 
where they were working or arrested for allegedly assisting 
demonstrators. 
The hospitals quickly turned into scenes out of Bruegel or Hier-
onymus Bosch as the dead and wounded were carried in-sometimes 
on stretchers, sometimes on bicycles, sometimes even on doors con-
verted in desperation to portable beds. The dead were often dumped 
unceremoniously into side rooms because the hospital morgue was al-
ready overflowing and the staff had no time to cope with people who 
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were no longer alive. The BBC's Kate Adie, like several Western re-
porters, found her car and driver at one point swept up in a desperate 
effort to get wounded Chinese as rapidly as possible to medical care. 
She recalls, "I came to a section of the crowd that was shouting 'hospi-
tal!' There was a woman with her brains hanging out, dying. We took 
her and a man and a female relative to the Children's Hospital, got her 
out of the car and raced in. The place was heaving with action. We 
realized we were in a procession. There were people on bicycles, on 
park benches, on tricycle rickshas. Park benches, with wounded peo-
ple on them, were being carried directly into the operating theater. I 
went into one theater and found, at a quick estimate, that there were 
30 people lying on the tloor. All of them had major gunshot wounds, 
to the head, the body, the legs, everywhere." 
"A man with a two-way radio seized me. The Chinese escorting 
me shouted 'Party man! Party man!' and hustled me away from him. 
There were 30 to 50 people brought in in the first 20 minutes there, 
and the doctors and nurses were in a state of rage. There was no con-
fusion in their minds as to what had happened. They were screaming 
with sheer outrage." 
A few hours later, after returning to the Beijing Hotel to tele-
phone her broadcast to London, Adie took her crew to the Beijing 
Union Medical College Hospital, the largest and best-equipped medi-
cal facility in the vicinity of Tiananmen. "The operating theater was 
on the third tloor," she recalled. "The surgeon was saying, 'We just 
can't cope. How many have come through here? Hundreds. But you 
must be careful.' A middle-aged woman, an official, started screaming 
at me, and the students with me screamed back at her. Then they took 
me to another room and pointed out to me a Xinhua News Agency 
reporter with a serious head wound. A lot of people were uncon-
scious. There was no treatment being given. Two days later they told 
me that many doctors and nurses had been shot on the square. There 
was a struggle around me between the party people and the students. 
All the people were shouting, 'Tell, tell, tell the world!' " 
Dr. Michael Mueller, an American physician who was in Beijing 
at the time, was told by Chinese medical friends that at least nine doc-
tors had been killed helping the wounded in and around Tiananmen 
and that several doctors had been beaten up inside the hospitals by 
troops who came in looking for wounded students. "They were very 
scared," Mueller said of his Chinese colleagues. Chinese physicians 
and nurses told Western reporters that the troops in a few instances 
pulled life-support systems away from seriously wounded patients, 
then struggled with doctors who tried to interfere. Some Chinese 
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medical personnel were almost certainly killed inside their hospitals. 
As for the corpses, the hospitals at first refused to permit relatives to 
see or collect them. But at some hospitals the crush of angry relatives 
was so great that the authorities had to relent. Still, many hospitals 
kept their cadavers for days afterward, under instructions from mar-
tial-law authorities not to reveal the number of dead they held. 
1:30 a.m. 
It was only a matter of minutes before the 27th Army would 
burst through the final barriers with tanks and ACPs and occupy 
Tiananmen Square. Some students and even teenagers were sharpen-
ing tent poles and other crude pikes. Other demonstrators were don-
ning surgical masks against the anticipated tear gas. A few formed 
what they called "daredevil squads," which would, they hoped, attack 
the troops in needle-like guerrilla actions around the city. 
All evening long, the war of the loudspeakers had continued, with 
the more powerful, Party-controlled amplifiers repeating the martial-
law warnings to people in the square to disperse or else accept full 
responsibility for any physical harm they suffered. The less powerful 
student loudspeakers broadcast defiant accusations of military brutal-
ity and recordings of the Internationale, the socialist anthem. 
At precisely 1:30 a.m., a chilling new order came booming from 
the government speakers. "A serious counterrevolutionary rebellion 
has occ1.J,rred in the capital this evening," it declaimed ominously. 
Many of the students flinched at the word counterrevolutionary, a 
deadly accusation in Chinese Communist parlance. It had not been 
previously used in government descriptions of the pro-democracy pro-
tests, but its currency now meant only one thing: the army would be 
pitiless in its suppression of the protest. The announcement contin-
ued: "Rioters have furiously attacked soldiers and robbed them of 
their weapons and ammunition. They have burned military vehicles, 
set up roadblocks and kidnaped officers and men in an attempt to sub-
vert the People's Republic of China and overthrow the socialist sys-
tem. The People's Liberation Army has kept an attitude of restraint 
for some days. However, the counterrevolutionary rebellion must now 
be resolutely counterattacked. Residents of the capital should strictly 
abide by the specific regulations as provided by martial law and coop-
erate with the soldiers to safeguard the constitution and defend the 
security of the socialist motherland and its capital. The personal 
safety of anyone cannot be guaranteed if he disregards this warning. 
He will be held responsible for all the consequences." 
The announcement was repeated over and over. As the official 
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voice began to blend with the furious noise of the army breaking into 
the square, the students responded with an appeal of their own. "Do 
you still have a conscience?" their loudspeakers asked the troops be-
ginning to pour into Tiananmen. "We are all Chinese." 
Other demonstrators were driving buses back and forth on the 
north side of Changan in front of the Gate of Heavenly Peace while 
the students inside tried to figure out what to do with them. One bus 
was driven directly into the narrow tunnel in the middle of the gate 
and parked with deliberate awkwardness at an angle from one side to 
the other. The driver seemed intent on protecting the students in the 
square from being attacked by motorized units possibly concealed 
within the ancient courtyards of the Emperors. In another, almost 
suicidal maneuver, one driver smashed his bus right into the front of 
the first convoy to reach the square. As a result, the tanks and APCs 
ground temporarily to a halt just 100 yards west of the square proper. 
Behind them were several helmeted troops. 
Quickly, military snipers started running along the wall of the 
Forbidden City, shooting as they went, and taking up positions to pro-
tect the north flank of the 27th Army as it prepared to enter the square 
proper. There were still thousands of people in the square, though 
none seemed to know exactly what to do. The headlights of armored 
personnel carriers, tanks and trucks were gleaming malevolently in the 
blackness, as though hunching up for a final pounce. 
About 100 yards in front of them, a thin line of students and 
workers, arms linked, stood defiantly, waiting for the military to make 
the next move. Then the rattle of automatic fire was heard, and sev-
eral in the front line of demonstrators crumpled to the ground. Shoot-
ing now seemed to be going on from several points on the northern 
side of the square. There was a constant to and fro of flatbed bicycles 
and tricycle rickshas coming and going with the wounded, blood drip-
ping onto the street, or in some places left thick upon the ground. 
Ambulances continued to make their way through the crowds to the 
center of the square or to the first-aid tent not far from the Goddess of 
Democracy. Several ambulances arrived at nearby hospitals with bul-
let holes in the doors. 
The most militant of the demonstrators fought back with little 
effect on the relentless advance of the soldiers. Molotov cocktails 
bounced against some of the APCs. Rocks were hurled through the 
air toward the west where the bulk of the armor and troops still held 
itself coiled for the final push. But most of the crowd now ran in 
terror from the volleys of AK -4 7 rounds that smashed back and forth 
in front of the gate. 
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2 a.m. 
Soon there was almost constant firing in the northern part of the 
square, most of it by troops moving eastward to block access along 
Changan. But while the crowd that had been herded east by the in-
coming troops had given ground in the square, it still contained 
thousands of demonstrators. More firing broke out. More people 
dropped, bleeding, to the street, and the pain stricken demonstrators 
began to disappear up north-south streets leading off Changan. 
To Hong Kong correspondent Nick Griffin, watching from his 
perch on the roof of the public lavatory south of the Great Hall, what 
was frightening about the newest wave of troops entering the square in 
his vicinity was their demeanor. "They looked doped up to their eye-
balls," he recalled. "They were waving their rifles around. When ci-
vilians would grab at them, they would nod as though spaced out." 
Other reporters who had seen the 27th Army up close on its way down 
Changan found chilling the manner in which some of the soldiers were 
smiling as they discharged their rifles. These impressions lent cur-
rency to a persistent rumor that the men of the 27th had been given 
amphetamines before their final thrust into Tiananmen. The most 
commonly relayed account was that the troops had been told they 
needed immunization against the poor hygiene in the square, and were 
then given either injections or tablets. There was no official confirma-
tion of those reports. 
Not far from the square, Michael Fathers, Asia editor of the Brit-
ish daily newspaper The Independent, was set upon by 27th Army 
troops. "Several soldiers broke ranks and ran to me, punching me and 
kicking me," he reported. "There was pure hatred in their eyes. They 
pushed me into a kneeling position and had another go at me, whack-
ing me across the back with their rods and kicking, always kicking, 
until I fell over. They pulled off my spectacles and crushed them." 
Added Fathers: "If this is the People's Army, God spare China." 
Dozens of APCs were now grinding across the square from west 
to east, taking up positions facing south. With them came more hel-
meted troops, assault rifles at the ready. Amazingly, a bus filled with 
young demonstrators went speeding westward against the flow of the 
crowd straight into the advancing APC columns, evidently determined 
to help stop the military onslaught. From their increasingly danger-
ous perches on the top level of the monument, Western camera crews 
recorded the scene as riot police boarded the bus as soon as it stopped, 
dragged out the driver and other occupants, and began beating them 
with long truncheons. 
Light machine guns were now being set up on tripods on the 
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north and west sides of the square, and Tiananmen was already 
hemmed in by troops on three sides. Only to the south was there 
room for crowds to come and go. The gaps were rapidly being filled 
here too, as more and more soldiers came in from the convoys that 
had by now broken through by the Kentucky Fried Chicken store. 
When some people in the large crowd still in the northern part of 
Tiananmen started shouting "Strike! Strike!" the troops fired directly 
into them. 
Bullets began thudding into the upper stories of the Beijing Hotel, 
which offered a clear view of Tiananmen to several Western camera 
crews inside. But that vantage was not safe. People on the hotel's 
balconies spotted army sharpshooters on the roof of the Ministry of 
Public Security building across the street. Military snipers seem to 
have occupied other high points in and around the square. Some Bei-
jing Hotel occupants were warned by public-security officials that they 
would be shot at if they came out to watch what was happening. 
Whenever the cacophony of rifle fire would let up a little, though, an-
other sound would filter up to the balconies, the sound of the screams 
and groans of the wounded and the incessant torrent of abuse shouted 
at the troops. 
3 a.m. 
By now, Changan Avenue between the Beijing Hotel and 
Tiananmen Square had been cut in two by several lines of soldiers who 
sat or knelt sullenly, aiming their rifles toward the angry and taunting 
crowds. The crowds moved back and forth on foot or on bicycle be-
tween stalled buses and other vehicles dragooned into service as barri-
cades by angry citizens. In the square, a few thousand students and 
workers were left, boldly taunting the incoming soldiers with shouts of 
"Fascist!" and hurling insults at Li Peng. The student loudspeakers 
were responding to the endless government repetition of the martial-
law warning with news of the casualty situation. 
In the south of the square, troops were putting together a perime-
ter toward Qianmen, trying to keep people away from the Great Hall. 
Many of the troops had bayonets fixed on their AK-47s, lending a 
sinister new dimension to their growing numbers. In the tents closest 
to the edge of the square, most of the students roused themselves from 
sleep and other activities and moved closer to the monument. Surpris-
ingly, Hou Dejian, the Taiwanese vocalist and hunger striker, was still 
there with his companions. Around 3:30 a.m., he succeeded in negoti-
ating with a senior officer in the square a moratorium on a fullscale 
military assault, pending a student vote to withdraw from the square 
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peacefully. The officer agreed to allow additional time before clearing 
the square. 
But Hou had little room for maneuver among the remaining stu-
dents, workers, and sympathizers close to the monument. An hour 
earlier Chai Ling, the spellbinding student orator, announced to her 
fellow demonstrators over the public address system that those who 
wished to leave could do so. Yet even this declaration had intensified 
disagreements among the remaining protesters. Hou and Beijing Nor-
mal University lecturer Liu Xiaobo, two of the four hunger strikers, 
took turns appealing for calm and nonbelligerence through the stu-
dent-controlled speaker system. But when they convened a meeting of 
student representatives in one of the tents, one faction favored a quiet 
withdrawal from the square while another insisted that everyone 
should stay until death. 
Several students had prepared Molotov cocktails, and one group 
had a rifle and a machine gun captured from troops the previous 
morning. A student organizer later explained, "One worker held onto 
the machine gun with one hand and brandished an iron bar with the 
other. He swung against anyone who tried to wrest the gun out of his 
hands. But we patiently explained that, yes, he could mow down sev-
eral soldiers, but it would be at the cost of several hundred of us get-
ting killed too. Finally, he relented and we had the gun removed from 
the square." 
4 a.m. 
The initiative was hardly with the students now. As the govern-
ment-controlled loudspeakers kept up their ominous warnings, the 
bright street lights, which had burned every night during the student 
occupation of Tiananmen, were suddenly and without warning extin-
guished. It was 4 a.m. There was a brief and dramatic silence before a 
spotlight came on and illuminated thousands of helmeted soldiers with 
mounted bayonets coming out of the Great Hall and taking up posi-
tions in front of the building, ready to move into the square. "They 
filled out the whole parking lot," recalled David Schweisberg, U.P.I.'s 
Beijing bureau chief. "Their uniforms and bayonets were glinting. 
Immediately, the students played the Internationale on their speaker 
system and began singing it. Some of them lit fires around the monu-
ment. Otherwise, it was pitch dark. Then people seemed to come 
back into the square from side streets and joined in the singing of the 
lnternationale. It was eerie." 
The lights came on again at 4:39 a.m. APCs were rumbling into 
the center of the square, heading for the tent city that had occupied 
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that area for weeks. At the same time, there was a great burst of gun-
fire all over the square, most of it, at first, apparently over the heads of 
the people. Suddenly, a great fear seemed to take over most of the 
remaining protesters still in the square, and a large exodus began, all 
of it to the southeast, where the troops had kept an exit corridor open. 
Over a loudspeaker, Hou Dejian explained why he and the other hun-
ger strikers, who were now essentially the leaders of the remaining 
protesters, were willing to quit the square. "We're not afraid to die," 
he said, "but we've already lost too much blood." 
About ten APCs had started rolling into the tents now, smashing 
them fiat and destroying everything in them. On the west side of the 
square, the thousands of troops from the Great Hall also started mov-
ing in, forcing anyone in their pathway to move, bayoneting some who 
resisted or were not moving fast enough, beating and occasionally 
shooting others. Students later claimed that several of their number 
had been crushed to death in the tents by the APCs. The authorities 
denied that charge, but given the fury of the assault it is likely that 
some people did die beneath the tracks of the vehicles. 
5 a.m. 
Chinese commandos in camouflage uniforms surrounded the 
monument with AK-47s and drawn pistols and issued a three-minute 
ultimatum for people to leave. Most of the remaining demonstrators 
took heed and moved quickly away from the monument to the south. 
Others, though, hesitated and were shot on the spot. At exactly 5 a.m. 
a sudden and unexplained burst of artillery and heavy machine-gun 
fire was heard from somewhere south of Tiananmen. Within ten min-
utes, troops were pouring into the center of the square from all direc-
tions. The attack forced the several hundred students who remained 
either to flee to the corridor still left open, where student marshals 
were guiding their comrades to the safety of side streets, or to face 
near certain death. 
By now firing was continuous in the vicinity of the square, though 
it was difficult to be sure exactly from which direction it was coming. 
Over the loudspeakers, students called on the ordinary citizens of Bei-
jing to do what they could to stop the troops. Nonstudent crowds in 
the square area responded by trying to block the intersections leading 
into it. Despite plaintive appeals for calm, some demonstrators con-
tinued to hurl Molotov cocktails at incoming APCs, and two were set 
alight on the outskirts of the square. As many of the students trickled 
out of the square, they chanted, "Down with fascists! Down with vio-
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lence!" Others flashed the V sign and shouted "Go with us!" at ap-
plauding Beijing residents. 
At the eastern end of the square, ambulances were no long being 
permitted through the defense perimeter set up by troops across 
Changan A venue near the Beijing Hotel. Thousands of young people 
were angrily milling around about 75 yards from the sitting soldiers. 
Many people were shouting "Fascists!" and "Beasts!" From time to 
time, a group of troops would stand up, or adopt a kneeling position, 
and fire straight at the most provocative looking knots of people, fel-
ling several and sending the others scurrying for cover. 
What happened in the next hour or so is difficult to piece to-
gether, but it is almost certain that this is when the most deaths oc-
curred in the square. At about 5:15a.m., a convoy of eight tanks, 21 
APCs and more than 40 trucks crammed with troops roared down 
Changan Avenue, past the Jianguo Hotel and across the Jian-
guomenwai overpass toward Tiananmen. Despite the absence of other 
traffic, it took them 15 minutes to reach the square. They had to 
smash through low railings, disabled buses and piles of debris left on 
the road by Beijing citizens to try to slow down incoming units. At 
5:30a.m., the tanks crunched at high speed past the Beijing Hotel and 
into the square. The tanks led the convoy, chiefly because they were 
the only vehicles capable of plowing through the burned-out buses and 
piled-up construction equipment that still blocked Changan at the in-
tersection with Wangfujing Street. As they stormed by, the lead tank 
smashed over the last main obstacle on the street, a small construction 
dozer that forced the front of the tank up into a 30° angle. The dozer 
was split, and a pathway was cleared for the APCs and trucks. 
As the tanks roared on, the sound of machine-gun and automatic-
rifle fire from the trucks was constant, and some of the APCs started 
emitting noxious clouds of tear gas. Despite the danger, young men 
were still crouching in front of the wall of the Forbidden City, hurling 
rocks and bottles vainly at the fast moving vehicles and howling with 
rage. But the tanks kept moving toward the square, and it was proba-
bly just after 5:30 that one of them knocked over the Goddess of De-
mocracy statue. Grainy government television footage aired several 
hours later showed a single tank toppling the statue amid signs of des-
olation and destruction in the surrounding parts of the square. Most 
of the shooting from the incoming trucks seemed to be aimed in the 
air, though citizens were still being killed and injured as the convoy 
came through. Then at 5:45, there was intense machine-gun fire either 
from the northern end of Tiananmen Square or from inside the For-
bidden City. Tracer fire also continued to arc through the sky, and the 
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occasional heavy boom of a tank or artillery round punctuated the 
night. 
6 a.m. 
The last of the students staggered out of the square. Even then, 
though, they were not safe. As they walked, arms linked, down Qian-
men Road, several were chased by APCs. As many as eleven people 
were crushed as they tried to make their way first west, then north to 
their universities. Several dozen students were shot at point blank as 
they approached Changan A venue on their way north on Beixinhua 
Street. Eyewitnesses said the gunfire was ferocious for several min-
utes. Other students in the street were crushed against walls by APCs. 
Back on the square, the army was mopping up. The number of 
corpses may never be known, or what happened to them or to the 
unfortunates who were wounded and could not be evacuated. There 
were persistent reports soon after the massacre that flamethrowers and 
blowtorches were used to incinerate piles of dead on the spot. Other 
reports asserted that several of the casualties were removed from the 
square and taken west along Changan in military trucks. Some ver-
sions had it that the dead were taken to Babaoshan Revolutionary 
Cemetery, one of the few large crematoriums in Beijing, and that the 
bodies were immediately cremated. Other stories spoke of a mass in-
cineration of corpses out in the Western Hills within the military-se-
curity zone. 
In the official effort to rebut charges of indiscriminate shooting in 
the closing minutes of the military attack on Tiananmen, political of-
ficer General Zhang Gong asserted that "there was not a single casu-
alty on the square." It is conceivable, though unlikely, that in the 
central part of the square around the monument, there were no fatali-
ties during the period in question. Too many reporters, other foreign-
ers and Chinese, however, witnessed volley after volley of gunfire 
directly into crowds on Changan on the edge of the square, and heard 
furious fusillades within the square during the time in question, for the 
government claim to be taken seriously. 
Dawn 
As the sun came up on June 4, citizens of Beijing who were una-
ware of the night's chaos awoke to a shocking sight. Spirals of black 
smoke were rising over several parts of the city from burning military 
and civilian vehicles. Dozens of intersections were littered with the 
carcasses of burned-out buses and trucks, with rocks, bricks, smashed 
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bottles, half-demolished construction equipment, discarded shell cas-
ings, and pedestrian and bicycle guard rails dragged into the street and 
then twisted into baroque shapes by the tracks of onrushing armor. A 
smashed bus still burned near the Wangfujing and Changan intersec-
tion. It had not been used as an obstacle to the military but as a make-
shift ambulance. Toward the west along Changan, destruction was 
still taking place. Bold groups of citizens were systematically destroy-
ing APCs that had either parked or stalled during the slow move east-
ward into the city the previous night. Before long, the line of burned-
out APCs near the Minzu Hotel looked more like a national military 
debacle than what the authorities termed, early Sunday, as their "ini-
tial victory" over the "scum of society." 
The army later acknowledged that 364 military vehicles-tanks, 
trucks, APCs, jeeps and military buses---had been destroyed in the 
furious hours of combat with unarmed civilians in the center of Bei-
jing. Authorities claimed that some 1,000 troops had been killed or 
injured. Some Western military attaches put the figure higher. 
In any case, the killing of civilians was still continuing, now in 
broad daylight. Near the Beijing Hotel along Changan, group after 
group of civilians would come within 50 yards of the sullen lines of 
troops guarding the square and taunt them. Then, provoked to the 
point of anger, an officer would give an order and a volley of AK-47 
rounds would fly, sending the crowd scrambling once more and leav-
ing another dozen or so bodies on the street. A particularly vicious 
round of gunfire at 10:27 a.m. left dozens of people littering the sur-
face of Changan. Several rounds also hit the Beijing Hotel, where a 
handful of Western reporters had managed to elude the room searches 
conducted earlier in the morning by angry public-security officials. 
Alexis Feringer, a graduate student at Tufts University's Fletcher 
School of Law and Diplomacy and working temporarily for Cable 
News Network, carefully observed every major event from her elev-
enth floor Beijing Hotel balcony from late Saturday night until early 
Monday morning. Her notebook indicates six incidents of troops fir-
ing into the crowds on Sunday: at 10:55 a.m., 11:53 a.m., 12:10 p.m., 
1:10 to 1:15 p.m., 2 p.m., and 3:20p.m. On each occasion, there were 
casualties. Meanwhile, Chinese military helicopters were landing and 
taking off from Tiananmen Square at almost five-minute intervals, 
probably helping evacuate the seriously wounded from Tiananmen. 
How many civilians died in the battle for Beijing? No one may 
ever know the precise figures, even if the regime in China were to 
change and a truly honest investigation were conducted. Children 
were killed holding hands with their mothers. A nine-year-old boy 
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was shot seven or eight times in the back, and his parents placed the 
corpse on a truck and drove through the streets of northwest Beijing 
Sunday morning. "This is what the government has done," the dis-
traught mother kept telling crowds of passersby through a makeshift 
speaker system. A similarly gruesome traveling atrocity exhibition 
was arranged by students at the pro-democracy Political Science and 
Law College of China. The cadavers of five students who had been 
crushed by APCs after leaving Tiananmen Square early in the morn-
ing were packed in ice and carried in grisly pomp from university to 
university in northeastern Beijing. 
Workers were shot bicycling to factories, old people died in their 
apartments as bullets thudded into the building. Students were 
crushed even on Sunday morning by APCs roaring west along 
Changan. Moreover, many bodies may never be located. Aside from 
isolated soldiers thrown into canals or the question of the dead on 
Tiananmen Square, some corpses were dumped into rooms in build-
ings that had no connection with hospitals. Mitch Presnick, of Cen-
terville, Va., a graduate student at Peking University, was taken 
surreptitiously into a building in northeastern Beijing and shown sev-
eral corpses-all of student age-lying on tables. He never discovered 
where they had been killed, or what the bodies were doing there. 
U.P.I.'s David Schweisberg called several Beijing hospitals for a 
body count for the first three days after the massacre and added up a 
total of 321 dead-until the hospitals refused, under government pres-
sure, to give out any more figures. Officials of the Chinese Red Cross 
reported that 2,600 died, but then they too were ordered to keep silent 
and to deny that they had ever given out such figures. The mayor of 
Beijing announced that more than 1,000 army personnel had been 
killed or wounded in the street fighting, but he made no mention of 
civilian casualties, which, it stood to reason, would have been greater. 
A courageous announcer for Radio Beijing's English service told lis-
teners that "thousands" of protesters "had died in the tragic incident" 
and called upon the people of all countries to "join our protests against 
the barbarous suppression of the people." Several minutes later, an-
other version of the same news item was broadcast, and the announcer 
who had read the first bulletin was never heard again on the radio. 
The Far Eastern Economic Review reported that Beijing hospitals 
queried by its correspondents had come up with a total of about 700 
deaths. At the other end of the spectrum, Beijing-based Soviet corre-
spondents reported privately to their editors that they estimated the 
number of dead to be close to 10,000. Experienced East European 
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diplomats who specialize in Chinese affairs also seemed to find this 
figure comfortable. 
In all probability, the total number of civilian dead in Beijing dur-
ing the 24-hour period beginning around 10 p.m. Saturday, June 3, 
was between 1,000 and 5,000. The number of soldiers killed was prob-
ably in the scores or low hundreds. 
Whatever the number, all were the victims of what can only be 
called a massacre. All died because of efforts by a reactionary regime 
to stop the clock on political change in the world's most ancient con-
tinuous civilization. As a youthful leader told a Western correspon-
dent shortly after the taking of Tiananmen Square: "Our calls for 
democracy have reached the living rooms of a largely apolitical peo-
ple. Now, at least, they know that there are such things as democracy 
and freedom and that they too deserve them." 

6. BEIJING BLOODBATH* 
Russell Watson** 
Almost to the end, the students thought they could win. As 
troops closed in on Tiananmen Square before dawn on Sunday, the 
unarmed protesters defiantly stood their ground. "You have to give 
your life to the movement," the students shouted over their loud-
speaker. But two hours later, as gunfire echoed outside the square, the 
last holdouts gave in to despair. "We can't let any more blood flow," 
someone shouted over the loudspeaker. "We must leave." The last 
1,000 or so students wearily walked out of the square, many of them in 
tears. At that point the Army stormed down the streets toward 
Tiananmen-tanks, armored personnel carriers and trucks full of 
troops, spitting gunfire in all directions. They smashed through the 
protesters' frail barricades and charged into the square, where they 
demolished the students' provocative statue, the "Godess of Democ-
racy." Angry civilians poured into the streets shouting, "You beasts! 
You beasts!" The soldiers shot back, killing 500 to 1,000 people and 
leaving the democracy movement in ruins. 
After seven weeks of nonviolent protest-and a strangely passive 
response from the government-the upheaval in China finally pro-
duced the bloodbath all sides had feared. The crackdown began 24 
hours before with a feeble thrust by mostly unarmed soldiers. Re-
pulsed and humiliated, the Army came back for more, and some of the 
demonstrators took to throwing rocks and even firebombs at them. 
Just after midnight on Sunday morning, the Army sent an armored 
personnel carrier roaring through the top of the square where a huge 
portrait of Mao Zedong sits atop the gate to the Forbidden City, the 
old imperial palace. Later, when two more APC's entered the square, 
protesters were waiting for them with Molotov cocktails. One escaped 
in flames. The other stalled and burned, its crew jumping free only to 
be beaten by the crowd. 
The Army had a provocation that it may have been seeking. Its 
own loudspeakers warned the protesters: "If you have taken guns 
from soldiers, do not use them"--even though a NEWSWEEK corre-
• Reprinted by permission of Newsweek, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from 
Newsweek, June 12, 1989. 
•• The other authors of this article include Melinda Liu, Tony Clifton, Lenore 
Magidan, Carroll Bugent, and Douglas Walker. 
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spondent in the square could see no students carrying firearms. Soon 
the Army began its paroxysm of violence. In the casualty room of one 
nearby hospital, where blood was inches deep on the floor, a man shot 
through the arm told a wire-service reporter: "They were simply rak-
ing the crowd with bullets." 
The military move may have been intended, in part, to break a 
political stalemate. For two weeks, Deng Xiaoping, China's 84-year-
old senior leader, had been trying to purge Zhao Ziyang, 70, the Gen-
eral Secretary of the Communist Party, who had argued for concilia-
tion with the students. Deng was supported by Prime Minister Li 
Peng and other hardliners, most of them elderly. They accused Zhao 
of "counterrevolutionary" and "antiparty" intrigues, but he refused to 
confess his "crimes," according to a liberal source. Many Party offi-
cials had little stomach for a deep and bitter purge of Zhao and other 
moderates. As the power struggle dragged on, some hardliners argued 
for the face-saving symbolism of a move by the People's Liberation 
Army, itself apparently divided, to restore order in the capital. "It 
won't do for the PLA not to enter Beijing,'' Qiao Shi, head of the 
Party's security department, told his colleagues. 
Pyrrhic victory: The Army thrust apparently restored the gov-
ernment's control over Tiananmen, but did not quell the spirit of pro-
test. Knots of angry people gathered all over the city, sometimes 
drawing more gunfire. Deng's crackdown was almost universally con-
demned. "I deeply deplore the decision to use force against peaceful 
demonstrators,'' George Bush said in Maine. And at the edge of 
Tiananmen, a weeping girl said the bloodshed had gained the regime 
nothing. "The government has won the battle here today," she said. 
"But they have lost the people's hearts." 
The crackdown seemed to begin inauspiciously for the hardliners. 
Before dawn on Saturday, a column of soldiers marched almost tim-
idly down Changan A venue toward Tiananmen Square. The troops 
were young; they wore uniform trousers and white shirts and carried 
no firearms. Several hundred yards short of their objective, crowds of 
civilians swarmed out to block the way, pelting the troops with rub-
bish and shoes and imploring them to stop. The People's Liberation 
Army fell back without a fight. Sheepishly, some of the soldiers said 
their mission was to combat "bad elements" and "hooligans." "Do we 
look like bad people?" asked one demonstrator. 
At about the same time, other columns heading for Tiananmen, 
some equipped with firearms, were stopped and turned back by protes-
ters. An Army officer leading one convoy of 40 trucks was quoted as 
saying: "We will not suppress the people. The people and Army must 
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stand together." The result was a victory parade on Saturday after-
noon, when some 60,000 workers and students celebrated what they 
described as "people's power." 
By afternoon, too, hardline military officers were citing the 
Army's loss of face-including student seizures of soldiers' AK-47 as-
sault rifles-as a reason for reprisal. The troops began to move into 
position again. Soon the confrontations started. A block or so from 
the square, thousands of people hurled stones and bottles in a futile 
effort to push back a column of troops. The soldiers-apparently 
older and more determined than their comrades of the morning 
before-whipped students' faces with belts and hit them with long 
sticks. "You can't hit the people," the crowd chanted, but the soldiers 
continued to beat them. 
In a fracas outside Zhongnanhai, the government compound near 
the square, troops fired about 20 canisters of tear gas into a crowd-
the first use of gas in seven weeks of demonstrations. The demonstra-
tors responded, hurling bricks and rocks at the soldiers and their 
buses. In Tiananmen, government loudspeakers announced new mar-
tial-law orders. They instructed people to stay in their homes and 
warned that security forces were authorized to use any "methods nec-
essary to break through the barricades." The crowds held fast. Near 
the Jianguomenwai diplomatic compound, about 30 military trucks 
were halted, some with slashed tires. Civilians thronged around, lec-
turing the troops about democracy. 
The shooting began at around 10 p.m. Saturday night. Off to the 
west of Tiananmen, protesters pelted a column of troops with chunks 
of paving and set a military bus aflame. The troops opened fire and 
forced their way through. After midnight, soldiers began to move into 
Tiananmen, setting the stage for the bloody denouement. 
For several days before the final crackdown, it appeared that 
Deng's purge might fizzle. By the end of last week, the Communist 
Party Central Committee still had not formally voted Zhao Ziyang out 
of office. At a meeting of about 100 committee members, many agreed 
that Zhao had broken discipline and should be removed as General 
Secretary of the Party. But they balked at labeling him a "counterrev-
olutionary," which would get Zhao expelled from the Party and elimi-
nate any chance for a political comeback. A meeting of all 170 voting 
members of the Central Committee was postponed, apparently be-
cause Deng was unsure of his political support. 
Warming up their old-fashioned propaganda machine, the hard-
liners staged pro-government rallies, blaming the student unrest on 
Chinese dissidents and foreign interests; in at least one parade, the 
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villains wore Uncle Sam costumes. At workplace meetings Zhao and 
his supporters were accused of counterrevolutionary intrigues, but 
even the Party faithful had trouble swallowing that line. At one ses-
sion in a prestigious academy, Party members shouted: "That's 
wrong! That's ridiculous!" After a Party circular had been read, an-
other member stood up and, in a voice dripping sarcasm, said: "Li 
Peng is the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time." 
Despite martial law, about 10,000 student demonstrators decided 
to stick it out in Tiananmen. They defiantly erected the Goddess of 
Democracy, a 33-foot statue made from plaster and plastic foam and 
bearing an obvious resemblance to New York's Statue of Liberty. 
State-controlled television called the statue "an insult to our national 
dignity." The students were of two minds about their long vigil. 
Some militants wanted to continue it until the government agreed to 
their demands: the end of martial law, withdrawal of troops from the 
city, lifting of censorship and a promise of no reprisals against the 
campaigners for democracy. Other students were ready to leave the 
square. Some of them had a new protest in mind: shaving their heads. 
"We would be shaven-headed like prisoners," said philosophy student 
Xiao Yang, "because the government has turned this whole country 
into a prison." 
Old slogans: Deng tried to buttress himself by bringing back 
some survivors of the Long March generation-revered veterans of 
the revolution, many of whom had been forced into retirement for op-
posing his economic reforms. Chen Yun, 84, head of the Central Ad-
visory Committee, a panel of elder statesmen, used the rhetoric of 
earlier purges to blame China's troubles on a "very, very few people 
who intend to create turmoil." Banners suddenly appeared bearing 
another old slogan: "Resolutely oppose bourgeois liberalism." 
What the old guard especially disliked about Zhao was his habit 
of acting on his own, instead of deferring to the elders. President 
Yang Shangkun, 82, who has strong connections to the military, 
charged that Zhao had revealed the existence of "two different voices 
within the Party" and dared to insist on his own ideas, even when 
Deng spoke against them. But the old guard was not unanimous. One 
of the veterans, former Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, 87, an old foe of 
Deng's, said the students' motives were "good, pure, wholesome and 
constructive." There were rumors that Prime Minister Li would be 
replaced, or that the Party elders were scheming to depose Deng him-
self after next October's 40th anniversary of the communist triumph in 
China. Deng was said to have resurrected some of Zhao's reformist 
aides to offset the old guard. 
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He recruited one useful ally in Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, a sup-
porter of Zhao who reportedly had opposed the use of troops to re-
store order. After a long absence from public view, Qin turned up on 
the television news Saturday evening, bringing fraternal greetings from 
Deng and Li to soldiers in Beijing. One theory was that Qin had 
thrown in his lot with the hardliners in order to avoid splitting the 
military. Another was that the hardliners had agreed to a compromise 
with some of the moderates: an agreement to deploy the troops in 
exchange for a lighter touch in the coming political purge. 
The military crackdown that resulted from Deng's political ma-
neuvers played badly overseas. In Hong Kong, scheduled to revert to 
Chinese control in 1997, pro-Beijing leaders began to talk about rene-
gotiating the terms of the merger. In Taiwan, an important source of 
investment for the mainland, President Lee Teng-hui said that Beijing 
"bared the true face of a communist and his true violent nature." 
Other foreign businessmen were expected to be skittish about investing 
in a China whose political and economic future suddenly looked so 
uncertain. 
'Death and taxes': George Bush warned that the hard-won "con-
structive relationship" between Washington and Beijing cannot be 
fully resumed until China returns "to the path of political and eco-
nomic reform." In an interview on Cable News Network, Secretary of 
State James Baker said China's use of force "will disturb the U.S. gov-
ernment and will disturb the American people considerably." Baker 
refused to be drawn into a discussion of how the United States might 
punish China for the crackdown; he even pointed out that Beijing had 
displayed "a significant amount of restraint" for several weeks and 
that there may have been "some violence . . . on both sides., But in 
Congress pressure already was building for sanctions against China. 
Republican Sen. Jesse Helms, who accused the Chinese of "acting as 
communists always do, .. wanted to end all U.S. military cooperation 
with Beijing. Democratic Rep. Stephen Solarz warned that if Bush 
didn't cut off U.S. arms sales to China, Congress would do it for him. 
"The enactment of that legislation is as sure as death and taxes," said 
Solarz. 
Some people in Washington did not want to hurt U.S.-China rela-
tions at a time when Beijing is enjoying a thaw with the Soviet Union. 
"There's a relationship worth maintaining with a country of more 
than 1 billion people," said a senior administration official. "We can-
not undermine 17 years of diplomacy because of one weekend., A few 
members of Congress also were reluctant to go off half-cocked by im-
mediately suspending arms sales to China. But one of them, Sen. Clai-
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borne Pell, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
conceded that if "the crackdown continues and there is further loss of 
life, this cannot help but affect relations between the United States and 
China." 
In a speech he made at the start of the student movement, Deng 
warned that without the unquestioned rule of the Communist Party, 
university students would become "unbridled and brazen. They will 
run wild," he said. But now that Deng has begun to use force to crush 
the students, things may only get worse for China, and for his own 
regime. "The immediate winners, politically, are likely to be losers 
over the long run," says Sinologist Michael Oksenberg of the Univer-
sity of Michigan. Deng's economic reforms will probably be put on 
hold. He will owe the military a debt of uncertain dimensions. His 
government will be handicapped by the resentment of the people 
China needs most: the young, the intelligent, the energetic and inno-
vative. The dead of Tiananmen will be exalted as martyrs, a constant 
rebuke to Deng and the hardliners. By opening fire on the democracy 
movement, Deng and his supporters may have condemned China to 
the fate they fear most: chaos. 
7. THE CRACKDOWN* 
Sandra Burton 
The first account that the sleepless people of Beijing heard from 
their government was sharply at odds with what they had seen and 
with the live television coverage that the rest of the world was watch-
ing. "A handful of thugs who crave nothing short of nationwide chaos 
stirred up a serious counterrevolutionary riot in Beijing," said Mayor 
Chen Xitong in a statement that crackled over Beijing Radio late Sun-
day evening, some 24 hours after the massacre. The army and police 
had rushed to the defense of the socialist system "with a courageous, 
dauntless spirit," the mayor added, but had managed to win only a 
"preliminary victory in the struggle to end the turmoil and smash the 
counterrevolutionary scheme." The People's Government, he con-
cluded, had no choice but "to resolutely crack down on the rioters and 
severely punish them without mercy." 
The student leaders of the democratic movement, who just two 
weeks before had attracted millions of people to their cause, were paid 
only cursory attention in the mayor's account, and their allies among 
the intelligentsia were altogether ignored. Mayor Chen's most glaring 
omission was predictable. He made no reference to the power struggle 
between Deng Xiaoping and the hardliners represented by Premier Li 
Peng, on the one hand, and the liberal faction of fallen Party General 
Secretary Zhao Ziyang on the other, which had paralyzed the leader-
ship for the previous six weeks. 
As reruns of old Korean War movies on the state broadcasting 
network gave way to selective replays of the mayor's message and 
other official statements that were even more farfetched, it became ap-
parent that the government intended to cover up the brutality of its 
crackdown on the democratic movement. Although vestiges of a ma-
jor military operation were everywhere in evidence, a clutch of latter-
day thought controllers was hard at work behind the scenes to say it 
wasn't so. Tanks and armored vehicles were positioned not only in the 
square and other combat areas, but also at major points of entry 
outside the city and at most major intersections inside as well. The 
military had established a particularly heavy presence around the capi-
tal's foreign enclaves, where diplomats, journalists and businessmen 
• Reprinted by permission of Time, Inc., dated November 1, 1989, from Massacre in 
Beijing-China's Struggle for Democracy (New York: Warner Books, 1989). 
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worked and lived.· The undulating wails of ambulance sirens and the 
sharp retort of automatic-weapons fire punctuated the silence of a city 
that was temporarily void of daytime civilian traffic. At night the 
alien groan of APCs navigating the gradual inclines of freeway fly-
overs made sleep difficult. 
As word of the carnage that had taken place on the way to the 
square spread through Beijing on Sunday and Monday, tempers flared. 
One group of grieving students laid the body of a young Tiananmen 
Square victim out on ice and paraded it from campus to campus for all 
to see. At the University of Political Science and Law, the students 
arranged a grisly exhibition of dead bodies. Other students speeded up 
the distribution of posters and tracts, which had begun to serve as an 
alternate press during the heady days of the student demonstrations. 
A concise, 15-point summary of Hong Kong press reportage of the 
Tiananmen massacre, which was posted in the middle of a busy shop-
ping area, drew throngs of passersby. Likewise, a photocopied hand-
bill identified as "Peking University leaflet" and several photographs 
of gruesome civilian casualties, faxed from Hong Kong, were eagerly 
examined by residents of a hutong just behind Tiananmen Square. 
"Loyalists of June 3," read the document, "the 27th Army is a mur-
derer and a slaughterer." 
Many people who had taken up defensive positions on the barri-
cades w~en the army moved in switched to the offensive when the 
major fighting ended. Surrounding stranded convoys wherever they 
found them on Sunday and Monday, they clubbed fleeing soldiers, 
broke open the gas tanks of their vehicles and set them aflame. In 
some cases soldiers beat civilians to the job, torching their own trucks 
after removing ammunition and supplies. By Monday the streets of 
the city were littered with the smoldering hulks of dozens of vehicles. 
Soldiers who approached the inevitable knots of bystanders that gath-
ered near the wreckage were routinely jeered. Just as routinely they 
fired at those who taunted them, adding more casualties to the already 
overburdened hospital wards. 
By then the propaganda campaign was well under way. Official 
party organs, which only weeks before had burgeoned to include ac-
tual news and photos of the student movement in the streets, were 
suddenly transformed back into the sort of shrill broadsheets that 
characterized the Anti-spiritual Pollution Campaign of 1983. Televi-
sion, too, took several steps backward, dropping the usual news re-
ports and substituting the texts of the proliferating martial law 
decrees. TV newsreaders could not bring themselves to look the cam-
era in the eye as they spouted the new government line. The broad-
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casters were warned that they would lose their jobs if they did not put 
a happy face on the revisionist statements they were required to read. 
Among the most startling of that genre was one handed down by 
the Party Central Committee and State Council on June 5, addressed 
to "all Party members and the people of all China." The purpose of 
the counterrevolutionary riots, it claimed, was "to negate the Party's 
leadership and the socialist system" by "killing all47 million Commu-
nist Party members" if necessary. The masterminds of the plot, ac-
cording to the message, were an "extremely few people who have 
doggedly persisted in taking the stand of bourgeois liberalization and 
have colluded with hostile forces overseas, providing Party and state 
vital secrets to illegal organizations." 
Given the outside objectives of the propaganda campaign, it had 
to be at least as crude as the previous weekend's military campaign if it 
were to be effective. The target of the Communist Party Central Com-
mittee's leadership group for propaganda and ideological work was 
not primarily the audience that had witnessed the truth, either first-
hand or through the lenses of foreign television cameras. Rather, it 
was the vast silent majority of Chinese, who it feared might have been 
infected by the same bourgeois liberal notions of free speech, in-
dependent association and government accountabilility that had 
animated the pro-democracy demonstrations. Chief among those the 
propagandists wished to inoculate were the 4 7 million Party members 
who had been exposed to General Secretary Zhao Ziyang's assertions 
that political reform was an essential adjunct to economic reform. 
Determined to eradicate any traces of such heretical thinking, 
Party hardliners had well before the massacre purged all Zhaoists 
from the propaganda group and even forced the hospitalization of one 
member of questionable zeal. The replacements the hardliners chose 
were orthodox political thinkers like Shanghai party boss Jiang Zemin, 
who could work compatibly with the martial law information units 
that had taken over newspaper editorial offices and the state broad-
casting apparatus. The campaign that this newly constituted group 
unveiled two days after the massacre was couched in the only language 
every Chinese citizen understood: the language of fear. 
"Maybe we underestimate the viability of Stalinism as a force to-
day," commented a senior Asian diplomat as the government's cam-
paign of intimidation quickly took on a life of its own. That campaign 
began with the broadcast of a segment of cleverly edited black-and-
white video footage of the devastation wrought by protesters on the 
night of June 4. The tape was shot by the British-made remote-control 
cameras on Beijing's major thoroughfares. Purchased by the Chinese 
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partly with development aid and purportedly installed to monitor city 
traffic, the system's cameras had been rolling throughout the six-week 
period of the demonstrations. 
The cameras had a low-light feature that allowed them to record 
scenes at night, and their lenses stripped the protective cloak of dark-
ness from the rioting near Tiananmen Square. They also homed in on 
individual protesters, like the one caught in the act of smashing the 
windshield of a military truck and hurling bricks at its trapped driver. 
The official voice-over of China Central Television (CCTV) reported 
that both the driver and his assistant had been killed. Both narrator 
and editor ignored the rest of the action depicted on the tape, which 
showed APC's roaring by the disabled truck in pursuit of the primary 
mission of the evening: to retake the square from the pro-democracy 
forces. 
As that and similar tapes were played repeatedly on state televi-
sion in the days following the massacre, the propaganda group, aided 
by 10,000 clerks, combed through miles of other footage previously 
recorded by the same cameras during the weeks of peaceful demon-
strations in the square, looking for frames of key leaders. Once identi-
fied, their faces were frozen into individual electronic mug shots for 
display on the evening news. Not that the leaders were likely to elude 
the ever expanding police dragnet, which included university cam-
puses, transport terminals, known dissident safe houses and those pre-
vious preserves of quasi-immunity, the foreign diplomatic compounds, 
which housed journalists as well as diplomats. 
During the day or two after the massacre, student leaders, their 
intellectual mentors and their chief contacts inside the Party ran for 
their lives. Those who had made contingency plans and secured exit 
permits were able, with the help of accommodating diplomats, to ob-
tain foreign passports and visas. Among them was Marxist theoreti-
cian Su Shaozhi, 63, who was ousted from his post as head of the 
Institute of Marxism-Lenism and Mao Zedong Thought in the wake of 
the 1986-87 student movement. Provided with a Dutch travel docu-
ment, Su was able to board an evacuation flight with a group of Euro-
pean students. An indifferent immigration official simply stamped his 
passport without questioning what a Chinese man of his age was doing 
in such company. 
Others sought refuge inside embassies or prevailed on foreign 
friends to hide them and help spirit them to safety by way of a sort of 
underground railway to the freewheeling Special Economic Zones in 
southern China. There, sympathetic entrepreneurs and bureaucrats 
helped shepherd the suspects to freedom across the border into Hong 
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Kong and Macao. One fugitive made his way onto a Chinese sightsee-
ing boat and jumped overboard off Macao, where he was rescued. 
Several others, who are believed to have been smuggled out of Chinese 
ports in cargo containers, surfaced safely weeks later in France. 
On the morning of Wednesday, June 7, several people who would 
figure prominently on the government's most-wanted list of alleged 
counterrevolutionaries were secretly hidden in the diplomatic com-
pound of Jianguomenwai and the adjacent embassy row. Without 
warning, soldiers manning a checkpoint in the vicinity launched a se-
ries of terrifying puzzling maneuvers. Just before 10 a.m., thousands 
of foot soldiers and a convoy of scores of trucks loaded with troops 
belonging to the despised 27th Army left Tiananmen Square and 
rolled eastward. All night long the men of the 27th had been moving 
out of the capital, to be replaced by fresh troops. 
When the trucks approached the Jianguomenwai overpass, sev-
eral detoured into a side street on which the American and British 
embassies are located, firing shots into the air and yelling, "Go home! 
Go home!" as they passed. Meanwhile, the main column of troops 
proceeded down Changan A venue, spraying the air with erratic bursts 
of gunfire, as if to ward off possible attack from unseen enemies. As 
bullets rained down on them, bicyclists and shoppers scrambled to es-
cape the apparently trigger-happy troops by ducking behind hedges or 
hitting the ground. 
To residents of the apartments inside the Jianguomenwai, which 
overlooked the street, and to employees in the adjacent thirty-story 
office tower belonging to the China International Trust and Invest-
ment Corporation (CITIC), the incident seemed anything but random. 
The bullets that crashed through the plate glass seemed to come from 
buildings of similar height across the street, rather than upward from 
the soldiers on their trucks. In addition, the shots appeared to have 
been aimed at specific targets. 
The small office of the Yugoslav industrial-engineering firm 
SMELT Global Project Management on the 27th floor of the CITIC 
building, for example, was left a shambles by eight shells, which shat-
tered the windows, ripped the blinds and tore through the plaster-
board walls and ceilings, dusting the desktop computers with shards of 
insulation. Ballistics experts who examined the flat trajectories of the 
bullets concluded that some of the shots came from the roof of the 
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, a hotbed of behind-the-scenes 
support for the student movement that had been occupied by the mili-
tary immediately after the massacre. 
SMELT's commanding view of the academy and Tiananmen 
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Square beyond had made it a popular vantage point from which to 
photograph army maneuvers. Just before the attack, a Japanese TV 
cameraman had been warned by Foreign Ministry officials not to con-
tinue taking pictures from SMELT's windows. Afterward; an East 
European diplomat speculated that the attack was "a planned action 
to frighten away foreigners." Said he: "This is the sort of terror that 
does not cause any physical harm." 
Minutes later, hundreds of rounds were fired into the nearby 
apartments of eleven American diplomats and numerous other for-
eigners. The firing was so intense that the U.S. Embassy lodged an 
official protest with the Chinese Foreign Ministry. The U.S. charged 
that the army had made a deliberate and premeditated attack on a 
building inside the diplomatic compound that had become a popular 
observation deck from which foreign military attaches could watch the 
tanks patrolling the bridge below. The embassy report challenged the 
official Chinese account, which held that the apartments were fired on 
by troops who were retaliating against a sniper. "There is no doubt in 
this embassy's opinion that certain apartments were deliberately 
targeted by the army," said the U.S. report, which was released a 
month later. It noted that one U.S. defense attache's quarters had 
been pockmarked with 18 bullet holes. 
One intelligence expert offered an explanation for why the Chi-
nese fired into that particular embassy building. "The night before, 
the Public Security Bureau and the soldiers arrested 24 people and had 
them kneeling on the ground in the execution position while we 
watched from a balcony," he recounted. The security officers, aware 
that foreigners had trained their binoculars on their prisoners, moved 
away. "I am absolutely convinced that those people would have been 
killed if diplomats had not been there." He was quick to admit, how-
ever, that he had no idea what happened to the prisoners afterward. 
Early the following morning at least one of the diplomats was 
warned by his Chinese counterparts not to remain in his apartment. 
By noon his flat was among those that had taken direct hits. Mean-
while, Chinese soldiers had sealed off the gates to the compound on 
the pretext that the mysterious sniper was inside. Residents were 
barred from leaving until plainclothes agents had removed an uniden-
tified Chinese man. Witnesses reported that the man they removed 
was not looking especially worried, leading many foreigners to suspect 
that he was a plant and that there was no suspected sniper at all. In 
fact, some sources claim that the man the authorities were really look-
ing for was Fang Lizhi. According to reports by the Hong Kong mag-
azine The Nineties and Agence France Presse, Fang had been briefly 
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hidden there after the massacre while waiting for the U.S. Embassy to 
answer his request for refuge. 
The family and friends of Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian, a 
physics professor at Peking University who is as active a crusader for 
political change in China as her husband, feared for the couple's safety 
after the imposition of martial law. In late May their friend Perry 
Link, a professor of Chinese literature and director of the U.S. Acad-
emy of Sciences office in Beijing, who had been with the Fangs when 
police prevented them from attending a Feb. 26 banquet hosted by 
President Bush, inquired of an American diplomat whether the Fangs 
could seek refuge inside the U.S. Embassy, if the need arose. The an-
swer he received was noncommittal. 
The morning after the massacre, Link bicycled to the Fangs' spa-
cious apartment near Peking University to check on the safety of his 
controversial friends. He found them relatively calm regarding their 
own condition, but fearful that the country's leaders had gone mad. 
Before they parted company, Li had agreed that if they needed Link's 
help, she would telephone him with a coded message: "Please bring 
the children here to play." 
At 5 p.m. that day she called with the message. Link rushed back 
to find her nearly mute with fear. Friends had phoned to tell them 
that their names topped the government blacklist. This time it was 
Fang himself who queried Link about the possibility of seeking tempo-
rary refuge in the U.S. Embassy. Because it was Sunday, however, the 
embassy was closed. So Link drove the Fangs and their son to the 
nearby Shangri-La Hotel and booked them a room in his name. 
On Monday Li's students called her to report that the military 
was preparing to take over the campuses located in the university belt 
in northwestern Beijing. They told her they were ready to die on the 
barricades, but urged that she and Fang seek protection. With that, 
Link drove the family to the U.S. Embassy, where they met with three 
ranking officials. Fang asked permission to hide in the embassy for a 
couple of days until the matter blew over. The diplomats explained 
that it would be impossible to keep his presence there a secret, given 
the large Chinese staff employed by the embassy and the likelihood of 
bugs. On the other hand, to grant him official protection as a tempo-
rary refugee was tantamount to sentencing him to a long confinement 
inside the embassy-not to mention the damage such a gesture would 
do to Sino-American relations. 
Realizing that public disclosure of any attempt by Fang to seek 
shelter from Americans would discredit both himself and the demo-
cratic movement, he decided to abandon the idea and settle for a U.S. 
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visa. That afternoon Link installed the Fangs in the nearby Jianguo 
Hotel. When he tried to call them the next day, June 6, he received no 
answer. 
In Washington on the same day, a State Department official said 
that Fang Lizhi and his family had been permitted to take refuge in 
the U.S. Embassy in Beijing. According to Agence France Presse, 
Fang was smuggled out of the hotel and into what was regarded as a 
more secure hiding place inside the Jianguomenwai compound that 
afternoon. The following morning, shortly after the shoot-out in the 
street, residents noted that limousines belonging to top-ranking Amer-
ican and British diplomats, which had been parked in the compound 
lot, departed just minutes before Chinese soldiers rushed in. 
Before the day was over, the city was roiling with rumors that 
Deng had died, Li Peng had been shot by an assassin and civil war 
between rival army divisions was imminent. Anti-American rhetoric 
grew heated with the announcement on CCTV that Fang had indeed 
fled to the U.S. Embassy. A Foreign Ministry spokesman termed U.S. 
charges that the Chinese military had massacred students "flagrantly 
unwarranted" and called the Bush Administration's suspension of 
arms sales and military exchanges with Beijing "absolutely unaccept-
able to us." In a televised news conference, government spokesman 
Yuan Mu defiantly pronounced the regime "unafraid" of either "con-
demnation or sanctions." He also produced new official casualty 
figures for the June 3-4 fighting: no more than 300 people had died, 
only 23 of them students. 
One diplomat felt he had witnessed it all before. "Everything we 
have seen in the past four days is preparation for a red Stalinist ter-
ror," he said. "What they are doing is attempting to drive out every 
foreign eye, so they can go about their executions." The shooting in 
the streets set off a stampede among expatriate dependents to join an 
evacuation effort that was already under way. Husbands with large 
attache cases stood in long lines at the Bank of China's foreign-ex-
change windows, waiting to change renminbi bills that were noncon-
vertible outside the country. Meanwhile, their wives and children sat 
anxiously in a convoy of embassy vans, trapped inside the locked 
gates, until police completed their search for the alleged sniper. Hys-
teria mounted as they watched Chinese soldiers outside, pointing their 
guns at residents and forbidding entry to embassy guards who had 
been assigned to escort the convoy. 
The scene at Beijing International Airport was chaotic even 
before that particularly besieged group arrived. Donna Anderson, an 
American, had been camped inside the terminal with her husband and 
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three children for 24 hours by that time, waiting with hundreds of 
other foreigners to get on a flight to Tokyo. "We didn't know about 
the shoot-out until just before we boarded the plane,'' she recalled. 
"The report was that someone had fired rockets into the CITIC build-
ing." By then, said Anderson, "order inside the airport had broken 
down. The waiting lines had deteriorated, and people were shoving 
each other and tearing at the standby list. We were walking on the 
conveyor belts to get from section to section, and the employees, who 
seemed to be as scared as anyone else, were not telling us to get off. 
People were beginning to panic." 
The panic was palpable that night, as an Asian diplomat watched 
an army supply convoy of 127 trucks pass under his balcony, bound 
for Tiananmen Square to the west. The lurid yellow-green glow of 
mercury-vapor lamps along the highway silhouetted the bayonets that 
protruded from the backs of the troop trucks escorting the convoy. 
Earlier in the day the 20 tanks and the APC's of the 27th Army that 
had blocked the intersection below pulled out and headed east. That 
move fed rumors that the soldiers were preparing to defend themselves 
and their bloody conquest of the square from one of the rival armies 
that was said to be riding to the rescue. Ever since the massacre, Bei-
jing residents talked wistfully about the prospect of civil war between 
the "bad guys" of the 27th Army and the "good guys" of the 38th, 
who had reportedly balked at orders to enforce martial law. 
An Asian diplomat did not dismiss such specualtion. For one 
thing, the presence of an estimated 250,000 troops in the Beijing re-
gion was a reflection of the political power struggle that was being 
waged there. Before martial law had been declared, many com-
manders had questioned the deployment of troops into what was es-
sentially a political arena. A few commanders had reportedly refused, 
and they had been replaced. There were reports that more armies had 
been called up to prevent the dissident officers from pulling a coup. 
"The troops did not arrive here exclusively to deal with the students," 
a Western diplomat acknowledged. "There was a certain form of 
power play going on there, and troops were positioned against each 
other. One reason there were so many troops was that each faction 
was, in effect, showing its cards." 
For another, wall posters in Beijing described "skirmishes" be-
tween several armies. Moreover, a segment of one of the ring roads 
that encircles the city remained littered with chunks of concrete road 
dividers well after street sweepers had begun cleaning up most of the 
city's streets. That was no accident, according to an Asian defense 
attache. "Those chunks are standard antitank barricades that are 
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designed to snarl the treads," he said. Two barricades had been 
erected at that particular junction, he explained. "The first barricade, 
which was made of buses, was erected by the people, but the second, 
the pieces of concrete, was laid out by the 27th Army." The 27th 
presumably wanted to stop some other unit's tanks. 
Other evidence that Beijing-based diplomats and military experts 
had collected was more circumstantial, but no less intriguing. "Some 
of the troops that moved through Beijing on the night of June 4 were 
not issued any ammunition," said an Asian envoy. "Only Yang 
Shangkun's men were given ammunition. So for the first few days, 
Yang was saying, 'We have all the firepower, so don't move against 
us.' " His informants contended that although the Chinese military 
was indeed divided over the use of force against the students, its com-
manders were too loyal to Deng to bolt while he was alive. "Accord-
ing to one scenario, there are a lot of fence sitters in the military who 
are waiting for Deng to die, at which point they can switch alle-
giance," he said. 
Given the uncertainty of the situation, it was no wonder that the 
government had been prompt to deny the report, first broadcast in 
Taiwan, that Deng was dead. Continuing headlines, in Hong Kong 
and elsewhere, that he was suffering from prostate cancer kept the 
level of tension high. "They are not sure where the threat is coming 
from, so the tanks swivel in all directions," the Asian envoy observed, 
"and the soldiers are very paranoid, very jumpy." 
Yet reports of major clashes in the western hills or at the 
Nan yuan military airfield to the south of the city remained unverified. 
So did stories in the Hong Kong press describing divisions within the 
ranks. The independent newspaper Ming Pao alleged that because 
other armies had refused to clear the square, the tough 27th Army, 
which was loyal to Yang, had been given the job. As compensation, 
added the paper, all brave officers would be promoted one grade and 
courageous soldiers sent to military training schools. Other stories de-
scribed the resentment that was building against the 27th by troops 
who did not take part in the massacre. 
Soldiers from a Beijing military region unit that had chosen not to 
shoot their way through the citizen barricades were reported to be so 
distraught on June 5, when they learned about the violence wreaked 
by the 27th Army, that they ripped off their badges, abandoned their 
tanks and trucks and retreated into the nearby Military Museum. 
Protesters promptly torched the vehicles. 
"They are not fighting it out," said an Asian ambassador about 
the curious behavior of some other military units, "they are just rna-
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neuvering around each other." The big question mark in the minds of 
most foreign observers was the Beijing garrison, which was believed to 
be under the influence of Defense Minister Qin Jiwei, its former com-
mander. A longtime ally of Deng, Qin was said to have opposed the 
use of force against the students. He was eyed by his fellow officers, as 
well as by foreign diplomats, as a likely candidate to lead a coup. 
"Those elite forces, which have not yet been brought into play, 
are sitting it out in the west of the city," said the ambassador. His 
defense attache had assured him that rival forces were "trying their 
best to disengage and compromise rather than use massive force 
against each other." However, he remained uneasy. "You never 
know," he commented. "One of my Chinese sources says the army 
has gone mad. He warned me, 'The soldiers have blood in their 
eyes.'" 
On June 9, Deng Xiaoping broke the suspense by addressing a 
group of top military officers, Politburo Standing Committee members 
and Party elders. It had been 24 days since the senior leader had made 
his last public appearance, his historic meeting with Mikhail 
Gorbachev. The setting-Deng surrounded by top government lead-
ers at a large oval table inside Zhongnanhai-was designed to show 
that he was not only alive, but in charge and undaunted by world 
criticism of the massacre. As television cameras panned the assembled 
guests, diplomats studied their TV screens carefully, preparing to note 
any significant absentees. 
One by one, the members of the Central Military Commission 
and the general staff greeted Deng, who walked under his own steam 
and stood unaided during a silent tribute for the June 3-4 military 
"martyrs." Then the group posed for a photo. There was General 
Yang Shangkun, dressed in a sports jacket, as if to underline his civil-
ian role as President rather than his military role as Permanent Vice 
Chairman of the Military Commission and de facto commander of the 
martial-law forces. There were his brother Yang Baibing, a member of 
the Central Military Commission and the army's top political commis-
sar, and Chief of Staff Chi Haotian, another relative of Yang's by mar-
riage. More interesting was the parade of officers who had been 
rumored to favor Zhao Ziyang. Defense Minister Qin Jiwei was pres-
ent, as were Deputy Chief of Staff Xu Xin and Central Military Com-
mission member Hong Xuezhi. 
"Absolutely unified," declared a Western intelligence expert af-
terward. "Every element of the general staff was present, including 
the two members of the Party's Central Military Commission who we 
believed were on opposing sides." The only glaring absence had been 
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anticipated: Military Commission First Vice Chairman Zhao Ziyang. 
What had earlier looked like signs of civil war had probably been no 
more than "the usual sorts of arguments that a military man would 
use about calling in military forces to handle what should be a political 
situation," the intelligence expert mused. Despite such reservations, 
he argued, "the army will follow orders." 
That was very much the message Deng delivered in his speech to 
the assembled leaders. He looked frail. His left hand trembled, his 
face was puffy, his eyes were ringed with dark circles. But as he spoke, 
his words grew in coherency. At one point he dismissed an unwanted 
bit of prompting from Li Peng, who sat in the seat of honor to his 
right, with a withering look. 
"This storm was bound to happen sooner or later," he began. 
"As determined by the international and domestic climate, it was in-
dependent of man's will." He classified the problem as "turmoil," and 
had said as much in the vituperative speech to his inner circle, which 
was distilled into the notorious April 26 People's Daily editorial. Be-
cause some elements of the leadership had disagreed with his conclu-
sion about how to handle the situation, he argued, events had got out 
of control and had provoked a "counterrevolutionary rebellion." At 
that point he had had to reach out to other elements of the Party and 
to the military for support. 
Gesturing to the top leaders and to the four members of the so-
called Gang of Elders who surrounded him at the table, Deng said, 
"We still have a group of senior comrades who are alive, we still have 
the army, and we also have a group of core cadres who took part in 
the revolution." The leadership, he said, had been able to analyze the 
situation and detect that behind the students and the ordinary people 
who took to the streets there lurked "a rebellious clique and a large 
quantity of the dregs of society," who were intent on "overthrowing 
the Communist Party and the socialist system . . . and establishing a 
bourgeois republic entirely dependent on the West." 
The army had stopped them. "This army retains the traditions of 
the old Red Army," said Deng with evident satisfaction. Noting that 
"there are not so many veteran comrades in the army, the soldiers are 
mostly little more than 18, 19 or 20 years of age," the old Long 
Marcher was all the more heartened by the troops' performance. "No 
matter how generations change," he said "this army of ours is forever 
an army under the leadership of the Party, forever the defender of the 
country, forever the defender of socialism, forever the defender of the 
public interest." 
The show of unity by the military and the old revolutionaries 
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under Deng certainly quelled speculation about impending civil war. 
Yet it also heightened anxieties that a clutch of paranoid old men 
would now have the power they needed to carry out a massive purge 
of all the individuals and interest groups whom they perceived to be 
enemies of the Party. The performance also raised the question of 
what price Deng had had to pay for the Old Guard's support. 
Throughout his decade in power, he had played the role of master 
balancer of factions, seemingly belonging to none. Had he been forced 
by circumstances this time to sell out to the hardliners? The events of 
the next two weeks led even his admirers to conclude that he had. 
Ideological slogans that had not been widely heard in recent years 
suddenly seeped back into the public vocabulary. Two of the elders, 
former National People's Congress Standing Committee Chairman 
Peng Zhen, 87, and State Vice President Wang Zhen, 80, had been 
among the key architects of the 1987 campaign against "bourgeois lib-
eralization." Zhao had managed to derail that campaign, and Deng 
had gone along with him. Now Deng himself laced his speeches with 
warnings against bourgeois liberalization. At the same time "class 
struggle," a Marxist concept that Deng had publicly tossed into the 
dustbin of history at the momentous Third Plenum of the Eleventh 
Central Committee in 1978, returned to vogue. That plenum, which 
launched China's historic process of modernization, also ordained for 
the first time that economic development and modernization must 
take priority over class struggle. 
More chilling than the reactionary phrases were the images of 
repression that quickly bombarded the TV screens. On Saturday came 
the announcement that 400 "scoundrels" accused of attacking soldiers 
had been arrested in cities all over China. Footage that would be re-
peated on national TV again and again over the next week showed a 
sweating prisoner, his hands cuffed, his head bowed, being led into an 
interrogation room and questioned at gunpoint by police. 
A student and a worker in Shanghai who had belonged to in-
dependent associations that supported the democracy movement in 
that city also figured prominently in the initial propaganda. The 
worker, Li Zhibo, had been beaten in the head by his interrogators and 
sported a puffed-up eye. Yao Yongzhan, a Hong Kong student ac-
tivist who had been accused of heading the Shanghai Autonomous 
Union of College Students looked to be in better physical shape. He 
had been grabbed at Shanghai airport while in the company of a group 
of British students and several consular officials who had provided him 
with a ticket to Hong Kong. He was detained for carrying restricted 
articles. 
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As if to caption the scenes of justice that were being meted out to 
this first group of prisoners, the authorities announced a nationwide 
ban on autonomous student and worker associations. Fearful from the 
start that groups without ties to the Communist Party might root 
themselves among the masses, much as the Solidarity labor movement 
did in Poland, Deng had warned intimates to beware of Chinese stu-
dents' demands for an independent student union. Were independent 
student unions to crop up, he had predicted back in April, "we will 
have many Lech Walesas, not just in Beijing but in every province." 
Throughout that weekend, CCTV repeatedly broadcast the first 
in a series of show-and-tell features: an attempt to persuade viewers to 
tum themselves and their neighbors in to the authorities, rather than 
wait to be hunted down. The 69-second video clip was identified as 
footage from an American television interview of a 40-year-old Beijing 
resident. In it he described the "massacre of students by the army" at 
Tiananmen Square, claiming that 20,000 people had died. Superim-
posed on the footage was the message "This man is a rumormonger," 
followed by instructions to denounce "those spreading false rumors" 
by going to the nearest police station. 
In fact, CCTV had violated canons of international broadcasting 
behavior-and, probably, law-by snatching a sequence of raw video 
feed belonging to ABC News off a satellite during transmission from 
Tokyo to New York City. Moreover, CCTV had passed the sequence 
off as information that had already been aired on American television. 
It had not. On seeing the Chinese version, ABC correspondent James 
Laurie recalled, "I was extremely upset." CCTV had, he realized, 
aired footage that ABC had left on the cutting-room floor. 
What happened was that the day after the massacre, Laurie had 
conducted one of the many man-in-the-street interviews in Beijing 
with the Chinese man in question. In the 21/z minutes of conversation 
that Laurie's crew captured on tape, the man had touched upon sev-
eral taboo topics, including the death toll in the square. Deprived of 
direct satellite transmission from Beijing since the imposition of mar-
tial law, Laurie shipped his unedited tape to Tokyo for transmission by 
satellite to New York. He then sat down in his hotel room in Beijing, 
wrote a script to go with the images, and read it, together with instruc-
tions on how to edit the tape, over a phone line to ABC in New York. 
What finally appeared on ABC's nightly news was a mere eight-second 
snippet of the man in the street with an English-language voice-over 
paraphrasing what he had said about bloodshed in the Chinese capital. 
"We are probably naive," says Laurie, "but we never thought anyone 
would do that." What is worse, the Chinese stratagem worked. Sev-
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eral days after the "rumormonger" was exposed on CCTV, he was 
identified and arrested in his hometown of Dalian. 
The state network later showed the accused man, Xiao Bing, an 
aluminum-window maker, in police custody. Two women had spotted 
the "rumormonger" buying cigarettes. They had followed him to his 
hotel, reporting his whereabouts to the Public Security Bureau. "At 
first he refused to confess what he did," said the People's Daily. "But 
after the videotape was played, he confessed." 
On Sunday CCTV went after Fang Lizhi and his wife Li Shuxian. 
"These two criminals are escaping to avoid punishment," read the 
government appeal for their capture, without mentioning that they 
had taken refuge inside the U.S. Embassy. "Once they are found, they 
should be immediately detained, and the Beijing Public Security Bu-
reau informed." Under an old photo of Fang, the TV report offered 
this description of China's most famous dissident: "About 1.72 me-
ters, a little fat, hair hangs to one side; long, square face, glasses; 
throws out chest and raises head when walking." 
As the Fangs' photos and descriptions flashed before the eyes of 
viewers, the Chinese government stepped up its verbal attacks on the 
couple. Beijing Radio read an order from the city Public Security Bu-
reau to alert border guards and airports throughout the country to 
prevent their escape. Meanwhile, the controlled press published ever 
more shrill anti-Fang commentaries. The authorities even issued a 
pamphlet titled The True Face of Fang Lizhi to discredit him. 
"You've gone to hide inside a foreign embassy?" questioned an un-
signed letter in People's Daily. "Exactly what kind of hero are you?" 
On the same day a signed commentary in that paper questioned Fang's 
patriotism and his continued usefulness to the pro-democracy move-
ment. "Now he hides himself in the U.S. Embassy and has degraded 
his position to that of a beggar," said the commentator. 
As the pace and quantity of arrests escalated early the following 
week, the nightly television news expanded beyond its usual 30 min-
utes to accommodate the proliferation of mug shots and the increas-
ingly heavy propaganda. On Tuesday most of the extra air time was 
devoted to photos of 21 student pro-democracy activists wanted for 
leading the "counterrevolutionary rebellion." Most of the faces that 
flashed on the screen were frozen stills lifted from tapes made of the 
demonstrations in Beijing and other cities, or photos shot by the hun-
dreds of plainclothes police who mingled with the demonstrators 
throughout April and May. Authorities had scrutinized the footage 
and matched faces with police records and other evidence, such as the 
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license registrations of the countless bicycles that police had picked up 
at demonstration sites and confiscated. 
The most charismatic of the student leaders, Uerkesh Daolet 
[Wuer Kaixi], was doubly honored by the showing of a separate short 
feature that was taken by a remote-control camera mounted on the 
wall of a dining hall in the Beijing Hotel. The footage was aired with a 
voice-over implying that the students at the table had been feasting 
when they were supposed to be fasting. Yet decipherable dates on the 
clip showed that the dinner actually took place more than a week after 
their hunger strike had ended. 
By Wednesday the frequent replays of the list of most-wanted stu-
dents began to pay off. Zhou Fengsuo, a 20-year old physics student 
at Qinghua University in Beijing, was arrested in the central China 
city of Xian. Zhou was turned in by his sister, an employee of the Air 
Force Institute there. "Just after the evening broadcast of the arrest 
warrants on television," said the TV commentator, "Zhou's sister and 
her husband went and made a report to the local police after talking it 
over. Five policemen went and arrested him. He admitted he was a 
student leader." 
Foreign residents were horrified at what they saw as his sister's 
betrayal of Zhou Fengsuo. But a Chinese viewer saw it otherwise. 
"She had to do it," he said, "there is no place to hide in China." In-
deed, in a country where marital spats and birth control are the busi-
ness of neighborhood committees, privacy and secrecy are at a 
minimum. Even in the best of times, Chinese citizens have been pris-
oners of their hukoubu and individual identification cards, which are 
necessary for obtaining jobs, housing and rationed food staples like 
grain and edible oils. Chinese travelers must routinely show their 
identification cards to buy train and plane tickets, and sometimes even 
provide letters of permission from their work units before boarding 
long-distance sleeper trains. Passports for foreign travel are good for 
one trip only. Chinese citizens who wish to go abroad must either buy 
foreign-exchange certificates on the black market, at a premium, or 
apply to the Public Security Bureau for coupons with which to buy 
airline tickets or limited amounts of foreign exchange. 
During the first few days after the massacre, controls in train sta-
tions and airports were lax. Those fugitives who were lucky enough to 
possess the proper papers, forged or otherwise, could slip onto trains 
bound for distant provinces or even out of the country. However, 
those who did not get out early faced almost insurmountable obstacles. 
Once the crackdown came, soldiers stationed themselves in and 
around airline terminals and train stations, and special teams were 
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mobilized to check the papers of arriving and departing passengers. 
Photo charts of the most prominent fugitives from the democracy 
movement were posted at airline ticket-sales counters all across the 
country. Travel restrictions were tightened in such a way as to render 
visas obtained before the massacre useless without an additional exit 
permit. 
More ominous than the limits placed on travelers trying to leave 
China were those confronting people who had no choice but to stay. 
"My work unit has been assigned a quota of baotu to bring in," said a 
young Communist bureaucrat, who supported the student movement. 
So had his Party branch. Although he could hardly be classified as a 
rioter, he had openly participated in some of the demonstrations. 
While he was unlikely to be detained, even a self-criticism would serve 
as a black mark against him in his dossier and would almost certainly 
hinder his career for as long as the conservative leadership remained in 
power. The Party branch's quota concerned him even more. "Expul-
sion from the Party is the worst thing that can happen to a Chinese," 
he said unequivocally. Loyalty to the Party told him to confess and 
write a criticism, but adherence to his own ideals told him not to repu-
diate his support for democracy. 
Students were in an even more precarious position than bureau-
crats, since their actions had been so openly recorded, and since they 
were dependent on the state to assign them their jobs. Prominent 
leaders of the illegal student organizations like Zhou Fengsuo were in 
the most immediate danger. Even if they managed to ftee to a distant 
province, they ran into problems when they tried to get jobs, housing 
or grain. "Even the pedicab drivers are organized," explained a Chi-
nese official. Anyone applying for a job, no matter how menial, would 
have to present an identification card, as would anyone wishing to buy 
rice at the low, state-subsidized price. A fugitive risked discovery or 
starvation unless he had enough money to buy food and shelter on the 
open market, or he had had the foresight and the necessary Hong 
Kong connections to forge a new identity-and a new ID card-for 
himself and a new hukoubu for his family. 
"In the new, open economy brought about by the reforms, the 
hukou did not seem so important," said a Chinese official. "People 
who could find part-time work in private or foreign companies and 
who earned enough money to buy their food and rent their housing on 
the private ~arket could get along without one. Or, for a price, they 
could get thetr hukou transferred from their hometown to Beijing by a 
corrupt Public Security Bureau official." But the crackdown had mo-
mentarily changed that. "Many young people who had not committed 
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serious crimes fled Beijing when the crackdown came," said a foreign 
resident. "They had been in technical violation of the law for staying 
on in the capital after graduation without a hukou, and they feared 
they might be picked up for that reason." 
As the propaganda intensified and the number of arrests multi-
plied, it began to appear that workers were even more vulnerable to 
arrest and harsh penalties than students, intellectuals and bureaucrats. 
Whether they lacked the connections to obtain travel documents-
passports, visas-or whether family responsibilities prevented them 
from fleeing quickly enough, workers constituted the bulk of those de-
tained in the immediate wake of the crackdown. And, as a Shanghai 
court made clear in the first trial related to the democracy movement, 
workers were the first to draw the death penalty for their participation 
in the movement. 
On June 15, three workers who had been charged, along with 
seven other people, in the burning of a train in Shanghai were sen-
tenced to death. The incident stemmed from a June 6 sit-in on the 
railroad tracks to protest the Beijing massacre. An oncoming train 
had rammed the demonstrators, killing six of them. In retaliation, 
protesters attacked the train with petrol bombs, setting it on fire and 
beating some of the fire fighters who attempted to extinguish the 
flames. No further deaths were caused by the fire, but nine carriages, 
six police motorcycles and 900 bags of mail were destroyed, and trans-
port on the busy Shanghai-Beijing line was halted for 50 hours. The 
court took pains to stress that the three accused had nothing to do 
with the student movement, but were "local hoodlums and thugs tak-
ing advantage of the disruption to cause trouble." 
The tough verdict was intended as a warning that the government 
would not flinch in the face of hostile world opinion to eliminate what 
it regarded as the sources of domestic disorder. On the same day the 
Shanghai verdict was reported, People's Daily carried a front page 
analysis of Deng's speech to the army. "If we give the impression of 
concessions or weakness, China will become a vassal of the imperial-
ists once again," according to the paper. Analysts believed the death 
sentences also reflected the government's fear that the latent dissatis-
faction prompting so many workers to join the student protests might 
flare into unrest and strikes later on. 
As dramatic as news of the death penalties was, the proceedings 
in the Shanghai courtroom were no match for the performance that 
was playing itself out in the court in the Manchurian city of 
Changchun the same day. There, 26 workers charged with the rela-
tively minor crimes of instigating social unrest and spreading rumors 
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were paraded at gunpoint into a packed hall. In a ritual that was re~­
iniscent of the Cultural Revolution, the audience jeered as the detain-
ees filed past, heads shaven and wearing placards around their necks 
imprinted with their names and crimes. 
The manner in which the Chinese government and state media 
chose to flaunt the harsh public treatment of prisoners sparked a storm 
of protest in Western nations. The U.S., which had suspended arms 
sales early on to protest the mass killings in the square, had prepared a 
list of additional sanctions that could be brought to bear in the event 
that the executions proceeded. No sooner did the Shanghai verdict 
become public knowledge than U.S. Congressmen began lobbying for 
the enactment of those further sanctions unless the Chinese authorities 
granted clemency to suspects who had been sentenced to die. 
The U.S. outcry did not daunt Chinese law-enforcement officials, 
who sentenced eight more people-workers, peasants and a jobless 
drifter-to death in Beijing for beating soldiers and burning vehicles 
on the night of June 3-4. In fact, the Supreme People's Procuratorate 
even moved to speed the wheels of justice by instructing judges that if 
the evidence was clear and sufficient, the courts "should not be ham-
strung by details, and should expedite the process of arrests and prose-
cutions." Furthermore, as an official circular suggested, public 
sensitivities should not be spared. "It is necessary to pay attention to 
publicity," said the circular, "to increase the social benefit of the cases, 
suppress and deter criminals, and encourage the masses to struggle 
against counterrevolutionaries and serious criminal offenders." 
No sooner had such instructions circulated than some particu-
larly gruesome footage was aired on Beijing TV screens. It showed the 
charred and mutilated body of a dead soldier, slouched against the 
wheel of an army vehicle. As the camera tightened its focus on the 
dead man, one could see that his torso had been ripped open by a 
sharp object and his entrails pulled out and prominently displayed. 
The man accused of disembowelling the soldier, Zhang Jianzhong, was 
shown under interrogation by police. Zhang reportedly admitted to 
being a member of a "dare-to-die brigade" that had assaulted soldiers 
in Tiananmen Square. According to the voice-over, Zhang confessed 
to picking up a shard of glass from the pavement and using it to dis-
embowel the dead soldier. Zhang was said to have described in detail 
how he tied a length of plastic rope to the man's intestines, pulled 
them out and displayed them prominently over his body. 
Zhang's story proved to be a clever diversion on the part of the 
government. It increased viewers' awareness of the intensity of the 
violence that was unleashed in the streets on the night of June 3-4. At 
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the same time it further compounded the confusion sown by the au-
thorities as to which side had committed the worse crimes, the soldiers 
or the students. 
As the symphony of propaganda swelled, analysts feared that a 
purge of major proportions was under way. Whether or not Deng 
could control it was a question that could not be answered, they 
agreed, until the Party Central Committee finally met to determine the 
fate of Zhao Ziyang. Zhao had not been seen in public since his tearful 
visit to the hunger strikers in Tiananmen Square on May 19. 
Although it was a foregone conclusion that he would be replaced, the 
Party leadership--like the government bureaucracy-was divided be-
tween the "dove" faction that supported Zhao's soft line on the pro-
tests and the "eagle" faction that wanted to smash the students and 
dump Zhao. As a result of that split, Deng had been unable to secure 
a consensus. "You delay a Central Committee meeting when you are 
not sure how it will come out," commented a Western analyst. 
The hardliners were not deterred by the stalemate. They simply 
intensified their lobbying of Central Committee members. While 
Yang Shangkun briefed the Central Military Commission about 
Zhao's failings, Li Peng ordered the secretaries of all 30 local, provin-
cial and regional Party committees brought to Beijing, where he pro-
ceeded to meet separately with each one. After a full week of such 
dialogues in late May, he had built a core of support within the 175-
member Central Committee for bringing a limited case against Zhao. 
It took him another month to secure enough votes to call a plenum. 
Finally, on June 23, the Fourth Plenary session of the 13th Cen-
tral Committee was secretly convened to take formal action on the 
matter. As a precaution against any unforeseen vote switching or any 
sudden surfeit of abstentions from resentful members, the army was 
called in to "protect" the meeting. "They used guns to force us to put 
up our hands in approval," one member confided to the Hong Kong 
magazine Zheng Ming. Fifty of the 285 members and alternates re-
portedly pleaded illness and did not attend. 
With communication between Chinese sources and foreigners 
sharply curtailed under martial law, veteran diplomats and journalists 
fell back on the China-watching skills they had honed during the Cul-
tural Revolution in an attempt to analyze the scarce data available. 
"It's just like the good old days," mocked one diplomat, on hearing 
the phrase antiparty clique for the first time in twenty years. 
The only immediate source of information on the plenum was a 
picture taken by the photographer son of Yang Shangkun that ran on 
the front pages of the official newspapers the next morning. It showed 
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Zhao and Hu Qili, the sole Politburo Standing Committee ~ember 
who had sided with him, seated across a table from Deng dunng the 
meeting. Surprisingly, both appeared to be applauding Li Peng. 
"That's Party ritual," said a senior Asian diplomat, who explained 
that the significance of the photo was not in the applause but in the 
fact that the two fallen members were present to hear the charges 
against them. "The picture is the Party's way of saying, 'We have 
them under control and we are handling the matter within the Party in 
our own way.'" 
Although the verdict against Zhao did not go so far as to accuse 
him of counterrevolutionary activities, as rumor had predicted, it was 
harsher than that brought against either of his two ousted predeces-
sors. "At the critical juncture involving the destiny of the Party and 
the state," read the communique that was later made public, "Com-
rade Zhao Ziyang made the mistake of supporting the turmoil and 
splitting the Party.'' More than that, it charged that the General Sec-
retary himself had "unshirkable responsibilities for shaping the tur-
moil." The man who had, first as Premier and then as Party chief, 
overseen the implementation of a decade of unprecedented economic 
reform in China, received only faint praise for having done "some-
thing beneficial to the reforms and the opening of China to the outside 
world." 
The traits that had stood him in good stead when the economic 
reforms were popular and the rate of growth double-digit now 
weighed like shackles on him. He had, said his peers, taken "a passive 
approach to the adherence of the Four Cardinal Principles and opposi-
tion to bourgeois liberalization." Likewise, he had "gravely neglected 
ideological and political work.'' Accordingly, the Central Committee 
voted to strip him of all his posts-though not of his Party member-
ship. In a somewhat ominous compromise, the "doves" and the "ea-
gles" also agreed to reserve the right to "look further into his case." 
Optimists observed that the prospect of further investigation signified 
that Zhao had not given his opponents the confession they wanted. 
Pessimists were worried that the Old Guard was trying to press more 
severe charges against him. 
Even thornier than the dilemma of how strongly to sanction Zhao 
was the question of who should replace him. With Zhao's elimination, 
at least temporarily, from the succession sweepstakes, the new Party 
chief would automatically vault straight to the head of the line of pos-
sible heirs apparent to the aged and ailing Deng. Each of the 
octogenarians was playing kingmaker and pushing his protege for the 
job. Chen Yun supported the conservative Vice Premier and State 
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Planning Commission Minister Yao Yilin. The ambitious Peng Zhen 
championed Public Security Minister Qiao Shi. Known as "the Chi-
nese Andropov"-a reference to the late Soviet leader Y uri Andropov, 
who was once KGB chief-Qiao was widely perceived as the front 
runner for the post. 
In the end, Deng imposed his own, more malleable choice by win-
ning the endorsements of former President Li Xiannian and Li Peng 
for Shanghai Party boss Jiang Zemin, 63. Jiang was ultimately accept-
able to the other factions because, lacking a political base or apprecia-
ble military support, he did not threaten any of them. "He's 
manageable, and he'll serve as a place holder until this power struggle 
is sorted out," said an Asian diplomat. 
"Deng was looking for a carbon copy of himself when he chose 
Jiang," said a Western diplomat, "someone who was for reform but at 
the same time tough on nonsense." An engineer who worked briefly 
as a trainee in the Stalin Automobile Factory in Moscow in the mid-
1950s, Jiang slogged his way up through the bureaucracy from the 
state import-and-export and foreign investment commissions. In those 
agencies, he was involved in the establishment of China's Special Eco-
nomic Zones. He eventually became Minister of the Electronics In-
dustry and then Mayor of Shanghai. Like Zhao, Jiang satisfied Deng's 
preference for someone with hands-on experience in the implementa-
tion of his precious reforms. 
Not coincidentally, Jiang's easy manner with foreign businessmen 
and his ability to speak their languages (Japanese and English, as well 
as Russian and Rumanian) figured heavily in his selection. Party lib-
erals obviously hoped he would help restore the lost confidence of in-
ternational investors and lenders and moot the cries for more 
sanctions from the West. A Beijing-based diplomat came away im-
pressed after a first meeting with the beefy new secretary. "He seems 
like someone you could sit and drink a bottle of wine with," he said. 
At the same time the hardliners looked favorably on the decisive meas-
ures he had taken to quell the unrest that roiled Shanghai in the wake 
of Hu Yaobang's death. Among other tactics, Jiang paid the people's 
militia, a volunteer brigade armed with clubs, 30 renminbi (about 
$7.50) a day to disperse student demonstrations. Although it seemed a 
crude tactic before June 4, it was subsequently judged a humane alter-
native to calling in armed troops. 
The Central Committee also ratified the elevation of Jiang and 
two other Politburo members to the elite Politburo Standing Commit-
tee, making it a six-member body and therefore under the thrall of tie-
breaking nonmembers Deng and the Gang of Elders. Significantly, 
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none of the six Standing Committee members was named to replace 
Zhao on the Party's all-important Central Military Commission. The 
Standing Committee was thus left without a direct line to the other 
major power broker behind the throne, the army. That gap left a con-
venient role for Yang Shangkun, the Military Commission's perma-
nent Vice Chairman, to fill. China watchers pointed to a photo in 
which Yang was flanked on either side by three Standing Committee 
members as illustrative of the fragmented nature of the newly consti-
tuted leadership. 
Backed by the military, in full control of the media and with a 
presentable new party chief in place, that leadership immediately set 
about trying to convince the world-and its own people-that life had 
returned to normal. Besides denying that a military massacre had 
taken place in Beijing, the state-controlled media began insisting that 
the worst was over and that nothing was substantially wrong with 
China that a strong dose of ideological education could not cure. 
The return-to-normalcy campaign began the week after the crack-
down with a photo on the front page of the official English-language 
China Daily showing two foreign tourists, two soldiers and a farmer 
all smiling together on the Great Wall. "Beijing is gradually returning 
to normal, with the tourist industry showing the most serious effect of 
the recent social unrest," the article began. But Beijing was far from 
normal, as a group of Japanese tourists learned some days later. 
Soldiers halted their bus and, citing martial law restrictions, forced 
them at gunpoint to tum over films they had taken of Tiananmen 
Square under military guard. Two tourists who refused were taken 
into custody and briefly detained. 
Foreign businessmen were treated with greater sensitivity. Those 
who had fled to Hong Kong or beyond were plied via phone and telex 
with promises of heretofore unattainable appointments or concessions 
on their return to China. "I expect all will be back very soon, since 
security is now no problem for them," commented Economic Rela-
tions and Trade Minister Zheng Tuobin at a press conference in mid-
June. Those foreign traders who stayed on in Beijing were showered 
with invitations and publicly eulogized for their dedication. An offi-
cial of the Italian automobile company Fiat was invited to meet a vice 
minister who had eluded him for months. During a reception at the 
Great Hall of the People, however, he suddenly found himself branded 
an "official friend" and surrounded by TV cameras. 
That incident made other members of the foreign business com-
munity more wary of the hospitality of the Chinese. "There is great 
sensitivity on the part of the American business community not to be 
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manipulated or ambushed for an interview by Chinese television," said 
a U.S. official. "Many companies are keeping their people out of 
China for that reason. They don't want to contribute to the credibility 
of the Chinese leadership." 
That credibility had rested for a decade on the words and deeds of 
a government trying to convince the world it was dedicated more to 
modernization than to ideology. The perception that Deng Xiaoping's 
China was a more benign and pragmatic Communist society than its 
Soviet counterpart was destroyed on the night of June 3-4. Many for-
eigners underestimated Deng's obsession with stability and the pri-
macy of the Party, and thus felt shocked and betrayed by his sudden 
resort to violence. The subsequent propaganda campaign only deep-
ened their revulsion. 
The reality behind the rosy Chinese propaganda was that the 
economy, which had already been going through a painful process of 
restructuring aimed at cutting inflation and recentralizing state con-
trol, was in dreadful shape. Inflation had not fallen below the high 
30% mark of the previous year in some cities. Indeed, it was expected 
to exceed that rate when the cost of keeping 250,000 martial law 
troops in and around Beijing and the production losses incurred dur-
ing the months of political unrest were factored in. "Some sources are 
already talking about 100% hidden inflation," said a European diplo-
mat, who was concerned that the government was so preoccupied with 
its theories of political conspiracy that it was ignoring economic 
problems he considered even more threatening to its survival. 
"I don't think they have had time to focus on the mess they are 
in," said a Western analyst. "They are putting most of their energy 
into re-educating people." Indeed, everyone from soldiers to Party 
cadres to factory workers to graduating college seniors was required to 
spend several weeks studying "the important speech" delivered by 
Deng on June 9, in which he asserted that the student demonstrations 
had "developed into a counterrevolutionary rebellion." Once they un-
derstood the origins of the counterrevolution, the Party ideologues 
contended, they would shed their bourgeois liberal tendencies. 
Meanwhile, foreign trade and tourism-at once the cause of and 
the deliverance from their problems-were in the doldrums. Tourism, 
the country's No. 1 foreign-exchange earner, was expected to fall to 
half the nearly $2 billion it earned in 1988. The upheaval in Beijing 
had occurred during the peak spring travel season, resulting in the 
cancellation of some 300 tour groups, totaling 11,535 people, in the 
month of May alone. Similar losses during the fall season would re-
verberate far beyond the mirrored and marbled lobbies of China's lux-
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ury hotels. A month after the crackdown, there were so few tourists in 
Beijing that Rumors Disco, which catered to foreigners, waived its 
$13.50 entrance fee. 
Nor was the prospect much better for 1990, when Beijing was 
scheduled to host the Asian Games. Although Chinese officials as-
sured the organizers of the Games that they would go on as scheduled, 
only about half the necessary 27 stadiums and gymnasiums were 
ready. The government was still $58 million short of the $150 million 
it was expected to need for the event. Worse, if the political situation 
remained unstable, the Games might fail to attract enough spectators 
to be profitable or might be canceled altogether. That would only ex-
acerbate the country's growing budget deficit. In a speech reported by 
the People's Daily in July, Finance Minister Wang Bingqian disclosed 
that state expenditures, including subsidies to money-losing state fac-
tories, had risen twice as fast as revenues during the first five months 
of the year. 
Faced with the dreary outlook for tourism in general, joint-ven-
ture partners looking to cut their losses in unfinished hotels and con-
vention centers grew increasingly quarrelsome. One particularly 
ironic tussle was over which side would pay damages for the 310 win-
dows of the sleek new Beijing World Trade Center complex that PLA 
soldiers had shot out during their June 7 rampage down Changan Av-
enue. "Why would the soldiers do that?" questioned a Singaporean, 
whose firm is under contract to decorate one of the center's two hotels. 
"Didn't they know that it's not a foreign project, but one that is jointly 
owned by China?" 
Bigger questions than that one remained unanswered after the 
crackdown. Foremost among them was why Deng, who had often 
said he wanted to live to see the historic raising of the Chinese flag 
over Hong Kong, had given orders that were so certain to destroy 
confidence in the viability of his "one country, two systems" concept 
for recovering sovereignty over the British colony. Beijing's new Party 
chief Jiang Zemin tried to limit the damage when he met on July 11 
with a small delegation of Hong Kong officials helping draft a new 
Basic Law for the colony. The officials were impressed with his style 
but far from reassured about his government's intent. "We practice 
our socialism, and you may practice your capitalism," the affable 
Jiang told the Hong Kong visitors, giving each a warm handshake and 
addressing the largely Cantonese-speaking group in their common lan-
guage, English. Jiang added a bit of folk wisdom: "The well water 
does not interfere with the river water." 
Not long afterward, Jiang's words rang hollow. Beijing fired Lee 
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Tze-chung, the director of Wen Wei Po, the mainland-supported news-
paper in Hong Kong that had denounced the massacre. Lee's removal 
made a mockery of the provisions for a free press that were enshrined 
in the 1984 Sino-British Joint Agreement on Hong Kong. 
When the crackdown began, orders went out to Party cadres and 
security forces to go after five types of counterrevolutionary elements. 
Guided by those criteria, several thousand people were picked up and 
questioned or detained, and at least 30 were executed. (This figure 
does not include secret executions). On June 30, "Circular No.3" was 
issued to Party members. It doubled the types of crimes that could be 
labeled counterrevolutionary. Crime No. 10, for instance, involved 
people who take revenge on those who informed on them for any one 
of the nine other crimes. 
The 25,000-word report, which Mayor Chen of Beijing presented 
to the 8th Meeting of the Standing Committee ofthe National People's 
Congress on the same day, added more fuel to the frenzied search for 
counterrevolutionary elements that was now going on nationwide. 
The report strung together a wealth of quotes, opinions and rumors 
lifted largely from the Western and the overseas Chinese press into one 
enormous paranoid conspiracy chronicling the rise and fall of the re-
bellion. "Some political forces in the West always attempt to make 
socialist countries give up the socialist road," the Mayor began. These 
sinister Western forces, he said, plan eventually on "bringing these 
countries under the rule of international monopoly capital and putting 
them on the course of capitalism." 
Chen's evide;nce was bizarre. First he cited a Sept. 19, 1988, 
meeting between Zhao and an American "ultra-liberal economist," 
who turned out to be the American conservative economist Milton 
Friedman. The Mayor intimated that the publicity given this tete-a-
tete in Hong Kong newspapers showed that a plot was afoot between 
Zhao and the U.S. to "topple Deng." The essence of the plot was to 
"whip up public opinion for covering up Zhao Ziyang's mistakes and 
pushing on with bourgeois liberalization in an even more unbridled 
manner." 
On that shaky foundation, the Mayor proceeded to erect a lean-
ing tower of innuendos and half-baked conclusions that embraced all 
the government's perceived enemies-from Fang Lizhi to elements of 
the U.S. Government, whom Chen implicitly accused of conspiring 
with Zhao and the students to overthrow the Chinese Communist 
Party. "The hardliners are preparing to try Zhao," warned a disaf-
fected senior Party member. "Behind the scenes they are building a 
case that effectively accuses him of treason." He cited an unreported 
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speech during the June Central Committee plenum in which Mini~ter 
of Public Security Wang Fang, a longtime confidant of Deng Xiao-
ping, accused Zhao of being in cahoots with an American CIA agent, 
the Hungarian-born American anti-Communist philanthropist George 
Soros and several associates of China's best-known private enterprise, 
the Stone Corp., in plotting the overthrow of the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
As if that were not enough, the hardliners also made Zhao a tar-
get of the Party's newly energized drive against corruption. In sum-
marizing the lessons learned in the course of putting down the 
counterrevolutionary rebellion, Deng had stressed that many people 
had lost confidence in the Party's leadership because of corruption. In 
no time at all, the new party leader launched an anticorruption cam-
paign in which Zhao and his businessmen sons were offered up as con-
venient scapegoats. 
"Our efforts in cracking down on corruption were not very suc-
cessful in the past," State Council spokesman Yuan Mu told a press 
conference in mid-July. "This was inseparably linked to the mistakes 
of Zhao Ziyang," he declared, explaining that the Party General Sec-
retary had taken a casual attitude toward corruption, brushing it off as 
an inevitable by-product of economic reform. 
As shrewd observers of the situation were quick to point out, 
however, Zhao's enemies would prosecute the fallen General Secretary 
at their own peril. "If they want to be really stupid, they can try him," 
said a Western diplomat. Given his reputation as an economic re-
former, many of whose programs would continue to be followed, and 
the fact that he had been ousted for siding with the students, he had 
the makings of a martyr. "They are treading dangerous ground," said 
the diplomat. "The leadership could make a real antihero out of 
him." No one knew that better than Deng, who had made a political 
comeback as a martyr himself and was therefore judged unlikely to 
hand Zhao such an opportunity. 
Meanwhile, however, Deng did nothing to restrain the elders and 
their allies from their goal of "mercilessly rooting out" all the manifes-
tations of "bourgeois liberalization" that had cropped up during the 
years they had been relegated to the political sidelines. They ordered 
the jamming of broadcasts by the popular Voice of America, planted 
vicious editorials against it in the press and secured the expulsion of 
two of its correspondents. Zealous followers in several cities even 
turned in a few unfortunate Chinese who were caught listening to it. 
They pressured foreign joint-venture hotels in Beijing to halve the 
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number of satellite broadcasts of foreign news programs to their guests 
and banned the sale of foreign periodicals and a growing list of books. 
As substitutes, they began promoting a patriotic line of audio and 
visual aids to understanding the counterrevolutionary rebellion. The 
official Xinhua news agency launched a TV ad campaign for sets of 
twelve "commemorative" photos of the "suppression of the counter-
revolutionary rebellion" at the exorbitant cost, by Chinese standards, 
of $20. The captions were as memorable as the street scenes. "This 
picture shows hooligans inciting those masses ignorant of the facts to 
attack the enforcers of martial law," read the caption on a stock photo 
taken on June 3 of chanting students atop a barricade of buses, with 
helmeted soldiers looking on. 
Newspaper ads promoted a cassette tape featuring ten top hits 
from China's early revolutionary years and the later Cultural Revolu-
tion, including I Am a Soldier and Party, Beloved Mother. A govern-
ment-produced video titled The True Story of the Turmoil, which went 
on sale to foreigners at a seminar for overseas travel agents, bore a seal 
authorizing airport customs agents to exempt it from the confiscation 
prescribed for private photos and tapes of the June 4 violence or its 
aftermath. 
"The conservatives definitely won this round," said a Western 
diplomat. "They are in full sway, and they don't need to worry too 
much about the balance between factions at this point." That made 
for a dangerous situation, he explained, because they were devoting so 
much energy to the purge that they were overlooking the ultimately 
more destabilizing problem of the economy. "They feel they are on a 
roll," he said. "They are saying to each other, 'Let's cure the country 
of Zhao once and for all.' " Such madness was likely to continue for 
another three months, before the country's real problems intruded on 
their fantasies of a populace purged of its bourgeois tendencies and 
once again grateful to the Communist Party for all it has given them. 
"The tragedy of China is that there is no system of retirement," 
observed an Asian ambassador to Beijing. "The people who took part 
in the Long March made a tremendous contribution to the building of 
this country. But these people, who are now over 80, and whose 
minds probably function for only two hours a day, are still making 
policy. For them the revolution is more important than anything else. 
In its name they shed blood in the past and are doing so again." 
United in their age and the ties made in their young manhood, 
China's leaders had become so hopelessly isolated from more than 
50% of the population born after the founding of the People's Repub-
lic that many younger Party members who considered themselves 
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good Communists no longer identified with them. "There is a mysti-
cal nature to the relationship between the octogenarians and the 
Party," observed a veteran China watcher. "The threat they perceiyed 
from the students was a threat not to the country but to that mystical 
body, the Party, as constituted behind the walls of Zhonghanhai." It 
was a threat not only to their power and privilege but to their theol-
ogy. "Because what the leaders said was considered canon law," he 
added, "what the students were advocating could only be heresay." 
The old leaders' remedy-large-scale ideological re-education-
was being administered under the gun. Students tolerated it because it 
was a prerequisite to a diploma and a decent job assignment. Factory 
workers went through the motions rather than visit trouble on them-
selves by resisting. But after ten years of relative leniency, most Chi-
nese chafed under the discipline of reciting the catechism. 
Few relished the notion of forsaking the bourgeois pleasures just 
as they were on the verge of being able to afford them. And, like up-
wardly mobile groups everywhere, the concept of democracy appealed 
to their burgeoning sense of self-confidence and to their idealism, 
neither of which the Party had properly addressed. 
"It's too late for re-education," observed an American official. 
"In Beijing even the Party cadres' kids were involved in the student 
movement. These are not the country bumpkins of the 1960s. Like 
kids in the U.S. they are more sophisticated than their parents in many 
ways. They have grown up on TV too." 
If the elderly leadership had succeeded in suppressing the autono-
mous students' and workers' groups and their democracy movement 
for now, it appeared to have given little thought to how to solve the 
problems of official corruption, rising prices and untapped human po-
tential, which had bred the discontent that ignited the protest move-
ment in the first place. Nor had it been able to produce an acceptable 
successor. "The new Party leadership is probably transitional," com-
mented a Western diplomat on the selection of Jiang Zemin. "They 
need a supreme leader, but there is no one in sight." 
Conventional wisdom ruled that when Deng died, Yang 
Shangkun would replace him. However, given Yang's age, that was 
merely a temporary solution. "This is the only country in the world 
where an 81-year-old is running to replace an 85-year-old," joked the 
diplomat. 
"Since June 4, China has entered a dark period," intoned the 
country's most prominent journalist, Liu Binyan, to an audience in 
Hong Kong one month after the massacre. "Perhaps it is not the 
darkest moment in Chinese history, but it is certainly the darkest in 
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the past 40 years," he said. And yet Liu predicted that this period of 
repression would last no longer than two years. By then the country's 
economy would be in chaos, and discontented peasants would join stu-
dents and urban workers in demanding change. 
As he spoke, student leader Uerkesh Daolet [Wuer Kaixi], polit-
ical scientist Y an Jiaqi and four other survivors of the Beijing Spring 
surfaced in France to announce the establishment of the Chinese Stu-
dent and Democracy Movement United Association [Federation for a 
Democratic China]. For the first time since 1911, the government in 
Beijing was about to face a well-financed revolutionary movement in 
exile, not unlike the one that had succeeded in overthrowing the impe-
rial system. 
Time was on the side of these young activists. Deng's repressive 
policies, predicted Yan, would "quicken the end of the present re-
gime." It was time for China to adopt a new political structure to end 
"thousands of years of the dynastic cycle." As an adviser to Zhao, 
Y an had hoped to point the way for the Party leaders themselves to 
spearhead the political reform that he considered an essential comple-
ment to economic reform. His efforts and those of Zhao had failed, 
but his blueprint was still valid. As for the students, although scores 
of their number were now in jail on the mainland and many more were 
on the run or in hiding, their nascent network remained intact. And, 
as it had so many times in the recent past, the vast, extended family of 
overseas Chinese was ready to provide the necessary moral and finan-
cial support to perpetuate itself abroad until the day when it could 
reunite within a stable and prosperous nation. 
On July 4 the leaders of the new movement issued from France a 
declaration "in the name of the students and masses slaughtered in the 
recent student and democracy movement as well as those who are now 
on the wanted list." Addressed to "all descendants of the Chinese 
people and the peace-loving people of the whole world," it proclaimed 
June 4 a national day of sorrow in China. The declaration also 
launched a campaign to obtain the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize for the 
Chinese students and the citizens of Beijing. "The progress of China's 
democracy movement is now uncontrollable, like the Yellow River 
breaking its dike," said the declaration. Announcing a break with the 
ideology on which it had been weaned, China's new generation pro-
claimed, "Modem and contemporary Chinese history has taught us 
sufficient lessons that fighting violence with violence and 'political 
power grows out of the barrel of a gun' will never guide China to 
genuine freedom and democracy." 
8. A FORTNIGHT LATER* 
Harrison Salisbury** 
Back in Connecticut following Tiananmen and its aftermath. I 
think I have been able to fill out the story of the massacre-how it 
happened, why it happened, who was responsible, and what lies ahead. 
It is not a pretty tale. The origins go back to the autumn of 1986 
and the vicious campaign that drove out Hu Yaobang, with his bril-
liant, almost childlike curiosity and daring ideas. Hu was a man intent 
on real change in China. He had Deng's confidence. He was a genu-
ine threat to the geriatric relics of the Long March and to their reac-
tionary allies, the military. 
Like Deng, Hu had little sense of measure. He often overshot the 
mark. It may seem silly, but his off-the-cuff proposal that China aban-
don chopsticks in favor of Western knives and forks was the straw that 
broke the camel's back. 
All of China hooted Hu down. Much of the West joined in. This 
and a dozen similar eccentricities were picked upon by the elders when 
Hu demonstrated sympathy and an inability (or unwillingness) to 
combat student and intellectual unrest. The student pro-democracy 
demonstrations began in the fall of 1986 and peaked in November and 
December. 
Hu tendered his resignation as Party Secretary on January 16, 
1987. Almost immediately a campaign against what was called spiri-
tual pollution was launched, designed to combat the Western ideas 
that Hu had permitted to flourish. Liu Binyan, China's most influen-
tial newspaper writer, an investigative reporter of heroic stature, was 
expelled from the Communist party and forbidden to write for his 
newspaper, the People's Daily. Liu specialized in exposes of corrup-
tion within the Communist party, and was known for his honesty and 
courage. He proclaimed himself-much as did the students on 
• Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Co., dated November 7, 1989, from 
Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June (Boston: Little, Brown, 1989). 
** Through an astonishing coincidence, the author spent the first thirteen days of 
June, 1989 in Beijing and later published his firsthand account of the massacre in a book 
entitled Tiananmen Diary: Thirteen Days in June (Little, Brown, 1989). This excerpt, 
written at his Connecticut home a fortnight after his return to the U.S. from China, records 
his analysis of Tiananmen. 
(157) 
158 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Tiananmen-as a supporter of an ethical Communism, one true to its 
ideals and not dedicated to privilege and power. 
This was the public side of the Hu Yaobang-"spiritual pollution" 
crisis. 
There was a hidden agenda, as I discovered in following up the 
revelation that PLA officers at that time were forbidden to listen to 
BBC and VOA. 
The army and public security administration began, for the first 
time, to prepare for riot control. Both the army and the Security Bu-
reau purchased riot-control chemicals, stanchions, and protective 
clothing for the riot force. Selected military and security battalions, 
including the elite 8341 regiment stationed in Zhongnanhai, began 
training in crowd control. 
The security forces probably began to study South Korean tactics 
in combating student demonstrations. The Security Bureau purchased 
a device that went into extensive use in the Tiananmen crisis, a minia-
ture TV camera developed by the Japanese that is smaller than an 
electric pencil sharpener. The camera can be automatically controlled 
from a central station to transmit pictures of all four sides of an inter-
section. The Japanese used the images from these cameras to help 
adjust the stop-and-go system of traffic lights to speed the flow of traf-
fic through congested areas. The Chinese purchased seventy-three of 
these cameras and put them up at Beijing's principal intersections. 
They said they would use them to spot traffic violators. The videotape 
pictures taken by the cameras would provide irrefutable evidence of 
violations. 
Whether that innocent purpose was the real reason behind the 
purchase cannot be known. In fact, in the Tiananmen affair the cam-
eras were used to photograph demonstrators, street battles, and stu-
dents. They produced grainy, low-lighting pictures seen by American 
(and Chinese) viewers on TV of many of the combat actions. These 
cameras enabled the Security Bureau to identify participants in the 
demonstrations. 
But there is no evidence that the troops brought into the city had 
had the benefit of the special riot training. The evidence goes the other 
way. On July 2 Li Peng told a Chinese-American visitor that the 
army had been compelled to use live bullets because it possessed 
neither tear gas nor rubber bullets. But tear gas was employed by 
some units, including the 8341 regiment. If riot-control equipment 
was not on hand, it could readily have been purchased and delivered in 
the six weeks between the decision to use force and June 4. Clearly, 
the government wanted a riot-a police riot. 
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The fact that these preparations were put in motion in early 1987, 
a time when student demonstrations were more intense than they had 
been at any time since Deng Xiaoping came to power, supports my 
notion that the military was readying itself for another and more se-
vere outbreak of unrest. 
There was no way in advance to predict that Hu Y aobang would 
die on April 15, 1989, nor that his death would touch off escalating 
student demonstrations. 
There had been a spate of rumors in March and early April of 
1989 of a possible comeback for Hu. Much attention was given to an 
unusual photograph published by the Beijing papers of him and Zhao 
Ziyang in friendly conversation. Hu had been suffering from heart 
disease but was said to be in improved health. However, he suffered a 
massive heart attack at a Politburo meeting on April 8, brought on, 
some said, by a violent disagreement over educational policy and, 
quite possibly, over the government's attitude toward the students. 
The report of a violent quarrel in the Politburo was officially denied. 
Hu's death touched off immediate demonstrations at Beijing and 
other universities, rapidly snowballing into marches on Tiananmen 
Square. 
This was the kind of disturbance that the security officials had 
had in mind when they embarked on their preparations. It is probable 
that the crisis they envisioned was the inevitable emergency that 
would accompany the death of Deng Xiaoping. "Plan A" was likely 
drafted for this event. When the Hu Y aobang demonstrations esca-
lated and the decision was made on April26 to employ force (reflected 
in a People's Daily editorial of that date), Plan A was apparently put 
into place as a method of dealing with the Tiananmen contingency. 
That Deng Xiaoping was directly involved in this there is no 
doubt. A variety of sources attest that he took part in the delibera-
tions and that, at some point, he became convinced that a plot threat-
ening not only to overthrow the Party but also to take his life and 
those of other leaders was developing under cover of the student 
protests. 
Deng, having come to power after the chaos, paranoia, intrigue, 
and plots of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four, was highly 
sensitive to such dangers. He had not returned to the elite compound 
of Zhongnanhai when he came to power in 1977-78, and he discour-
aged his associates from living there. "It is not safe," he said: "one 
bomb could kill us all." He had a house built for himself with strin-
gent security features, TV monitors, steel walls, bullet-proof glass. It 
is located just north of the Forbidden City, adjacent to the Defense 
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Ministry, in Iron Lion Lane, where the old imperial granaries once 
stood. 
One of Deng's first moves as the Tiananmen crisis mounted was 
to change the palace guards (his personal guards, that is), and he in-
structed his associates to take the same precaution. This was a page 
out of Stalin's book. The Soviet dictator periodically changed his per-
sonal guards and usually had them shot. He acted on the theory that 
after a few years in a position of high trust a man inevitably would be 
tempted to join the other side. If he hadn't-too bad. Stalin was tak-
ing no chances. Neither was Deng. (The changing of guards had also 
been a frequent tactic of Mao's and of Jiang Qing's and her Gang of 
Four.) 
Whether at this time Deng moved out of his bullet-proof house to 
the security of a special nuclear-safe command center in the military 
district of the Fragrant Hills, to the west, is not certain. But at a key 
point in the developing drama Deng and his closest colleagues did 
move there to direct operations. 
Amid these mounting tensions Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang de-
parted for North Korea on a state visit, leaving Beijing by special train 
on April 23. Three days later, in his absence, the decision was made to 
employ military force against the demonstrators but to delay action 
until after the Gorbachev visit, May 15-17. The text of the People's 
Daily editorial reflecting that decision was telegraphed to Zhao in 
Pyongyang. Zhao, so I have been told, concurred with it. The ratio-
nales were the growing chaos in the city, the need to restore Party 
discipline, the rising impact on industrial production, and (supposed) 
evidence that a plot against the government was taking shape. 
Zhao got back to Beijing on April 30. The crisis had heightened. 
The students were planning a huge protest for May 4, anniversary of 
the 1919 demonstration. Zhao found himself selected to give a milk-
and-waterish May 4 speech, and he received firsthand information 
from his own staff about the true nature of the demonstrations. 
Serious doubts arose in Zhao's mind about the hardline solution. 
At the initiative of the Military Commission, troop movements were 
already under way. Deng was Chairman of the Military Commission, 
Zhao Vice Chairman, and Yang Shangkun Permanent Vice-chairman, 
nominally number three on the organizational chart but, in fact, oper-
ating head of the body. (Deng has often insisted that Zhao was con-
centrating on the work of the Military Commission, but it is doubtful 
that this was true.) 
The Military Commission occupies a unique position in China. 
Because the Red Army under Mao brought about the Revolution, the 
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Commission has always had a special place. Mao served as Commis-
sion Chairman during his life. Deng has held that post while ostensi-
bly shedding all others. It is the supreme and ultimate authority in 
China. 
In Zhao's absence, plans for the military solution of Tiananmen 
had gone forward swiftly under Yang Shangkun's direction. Zhao was 
not without influence with the military; he had close ties with the de-
fense minister, former commander of the Beijing military district, and 
some other professional military men. But, of course, Deng had been 
put into office by a group of old Long March commanders, some of 
whom in retirement still commanded enormous prestige, both military 
and political. The weight of Deng and Yang Shangkun out-balanced 
that of Zhao in a ratio of 100 to 1. 
With the troops already moving in and the visit of Gorbachev 
days away, Zhao shifted his position. He decided to oppose a military 
solution. His decision aroused anger and dismay. "But you had 
agreed to the proposal," he was told. "How can you change your 
mind?" 
Zhao held his ground. He could not be party to the planned ac-
tion. Zhao's stand threw the leadership into confusion. At all costs it 
wanted to present a united front. The row raged right into the 
Gorbachev visit. Zhao tried to resolve the matter by tendering his 
resignation. That was refused, just as Liu Shaoqi's had been during 
the Cultural Revolution. Liu had gone to Zhou Enlai and admitted 
that he had made mistakes; Mao had pointed them out. He wanted to 
resign, go back to a farm in Yanan, and retire. He would take all 
responsibility on himself-it was his fault, not that of his associates. 
Let him quit and let the country get on with its business. Zhou Enlai 
replied sadly: "I am sorry but you will not be permitted to resign." 
Zhao took his case to Yang Shangkun, who had become very 
close to him. Several times in difficult periods Yang had been of assist-
ance. Zhao told Yang that he had to see Deng Xiaoping and put his 
case before him. Yang pondered a moment and then, it was said, told 
Zhao: "I'm sorry. But in this case I can't help you." Yang had be-
come Deng's gatekeeper. 
Zhao took a bold step. He told Yang he, too, was sorry, but he 
could not support a decision with which he did not agree. 
It may have been this defiance of the Party line that emboldened 
Zhao to tell Mikhail Gorbachev that while Deng had given up all his 
positions at the 1987 Thirteenth Party Congress, he had actually re-
tained a veto over everything. "We agreed," said Zhao, "to submit all 
important questions to him." 
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This was hardly news. It had been apparent to all that regardless 
of title, Deng possessed the highest authority in the country. But 
Zhao's honest acknowledgment of this universally known secret sealed 
his fate. 
Not only was Zhao refusing to accept a Party decision, he was 
telling the head of China's great and sometimes hostile neighbor a 
Party "secret." 
Events raced forward. Gorbachev came and went. Hardly had 
the Soviet leader left town than on May 18 Deng left as well. He went 
to Wuhan, where he had, as chairman of the Military Commission, 
convened a meeting of the heads of China's seven military districts. 
He had summoned the commanders to extract from them a pledge of 
support for the military crackdown at Tiananmen. He spent the day 
with the commanders and came away with their unanimous support in 
hand. The way was cleared for action. 
On May 19 Zhao visited the student hunger strikers at 
Tiananmen. He had fought for three days for permission to go there. 
Finally, the Party leaders gave in. Zhao went, but he was accompa-
nied by an unsmiling, laconic Li Peng. With tears in his eyes, Zhao 
spoke to the hunger strikers. He said he had come "too late, too late" 
but expressed hope that the students' high aspirations ultimately 
would be met. Li Peng said nothing. Later that evening under Li's 
signature and that of Yang Shangkun the order placing Tiananmen 
and other areas of Beijing under martial law was issued. 
Tragedy now waited around the comer. 
Why had events reached this critical point? There were two pos-
sible causes. First, Deng felt-and declared to his Party associates-
that Zhao had betrayed him, specifically by the remark to Gorbachev, 
and in general by his support of the students and refusal to follow the 
Party diktat. It is not clear that Deng believed Zhao was engaged in a 
conspiracy, but it is clear that there were those who were making such 
suggestions to Deng. For Deng, Zhao's "betrayal" may have served as 
the final impetus to go ahead with the crackdown, an action that had 
been delayed several times to that point-probably by Deng himself, 
against the desires of the hardliners on the Standing Committee. 
Second, from the earliest days of his comeback Deng held a nega-
tive attitude toward the students. He and his fellow members in what 
was simply called the club, a cozy institution where Deng and his 
council of elders met to chat, to plan, and to play bridge, contemptu-
ously termed the young wa wa, children. They were uppity, rambunc-
tious, ungrateful They didn't know their place. The elders knew best. 
The wa wa did not appreciate what had been done for them. As Deng 
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told his fellow club members, he had given them more presents than 
anyone else who had ruled China. He let them go abroad by the tens 
of thousands to study or to work. He put no impediment on what they 
read or wrote (hardly true). The state was spending more money than 
ever to educate them. The state had treated them like prodigal chil-
dren-and how had they repaid this? 
With shouts and slogans and, worst of all, with total betrayal. At 
a time when he was engaged in the supreme diplomatic negotiations of 
his career, those with Mikhail Gorbachev, they had publicly humili-
ated him. They had caused him to disrupt his schedule of meetings 
and entertainment. He did not know from one moment to another 
where he could meet his guest; he was no longer master in his own 
house. This had never happened in history to a chief of state. "I 
could not figure out who was in charge," Gorbachev was quoted as 
saying after his Beijing visit. 
Deng put his relationship to Zhao and to the students in the same 
context-they had both caused him loss of face and personal humilia-
tion. As one who knows Deng well told me: Deng is a brilliant man, 
brave, courageous, bold. He took the steps that had to be taken to get 
the country going after Mao and the Gang of Four. But he has a 
terrible weakness. If he thinks someone he trusts has let him down or 
betrayed him, his temper is like lightning. Nothing can withstand 
him. This is the great tragedy. 
I think, however, that Deng's temper is not the whole answer. I 
date the problem back a year, just as I was leaving China at the end of 
June 1988. I had expected to meet with Deng, and this hope had been 
encouraged by Yang Shangkun, who was my liaison with Deng-but 
the meeting never materialized. Deng had gone to Beidaihe, his usual 
summer retreat. He swam and relaxed there each year, and the gov-
ernment moved there, too. 
That June 1988 the Party simply split apart. As it met at 
Beidaihe, it was unable to agree on how to handle urgent problems. 
Basically those were economic-the uneven pace of development, the 
overinvestment in non-economic high-rise office buildings and hotels, 
the uncontrolled pouring of state funds into trivial municipal and 
county projects, often riddled with graft, the inability of banks and 
fiscal controllers to curb racing inflation and the rise of the cost of 
living. 
Two things made it impossible to resolve these issues: Deng's in-
sistence that his development program move forward in the fast lane, 
and the savage attack of the Party reactionaries, who sensed a strategic 
moment to dump the whole Deng program. 
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Aided by some of the military, the elders succeeded better than 
perhaps even they realized. They halted the Deng program. Deci-
sions were postponed until a later meeting, in July, when Deng was 
compelled to accept transfer of economic questions from Zhao's hands 
to those of Premier Li Peng. To protect Deng-beginning now to 
show age-slowed responses-blame for the troubles was heaped on 
Zhao Gust as earlier, in 1986-87, it had been heaped on Hu Yaobang). 
The Beidaihe meetings resolved nothing. The crisis continued. 
The government allotted token subsidies to the hard-pinched Bei-
jingers and other big-city residents. The question of graft and corrup-
tion and influence peddling by sons, daughters, and relatives got only 
lip service. 
The arguments at Beidaihe were no more effective than those in 
Petrograd in 1916 and early 1917, when Czar Nicholas II and his ad-
visers struggled to resolve the crisis that was overwhelming Russia. 
They changed nothing but the names of the ministers. 
China rolled ahead to disaster with the players in the power elite 
worrying not about the country but about how the power pie would be 
cut. The oligarchs saw a chance to prolong their reign a few more 
years. The military knew it held the top cards and that in a crisis 
power would flow its way. Some individuals, like Yang Shangkun, 
saw a chance for a quantum leap upward. 
What Deng thought or felt is not recorded. 
In August 1988, just after the events at Beidaihe, I met a gifted 
(but sometimes mistaken) observer of the Chinese political scene. He 
had been in China and was in a state of great excitement. Deng had 
lost control. He was no longer in charge. He thought everything must 
be done immediately-while he was still among the living. Haste was 
the only word he understood. He was not in touch with reality. He 
no longer was able to judge a situation on the basis of real evidence. 
No one could talk to him. The sessions at Beidaihe had been a failure. 
They had broken up with everyone in conflict. The countryside was in 
awful shape. No food. The cities were a disaster because of inflation. 
No meat in city or country. A total mess. The slogan was going 
around: "Better Mao and 48 than Deng and 108"-meaning that 
earning 48 yuan a month under Mao was better than earning 108 yuan 
under Deng. 
I was appalled. This report did not jibe with anything I had seen. 
I knew it was false in major segments: The countryside was not starv-
ing. There was plenty of food and plenty of money. I had been travel-
ing in China almost continuously for six or seven months. This was 
not a description of the China I knew. 
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What bothered me most was that this description was issuing 
from very high quarters, from persons who had been at Beidaihe. This 
might not be the true situation, but it was the situation in which they 
wanted others to believe. 
I was so upset by the report that I wrote some of my highly 
placed Chinese contacts and told them they should know what kind of 
stories were emerging from official quarters in China. I thought it was 
propaganda to support the campaign of the reactionaries to drive Zhao 
from office and compel Deng to abandon his reform and opening poli-
cies. In so doing China would move back toward the bankruptcy of 
Stalinist economics-just at a time when the Soviets were trying to 
imitate China's remarkable innovations. 
I smelled high politics-succession politics-in all this. The 
struggle for the dragon throne was under way. It seemed likely that 
Deng was losing vigor. Possibly he was getting out of touch. Possibly 
there were those in whose interest it was to detach Deng from reality. 
Much the same had happened in Mao's last years. 
After this I watched closely and listened to my Chinese friends. 
The battle swirled around Zhao. Sometimes the liberals seemed to 
gain a bit, sometimes Zhao unexpectedly emerged into prominence, 
then was lost in a swirl of political fog. Li Peng's picture moved in 
and out of circulation. A political battle was in progress, but it was 
hard to distinguish it from the normal give-and-take of Chinese 
politics. 
Certainly I had no premonition, as China moved toward the forti-
eth anniversary of the Communist Revolution and the tenth year of 
the Deng regime, that she would explode into Tiananmen. 
Nor did the emergence of the student demonstrations in April 
1989 and their escalation into May and finally June seem to me to 
presage disaster. I confess I was mystified at the irresolution of the 
government and its unwillingness to enter into a simple dialogue with 
the students at an early stage, when an easy solution was not beyond 
reach. 
As tension rose, as the troops moved in, as the government began 
to prepare for arbitrary action, another suspicion arose. Was there not 
something deliberate in all this? Was the crisis temperature being al-
lowed to rise until military action became inevitable and even 
necessary? 
That hypothesis becomes inescapable when viewed against the 
background of the government's program. It was-and is-totally un-
able to cope with the economic problems that have been spun off by 
Deng's fast-paced development. Nor does it seem able or willing to 
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touch the issue of graft in high places. This made more attractive a 
military solution. It would solve nothing basic, but it would terrorize 
the population and give the Party a chance to impose absolute control 
on an unruly citizenry. It would keep them from shouting. They 
might suffer and starve, but they would be afraid of the army's guns. 
Harsh, yes. But to preserve its power, the junta would halt at nothing. 
The notion, held by many Americans, that the bright young people in 
Tiananmen were touching the hearts and minds of Deng and his men 
was naive. 
Unless the army was a complete society of fools, only a deliberate 
desire to initiate and continue terror could explain the manner in 
which Tiananmen was handled-the extraordinary firepower directed 
at random against the citizenry. Whatever the number of students 
killed on Tiananmen, it was only a fraction of the general public 
mowed down. 
The incredulity over the casualty figures of three or four thousand 
reflected the fact that these casualties were not inflicted in the center of 
town but in the outskirts, where the conduct of the PLA had touched 
off a genuine people's war. Tens and hundreds of thousands of ordi-
nary citizens sprang from houses and flats to oppose armor with bare 
hands. The spectacle of the lone man dancing in front of an armored 
column to bring it to a halt was a symbol of the people of Beijing. 
They emerged en masse to try to convince the people's army that they 
were the people. 
A man of whom I heard walked from the suburbs and up to the 
barrier line just beyond the Beijing Hotel early on the evening of June 
4. He walked to that point and the Tiananmen troops opened fire. 
The bullets coursed past him on either side. He could not believe it. 
He threw himself on the pavement, arms outstretched. A bullet hit a 
foot ahead of him, spattering fragments that injured his hand. He 
went to the Capital Hospital, where his wound was treated after a long 
wait. They had many more serious cases. Doctors in some hospitals 
operated for seventy-two hours without halt. Many deaths resulted 
when blood supplies ran out. 
"Why did you go to Tiananmen?" the man was asked. 
"I had to tell them," he said. "I had to talk to them and tell them 
that we were the people." 
No one who saw or talked to the people of Beijing can believe 
that they will easily swallow the government line that Tiananmen did 
not happen, that only "bad men" and "bandits" burned the trucks and 
held back the troops. 
To the people of Beijing it is apparent that the mantle of heaven, 
A FORTNIGHT LATER 167 
which slipped from the death grasp of Mao Zedong to the agile hands 
of Deng Xiaoping, has slipped once again. Deng has lost it and no one 
yet has retrieved it. 
And what of the future? I have heard estimates of six months to 
two years before there is another shuffle of the deck. That depends on 
the lives of elderly men, particularly the life of Deng Xiaoping. His 
mind, I have been told, is clear, if not as nimble as it was. His body 
has deteriorated this last year. The process is irreversible. Hopefully 
he will not sink into the vegetative state in which Mao spent his last 
years, totally manipulated by unscrupulous handlers. 
Already it is said that Deng is much in the control of a small 
band of individuals. He spends little time on affairs of state (is not 
strong enough or lacks the will), accepts the evaluations of others, has 
little firsthand knowledge of conditions, is totally unaware of the real-
ity of Tiananmen, quite possibly believes the vapid propaganda of the 
army and the Party. 
Deng's speech of June 9 to the military commanders, congratulat-
ing them on their actions of June 4, was read abroad as bristling with 
anger and the determination to use any means necessary to regain con-
trol of the "counterrevolutionary" situation. 
So Deng said, but the full text of the speech discloses a baffled, 
almost bewildered old man, painfully clutching at his vision of a new, 
open, and reformed China, a China that will go forward to economic 
vigor and meet his goals for the year 2050. It is apologetic in tone. 
Deng is obviously stunned at the resistance the people put up to the 
PLA crackdown. There is a plaintive vein of incomprehension run-
ning through his remarks, as though he cannot really believe it all 
happened, that his dreams and ambitions have been shattered in a sin-
gle tragic night. 
There is no way that Deng's condition will take a turn for the 
better. The trend is down and it will not change. Yang Shangkun has 
acquired enormous influence with Deng, with the army, and with the 
elders. But although more vigorous than Deng, he is only two years 
his junior. He too has entered a zone in which physical and mental 
frailty may readily make their appearance. And he is not without ene-
mies. He did not receive a unanimous vote in his election to the Mili-
tary Commission. 
None of my Chinese friends believes Li Peng has a constituency. 
They see him as an instrument, not a player. They do not expect his 
power to grow. The new Party Secretary, Jiang Zemin, has no wide 
political base. He has only Shanghai behind him, and even there he is 
not too popular. This is hardly an accident. When Mao had to pick a 
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successor after the death of Zhou Enlai and the second fall of Deng 
Xiaoping, he picked Hua Guofeng, a political unknown whom he had 
met in his native Hunan. He didn't want a man of power. Deng's 
choice of Jiang was based on the same kind of political calculation. 
With Li and Jiang in place Deng feels no political threat. 
It is a situation pleasing to the army. The military has demon-
strated to Deng that without it he cannot retain power. The com-
manders have demonstrated to themselves that they are more 
powerful than Deng or the Party. On the next round they expect to 
pick their man for the top office. Not necessarily an army man, but 
one who can head a tightly run military state. Something, say, like 
South Korea. With a doctrine that has already been evolved by the 
reactionaries, a doctrine called authoritarianism (which is just what it 
says, a gloss of Nazism and fascism), they think they can do very well. 
Who needs democracy? The fast-moving Asian "tigers" have done 
very well without democracy. China, they think, is too big, too incho-
ate to function under such a system. With authoritarianism, some 
peasant graft, and the guns of the armored divisions China should do 
very well. 
As I have been writing these lines I have talked to some of my 
Chinese friends. What is there to hope for? They shake their heads in 
despair. "This is only the beginning," they say. They think of it in 
terms of the unthinkable: the Cultural Revolution in reruns, China 
sinking back into the sloth of warlordism, fascism. 
I fear they are right. I confess I was one who thought the stu-
dents in Tiananmen could change the minds of the stubborn men who 
run the country. Yes, even that of Deng Xiaoping. 
I was as naive as that young man from Nankai whom I met in the 
square. I thought he and his comrades were the wave of the future. 
Like so many Americans, I was very proud of the youngsters, so 
brave, so idealistic. 
Now I know that China is still ruled by her three great symbols: 
the Yellow River, the Great Wall, and the Dragon. The Yellow River 
is believed to have given birth to Chinese civilization thousands of 
years ago in its rich alluvial soil and to have established China as a 
river country, not an ocean country. She still lives by the Yellow 
River waters, not the blue of ocean seas, turning inward instead of 
outward, as did the men of the Renaissance and the privateers of 
Queen Elizabeth. Not yet have the people and their rulers begun to 
see that the Great Wall keeps the people in, as well as invaders out; 
that the walls and courtyards in which they contain themselves, the 
great magenta walls that surround the Forbidden City and 
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Zhongnanhai, confine minds as well as bodies. And the Dragon is still 
supreme, China's benevolent dragon that protects the nation, protects 
the throne, protects the dynasties, protects the people-so long as they 
do not threaten its order. 
Now I know that these myths still hold China under their sway. 
The TV documentary, Yellow River Elegy, which challenged them, has 
not tom China away from her ancient foundations. "If they had only 
discussed these ideas," said the director of the documentary the night 
before the guns roared at Tiananmen, "they would not be in this 
situation." 
He was right, but now, I am afraid, it will be years before the 
bright dreams of the Elegy will gleam through the dark clouds of the 
Dragon, break down the barrier of the Great Wall, and send China 
soaring away from the silt of the Yellow River into the clean blue 
waters of the sea and the endless precincts of space. 

9. HOW THE HARDLINERS WON* 
Nicholas D. Kristof 
Hu Yaobang always tried to do things his own way, from the day 
at age 14 when he ran away from home to join the Communists to the 
time in 1986 when, as Party leader, he suggested that maybe it was 
time for Deng Xiaoping to retire. This year, after he had his heart 
attack-embarrassingly, 40 minutes into a Politburo meeting-the 
doctor ordered him to spend a week in bed. But Hu, 74, was impa-
tient; in particular, he was tired of bedpans. In the early morning of 
Aprill5, on the seventh day after the heart attack, Hu raised his lithe, 
5 foot, 3 inch frame from the bed and stepped toward the bathroom. 
It was too much for him. Hu Yaobang suffered a seizure, collapsed 
and died. 
Hu's seizure was a prelude to China's. His death triggered weeks 
of massive protests, giddy days last April and May when throngs of 
more than a million filled the streets of Beijing, criticizing the growing 
corruption, and in general demanding more of the democracy that Hu 
had come to symbolize. And then, after seven exhilarating weeks, it 
all came to a sudden end. In the early hours of June 4, as the world 
watched in horror, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army rolled 
toward Tiananmen Square and troops fired on the crowds, killing hun-
dreds and wounding thousands. 
Behind this highly public drama lay another one, less visual and 
far less understood, yet just as significant. It was enacted not on the 
streets but in Zhongnanhai-the park-like compound a few hundred 
yards from Tiananmen where most of China's top leaders have their 
villas-and in Deng Xiaoping's own large estate a mile north of there. 
This was the battle within the leadership, a struggle among ambitious 
men and their competing visions of China. The echoes of this struggle 
still reverberate through the country, and China's future will depend 
on how it is resolved. 
The following account is pieced together from conversations with 
dozens of people, including many Party officials, as well as a reading of 
various documents-reports and speeches-some released to the pub-
lic, others "internal" and closely held. In many places in the narra-
• Reprinted by permission of New York Times, Inc., dated November 14, 1989, from 
The New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1989. 
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tive, I have avoided attribution, sometimes because those involved 
spoke only on condition their names not be used, sometimes because 
use of their names would put them and their families in jeopardy. 
The central figure in the tragedy is Zhao Ziyang, who in 1987 
succeeded Hu Yaobang as General Secretary of the Communist Party. 
A wily and sometimes ebullient politician with a razor-sharp mind, 
Zhao was expected to become Deng's successor as paramount leader. 
More than any other official, Zhao was identified with Deng's eco-
nomic "opening" of the country; he surrounded himself with some of 
the best and brightest of the country's young scholars who, based in an 
archipelago of think tanks around Beijing, submitted revolutionary 
proposals for economic and political change. For many young intel-
lectuals, this was China's Camelot. 
By the summer of 1988, however, their patron's job was in jeop-
ardy. Inflation and corruption were on the rise, and the people were 
grumbling. Many older Party officials regarded Zhao as too impa-
tient; they were appalled when he flirted with heretical notions such as 
freeing prices and selling off state-owned companies to private share-
holders. They began to criticize Zhao, in what they viewed as an at-
tempt to save the revolution and the economy. Early this year, some 
of Deng's most influential associates, most notably Chen Yun, the 84-
year-old genius of central planning, formally advised that Zhao, 69 at 
the time, be dismissed. 
Such is Zhao's situation when his predecessor, Hu Yaobang, col-
lapses in Beijing Hospital and the drama begins. 
April18 
With the news of Hu Yaobang's death, university students-for 
whom Hu was a symbol of change-begin hanging posters mourning 
him and criticizing the Party leadership. In the predawn hours, sev-
eral thousand students march to Tiananmen; within a few days, 
thousands of them are effectively occupying the square and threaten-
ing to force their way inside Zhongnanhai. 
During this first week, I happen to have lunches on three occa-
sions with lieutenants or supporters of Zhao. The ruling faction in 
Beijing will later claim that Zhao was behind the protests from the 
beginning, plotting with the students with an eye toward seizing 
power, but this week none of the aides think much of the students; 
indeed, they are openly dismissive. "It's nothing," one says derisively. 
"It'll be over soon." They regard the protests as just another head-
ache for their boss, another threat to his already precarious position. 
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At the beginning, the Zhao faction is as befuddled by the students as 
anyone else. 
Meanwhile, just to the east of Tiananmen Square, on Justice 
Street, officials of the Beijing People's Government are appalled at the 
students' conduct. Beijing Mayor Chen Xitong and local Party leader 
Li Ximing have their staffs prepare reports focusing on the most outra-
geous of the students' slogans-those calling for the ouster of Deng 
Xiaoping. 
On April 23, Zhao Ziyang embarks on a previously scheduled 
visit to Pyongyang, North Korea, leaving hardline officials in charge 
of policy. 
Apri124 
The Politburo Standing Committee-now presided over by Prime 
Minister Li Peng, Zhao's primary rival-meets to discuss the unrest, 
and resolves that the Party must act firmly in the face of the 
demonstrations. 
Early the next morning, two Mercedes Benz limousines pull out 
of Zhongnanhai, wind their way north and then-ignoring a "Do Not 
Enter" sign-pull into a narrow alley just south of Dianmen Gate. A 
team of elite guards admit Li Peng, 60, and 82-year-old President 
Yang Shangkun through a steel gate and into the residence of Deng 
Xiaoping, 84, China's senior leader. 
They find Deng in a grim mood, outraged by the ongoing protests 
and deeply alarmed at the prospect of further unrest. He comments 
that other socialist countries that had been tolerant of unrest-he cites 
the example of Poland-had experienced economic collapse; he also 
hails the authorities in the Soviet Republic of Georgia for their firm 
measures against dissent. (At least 19 protesters had been killed by 
troops in a recent incident there.) 
Finally, Deng tells his two colleagues that Army troops must 
enter the city and crush any further demonstrations. "We do not fear 
spilling blood," declares Deng, "and we do not fear the international 
reaction." A stenographer takes down his words, and they are later 
turned into a document that is read to other Party officials. 
On Deng's orders, a hardline editorial is prepared for the People's 
Daily, condemning the student unrest and calling for a crackdown. 
When a draft is taken to Deng's home, the leader strikes out each use 
of xuechao ("student movement") and replaces it with dongluan ("tur-
moil," the same pejorative used to describe the Cultural Revolution). 
A copy of the editorial is transmitted to Pyongyang, and Zhao cables 
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back his approval-a cable his rivals will be quick to produce when 
the Party leader later tries to repudiate the editorial. 
April26 
The students are planning a major demonstration for tomorrow. 
Though Deng has issued his orders, senior leaders spend much of the 
day negotiating frantically on how to carry them out while avoiding 
violence. Meanwhile, troops are brought into Beijing and given orders 
to use tear gas and force if necessary to suppress the demonstration. 
The chief lobbyist for restraint is Yan Mingfu, 58, a top official in 
the central Party apparatus and the son of a prominent aide to Zhou 
Enlai. Fluent in Russian, Y an had translated for Deng during the 
early 1960's, and their long friendship gives him extra maneuvering 
room. No one dares countermand Deng's explicit instructions, but 
Y an argues that the regime must somehow avoid getting blood on its 
hands, that bloodshed would only further discredit it. He and other 
officials seek to devise a way to implement Deng's instructions while 
avoiding a confrontation. 
Finally, late in the evening, a decision is made by Qiao Shi, the 
head of the security forces and one of five men on the all-powerful 
Politburo Standing Committee. The troops will be deployed, as Deng 
had ordered, but they will follow a strategy of non-violence. Soldiers 
are to block the roads, and use whatever persuasive techniques they 
can to calm the students; but they are not to use their guns or clubs. 
For a regime struggling to short-circuit a growing mass move-
ment, this proves to be a miscalculation. 
April27 
Word quickly spreads on the campuses that troops are in the 
area, armed with clubs and tear gas. When students emerge from the 
main gate of Beijing University just before 9 A.M., chanting demo-
cratic slogans and waving banners condemning The People's Daily edi-
torial, few expect to reach Tiananmen Square. Some have written 
their wills, expecting to be clubbed to death in the streets. 
And yet a miracle comes to pass: When the students reach the 
first line of policemen and troops, the men do not use their clubs. The 
delighted crowd easily pushes through the lines, and soon the streets 
are full of hundreds of thousands of workers and students cheering for 
democracy. 
It is a turning point: April 27 will come to be regarded by many 
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intellectuals as perhaps the most triumphant day of protest in China 
this century. 
But inside Zhongnanhai, the power struggles have grown more 
intense. Upon his return from North Korea on May 1, Zhao huddles 
with his closest aide, Bao Tong, to discuss the situation. Bao, 57, a 
lean man who doubles as a Central Committee member and secretary 
to the Politburo, points out that the published version of The People's 
Daily editorial differs slightly from the one transmitted to Korea. This 
lets Zhao disavow the increasingly hated editorial. In a roundabout 
challenge to Deng, Zhao suggests to a number of officials that the 
party retract the editorial. 
May4 
Zhao has begun to align himself more and more with the stu-
dents. In part, this is a genuine reflection of his views, but it is also a 
tactical move. Slipping within the Party, Zhao sees a chance to shore 
up his position by turning himself into a populist. On this day, he 
carries this line a step further in a conciliatory speech on national 
television. 
"The just demands of the students must be met," he declares, 
adding that the problems should be solved in a democratic and legal 
way. In contrast to The People's Daily editorial, Zhao discounts the 
"threat" posed by the students. "They are by no means opposed to 
our fundamental system," he says of the protesters. "Rather, they are 
asking us to correct mistakes in our work." 
The speech, drafted by Bao Tong, marks the beginning of the 
open split between Zhao and Deng. To cement the image of Zhao as 
the great conciliator, his aide Bao has the national television networks 
broadcast the speech this evening and repeat it over the next three 
days. And he has The People's Daily run the text on the front page 
and include a roundup of positive responses from the public. 
During the week, the demonstrations subside, but Chinese jour-
nalists begin to be more aggressive in demanding freedom of the press. 
For Zhao, the demands represent a chance to position himself as the 
man of the future. 
On May 6, he summons two senior Party officials in charge of 
propaganda, Hu Qili and Rui Xingwen. "There is no big risk in open-
ing up a bit by reporting the demonstrations and increasing the open-
ness of news," Zhao tells them, according to an account later 
circulated by the Government. The same day, Hu Qili meets with the 
publishers of China's eight largest newspapers and tells them they can 
ease up their control. Journalists rush to oblige Zhao, describing what 
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is happening in the streets. The coverage lends new impetus to the 
democracy movement. 
MayS 
The bosses of Beijing, Li Ximing and Chen Xitong, are outraged. 
The more the Party opens up, the worse they look; in the streets they 
are increasingly portrayed as villains. The two officials have tried to 
force Zhao to call meetings so they can confront him with his diver-
gence from the Party line as expressed in The People's Daily editorial. 
Zhao resists; but finally, today, he calls a meeting. 
It is a stormy and inconclusive session. The Beijing Party faction 
bitterly criticizes the Party leader's May 4 speech, accusing Zhao of 
betraying the Party. 
"Who has betrayed you?" Zhao retorts, according to a Govern-
ment report. "It was only during the Cultural Revolution that people 
were betrayed . . . If I made incorrect remarks, I'll bear the 
responsibility." 
May 11 
The paralysis in the leadership, and the public groundswell for 
change, are combining to help Zhao. According to some sources, 
Zhao is at his finest when the Politburo gathers in an expanded meet-
ing in Zhongnanhai. 
In addition to the regular Politburo members, other prominent 
officials fill the chairs around the table. But Deng Xiaoping does not 
attend, and gives Zhao an edge; in Deng's absence, it is he who holds 
the position of authority. 
It is a tense time; Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev is due to 
arrive in a few days for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, and 
yet the student movement threatens further unrest. Zhao seeks a man-
date for his conciliatory approach, urging that the leadership move 
toward some of the principles of the democracy movement-particu-
larly an end to corruption and a more open government. He submits a 
letter welcoming an investigation of his two eldest sons, who are 
known to be using their connections to make immense sums of money. 
This is one of Zhao's key efforts to tum himself from Party boss to 
populist, and at first it seems to work. In the absence of any organized 
opposition, the meeting ends with a half-hearted endorsement of 
Zhao's approach. 
Openness is in the air, and Zhao rushes to make clear how much 
has changed. Zhao's aide Bao Tong drafts an article praising human 
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rights and calling for a system of balance of powers, and he rushes it to 
The People's Daily. It appears as the lead story on May 12. 
That afternoon, I drop by to see Y an Jiaqi, a prominent political 
scientist who will later lead the exiled democracy movement, and find 
him giddy with enthusiasm. "This is the first time that the press has 
ever used 'human rights' in a favorable context," he says, happily 
clutching the newspaper. 
Around the same time I have lunch with one of Zhao's aides, one 
of the brilliant young men trying to remold China, and he is more 
hopeful than he has been in months. "There is hope that Zhao can 
stay in control and consolidate his position," he says. "The worst 
stage ofthe fire appears to be over, but there is still danger." The key, 
he says, is that Zhao's conciliatory approach has to be proven effec-
tive: The students will have to respond by ending their occupation of 
Tiananmen and returning to campus. 
But this is not what happens. Instead, the protests escalate, and 
the students thereby doom their protector. 
May 13 
The students begin a hunger strike on Tiananmen Square, and 
sympathetic citizens surge onto the streets to show support, literally 
taking over the center of the capital. 
During Gorbachev's visit, there is chaos. The embarrassed Chi-
nese Government finds itself constantly rearranging its plans to avoid 
interruption by the students. 
During this time, Yan Mingfu, the party's chief negotiator, pleads 
with the students to go home, warning in a private meeting that, if 
they press too far, they could well destroy those leaders who sympa-
thize with them. The students listen politely but refuse to compro-
mise; these are matters of principle, they say. Though Zhao's rivals 
view the demonstrators as pawns of the Party leader, the students' 
action at this point undermines their supposed sponsor. 
In the struggle within the leadership, the turmoil creates new un-
certainties. Zhao, no doubt realizing that hardliners will try to seize 
on the growing chaos to force his retirement, takes the offensive. On 
May 16, during his televised meeting with Gorbachev, Zhao Ziyang 
lunges for power. 
"Our whole Party cannot do without Comrade Deng Xiaoping's 
helmsmanship on important issues," Zhao tells Gorbachev and the 
watching Chinese people. "We formally adopted a decision at the first 
plenary session of the 13th Party Congress that on important ques-
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tions we still need him as the helmsman. The decision has never been 
released until today, but it is a very important decision." 
To outsiders, this seems a defense of the senior leader. It is the 
opposite. Many Chinese immediately understand that Zhao is blam-
ing his long-time patron for the stalemate over the students. Zhao is 
saying that he would like to meet the student demands, but that Deng, 
"the helmsman," will not allow it. 
May 17 
As the streets overflow with protesters and the Government loses 
control of the capital, the Politburo Standing Committee is summoned 
to the home of a furious Deng Xiaoping. 
It is there, according to many Chinese officials, at a stormy meet-
ing in the home of his former patron, that Zhao pleads for a program 
of conciliation with the students. It is the moment of confrontation, 
but Deng and his prestige prevail. Zhao is a minority of one-with 
Prime Minister Li Peng and the planning czar Y ao Yilin strongly op-
posed, the security chief Qiao Shi emphasizing the need for order and 
the propaganda boss Hu Qili, though sympathetic to Zhao, still un-
willing to disagree openly with Deng. Although no formal decision is 
taken, it is at this meeting that China is set firmly on the course to-
ward June 4. 
Having lost the vote, Zhao does not give up. His aides lobby furi-
ously, sensing that Qiao Shi and Hu Qili can be persuaded to come 
around. Meanwhile, to put further pressure on the Party, Zhao sub-
mits his resignation. 
"My way of thinking is not in accord with your way of thinking," 
Zhao writes Deng. Zhao knows that the announcement of his resigna-
tion might well bring further protests, and gambles that the Politburo 
will prefer to adopt his proposals than risk being blamed for ousting 
him. 
But Deng refuses to accept the resignation, and a day later Zhao 
revokes the offer. Instead, Zhao goes on sick leave, announcing that 
because of some unspecified ailment he will henceforth not participate 
in Party business. Meanwhile, he tries to take his case to the people, 
leaking word of the May 17 Politburo session (reportedly, through 
Bao Tong). A new wave of public anger and indignation at the leader-
ship follows-and with it, for the first time, a certain amount of sym-
pathy for Zhao. 
Around this time, a Mercedes Benz limousine with an A01 li-
cense plate and darkened windows pulls out of Zhongnanhai. The car 
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slowly circles Tiananmen Square several times, so the passenger can 
see for himself the enormous demonstrations. 
In the car is Zhao Ziyang. All week, he has been telling aides and 
other officials he wants to visit the demonstrators-which would ad-
vance his conciliatory posture one step further. But when he proposes 
this idea to his colleagues, Li Peng vetoes it as too radical a move. So 
Zhao drives around the square, observing events-if only from behind 
the darkened windows. 
Meanwhile, after the epochal May 17 meeting, Deng and his eld-
erly colleagues, together with Li Peng and the conservative faction in 
the Politburo, decide to call troops into the capital and declare martial 
law. One aim, of course, is to re-establish order and win the streets 
back from the demonstrators. But there is another reason, perhaps a 
more important one: Deng and his colleagues, believing they have 
been betrayed by Zhao, fear the Party leader might somehow mount a 
coup d'etat. They intend the troops to guard key government installa-
tions and ministries from a possible attack. 
Amid this atmosphere of fear and mutual suspicion, Party offi-
cials hold hurried negotiations, debating how exactly to summon the 
troops. Zhao sends for Y an Mingfu. The Party leader asks him to 
visit President Yang Shangkun where, pretending he is acting on his 
own initiative, Yan is to urge the President not to call in the Army. 
Y an, tom between conflicting loyalties, goes to see the President. 
"Zhao Ziyang has asked me to come to you and urge that the Army 
not be summoned to Beijing," he tells Yang, and adds, according to a 
well-placed Party official, "I was supposed to say it was my own idea, 
not his." President Yang is angry at Y an for being a lackey of Zhao, 
and Zhao is furious at Yan's betrayal. 
Word spreads that General Xu, Commander of the 38th Army, 
has refused to move his troops into the capital. The consternation at 
Zhongnanhai grows. "I moved troops against the people once" --on 
April27-General Xu reportedly says, "I'm not going to do it again." 
Rather than command his troops, General Xu reports to a local 
hospital. His disobedience is doubly worrying because he is the son of 
one of China's most senior military figures, Xu Haideng. If he cannot 
be trusted, who can be? 
May 19 
In Tiananmen Square, the hunger strikers have been fasting for 
nearly a week, and many of them have begun to drift in and out of 
consciousness. Each time a student faints, an ambulance races 
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through the crowd along a special lane that is kept open for the 
purpose. 
Within Zhongnanhai, the almost constant sirens exacerbate the 
sense of crisis. Zhao repeatedly asks permission to go out and show 
sympathy for the hunger strikers, but other Politburo members refuse 
the request. 
Finally, early this morning, Zhao announces he is going to the 
square anyway. In an effort to show Party unity, an appalled Li Peng 
trails behind as Zhao leads a small retinue into the square. "We have 
come too late," Zhao tells the students, as tears well in his eyes. 
Deeply disturbed by what he regards as the chaos growing 
around him, Li Peng convenes the Politburo Standing Committee later 
in the day to endorse the declaration of martial law. Li also arranges 
for a televised mass meeting that evening in the Army-owned Jingxi 
Hotel. Zhao, who apparently led his colleagues to believe he would 
preside, at the last minute refuses to attend. 
"At least sit at the rostrum to show unity," President Yang re-
portedly pleads. "You don't even have to say anything." But Zhao 
insists he cannot go along with the crackdown, and that in any case he 
is ill. 
Instead, Qiao Shi presides and Li Peng gives the main speech. 
Then President Yang makes an impromptu announcement ordering 
troops into the capital. Though the plan had been not to impose mar-
tial law until the early hours of May 21, troops are already visible on 
the streets. Martial law is formally imposed on May 20. 
But when the bulk of the troops arrive at the outskirts of the 
capital, citizens rush from their homes to block their way, some people 
lay down in the street in front of the military trucks. Hundreds of 
thousands of protesters, organized in groups representing factories and 
offices and even the Foreign Ministry, parade through the center of the 
city. 
With the troops stymied, it seems for a few days that Zhao might 
win after all. But how can he convert this apparent victory in the 
streets to a political triumph within the Party? 
Zhao quickly turns to the mechanism of the National People's 
Congress to revoke martial law and perhaps even impeach Li Peng. 
Almost a third of the 158 members of the Congress's Standing Com-
mittee agree to hold a special session (an entirely legal process, but one 
that eventually lands an organizer, Cao Siyuan, in prison). Zhao then 
surreptitiously sends a message to the head of the Congress, Wan Li, 
who is visiting the United States, to rush home. 
When Li Peng finds out about the message shortly thereafter, he 
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hurriedly convenes a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, which 
sends an equally urgent cable to Wan Li ordering him to remain in the 
United States. Having received both cables, and with the situation in 
Beijing appearing increasingly chaotic, Wan has no idea what to do. 
May23 
Finally, after meeting President Bush in Washington, Wan Li 
cuts his trip short, announcing that because of illness he is returning to 
China. Bao Tong tries to have someone meet his plane in Shanghai, 
but the other faction is a step ahead. As soon as the plane touches 
down, a limousine sent by Shanghai boss Jiang Zemin rolls onto the 
tarmac, collects Wan and bundles him off to a guest house where the 
situation is explained to him. After some discussion, Wan Li agrees to 
back his old friend Deng Xiaoping and support martial law. 
After this episode, Bao Tong notices he is being followed, and his 
telephone tapped. A few days later, he is arrested. Meanwhile, the 
bodyguards assigned to his boss, Zhao Ziyang, are changed, and the 
nine new guards respond not to his commands but to the Politburo's. 
Zhao's secretary is dismissed, and is spared arrest only because the 
Politburo thinks well of his family. 
Around this time, there are frequent reports that Deng Xiaoping 
is traveling to Wuhan and other cities to meet with military leaders 
and ask for their support. But Chinese officials with knowledge of 
Deng's movements say this never happened. Deng and his colleagues 
were already consolidating their hold over the Party and the military, 
and as it became clear that Zhao had lost the battle, people streamed 
to the winning side. 
Provincial leaders are summoned to Beijing for indoctrination. 
They are housed in special guest houses and forbidden to bring more 
than one aide; all their movements are controlled to prevent contact 
with the Zhao forces. Some complain that they are treated as virtual 
prisoners. 
The conservative faction-particularly Li Peng, Yao Yilin, Li 
Ximing and Chen Xitong-now has the edge, and the latter two Bei-
jing officials are expecting promotion. But on May 31, Deng meets 
with Li Peng and Yao Yilin, and tells them the Party needs fresh 
faces. Deng has already consulted with his octogenarian colleagues, 
Chen Y un and Li Xiannian, and decided to choose Jiang Zemin to 
replace Zhao. 
"I hope everyone will regard Jiang Zemin as the core of the Party 
and unite together," Deng tells Li Peng and Yao Yilin, according to 
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the confidential text of his remarks. "Please don't look down on each 
other and waste energy fighting among yourselves." 
June 3 
Thousands of troops have infiltrated into the capital, and people 
are growing accustomed to them--even in the Tiananmen Square 
area. The demonstration itself has lost much of its impetus, with 
many students from outside the capital returning to their homes. 
Fewer than 10,000-probably considerably fewer-are still living in 
the square. 
During the early hours of this Saturday morning, thousands of 
soldiers are sent into Beijing from the east, probably to bolster the 
show of force in the capital and gradually restore order. At this hour, 
the streets are empty of civilians, and it seems likely the plan was for 
the troops to enter the city quietly, without attracting attention. 
But shortly before midnight, three miles west of Tiananmen, a 
speeding police van had swerved out of control, killing three bicyclists. 
An angry crowd quickly gathered, and many of the suspicious people 
insisted the incident was intentional. Some also declared that since the 
van was racing toward Tiananmen Square, the police must be prepar-
ing to evict the demonstrators. 
The news has raced around Beijing, and, for the first time in a 
week, people swarm out of their houses to occupy the streets. The 
angry, defiant crowds soon encounter the exhausted soldiers, who are 
just finishing their forced march into the city, confirming the public 
impression that the authorities are scheming to attack the students. 
The indignant citizens search all vehicles passing by on the roads, and 
beat up some of the soldiers. 
The troops are unarmed, probably to insure safety during the trip; 
their gear and weapons are transported separately in buses taking an-
other route. Under normal conditions, these buses would never have 
been stopped, but after the accident, they are halted and searched, and 
machine guns are found. The discovery further inflames the crowds, 
and angry citizens confiscate the weapons. 
June4 
News that troops have been beaten, and guns stolen, alarms the 
conservative officials now holding the reins of power. Though the cap-
ital has been growing steadily calmer during the last week, the leaders 
decide they have to act decisively. And so Deng and his colleagues 
How THE HARDLINERS WON 183 
order the Army to take control of the city, using whatever force is 
required. 
What happens before dawn on this Sunday has been much writ-
ten about, and much confused. Based on my observations in the 
streets, neither the official account nor many of the foreign versions 
are quite correct. 
There is no massacre in Tiananmen Square, for example, 
although there is plenty of killing elsewhere. Troops frequently fire at 
crowds who are no threat to them, and at times aim directly at medi-
cal personnel and ambulances. Some of those who are shot have been 
threatening the troops--for while the students have generally urged 
nonviolence, many young workers carry firebombs or pipes, and they 
manage to kill more than a dozen soldiers or policemen. But many 
other civilians are casually slaughtered for no apparent reason. 
An acquaintance of mine, the only son of a Party member who 
has always believed in the Government, is riding his bicycle to work in 
northeast Beijing that morning when a detachment of soldiers sees 
him. They shoot him in the back, killing him. He becomes simply 
another statistic in the tragedy of 20th-century China. 
Armed force enabled Deng and his colleagues to regain control 
over the capital, and during the months since, the leadership has 
slowly been consolidating its authority and purging those who are 
judged to have failed the test. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of all his 
offices and has vanished into a walled villa at No. 6 Fuqiang Alley, 
where he is said to spend much of his time reading. Bao Tong remains 
in prison. 
Yet the killings of early June did not resolve the power struggles, 
they intensified them. There still is no consensus in the leadership 
about how China should be managed politically or economically. The 
leaders continue to fight among themselves about what economic poli-
cies to endorse, and whom to promote or purge. 
On the surface, a degree of normalcy is returning to China, and 
martial law has been relaxed in Beijing. But there remain deep and 
unresolved tensions that have only been exacerbated by the bloodshed. 
Many Chinese compare the present period to the jockeying for power 
at the end of the Maoist era in 1976, and they note that the Maoist 
political hierarchy and economic system collapsed only two years after 
Mao died. When Deng and his octogenarian colleagues follow Mao, 
the same thing may well happen. 
At that time, when change finally comes, it is likely to be all the 
more rapid, all the more sweeping, for having been repressed in 1989. 
Many of my Communist friends used to believe in the system. Now 
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they are no longer Communists but simply Party members who believe 
neither in the Party nor in Communism. 
Zhao could well re-emerge-now 70, he is still four years younger 
than Deng was on his triumphal return to power in 1978-but the 
change will not depend on him; for throughout the Party and nation 
there is a deep longing for change, a deep sadness about what has hap-
pened. Today, many Chinese remember the words of the great writer 
Lu Xun early in this century: "Lies written in ink cannot obscure a 
truth written in blood." 
10. THE FALL OF ZHAO ZIY ANG* 
John Fincher 
Through television millions of people around the world watched 
the Chinese army's bloody suppression of pro-democracy demonstra-
tors in and around Beijing's Tiananmen Square on the night of June 3-
4, 1989. For its victims and witnesses, the liberating experience of 
people power was no less a surprise than the carnage that followed. 
Days of hopeful fraternization between the people and the "people's 
army" led only to a night of slaughter. If the event may be put into an 
American rather than an East Asian context, it was as if the Wood-
stock rock festival had been followed directly by the mass suicide at 
Jonestown, and both were telecast back-to-back. 
The intimacy of the final encounters between unarmed students 
and tanks manned by young soldiers was unnerving. The memory of 
those hot spring nights in Beijing will have lasting consequences. Ef-
forts to argue that the slaughter was a creation of the foreign media 
will not wash out the stain. The Big Lie minimizing civilian casualties 
that was ordered up for television stations exposed all too clearly the 
survival of a propaganda style befitting the Cultural Revolution's Lin 
Biao and the "Gang of Four." Within weeks the body counts offered 
by army spokesmen were invalidated even by Communist party offi-
cials. Accusations against the foreign media had to contend with mil-
lions of mainlanders who live within reach of Hong Kong and Taiwan 
television. These viewers have spread Western accounts through ana-
tional population that has grown accustomed to seeing Western news-
casts excerpted on its own stations. 
This year's demonstrations marked the 70th anniversary of the 
May 4, 1919, pro-democracy student protests to which the Commu-
nist Party of the People's Republic of China (PRC) traces its legiti-
macy. It is easy to imagine future commemorations of the June 3-4, 
1989, incident; so many people were involved that the symbolism of 
that date is likely to be long-lived. From April to June the movement 
filled the stage of Chinese politics with autonomous or, as the Chinese 
term them, "self-governing" organizations of students, factory work-
ers, and professionals. Even the journalists charged with telling the 
• Reprinted by permission of Foreign Policy, dated November 2, 1989, from Foreign 
Policy, no. 76 (Fall, 1989), pp. 3-25. 
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government's story played a prominent role as organized petitioners 
and demonstrators. 
Party-appointed officials who try to speak as authorities in 
China's sophisticated and increasingly well-informed society have 
been compromised irreparably by the crackdown. The regime that or-
dered its troops to fire on its own civilians and then sent its police to 
harass them in a widening witch-hunt for demonstrators and support-
ers will not be able to suppress information about its actions. Arrests 
have been numerous and executions have continued, but a surprising 
number of those on the "most wanted" lists of leading agitators and 
"hooligans" have escaped through the tightly woven police nets. Sym-
pathetic concern for fugitives has combined with indifference or cor-
ruption to afford ways out of China for determined individuals. 
The very length of the lists of those sought by the Chinese police 
may help to build opposition, provided enough of those named actu-
ally survive. Many leaders of Beijing's democracy movement have 
turned up in Hong Kong and overseas. Their potential influence as 
refugees is amplified by the support of a worldwide community of Chi-
nese-speaking people that sustains the flow of news and information 
into China. 
Since 1977 Chinese policy has been guided by Deng Xiaoping's 
admonition to "seek truth from facts." In 1989 tens of thousands of 
mainland students overseas disseminated the outside world's picture of 
events in Tiananmen Square to contacts throughout China. Through 
direct-dial telephone lines it became possible to subvert the Big Lie on 
central television with "truth from FAX." The most powerful truths 
were lamentations over events in Tiananmen Square that were printed 
in the Communist Party's own Hong Kong newspapers, faxed into 
China, and photocopied there for posting on walls and telephone poles 
throughout mainland cities. 
The spread of rapid access to information has produced local res-
ervoirs of political awareness in the population. People now under-
stand better their own aptitude for creating self-governing 
organizations when necessity and opportunity coincide, as they did in 
1989. Each of half a dozen waves of democratic activism in China 
since 1976 has directly inspired leaders of the next wave, despite a lack 
of continuity in leadership. The 1989 movement reached tidal wave 
proportions because of that reinforcing tendency. 
Democratic impulses inside China have long been stimulated by 
news from Eastern Europe as well as from the West and Japan. What 
might be termed the "Polish syndrome" has haunted conservative 
party leaders and tantalized other Chinese ever since Solidarity ap-
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peared on the world scene. But China's own version of "Solidarity" 
may already have arrived in the networks of political action groups 
that appeared during the Beijing spring. Warnings against the Polish 
syndrome from the party Propaganda Department may have served as 
self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Chinese sensitivity to changes in the world-wide Communist 
movement made Hungary another source of anxiety for hardliners. 
But others saw Hungary as a model. In late 1987, when Zhao Ziyang 
left his post as Premier of the State Council to become the new Party 
General Secretary, Party policy reflected his determination to outdo 
the Hungarians in bold economic reforms and to "break through the 
pass" with complete price reforms. Interest in outdoing Hungarian 
economic reformers tended to license interest in following Hungarian 
political reformers, who want a multiparty system as well as self-gov-
erning mass and professional organizations. 
Reform of the Chinese media also became a locus for develop-
ments resembling those in Poland or Hungary. The spell of glasnost, 
or openness, soon began to enchant Chinese citizens. But even before 
the dramatic reforms in the Soviet Union, proliferation of free-enter-
prise publishing establishments around China was fueling reform. 
Moreover, media reform was accompanied by steps toward electoral 
reform. Under then General Secretary Hu Yaobang, China in 1980 
introduced contested local elections, the first since the early days of 
the PRC. 
By the time of Hu's death on April 15, 1989, the National Peo-
ple's Congress (NPC) was inching its way toward dealing with issues 
of press freedom and tolerance of nonparty organizations. Meanwhile, 
more and more radical reformers still to be found in the Party signed 
human rights petitions for the release of Wei Jingsheng, who was im-
prisoned for circulating "state secrets" as a leader of the late 1978 and 
1979 Democracy Wall activists. Reformers also urged freedom in the 
media to equal that reappearing in the visual and performing arts and 
in literary and scholarly writing. 
THE DEMOCRACY DEMONSTRATORS 
The death of Hu provided a catalyst for the expression of student 
demands for improved living conditions and political reform. The offi-
cial response to their marches on Tiananmen Square was hardline crit-
icism in the party's newspaper, the People's Daily, of April 26. But the 
applause and solicitude of the people of Beijing during the students' 
April 27 demonstration strengthened their determination to rebuff 
hardline response to their protests. A new urgency shaped plans an-
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nounced long before to commemorate the May 4, 1919, student dem-
onstrations. Activists decided to exploit the occasion to call for 
democratization of present-day China. 
During May, students' requests for dialogue and their ambitions 
to govern their own organizations became a more direct challenge to 
the authorities responsible for the tough April 26 response. Calls for 
the now 85-year-old Deng's long-promised retirement and Premier Li 
Peng's resignation came to look more and more like interference in 
China's leadership succession question. The army's intervention of 
June 3-4 insured that meetings of the NPC's Standing Committee in 
late June would rubber-stamp the martial law decrees of the Li Peng 
regime. Consideration of a new liberalizing press law and attention to 
the succession crisis were now out of the question. 
Americans have rightly taken heart at the prominence in China's 
demonstrations of a "Goddess of Democracy" that resembled the 
Statue of Liberty. Many demonstrators also raised two fingers in a 
Churchillian "V for Victory" gesture, thanks largely to its association 
with Philippine "people power." 
Yet despite fears expressed in May by hardline party elders, the 
events of 1989 do not represent a revived effort to roll back commu-
nism. The confrontation between Chinese democrats and their op-
pressors is not quite as simple as might be suggested by Reaganite and 
Thatcherite accounts of the victory of capitalism over communism in 
East Asia or Eastern Europe. It should be remembered that during 
the hours the young Chinese protestors standing near their statue of 
liberty were facing death, they were also singing the Internationale. 
Appeals to Marxist, if not Leninist, traditions of critical self-scrutiny 
have been an important part of glasnost. In China as elsewhere the 
Communist Party has long confined the tradition of self-criticism to 
semi-private confessions of a quasi-religious character. But as the task 
of criticizing the Party from within has grown more open, it has 
brought public notoriety to righteous individuals who are seen as vir-
tually courting expulsion from the Party. What China's elderly 
hardliners call the threat of rollback is actually closer to a developing 
tradition of "peelback." 
With their signs and T -shirts of welcome, China's democratic ac-
tivists displayed their enthusiasm for glasnost as Soviet President 
Mikhail Gorbachev's May 15-18 visit approached. Gorbachev's re-
sponse to the student welcome was measured, but he increased his 
popularity with students simply by showing up. Whatever he may 
have intended, Gorbachev found himself cast in an important role in 
the long drama of leadership succession in China. A similar situation 
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had greeted Taiwan's minister of finance, Shirley Kuo, who made an 
unprecedented trip to Beijing for the May 4 meeting of the Asian De-
velopment Bank as leader of a 12-member delegation of officials. To-
gether the Soviet and Taiwanese visits gave then Party General 
Secretary Zhao an opportunity to portray himself as China's counter-
part to Gorbachev in domestic reforms and as the mainland's counter-
part to Taiwan's Nationalist party leader and president, Lee Teng-hui, 
in a possible "Chinese common market" program pointed toward 
their countries' eventual reunification. 
In both domestic and foreign matters Zhao's response to 
Gorbachev's presence made him look more and more like the natural 
successor to Deng as China's paramount leader. Moreover, 
Gorbachev refused to distance himself from Zhao while having only 
begun his still very correct relationship with Deng and, for that mat-
ter, with Li Peng and President Yang Shangkun. 
Most Western and some Chinese observers have incorrectly seen 
Zhao and his kind of reformism in China as in a state of steady decline 
during 1987 and 1988. Thus his visit with the student hunger strikers 
in Tiananmen Square just before Li Peng's announcement of martial 
law the night of May 19 was viewed as the dramatic end to the slow 
frustration of his reform efforts. Such interpreters are then forced to 
consider a surprise the appointment of the relatively reformist Mayor 
of Shanghai, Jiang Zemin, as Zhao's successor as General Secretary. 
The more plausible and simpler explanation is that Zhao's campaign 
to succeed Deng when he retires--ifhe retires-and Zhao's campaign 
for reform had been proceeding generally successfully up to the eve of 
the visits by Kuo and Gorbachev, which Zhao meant to use to further 
both causes. The near success of Zhao's own leadership campaign 
over the past two years is now confirmed by the appointment not only 
of the Mayor of Shanghai as his replacement but also of the Mayor of 
Tianjin, Li Ruihuan, to the Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
Although brought about by Zhao's dismissal, the appointment of 
mayors from two of China's larger, internationally important cities to 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo is an acknowledgement of 
Zhao's appreciation that China's present challenges and future pros-
pects lie mostly with urban centers. Zhao is the most prominent of 
China's recent leaders to have rejected the mythic power of "peasant 
China" as the vanguard of the revolution to which veterans of the 
1934-35 Long March or their proteges on the Politburo cling even 
now. It is an inventiveness that makes Zhao appear, like Gorbachev, 
all the more a practitioner of a new kind of Communist Party politics. 
Theirs is a presidential style that depends upon a wide repertoire of 
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new initiatives in domestic affairs. Both leaders have frequently sur-
prised followers and rivals alike by publicly turning onto new avenues 
when temporarily slowed by some obstacle. And unlike the politics of 
their Leninist predecessors-including those in the Maoist mode-
theirs is a politics that exploits international conditions that are 
favorable to nonmilitary initiatives. Both Zhao and Oorbachev might 
thus be considered their countries' first genuine postwar leaders. 
Their approaches reflect the goal of rendering changes in domestic and 
international conditions that depend upon making a sustained transi-
tion from preparations for war to preparations for peace. 
Both men have struggled with agricultural stagnation in their 
countries, underproduction due in China's case largely to failures of 
Mao's militaristic utopian commune system, and in the Soviet case 
partly to the failures of another somewhat utopian venture, the virgin 
land projects imposed by Nikita Khrushchev. In the late 1970s and 
early 1980s Zhao helped Deng reform agriculture and enrich the life of 
China's rural population, primarily by supporting family farms instead 
of the commune system. With rural reform well in hand, since about 
1984 he has concentrated on the transformation of urban China, en-
couraging private or collectively funded rather than state owned and 
subsidized enterprises. Zhao stood at the forefront of Chinese who 
realize that a decade of 10 percent annual economic growth and other 
structural changes have brought China to where it may soon become 
another of East Asia's predominantly urban economies and societies. 
Zhao's identification with the rapid approach of China's transi-
tion from a rural to an urban society has alarmed many party 
hardliners. Most of China's old leaders have been slow to realize or 
unwilling to believe that by 1987 the contribution to the gross national 
product of China's "rural areas" had become half nonagricultural, and 
that the population of China's "urban areas" could be estimated as 
more than 40 per cent of the total population. In addition, they were 
alarmed that collective or private and household enterprises account 
for more than 40 per cent of the industrial product that previously was 
overwhelmingly accounted for by state enterprises. 
Regrettably, the acceptance of Zhao's agenda came only in the 
wake of military moves designed both to eliminate him from conten-
tion for the succession to Deng and to put down student demonstra-
tors. It was also accompanied by the enforcement of martial law in a 
way that could be designed to reverse the urban tendency of Chinese 
society, as has happened before in Chinese history. 
Although leadership of the Communist Party now has an urban 
bias, Deng is the same man who suggested during the recent crisis that 
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it does not matter if the students do not support the party since it can 
depend on the backing of the army and the peasantry. Something of 
what Deng meant can be seen from revealing footage from a still un-
finished documentary on the Chinese army filmed by an Australian 
crew in 1988. Some obliging army propagandists arranged a display of 
antiriot training classes. While the cameras rolled, several soldiers 
raced up the steps of an apartment building to capture a mock terror-
ist. Meanwhile, their commander attacked the culprit with abusive 
shouts: "you intellectual" or "you educated element." Army person-
nel on the spot did not think it necessary to conceal the assumption 
that students, not "hooligans," were the likely target of army action. 
That episode, like the Tiananmen incident, shows again how links 
and alliances between the Party Propaganda Department and army 
trainers have always been close. The same can be seen from the align-
ments of influential Party figures involved with propaganda such as 
Hu Qiaomu and Deng Liqun who have resisted de-Maoization or who 
have consistently sought to curb political reforms. 
DENG'S BALANCING ACf 
Militarism is an important factor in the history of militancy in the 
Chinese Communist Party. But its role has often been obscured by 
foreign analyses that have exaggerated the significance of regional ten-
sions in the army. As the Tiananmen incident shows, predictions of 
geographic divisions between army units-like those asserting that the 
27th Army brought from northwest China to control the capital was 
the target of some unnamed unit or units-almost always prove mis-
leading. Once again, a predicted revival of warlordism did not take 
place. 
The major question in this area of Chinese politics is not regional-
ism in the military but the overall relationship between civilian and 
military rule. A critical element of China's present situation is the 
tripartite division of power among the army, Party, and state. Deng's 
political reforms have focused on separating and balancing Party and 
state entities in a way that is essential to economic advances. They are 
meant to reduce the day-to-day role of the Party in the operation of 
the state and to make it easier to get the state bureaucracy out of the 
economy. But the separation between Party and state has been stabi-
lized only by balancing the two with the army. And this primitive 
division of powers has been maintained by Deng's continued interven-
tions in the Party-state balance as chairman of two nearly identical 
military affairs commissions, one of the Party and one of the state. 
Even if he is serious about retiring, it is difficult to see how Deng 
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can get out of his position in the army without kicking over this three-
legged stool. If China is not on the way to establishing the supremacy 
of a civilian president as a genuine commander-in-chief of the coun-
try's armed forces, the rare but decisive interventions of Deng, the 
chairman of China's Military Affairs Commission, in the Party-state 
balance are hard to describe as anything but disguised military coups. 
The Party-state constitutional problem is not peculiar to China, 
as can be seen from Gorbachev's assumption of the posts both of party 
General Secretary and of President. Deng has differed from his prede-
cessor and other leaders of communist countries by his skill in keeping 
his hand in military interventions largely unseen-that is, until the 
events of the Beijing spring. These events showed the degree to which 
Deng's power ultimately flows from the barrel of a gun, in particular 
from those guns of army units personally loyal to Yang. 
From the PRC's founding in 1949 until he was driven from 
power by Mao in the Cultural Revolution, Deng had been mainly a 
Party figure despite his unrivaled pre-1949 connections with military 
leaders. After his return to power in 1973 at Mao's behest, he became 
primarily a military figure operating in the Party and state at a slight 
distance from what Chinese leaders have long called, with their fond-
ness for military metaphors, the "front line" of politics. After Mao's 
death in 1976 Deng not only profited personally from the arrest of 
Mao's wife and other members of the Gang of Four, but he also engi-
neered the abolition of the office of Party Chairman that Mao had 
made the highly autocratic center of power in China. Through negoti-
ations with Party colleagues whom he had recalled from their Cultural 
Revolution banishment, Deng initiated the appointment of Hu 
Yaobang to his own pre-Cultural Revolution job, General Secretary. 
Without an all-powerful chairman, the Party could more easily be bal-
anced by the state through the work of his other protege, Zhao, as 
State Council Premier. 
With Hu in charge of the Party and Zhao in charge of the State 
Council, however, Deng also began a program of the gradual retire-
ment of his aging Long March comrades. Deng himself in November 
1987 retired from membership in the Party Politburo and its Standing 
Committee, which he had chaired. He left himself only one major 
formal title: concurrent Chairman of the Party and State Military Af-
fairs Commissions. 
From September 1987 to April1989 preparations for Deng's own 
retirement became the central succession problem. Gorbachev's ex-
pected visit to Beijing assumed a role in these preparations: It prom-
ised to end military efforts in either country to invoke the threat of 
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Sino-Soviet military conflict as a serious policy consideration. Once 
the possibility of war with either power was formally declared un-
likely, what substance would be left in the job of Chairman of the 
Party and State Military Affairs Commissions for a man of Deng's 
historic stature? If Deng were to retire after Gorbachev's visit, the job 
would seem destined to go to Zhao, who since May 1988 had been 
Deng's first deputy of the military affairs commission. Yang, Deng's 
executive deputy in the commission, would presumably retire since 
both men were already in their mid-eighties. But would Yang abide a 
direct threat to his military power from Zhao? 
This threat had its roots in the military's objections to the policies 
of Hu Yaobang, Zhao's predecessor as General Secretary. Hu's re-
moval in 1987 followed student demonstrations connected with his en-
ergetic pursuit of political reform and democratization. Hu's 
policies-like Zhao's later-had the effect of promoting civilian au-
thority. They rankled many of the older, conservative army leaders, 
including Yang. Deng was reliably reported to have let Yang take the 
credit-or blame-for Hu's dismissal. 
Some of Yang's continuing restiveness was betrayed in 1987 dur-
ing preparations for a trip to America to discuss military matters. 
Yang stubbornly insisted that the Chinese Foreign Ministry arrange 
for his American hosts to accord him treatment normally reserved for 
a head of state even though he was traveling only as a military deputy 
chairman. The demand revealed that Yang had been tipped for the 
presidency, then still held by Li Xiannian. But it may also have re-
vealed his exalted view of his own status as future president, and per-
haps his view of himself as not a lesser man than Deng. After all, 
Deng received head-of-state treatment from President Jimmy Carter 
during a U.S. visit in 1979 while formally only Vice Chairman of the 
Party. 
Although Li Peng had become heir to Zhao's job as premier of 
the State Council when Zhao took over the Party, the formal confir-
mation of the promotions of both Yang and Li depended on Zhao's 
confirmation as Deng's "first deputy" for the military. While a pre-
mier-in-waiting, Li was ready to oblige Yang by insisting that "his" 
foreign minister get the Americans to give Yang what he wanted. Li's 
behavior is understandable, as he was probably still smarting from 
Zhao's agreeing to his promotion from a vice minister's to a minister's 
position only after a leading Party elder, Chun Yun, argued that he 
was a likely candidate for on-the-job training as minister. 
By the time of his confirmation as General Secretary on Novem-
ber 2, 1987, Zhao had already launched policies that induced the Con-
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gress to refuse to reelect to the new 13th Party Central Committee 
some of the Politburo and Propaganda Department's strongest critics 
of Zhao's predecessor, Hu. Those critics had campaigned against the 
"bourgeois liberalization" that accompanied reforms pursued by Hu 
and Zhao. The 13th Central Committee thus came to be known as 
"Zhao's Committee." 
By early 1989, after his election as first deputy of the state Mili-
tary Affairs Commission the previous year, Zhao had kept on track his 
effort to succeed Deng as army leader. But as heir apparent, Zhao 
faced complicated problems in dealing with Yang, Li Peng, and ulti-
mately Deng. 
Considering the history of Deng's disguised military interventions 
in the Party-state balance he had helped create, the events of late April 
1989 can only be described as an attempted military coup by Yang, Li 
Peng, and other leaders embraced by Deng. The enforcement of mar-
tiallaw on June 3-4 might then be described as a successful military 
coup. 
Zhao's approach to the succession problem had been different 
from that of Hu, who lost his job in January 1987. Whereas Hu was 
known for privately urging Deng to set an example for others by retir-
ing before it was too late, Zhao chose simply to campaign for Deng's 
job by assuming his patron's retirement was a foregone conclusion. 
This approach was rebuffed sharply on April 25, when the first 
coup attempt against Zhao took place during his visit to North Korea 
April 24-29. It came in the form of a reaction to the student demon-
strations that followed Hu Yaobang's death on April 15. According 
to accounts of a sometime associate of Deng, and a senior editor in 
Beijing, on April 25 Deng used army and police reports brought to 
him by Yang and Li as the basis for developing the infamous People's 
Daily editorial of April 26 that attacked student protestors. In order 
to return safely from Pyongyang and to seek out Deng and key col-
leagues, Zhao had to telegraph some kind of confirmation that he did 
not oppose the line taken by the three men. The People's Daily was 
forced to represent the editorial as its own. The editorial provoked an 
utterly unexpected turnout in Beijing on April 27 of tens of thousands 
of students and hundreds of thousands of the general population. It 
became the largest demonstration ever seen to that date in China-
larger even than those organized with army assistance during the Cul-
tural Revolution. 
Many of those who cheered or marched with the student demon-
strations on April 27 and afterward were destined to be portrayed in 
official accounts as "hooligans," "thugs," and "criminals." The agents 
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of their expulsion from the body politic would be soldiers summoned 
to surround and enter Beijing under provisions of Li Peng's martial 
law edict, which was promulgated with the full backing of Yang and 
"Chairman Deng," as the propagandists began to style him, using his 
military title to echo the style of address used for Chairman Mao. 
Between April 27 and June 4, China saw the kind of reformism 
behind which Zhao, his Party supporters, and a huge part of the popu-
lation were prepared to take a stand. Upon his return from North 
Korea on April 30, Zhao moved quickly to qualify the hardline attack 
on students by accepting the legitimacy of their demands for contin-
ued political reform and democratization and by praising the disci-
plined behavior of demonstrating students and workers on April 27. 
He was personally responsible for the moderation of official criticism 
of the students and their supporters. He also sponsored efforts at gov-
ernment dialogue with hunger strikers on the important issue of free-
dom for self-governing student unions, relying on the same Party 
official (now dismissed) who had been handling reform of relations 
between the Communist and the democratic parties in the NPC. 
By making public his intention to accept the students' challenges, 
Zhao highlighted Li Peng's unwillingness to open a dialogue with 
them. He also used the world media's anticipation of Gorbachev's 
visit to introduce a de facto policy of glasnost. Full coverage of the 
activities of the students, the police, and the army were guaranteed by 
the presence in Beijing of hundreds of foreign print, radio, and televi-
sion journalists. Just as important, however, was the liberation of Chi-
nese journalists. The moderation of official media attitudes toward 
either the students or their reform issues depended on Zhao's progress 
in countering the coup attempt that produced the original April 26 
editorial of the People's Daily. 
ZHAO'S MOVES 
Zhao and his aides shrewdly used his speech at the Asian Devel-
opment Bank meeting on May 4 to promote his agenda for economic 
change in the Politburo. The speech provoked excited discussion of a 
more general common market relationship between Hong Kong, Ma-
cau, the mainland, Singapore, Taiwan, and possibly even South Korea. 
Then, with equal aplomb, Zhao used his May 16 meeting with 
Gorbachev to appeal publicly to Deng to step down from his formal 
and informal positions and thereby open the way to a constitutional 
solution of China's succession problem. He did this by casually re-
vealing that Deng's "retirement" in 1987 from his Politburo position 
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was qualified by retention of his right to review the decisions of the 
Politburo Standing Committee. 
This revelation of an innermost Party secret was followed by 
leaks to the foreign press from other sources indicating that Deng had 
hosted Standing Committee meetings in his own home. By this time 
Chinese journalists, along with Zhao's aides, were the major source of 
reliable detailed information for the world media and the student dem-
onstrators. Chinese journalists had long resented the use of their best 
investigative reporting not in publication, but as intelligence for Party 
leaders. Then they saw their professional gains from promised re-
forms jeopardized first by the April 26 editorial dictated to the People's 
Daily and next by the crackdown on the editor of a nonparty paper in 
Shanghai, the World Economic Herald. Though small in circulation, 
this paper had become the conscience of professionals in the print me-
dia, a kind of Chinese equivalent of LF. Stone's Weekly. Chinese jour-
nalists showed themselves fully capable of introducing glasnost and 
using government leaks as some of them had seen done in 
Washington. 
Zhao's initiatives in price and enterprise reforms and, above all, 
in coastal development were part of his campaign to win broad sup-
port in the general population as well as in the army, Party, and state 
bureaucracy. He sought the approval of those whose lives had been 
bettered by the agricultural reforms and the open-door policies. And 
he promised to deal with problems of corruption, inequality, and infla-
tion with more rather than fewer similar reforms. 
His free-wheeling approach to economic reforms made him an 
easy target of those in Chinese politics who use corruption as a 
codeword for capitalist tendencies. Many organizers of the demon-
strations were hurt by inflation and other problems that were easy to 
blame on the reforms. They initially made Zhao and other officials a 
target of attacks on corruption. 
Zhao's response was direct. He consistently argued that most 
corruption could be eliminated by completing reforms designed to pre-
vent certain officials from buying some commodities at low, state-sub-
sidized prices and then selling them for profit at higher, free-market 
prices. As for actual corruption, namely nepotism among officials, he 
proposed stem measures that would have restricted the ability even of 
his own sons to profit from business activities, as both had been 
charged with doing. At the same time he profited from Li Peng's vul-
nerability as someone who had achieved high power largely on the 
strength of connections he inherited as the foster child of the late Pre-
mier Zhou Enlai. 
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The popular open door policy associated with Zhao originated 
after Mao's death in the relaxation of strict controls on all manner of 
overseas connections. With the establishment of full diplomatic rela-
tions with the United States in 1979, the policy came to include an 
emphasis on special zones for foreign trade and investment, the first on 
the coast just opposite Taiwan and Hong Kong. By the mid-1980s, a 
succession of cities farther up the coast and some major inland river 
ports also received greater autonomy in pursuing foreign contacts and 
exchanges. 
During Zhao's tenure as General Secretary, the list of municipali-
ties freed from supervision by financial governors was expanded to 12. 
Many mayors of open door cities struck out on their own to develop 
trade and investment ties with foreign firms and overseas Chinese. 
Zhao encouraged this trend by using his new position to widen the 
scope of the policy by calling for the overall development of coastal 
China. As a result, in 1988 nearly 300 cities and counties-home to 
more than 150 million resident Chinese and homeland to perhaps 50 
million more overseas-were opened to the possibility of direct inte-
gration into the Pacific and global economies. The policy gave that 
large region of China best endowed for rapid development a relatively 
free hand to move without undue fear of central interference. It also 
blurred increasingly artificial administrative distinctions between ur-
ban and rural areas throughout that region of the country. 
The most important-and most explosive-societal implication 
of Zhao's reforms was the pressure they created to open China's cities 
to greater freedom of movement for the country's vast populace. The 
increasing market orientation of economic policies translated into 
greater emphasis on the free large-scale circulation of labor as well as 
of commodities, technology, economic information, and capital. The 
acceptance of freer internal circulation-often without the specific en-
dorsement of the state-helped fill the streets of Beijing and other cit-
ies with recent migrants, temporary residents, and casual visitors 
during the spring of 1989. They, in addition to the city's permanent 
residents, were active in the huge show of support for student demon-
strators-most of whom also were not native to the city. They have 
been victims of Li Peng's campaign to enforce martial law through a 
roundup of so-called hooligans and lawless elements. 
CLOSING THE OPEN DOOR 
As the government has emphasized in the search for democracy 
movement fugitives, all Chinese have long been required to register as 
permanent residents either in "rural" or "urban" households and 
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work units in specific localities. Particularly under the commune sys-
tem of 1957-77, all citizens have been subject to a police-administered 
internal passport system whose provisions are particularly strict in 
controlling movements from rural to urban areas. It does not take 
martial law to arrest anyone who has lingered more than a few days 
away from home without explicit local authorization that proves the 
bearer is not an "illegal alien" or "hooligan." 
The effect of Li's policies as premier has been to maintain direct 
state control over population movements. The effect of Zhao's policies 
as Party General Secretary has been to encourage local authorities' 
tolerance of people's freer circulation. Tolerant policies have pre-
vailed as growing food supplies have undermined controls on move-
ments based on the grain-rationing system. An important related 
restriction has been the failure to expand city housing much beyond 
that needed for permanent residents. However, in China's increas-
ingly entrepreneurial society this fact has not prevented the develop-
ment of a booming rental market in spare bedspace and rooms. The 
ultimate physical constraint on the population's free movement has 
become the inability of the transportation system to cope with increas-
ing flows of people and commodities into, around, and out of cities. 
The future of mass circulation of China's 1.1 billion people now 
resides very much in the hands of the army and police. The nature of 
their daunting task was seen in the discovery by the state statistical 
services during the 1982 census of just how far behind reality enumer-
ations of China's urban population had fallen thanks to the rigidities 
of the household registration and internal passport system. The 1982 
figure for the urban population of around 20 per cent has been re-
placed with a 1987 figure of more than 40 per cent. 
Indeed, trends identified in mid-1987 suggested that, depending 
on what the data indicated as a reasonable definition of "urban" and 
"rural," China might have passed the rural-to-urban point as early as 
July 1, 1989. Despite the demographic uncertainties it was clear by 
1989 that Chinese society was approaching an important turning point 
of which Chinese policymakers, though troubled by its social and 
political consequences, were well aware. 
Anyone who is familiar with the farmers' markets in the centers 
of mainland towns and cities or with the edges of its larger cities 
knows well the changes in Chinese life that have accelerated since 
1978, and particularly since 1987. The growing intermingling of rural 
and urban folk is also apparent to anyone who travels the roads and 
railroads of China. Chinese travelers are burdened with bags or bun-
dles of items they are buying or selling. The explosion of service enter-
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prises catering to the needs and desires of the urban population is 
accompanied by the appearance everywhere of workshops and manu-
factories. Extra space is turned to such moneymaking activities, and 
wherever geography and local custom allow, huge blocks of land are 
being used for such developments whether or not the law pronounces 
them entirely legitimate. 
Chinese journalists reported-before the statisticians and scholars 
did-that China has been producing more and more "peasants who 
are not peasants." Even the dependably settled urban and rural popu-
lations have been changing their ways. They are not the anxiously 
docile souls some were when they drilled with wooden rifles and dug 
air raid shelters during the Cultural Revolution. There is no doubt 
that Zhao's policies and politics have made him the champion of both 
the most rapidly growing component of China's society-the "circu-
lating" population drawn from home by opportunities to make 
money-and most of the urban population. 
Such changes reflect what the Chinese population itself wants and 
what the crushing of the student protest in Tiananmen Square most 
directly threatens. It is the size of this urban population that offers the 
best insurance against China's reversion to values and policies that are 
threatening to its neighbors as well as to itself. That these values per-
sist speaks to the powerful identification many of China's elderly lead-
ers feel for the mythical entity known as "rural China" since ancient, 
or "traditional," times. 
Deng, for one, reportedly suggested in his admonitory talks to 
leaders during the recent crisis that it does not matter if the students 
and their supporters desert the Party since it can depend on the army 
and the peasantry. Although army troops can be trained to treat stu-
dents as hooligans, increasingly less of China is dependable in the 
sense implied by Deng and others who still invoke the peasantry in all 
their explanations or exhortations. When speaking of "peasants" as a 
group who provide recruits and supporters of an army that can control 
the cities, Deng may be speaking of something that existed in the past 
mainly as a deterrent force. Forty per cent already may be a high 
estimate of the proportion of the Chinese population that Deng would 
call the "reliable" peasantry. And 40 per cent is probably already a 
low estimate of the proportion of the Chinese population that Deng by 
now would have to call "unreliable." Thus it seems that China has 
evolved into a tripartite society run by a tripartite Party-state-army 
political system, a fact that foreign policy makers and observers will 
have to bear in mind. 
Assessing the domestic costs of urban China's trauma is a com-
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plex matter, but it is hard to imagine how the current regime could 
have paid a higher price abroad than that ensured by international 
media coverage of the democracy movement, the final crackdown, and 
the beginning of the police terror that followed. The regime damaged 
itself almost as much as it hurt those it declared to be its enemies. The 
current situation is reminiscent of the way Chinese army units in effect 
defeated themselves while defeating Vietnamese units in 1979. Even 
though Deng himself ordered the 1979 military campaign against Viet-
nam and decorated its "heroes," he subsequently used the "state se-
cret" of the army's deficiencies to strengthen his own control of the 
army and its budget. This control helped him buy time for the highly 
successful economic reforms over the following decade and earned 
him the reputation as both an adventurous reformer and a political 
moderate. 
Those who nourish hopes that Deng might again prove to be a 
moderating influence, however, must reckon with two major differ-
ences between the domestic political impact of the attack on Vietnam 
a decade ago and the Tiananmen incident. This time the Chinese cas-
ualties were entirely self-inflicted. And this time they could not be 
kept secret, particularly since they happened during a glasnost cam-
paign led by a Party chief. Moreover, Deng no longer has much time, 
even if he might again have the inclination, to switch back from the 
role of ruthless patriarch to that of moderate modernizer. 
It will probably be at least three years after the coup against Zhao 
before clear indications of the leadership situation emerge. The time 
frame could be altered by either the early death or long survival of 
Deng and a few of his conservative contemporaries. It will also be 
necessary to wait and see just how much the new leadership combina-
tion is inclined to carry out reforms for fixed terms of office and regu-
lar Party and state congresses. 
There is much interest but not much point in speculating about 
the role and attitudes of Deng alone at this time in his life and in 
China's history. Deng must now be seen as but one player in a four-
handed leadership game with Li Peng in charge of the state, Yang 
representing the army, and Jiang Zemin with the difficult job of fol-
lowing Zhao's spectacular act as Party chief and would-be Gorbachev. 
Although Deng would hate the comparison, perhaps the West should 
approach China more consciously, albeit inconspicuously, as if it had a 
monarch without an heir and a government formed by a three-party 
coalition. 
The open door policy continues, regrettably, only in the narrow-
est technical sense. A genuine resumption of the policies interrupted 
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so brutally on June 3-4 will require that China end the closed-cities 
policy that martial law in Beijing represents. The nationwide crack-
down had the effect of beginning to close cities to the full implementa-
tion of Zhao's coastal development policies. It is possible that China's 
new leaders will feel free to endorse some aspects of Zhao's coastal 
development policies without hurting their own careers now that the 
author of the reforms has been driven from power. But the more 
likely immediate results will be a tightening of government control 
over the extension of credit, the introduction of taxation on prosper-
ous private enterprises, and other policies of Li Peng that are designed 
to temper reform and "excessive" growth. 
The reopening of China's cities also depends on the beckoning 
and supporting presence of open cities elsewhere in East Asia, starting 
with Hong Kong and Taipei but also extending to Seoul and perhaps 
to Vladivostok someday. Among China's neighbors, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan have too much at stake personally for Westerners to take a 
righteous position toward what may look like opportunistic business 
behavior. Fortunately, the democracy movements in their own socie-
ties have been inspired rather than cowed by events on the mainland, 
thanks particularly to the alertness of Taiwan's President Lee, who 
responded to Zhao's initiatives by sending Shirley Kuo to Beijing at a 
time when Lee knew it would contribute to Zhao's success. 
China's Western trading partners have the best opportunity, as 
well as the responsibility, to develop a dual policy characterized by 
considerable use of official sanctions plus the expectation, if not active 
encouragement, of considerable private-sector exchange in business, 
culture, education, and science. In both official and private-sector 
contacts, no opportunity need be lost to raise human rights concerns 
on behalf of the thousands of democratic activists on the wanted lists 
of Chinese police, the hundreds already in custody, and the scores 
awaiting execution. Deng has already prepared Party cadres and the 
public for the harshest measures against "hooligans" and some activ-
ists by telling them, "Do not fear world opinion." Why then should 
the world be afraid to express its opinions? 
Tough sanctions stretching from military items to educational aid 
will make sense if they are coordinated among countries and regularly 
reviewed with an eye to their impact on the Chinese situation. Condi-
tions in Deng's China require something akin to the environmental 
impact assessments made for domestic programs of the U.S. govern-
ment. These could help ensure that particular sanctions are effective. 
The ultimate standard for policy judgments, in addition to the merits 
of individual human rights cases, ought to be the impact of specific 
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sanctions, on the one hand, and commercial and cultural contacts, on 
the other, on the future size and well being of the expanding "mid-
dling" classes in China, whose political reliability is now under ques-
tion but whose presence should lend a degree of stability and 
modernity to China's domestic and foreign policies. States to the West 
(including, one hopes, some East European states or parties) should be 
trying to serve the interests of a part of the Chinese population that is, 
in many respects, much like their own middle-class majorities. 
The sheer size of China's "middling" classes and urban popula-
tion allows confidence that measured toughness will not force China 
back into the ideological mode imposed on the country by Maoists. It 
also matters that xenophobic Maoism was a product of the very differ-
ent world conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, as well as the product, 
and partly the cause, of different conditions within China. 
Today it is both safe and prudent to make the West's interest in 
China's contemporary social classes a declared policy. This is particu-
larly true in light of the confused agrarian mythologizing in both 
Western and Chinese thinking that colors our understanding of what 
is distinctive and hopeful-or allegedly fearsome-in Chinese society 
and culture. 
The trauma of Tiananmen Square might suggest a more cautious 
"realism" in approaching leadership changes in communist states. 
The future Zhao or Gorbachev is, after all, unpredictable. But the real 
lesson from the eclipse of Zhao's brilliant career may be that when 
historically rare opportunities arise it is best to be an agent of 
change-and not its spectator or victim. It is too late to hope for 
much moderation from Deng, but another Zhao could emerge in due 
course. For their part, outside powers really have no alternative but to 
work with the forces inside China that Zhao represented. For they 
were creating the kind of China that can play a constructive role in the 
world and that can improve the living standards of the Chinese people. 
While harsh repression continues, the world cannot engage in business 
as usual. But in the long run it is in the interests of China's neighbors 
and friends that they renew constructive contact with the economic 
and social forces Zhao was attempting to guide. 
11. YOUTH AND STUDENTS IN CHINA BEFORE AND 
AFfER TIANANMEN 
Stanley Rosen 
Over the last decade, the relations between Chinese youth and the 
Communist Party of China (CPC) were marked by an increasingly 
obvious irony, culminating in the tragic events of June 4, 1989. The 
successful implementation of the Party's ambitious modernization 
program required the active participation of China's brightest young 
people. To encourage such support, the CPC had, among other 
things, allowed them greater freedom of expression and association, 
recruited them into the Party and promoted their overseas study. At 
the same time, the gradual marketization of social and economic life 
had rendered the Party's blandishments relatively ineffective, and con-
tributed to the decline of the Party's social control. If youth faced 
highly indefinite prospects in 1978, relying on the Party to expand ed-
ucational opportunities, provide jobs and integrate them into the still 
uncertain post-Cultural Revolution society, by 1989 youth expecta-
tions had risen beyond the abilities-not to mention the inclinations-
of the CPC to meet them. In the aftermath of June 4, hardline Party 
leaders have reverted to a concentration on control, forsaking, at least 
for now, the erstwhile strategy of reaching out to youth. 
The dramatic change in youth expectations was in fact a product 
of the CPC's success in solving some of the thorniest problems left 
over from the Cultural Revolution, so that the structure of opportu-
nity,'in 1989 far exceeded the limited options confronting youth a dec-
ade earlier. The restoration of the university entrance examinations in 
December 1977 marked the end of the Maoist experimentation with 
educational levelling. A decade ago there was great pressure on young 
people to squeeze into the small number of university places. Only 
178,000 ofthe 5.7 million candidates (4.87 percent) were able to enter 
a university in 1977. Those who were unsuccessful commonly became 
"youth waiting for work" (daiye qingnian ). The job market was over-
whelmed by the combination of current and recent-year high school 
graduates competing with older, "sent down" urban youth who had 
been trickling back from the countryside, particularly since the mid-
1970s. In those uncertain times, youth were seeking stability. En-
trance to a university virtually guaranteed a state-assigned job in gov-
ernment or a state enterprise. 
(203) 
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Politically as well, opportunities for youth were far from abun-
dant. The CPC, still recovering from Mao's Cultural Revolution as-
sault-spearheaded by college and high school Red Guards-
recruited only five million members from 1977-1983, far below the 
Cultural Revolution rate of recruitment. University students were 
shunned almost completely, as many Party officials resisted attempts 
to substitute ability for political loyalty as the main criterion for Party 
membership. Students for their part were suspicious of political en-
tanglements and, following ten years of educational minimalism, ea-
gerly were pursuing professional proficiency. As late as the end of 
1983, fewer than 1 percent of Chinese undergraduates were Party 
members, the lowest figure since 1956.1 
If youth in the immediate post-Mao period had been seeking 
largely to recover the stability associated with the mid-1950s-repre-
sented by a good job in a state enterprise-youth by the late 1980s had 
expectations unimaginable a decade earlier. The pressure to enter a 
university had eased, particularly in those areas, such as Guangzhou, 
where a rapidly expanding economy offered a variety of educational 
alternatives and employment opportunities for those unable to attend 
a university. By 1987, there were 1,063 regular colleges and universi-
ties, with close to 2 million students. Nationally, 2.275 million appli-
cants sat for the university entrance examinations in that year, and 
621,000 were recruited (27.13 percent)-2 The national rate of people in 
cities and towns awaiting employment had fallen from 5.9 percent in 
1979 to 2 percent in 1986; moreover, employment difficulties had 
shifted from large and medium-sized cities down to the lower levels. 
One survey noted that the proportion of people waiting for employ-
ment in the county seats and towns relative to the total number of 
people waiting for jobs throughout the country had risen from 38 per-
cent in 1980 to 50 percent in 1986.3 
The creation of an educational system that is bifurcated into elite 
1. Stanley Rosen, "The Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Society: Popular At-
titudes Toward Party Membership and the Party's Image," paper prepared for the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, Georgia, August 31-Sep-
tember 3, 1989. To appear in The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs, July 1990, pp. 51-
92. 
2. It should be noted that only 524,000 were recruited under the state plan, and that 
41,000 were sponsored by enterprises, 14,000 were self-financed students and 42,000 were 
recruited by the low prestige "irregular" T.V. and correspondence universities. Neverthe-
less, the contrast with the late 1970s remains striking. Zhongguo baike nianjian 1988 (Bei-
jing, Shanghai: Zhongguo dabaike quanshu chubanshe, December 1988), p. 479. 
3. Yang Guohua, "Accomplishments in Employing Workers in Townships and Cities 
and the New Situation We Face," Qingnian yanjiu, No. 1, January 1988, translated in 
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and mass sectors, and the increasing importance of.- and possibilities 
for-material success had created differing . expectations among 
China's youth. For those unable to enter a "key" junior or senior 
high, continuing their schooling was considered to be a poor invest-
ment, since the likelihood of entrance to a good university was remote. 
On the other hand, dropping out and finding a well-paying job, or 
helping one's family prosper, became attractive possibilities. 
For those who could enroll in a good university, expectations 
were far higher. Of those graduating from the elite Beijing University 
in 1985, for example, 55 percent enrolled as graduate students; 13.7 
percent were assigned to research institutes; 5.1 percent were assigned 
to colleges and universities; and, 13.3 percent went to government in-
stitutions. Only 10 percent went to production departments. The 
large majority of those going on to graduate school had a reasonable 
expectation that they could cap their climb up the educational ladder 
by studying abroad.4 Graduate students with marketable skills-e.g., 
foreign language or computer science majors-were able increasingly 
to benefit from China's more open labor market by transferring from 
their universities to well-paying jobs at one of China's new high-tech 
or foreign trade corporations, albeit at the cost of a transfer fee of 
several thousand yuan. Recent changes in the job assignment system, 
which allowed for more individual initiative in finding employment, 
had diminished further the state's control over the brightest university 
students. 
Politically, the Party had begun to look favorably on young intel-
lectuals beginning in 1984. Whereas only 318 university students in 
Beijing entered the CPC in 1980, over 6,000 joined in 1985. Although 
joining the Party represented a calculated risk- what some Chinese 
referred to as "a game of snakes and ladders"-and many resisted the 
temptation to join, there is no question that the CPC's major effort to 
attract the young and the talented had begun to bear fruit prior to the 
1989 demonstrations. Still, relatively few students were interested in 
using Party membership to pursue a career in government or politics. 
One study of 344 graduating students at the elite Qinghua University 
found that 73.8 percent were committed to pursuing an academic ca-
reer, including study abroad; 9.3 percent expressed an interest in going 
Stanley Rosen, ed., "Issues in Employment," Chinese Economic Studies, Vol. 21, No. 4, 
Summer 1988, pp. 69-91. 
4. For details on job assignments of undergraduates and master's degree holders at 
Beijing University and Hangzhou University from 1983-1986, see Stanley Rosen, ed., 
"Profiles of Beijing University and Hangzhou University," Chinese Education, Vol. 21, No. 
4, Winter, 1988-89. 
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into business and becoming rich; and, only 5.5 percent sought Party 
membership and a government position. 5 
As the general overview presented above suggests, the Party's 
youth and education policy in the reform decade had not been a clear 
success. If opportunities for youth clearly improved over the ten year 
period, youth confusion and dissatisfaction were arguably as high in 
1988 as they were in 1978, albeit for different reasons. If students had 
complained that studying was useless (dushu wuyong) during the Cul-
tural Revolution, the same complaints could be heard in the late 
1980s. In their solution to educational problems brought about by the 
Cultural Revolution reforms, post-Mao reformers in tum created new 
problems. In the broader area of youth policy, the regime had failed 
in part because a divided leadership continued to pursue policies that 
ultimately were mutually contradictory. Policy had oscillated in re-
sponse to the waxing and waning of different leaders and philosophies. 
Thus, trends in youth attitudes and behavior that had been accorded 
praise or at least understanding at one point were reinterpreted and 
condemned later. 
In the aftermath of the military crackdown in and around 
Tiananmen Square, it is striking how much of the Party's post-Mao 
relationship to youth, which had been forged during the reform dec-
ade, has been rolled back. Whereas youth in the late 1970s sought a 
return to the stability of the 1950s, it is now the Party leadership that 
yearns for those halcyon days. Indeed, much of recent Party policy 
appears to be based on the reconceptualization of a China that existed 
prior to the Cultural Revolution. Revolutionary heroes of the early 
1960s such as Lei Feng and Iron Man Wang Jinxi have been the sub-
ject of highly publicized emulation campaigns; political loyalty 
("Red") has replaced expertise as the main criterion for Party mem-
bership and promotion; the already limited independence of mass or-
ganizations like the Communist Youth League (CYL) has been further 
restricted by a Central Committee Circular calling for tighter Party 
control over these transmission belts; another Central Committee 
communique has resurrected the concept of the mass line to govern 
relationships between the Party and the people; and, there has been a 
renewed emphasis on working class leadership, central planning and 
other familiar policies of an earlier China. 
The attempts to restore social and ideological control through the 
5. "An Investigation of the Ideology of a Portion of the Students at Four Nationally 
Prominent Universities," Qingnian gongzuo yanjiu yu cankao, February 10, 1989, pp. 16-19 
(no cited author). 
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stress on the primacy of the Party have been accompanied by more 
specific policies intended to punish those who show recalcitrance in 
accepting the new rules of the game. Thus, the State Education Com-
mission has threatened to cut enrollment at colleges and universities 
that are found to have weak programs in ideological and political edu-
cation; new regulations called for those working in government or 
Party jobs at the national level who graduated in or after 1985 to be 
transferred to low-level provincial or rural jobs, with their return de-
pendent on their performance; and, in an increasingly tight job mar-
ket, exacerbated by economic retrenchment policies, political 
authorities have recentralized control over job allocations. 
Despite these policies, the regime's own findings, as revealed in 
survey data published in the Chinese press before and after June 4, as 
well as interviews with students, professors and politi;al workers, sug-
gest the almost certain failure of these measures beyond the short 
term. Interviewees note the cynicism and despair among students in 
China today. Even the small numbers of intellectual defenders of the 
regime, like the widely disliked He Xin, base their defense on the im-
portance of stability and the fear of chaos, not on a positive belief in 
communism. Everyone seems to acknowledge the prevailing senti-
ment as koushi xinfei (saying one thing and meaning another). Thus, 
the regime likely will be effective in preventing student unrest leading 
to an Eastern European scenario during the series of upcoming anni-
versary days and the September 1990 Asian games, but for the long 
term the policies are unrealistic, even anachronistic: the China that 
has been conceptualized no longer exists. 
The purpose of this article is to examine changing youth attitudes 
and behavior, and the party's interpretation of these changes. It will 
be argued that China's "liberal" reformers and conservative "ideo-
logues" were in sharp disagreement in their assessment of Chinese 
youth, that by 1988 the reformers had succeeded in gaining influence 
over important socializing agents at the expense of their opponents, 
and that the Tiananmen crackdown has reversed this process. Prior to 
June 4, the role of youth in an ongoing, successful reform process had 
been a common theme in such publications as Zhongguo qingnian 
(Chinese Youth) and Zhongguo qingnian bao (Chinese Youth Daily). 
After Tiananmen, the focus has shifted to the anti-state behavior of 
youth and their role in the turmoil. 
EXPLAINING CHINESE YOUTH PRIOR TO JUNE 4 
The CPC's youth policy has long been a source of internal con-
tention. Economic and ideo-political goals have coexisted uneasily 
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through most of the post-1949 period, with the presence of Chairman 
Mao as the ultimate arbiter contributing both to the periodic conflict 
and its resolution. With the shift of the country's focus to rapid eco-
nomic development in 1979, the previous emphasis on politics as class 
struggle was repudiated as "sham Marxism," but this did not remove 
the potential conflict. It was still necessary for the CPC to maintain 
political and ideological control, a feat accomplished through the im-
position of the Four Cardinal Principles (uphold the socialist road, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party 
and Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought). Purposely vague, 
they have been invoked as constraints on unorthodox behavior in 
word or deed. 
A more obvious contradiction was the dual admonition in post-
Mao China to promote a Communist value system and to succeed 
through competitive efforts. Indeed, the signals youth received 
through the regime's socializing agents commonly were mixed and 
contradictory, a major point in post-Tiananmen critiques of ideo-polit-
ical work, varying directly with the forward, backward and sideways 
thrust of various aspects of the reform program. If highly critical 
views of the growing materialism of youth were often relegated to ob-
scure and internal CYL journals while the influence of radical reform-
ers waxed, these same views would appear in widely circulated 
national journals and newspapers during less hospitable times for re-
form, for example, after the student demonstrations of December 
1986. Recent policies that emphasized old methods of political indoc-
trination and ideological control represent a victory of those in the 
Party who have been advocating such measures for years, but with 
only intermittent and short-lived successes. 6 
That China's recent history could be interpreted in vastly differ-
ent ways is clear from an examination of the "reform decade's" influ-
ence on youth as presented in widely circulated and authoritative 
youth magazines and newspapers published before and after the "tur-
moil." Before the 1989 demonstrations, the views of the ideological 
hardliners had been eclipsed by those seeking to influence youth be-
havior more by carrots than by sticks. By 1988, the advocates of a 
policy that acknowledged the futility of outdated, heavy-handed polit-
ical indoctrination at a time when the CPC's ability to influence youth 
behavior had drastically declined were featured prominently in the 
6. Stanley Rosen, "Political Education and Student Response: Some Background 
Factors Behind the 1989 Beijing Demonstrations," Issues and Studies, Vol. 25, No. 10, 
October 1989, pp. 12-39. 
BEFORE AND AFfER TIANANMEN 209 
media. As the reform program was completing its first decade, these 
advocates argued forcefully that a youth policy that tied the success of 
young people to the nation's political and economic progress was far 
more effective than mere political and moral exhortation. 
These views received their widest currency throughout 1988 in a 
six-part series of celebratory articles in the national journal of the 
CYL. The series reflected on the positive changes for youth from 
1978-1988.7 Focusing on key issue areas, each article traced the in-
creasing freedom and opportunity opened up to youth since the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee (December 1978). Thus, 
the transformation of the educational system had enabled youth to de-
velop their talents fully. If the decade began with a struggle merely to 
squeeze into a university (gaokao re), before too long students were 
studying abroad in large numbers (chuguo re) (Part 1). The develop-
ment of a commodity economy, the new system of agricultural con-
tracts, and the growth of special economic zones, among other factors, 
enabled enterprising youth with limited opportunities for educational 
success to become wealthy, for which it was no longer necessary to 
apologize (Part II). 
In politics, the ten years were marked by the persistent pursuit of 
democracy and popular participation. In this context, even the "De-
mocracy Wall" of the late 1970s was seen in essentially positive terms, 
and the student demonstrations of 1985 and 1986 were merely the 
"high tuition cost" inevitable in the pursuit of democracy (Part III). 
Perhaps the most crucial change was the "silent revolution" in youth 
values, marked by increasing secularization (shisuhua) and the pursuit 
of material benefits over spiritual concerns (Part IV). The transforma-
tion in male-female relationships, particularly love and sex, and 
youths' lack of excessive concern with the morality of others was the 
theme of Part V. The desirable male was no longer a "bookworm" 
(shu daizz), but an entrepreneur who could compete successfully in the 
marketplace. Indeed, in a passage that sounds almost eerie in the light 
of June 4, the article noted that "ten years ago the only true men 
(nanzihan) in the hearts of young women were soldiers, but today 
beautiful women dare to ride easily on the back of a private entrepre-
neur's motorcycle."8 Finally, reflecting a prevalent motif in intellec-
tual circles throughout 1988-the contention over China's cultural 
tradition and its proper place within a rapidly changing world-the 
7. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 1, January 1988, pp. 2-5; No.3, March 1988, pp. 6-9; No. 
5, May 1988, pp. 4-7; No.7, July 1988, pp. 2-5; No.9, September 1988, pp. 2-5; No. 11, 
November 1988, pp. 2-5. 
8. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 9, September 1988, p. 2. 
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series concluded by interweaving China's past and future prospects 
with current conditions, noting how a feudal legacy continued to in-
hibit the country's development and prevent it from becoming inte-
grated into the world outside (Part VI). 
The "liberal" point of view taken in this series could, of course, be 
found in other journals. It was the publication of these ideas in the 
widely circulated, presumably orthodox and influential Chinese Youth 
magazine that made the series significant and worthy of particular at-
tention. The articles repeatedly brought forth negative images of 
China's feudal past and leftist lurch during the Cultural Revolution. 
For example, the piece on democracy began with a forceful poem that 
had inspired the April 5, 1976, demonstrations in Tiananmen Square, 
the beginnings of a movement which culminated in the political de-
mise of the "Gang of Four" and the rise to power of Deng Xiaoping. 
The authors did not hesitate to take sides on controversial issues. 
The young economist Zhang W eiying's provocative essay, entitled 
"Rehabilitate Money," which had been subjected to critical scrutiny 
and debate in 1983, was vigorously affi.rmed.9 Intellectual gurus such 
as Y an Jiaqi and Su Xiaokang were quoted favorably. The concluding 
piece offered solutions to China's backwardness that echoed Su's 
themes from the highly controversial television series, "River Elegy." 
Indeed, the co-author of the concluding article, Yuan Zhiming, had 
collaborated on the "River Elegy" script and, like Su, is currently in 
exile in America. 
Chinese Youth continued to present the views of liberal thinkers 
in 1989. In January, Su Shaozhi and Wang Yizhou "reminded" (tishl) 
young people of the "triple anniversary" of the French Revolution, the 
May Fourth Movement and the liberation of China, and the role of 
youth in the forefront ofthese struggles. 10 In February, Yan Jiaqi was 
interviewed on the relevance of "Mr. Democracy," "Mr. Science" and 
"Mr. Law" to the current Chinese situation. 11 
Far more controversial ideas than those expressed in Chinese 
Youth could be found in Shekou tongxun bao in 1988 and early 1989. 
In a series of articles on individualism and collectivism, this special 
economic zone paper critically evaluated the regime's propaganda ex-
tolling the "moral spirit" of such official youth heroes as Lei Feng, 
Zhang Haidi and Zhu Boru, arguing that these "moral supreme beings 
9. For Zhang's essay and several responses, see Stanley Rosen, ed., "The Impact of 
Modernization on the Socialization of Chinese Youth," Chinese Education, Vol. 18, No. 1, 
Spring 1985, pp. 51-61. 
10. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 1, January 1989, pp. 1-2. 
11. Zhongguo qingnian, No.2, February 1989, pp. 2-4. 
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of heaven" had become an "ideological burden" that had to be shed if 
socialism with Chinese characteristics was to be constructed. 12 What 
attracted the most attention, however, was the so-called "Shekou 
Storm," which was a frontal assault on the old concepts of politics and 
morality. 13 
In January, 1988, invited by the local CYL branch, three well-
known "professors" of propaganda from the Research Center on Ideo-
logical Education for Chinese Youth addressed seventy young workers 
in Shekou, in the Shenzhen special economic zone (SEZ). What made 
the symposium newsworthy was the unexpected attack on the content 
and form of traditional ideological work by members of the audience. 
Two cultures had collided. Youth in Shekou had no patience with 
what one called "empty sermons," preferring "a discussion of concrete 
questions." The propagandists were used to neither dialogue nor dis-
courtesy. They could not have expected to be challenged on positions 
they considered unassailable. For example, one professor had earlier 
criticized as "gold diggers" those who came to the SEZs to make 
money; rather, they "should contribute a large portion of their income 
to the state to be spent on public welfare." This smacked of "leftism" 
to some youth, who pointed out that making money was fine and, in 
fact, gold diggers had developed the American west. 
Confronted with what they took to be the familiar sanctimonious, 
self-righteous style of the propagandists, the youth seemed to enjoy 
flaunting their freedom and Shekou's "foreignness." One reportedly 
noted that "the central government is far away. Even if I swear at 
you, no one will come to interfere, and my Hong Kong boss will not 
fire me because ofthis." Another stated: "We find newspaper propa-
ganda disgusting. It says Shenzhen takes the socialist road with Chi-
nese characteristics. What Chinese characteristics are actually there? 
The characteristics of Shenzhen are foreign characteristics!" One 
propagandist, when challenged, asked whether the troublesome youth 
dared to reveal his name. To great amusement, he presented his busi-
ness card. 
Although brief accounts of this encounter were published in 
Shekou, the national press, for example, China Youth Daily, was for-
12. Shekou ton~xun. bao, .December 26, 1988, p. 3 and January 19, 1989, p. 3. 
13. The followmg discussion draws from the Daily Report, September 21, 1988, pp. 53-
60 (Renmin Ribao, August 6 and 29, and September 14); the Daily Report, September 28, 
1988, pp. 68-70 (Renmin Ribao, September 3), the Daily Report, October 26, 1988, pp. 19-
21 (Jingjixue Zhoubao, October 2); China News Analysis, No. 1374, December 15, 1988; 
Chang Tianyu, ."Wh~t does the 'Shekou Storm' signify?", Guangjiaojing, September 1988, 
pp. 94-95, and mterv1ew data. 
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bidden to reprint information on the subject for many months. Then, 
between August 15 and September 16, 1988, People's Daily published 
35letter~ut of the thousands received-commenting on the Shekou 
Storm. The propagandists were given a chance to reiterate and defend 
their style and their views. They also noted their own personal health 
and family difficulties, and lack of interest in financial remuneration. 
In comments that could have been made by any political work cadre, 
one noted that: "When ideological and political work is difficult, we 
who work on the front line have given so much and yet have not been 
properly assessed." Most poignantly, he ended with a plea, saying: 
"We admit that we need to improve. However, even if there are weak-
nesses and mistakes in our work, shouldn't people help in a positive 
way and as comrades?" 
In fact, the level of confusion and dissatisfaction among youth 
was a common theme in the late 1980s in specialized journals. One 
writer compared Bei Dao's 1976 short poem "A Reply" (Huida), in 
which he exclaimed "I Do Not Believe," thus articulating "the awak-
ening, doubting, and reflecting of that generation" to Cui Jian's "I 
Have Nothing," China's first rock-and-roll song a decade later, which 
became the anthem of the "new-birth generation" (xin sheng daz). 14 
Analyzing the youth culture in the aftermath of the failed student pro-
test movement of December 1986-January 1987, one student com-
pared the resulting loss of idealism to the experience of the Red 
Guards in the 1960s, noting that "the majority of students have fallen 
from the clouds to earth, and are now beginning to pay attention to 
reality and practicality."15 He also suggested the similarity between 
the growing individualism and negative rebelliousness on university 
campuses to a "fin-de-siecle" mood, in which students "cope with each 
day and just seek to get by, having no sense of anything beyond just 
making a living." Others spoke of three factions on the campus-
tuopai, mapai, and xuanpai (TOEFL faction, mah jongg faction and 
revolving or dancing faction). 
Interest in officially-sanctioned student activities and general pub-
lic service on the campuses had waned. In May 1987, when elections 
for a new student union were conducted at Wuhan University, more 
than 40 percent of the students did not bother to vote. Six months 
earlier they had demanded the student union be reconstituted or abol-
ished. In September, when the same student union conducted a sur-
vey, they found that 80 percent of the students did not have confidence 
14. Dangdai qingnian yanjiu, No. 8, August 1988, pp. S-6. 
15. Hainanjishi, No.5, May 1989, pp. 18-27. 
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in the union and 90 percent felt that the union's work did not concern 
them at all. In the second half of 1988, a class at Wuhan University 
felt compelled to hire a student, at a compensation of 70 yuan a semes-
ter, to be social life commissioner; no one had been willing to serve. 
At Zhongshan University in Guangzhou, it was discovered that nearly 
half of the classes had not promoted any group activities over the past 
year. These examples may be multiplied. 16 
This was just part of the picture, however. The disillusion with 
collective action common from 1986-1988 led to a "theory mania" on 
the campuses. The most influential Western philosophers were Sartre, 
Nietzsche, Maslow and Adler, with students intrigued by their ideas 
about the infinite potential of man, individual freedom of choice and 
ultimate self-actualization, to name a few. 
Chinese authorities long had been concerned about the impact of 
Western thought on the campuses and periodically had conducted 
surveys to assess its influence. They were particularly sensitive to this 
issue as the age and experience of new university students began to 
drop by 1979-1980, when more and more students came directly from 
secondary school. When Fudan University did a study of the 1978, 
1979 and 1980 entering classes in the departments of philosophy and 
computer science, they discovered that more recent entrants admitted 
they did not understand theories of existentialism and "Western 
Marxism" (70-85 percent), but the 1978 class felt much more comfort-
able commenting on these theories, assessing them in general as erro-
neous, but with some reasonable elements. 17 
A survey at Beijing University was more extensive, and students 
were asked for their views on a series of Western works and authors. 
The least familiar book was a commentary on the Frankfurt School of 
Social Research (76 percent did not know of the Frankfurt School). 
Montesquieu and Rousseau were more familiar to the students, and a 
book on the history of contemporary Western philosophy (probably by 
Bertrand Russell) was rated highest. Although over 67 percent had 
not had contact with this last work, over 20 percent thought it had 
research value, and 11 percent felt its reference materials were 
useful. 18 
Table 1 is from a survey of students in the entering classes of 1980 
and 1981 at Shanghai Normal Institute, which reports rather similar 
results. It is important to realize, however, that by the early 1980s 
16. Ibid. 
17. Qingnian yanjiu, No.7, 1982. 
18. Ibid. 
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there was already a wave of interest in Western writings and an indif-
ference to standard ideo-political works by the usual suspects. Table 2 
gives some indication of this. It was perhaps only a matter of time 
before Western philosophical writings would find a market on Chinese 
campuses. Indeed, the incessant preaching against the dangers posed 
by such "forbidden" authors as Freud, Sartre and Nietzsche by dis-
credited political thought cadres, who may not even have read, much 
less understood, these writings, merely made them more attractive to 
the students. 
The criticism against these authors had increased markedly by 
1987, and continued thereafter unabated. Thus, a report in Beijing 
Ribao (Beijing Daily) blamed a university student's suicide on his 
reading of Sartre and Nietzsche. A more comprehensive series of 
studies blamed these theorists for a variety of ills. One youth league 
journal listed the following survey results, among others, to document 
the pernicious influence of existentialism: (1) a study of 12 student 
suicides from January-April 1987 at ten Shanghai universities; (2) a 
study in parts of Jinshan, Songjiang and Chuansha districts which re-
vealed that 65 percent of the youth were living together without the 
benefit of marriage, and thought such cohabitation "normal" and "a 
result of free choice;" (3) a study of 27 Shanghai universities and 95 
scientific research institutes which showed a sharp decline in new can-
didates for master's degrees and lower exam scores for the applicants 
they had. 19 Moreover, Sartre was blamed explicitly for the declining 
authority of the Four Cardinal Principles. The following passage, 
from an essay critical ofSartre and existentialist theory, reports results 
from another survey of Shanghai universities and provides the flavor 
of the critique: 
Under the ideological impact of the proposition that "life is 
nihilistic, and the world is ridiculous," some young people 
have grown to have little confidence, or none at all, in Marx-
ism-Leninism, in socialism, and in the leadership of the 
Communist Party. According to some statistics, 52.86 per-
cent of the young students have not given any thought to 
joining the Chinese Communist Party or Party organiza-
tions; 14.36 percent expressed clearly that they simply will 
not consider it, and 82 percent see communism as an illusion 
that can be seen from afar but not actually approached. 20 
19. Los Angeles Times, May 28, 1987; Tuande Shenghuo (Shanghai), No.2, February 
1988, p. 33. 
20. Dangdai qingnian yanjiu, No. 2, February 1989, p. 11. 
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TABLE 1 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND SARTRE AND HIS 
THEORY? 
Responses 
Read Sartre's Works and Commentaries 
Heard about it from Others 
Haven't Heard about It 
Other Responses 
No Response 
Number 
120 
196 
547 
14 
192 
N = 1,069 
Percentage 
11.2% 
18.3% 
51.2% 
1.3% 
18.0% 
Source: Ye Jun, "Guanyu daxuesheng dushu qingkuangde diaocha" [An Investigation of 
the Reading Preferences of University Students] in Gaodeng xuexiao deyu yanjiu wenji [A 
Collection of Writings Reporting Research on Moral Education in Universities] (Beijing: 
Moral Education Research Office, Institute of Youth Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, February 1983), Table 7, p. 328. 
POST-TIANANMEN ANALYSES OF CHINESE YOUTH 
The open challenge to the Chinese leadership in the spring and 
the brutal military crackdown of June 3-4 provided an opportunity for 
more orthodox political work cadres to launch a counterattack, not 
just on recent questionable writings, but on more general grounds. In-
dividual articles by "elite" intellectuals who had "fled" China were of 
course singled out. Su Shaozhi and Wang Yizhou were now accused 
of "inciting" (shandong) youth to action, not merely reminding them 
of the earlier actions of their predecessors.21 Yan Jiaqi's Chinese 
Youth interview, predictably, was interpreted as advocating a system 
of Western capitalist democracy for China. 22 The Shekou Storm inci-
dent was revisited and now seen as a deliberate attempt to use the 
media to negate the Party's ideo-political work. The three abused 
political workers, along with many of their comrades, once again were 
able to preach without refutation.23 Indeed, seeking explanations for 
the student unrest, these same authoritative newspapers and 
magazines for youth reinterpreted the entire decade from 1978-1988, 
seeing the trends in far less sanguine terms. 24 
The key event to be explained is no longer the reform program 
21. Personal communication with Su Shaozhi. 
22. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 9, September 1989, p. 11. 
23. Zhongguojiaoyu bao, August 8, 1989, p. 1; August 22, 1989, p. 4. 
24. See, for example, the articles from Beijing qingnian bao and Sixiang jiaoyu yanjiu, 
No. 3 and No.4, 1989, reprinted in Zhongguo qingnian bao, August 28, 1989, p. 3. 
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TABLE2 
WHAT KIND OF BOOKS DO YOU LIKE TO READ? 
Book Category 
Foreign Novels and Stories 
Books in Own Specialty 
Books for the Self-Cultivation of Youth 
Chinese Novels and Stories 
Works in Psychology 
Works in Philosophy 
Marxism-Leninism 
Political Theory 
Works by Chairman Mao and Other 
Revolutionaries of the Older 
Generation 
Number 
469 
350 
348 
342 
115 
77 
48 
44 
22 
N = 1,815 
Percentage 
25.8% 
19.3% 
19.2% 
18.8% 
6.3% 
4.2% 
2.6% 
2.4% 
1.2% 
Source: Ye Jun, "Guanyu daxuesheng dushu qingkuangde diaocha" [An Investigation of 
the Reading Preferences of University Students] in Gaodeng xuexiao deyu yanjiu wenji [A 
Collection of Writings Reporting Research on Moral Education in Universities] (Beijing: 
Moral Education Research Office, Institute of Youth Studies, Chinese Academy of Social 
Sciences, February 1983), p. 320. 
and its success, but rather the "turmoil" and the anti-state behavior of 
the students. Viewed from this perspective, the growing awareness 
and increasing opportunity afforded young people by a steadily matur-
ing reform program is replaced by a critique of ideo-political work and 
a cyclical theory of youth behavior. University students in particular 
are seen as wavering elements, lurching from one "hot topic" to an-
other, beset by ideological contradictions. Moreover, their sense of 
mission combined with a lack of responsibility to make them easily 
mobilizable, whether by a leftist Jiang Qing in the Cultural Revolution 
or "elite" intellectuals such as Yan Jiaqi in 1989. 
Post-Tiananmen assessments commonly trace the changing out-
look on life (rensheng guan) of university students through a series of 
stages, noting that ideo-political workers at each stage were unable to 
overcome the lack of appropriate ideals that have marked youth atti-
tudes in the aftermath of the Cultural Revolution. 25 Students are seen 
as alternating between private and public values. One author de-
scribed students as initially concerned with social and politica1 
problems (1979-1981), later turning inward and concentrating primar-
25. For example, Zhongguo qingnian bao, November 2, 1989, p. 3, which discusses six 
stages since 1980. 
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ily on their own futures (1982-1984). The next stage found them once 
again oriented toward society and politics, bringing on the stude?t 
demonstrations of 1985 and 1986. They also had become caught up m 
the hot political, economic and cultural topics that dominated schol-
arly discussion in intellectual circles, including debates over Western 
thought trends, democracy and the T.V. series "River Elegy." When 
they lost confidence in developments in the larger society (the reform 
process) and their own futures, their depression hit bottom. This cur-
rent phase of the cycle, the author concluded, had yet to run its 
course.26 
Despite their division of the reform decade into stages, post-"tur-
moil" accounts of youth attitudes and behavior are dominated by ideo-
political concerns and are essentially unilinear in showing how early 
warning signs of youth malaise went unchecked, leading, step-by-step, 
to an open challenge to the Communist Party. Moreover, in building 
their case, such accounts focus almost solely on the key actors in the 
turmoil-university students-at the expense of other youth. Earlier 
positive accounts, although more balanced in their discussion of re-
form in a variety of issue areas, also tended to be unilinear. Both types 
of accounts, marshalling evidence for unambiguous conclusions, like-
wise suffer from a familiar affiiction called "cutting with one knife" 
(yidaoqie), in which youth too often are presented conveniently as an 
undifferentiated group. Only occasionally does one find distinctions 
made among youth, for example, in different geographical areas, from 
families with different income levels, and in different types and at dif-
ferent levels of schooling. It would be useful, therefore, to attempt 
some preliminary disaggregation. Are there significant differences in 
the values and aspirations of youth in, for example, special economic 
zones and the interior, in the urban and rural areas, at different levels 
of schooling, and over time? Although there has been a significant 
amount of survey research done by Chinese researchers on this sub-
ject, the questions are large and can be addressed only superficially 
here. To give a flavor of some ofthe research in this field, we present a 
few of the studies conducted by researchers in the city of Guangzhou. 
Guangzhou researchers seem to have been the most active in 
comparing youth attitudes and behavior in their city to cities else-
where in China, at least in part to dispel some of the criticism of the 
"open policy" and its negative effects on youth. The surveys often 
seem to have an agenda, to demonstrate the benefits the open policy 
can bring. 
26. Zhongguo qingnian bao, August 28, 1989, p. 3. 
218 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
One imaginative study by a well-known young social scientist in 
Guangzhou compared Guangzhou to Chengdu in terms of the impact 
of outside forces on youth (age 35 and under). The author's starting 
point was the widespread hypothesis that Guangzhou, a coastal city 
presumably heavily influenced by Hong Kong and the West (nearly 70 
percent of the city's residents have relatives either in Hong Kong, Ma-
cao or other countries), should be affected much more by negative fac-
tors associated with the open policy than Chengdu, an inland city 
which is presumed to be relatively free of influences from the outside 
world. Interestingly, the author shows that while Guangzhou youth 
have been affected marginally by negative, nontraditional values (such 
as somewhat greater willingness to accept cohabitation by lovers who 
are unmarried), they also have been influenced more by positive values 
from outside, such as a greater display of individual initiative. In ad-
dition, though Chengdu youth have had less exposure to foreign cul-
ture than Guangzhou youth, "the proportion of those who take an 
affirmative attitude toward the propaganda of Western culture is 12 
percent more than in the Guangzhou group." The author concludes, 
therefore, that "contamination by foreign ideology and culture is not 
necessarily in direct proportion to the amount of exposure one has to 
it." Given the general perception of Guangzhou decadence in much of 
the rest of China, there is a certain defensiveness in the study. Wit-
ness, for example, the following passage: 
Some people hold that Guangzhou opened its door to the 
outside world earlier than other places and Guangzhou peo-
ple have more access to foreign ideology and culture, and 
thus inevitably it must be the "hardest hit area" of spiritual 
contamination. This viewpoint manifests a lack of national 
pride and an absence of a realistic attitude. It is the symp-
tom of neurasthenia and lacks logical reasoning. And it does 
not tally with the actual situation in Guangzhou. 27 
Another study, by a researcher at the Guangzhou Institute for 
Educational Research, surveyed graduating junior and senior high 
school students in Guangzhou and Xian concluding, among other 
things, that Guangzhou students were not as desperate to enter key 
schools and universities as their Xian counterparts. With the rapid 
development of the economy, job possibilities had become quite good 
in Guangzhou. 28 
27. Guangzhou yanjiu, No. 4, August 1984, pp. 18-22. 
28. See Zhongguojiaoyu xuehui tongxun, No.2, 1987, pp. 28-32; Guangzhou yanjiu, 
No. 9, 1986, pp. 45-48. 
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But praise for the positive changes in the areas open to foreign 
influence came from publications outside Guangzhou as well. One 
study published in Beijing described the change in the sense of values 
held by Chinese youth over the course of the reform decade. One area 
singled out for special consideration was the differential impact the 
reforms had had on youth in different geographical areas. In open 
areas, youth were seen as less conservative and inflexible. For exam-
ple, the survey noted that 45.2 percent of young intellectuals agreed 
that "it is more valuable to make contributions than to receive bene-
fits," with another 16.7 percent treating giving and receiving as equal 
values. By contrast, only 24 percent of young intellectuals outside the 
open areas made such selfless choices. Similarly, while 19 percent of 
those outside the open areas agreed that "as long as they did things 
with a clear conscience, they didn't care about the results," only 6 
percent of those in the open areas agreed with this statement. 29 
The most recent example of such a survey was likewise conducted 
by a researcher at the Guangzhou Educational Research Institute. 30 
Questionnaires were distributed to 2,433 junior and senior high stu-
dents from Shenzhen, Guangzhou, Hangzhou, Xian and Chongqing 
(representing special economic zones, coastal open cities, coastal open 
districts and interior cities) to determine the differences in ideological 
concepts in different types of geographical areas. Ten major changes 
in concepts are discussed. Although it is unclear when the survey was 
conducted, the results cast a very different light on the open areas. 
Indeed, it is not difficult to see why selected findings were given wide 
circulation in a national youth newspaper published after June 4. It 
certainly suggests that survey results will continue to be used in pur-
suit of political agendas. For example, when it came to large societal 
issues, 55 percent of the students were most concerned with "develop-
ing the economy and raising the standard of living." Only 4 percent 
were concerned with "persisting in a socialist direction." Students in 
open districts were considerably more concerned with an emphasis on 
economics over politics. When it came to ideals, 57 percent of the 
students felt the purpose of studying was to meet the practical needs of 
the individual (to get promoted, find a job, learn more), while 26 per-
cent felt that the purpose of studying was to benefit society or meet the 
demands of the times (shidai xuqiu ). Again, individual interest was 
significantly stronger in open districts than in the interior. 
Other surveys of secondary school students show similar results, 
29. Shidai (Beijing), No. 6, June 1988, pp. 13-14. 
30. Zhongguo qingnian bao, October 30, 1989, p. 3. 
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pointing up the failure to instill proper morality in young students. 
For example, a study done in a county of Jiangsu province asked, 
among other questions, who the students felt was the greatest individ-
ual, the one most worthy of respect. Of the 100 senior high students 
queried, 38 percent chose themselves.Jl A survey in Shandong found 
that only 43 percent of the students polled "believed" in Marxism; 55 
percent believed in nothing; and 1.3 percent believed in religion. 32 
These surveys appear to be part of a general trend, following the 
victory of the hardline forces, to air discussions of social problems and 
evidence of moral decline more openly. This fits in with the campaign 
against the "six vices" (liu hal) and critiques of the unacceptable side 
effects of the reform program. Thus, one commonly finds articles on 
prostitution, pornography, unmarried couples living together, female 
and child abduction and homosexuality, to name a few, in the widely 
circulated press, particularly magazines for youth. Although such 
prurient reading material not incidentally is also good for circula-
tion-the market still rules in the highly competitive field of 
magazines for teenagers-at least some of these stories in the past 
would have been relegated to internally circulated and specialized 
journals for scholars and political workers. 
Despite the clear decline of serious work on Chinese public opin-
ion, it is still possible to find studies of political attitudes and socializa-
tion of college students in open academic journals. Tables 3-8 are 
drawn from a survey conducted by a Fudan University researcher 
among 150 students (200 questionnaires were distributed), including 
graduate students and undergraduates representing entering classes 
from 1985 to 1988. Among the findings, one notes an indifference to 
politics (Table 3) and a strong concern with material success (Table 8). 
Interestingly, there is also a strong feeling that students should be en-
gaged in politics (Table 5) and that the indifference noted may not 
represent the true picture (Table 4). It is also striking that only 2.7 
percent were "very confident" about the future of reform (Table 6) 
and that a majority admitted that the strong desire to go abroad was 
related to the slow pace of reform (Table 7). These results are quite 
similar to what one hears from interviewees. 
31. Zhongguo qingnian bao, December 11, 1989, p. 3. 
32. China News Analysis, No. 1395, October 15, 1989, p. 8, from Renmin Ribao,Ju1y 1, 
1989. 
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TABLE3 
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING 
EXPRESSION: "NOWADAYS UNIVERSITY STUDENTS ARE 
INDIFFERENT TO POLmCS''? 
Strongly Agree 
Generally Agree 
Agree Somewhat 
Disagree 
Firmly Oppose 
Other 
N = 150 
22.4% 
21.8% 
25.9% 
21.1% 
5.4% 
3.4% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang. 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
TABLE 4 
FROM WHAT YOU'VE SEEN AND HEARD, WHAT IS YOUR 
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CONCERN UNIVERSITY 
STUDENTS NOW HAVE TOWARD CURRENT EVENTS 
(REFORM AND THE OPEN POLICY)? 
Very Concerned 
Superficially Unconcerned, But Deep Down Very 
Concerned 
Not Too Concerned 
Very Unconcerned 
Other 
N = 150 
11.3% 
36.2% 
40.4% 
5.7% 
6.4% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, ''Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang, 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
222 CoNTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
TABLE 5 
DO YOU FEEL THAT UNIVERSITY STUDENTS SHOULD 
ACI'IVELY DISCUSS AND PARTICIPATE IN POLmCS? 
Definitely Should 
Should 
Should Not 
Can't Say For Sure 
Other 
N = 150 
33.8% 
41.4% 
6.2% 
14.5% 
4.1% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang, 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
TABLE 6 
DO YOU HAVE CONFIDENCE IN THE 
FUTURE OF REFORM? 
Very Confident 
Confident 
Can't Say For Sure 
No Confidence 
Other 
N = 150 
2.7% 
37.4% 
38.8% 
14.9% 
6.2% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang, 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
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TABLE 7 
WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE FOLLOWING 
EXPRESSION: "THE CRAZE TO GO ABROAD THESE 
DAYS IS A REACI'ION TO THE SLUGGISH 
DEVELOPMENT OF CHINESE REFORMS"? 
Agree 
There's Some Truth In This 
Disagree 
Firmly Oppose 
Other 
N = 150 
20.4% 
36.8% 
32.7% 
6.1% 
4.0% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang, 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
TABLE 8 
THE THINGS OF MOST INTEREST TO STUDENTS 
THESE DAYS 
Finding A Good Job 
Making Money 
Going Abroad 
Love and Romance 
Doing Well In Studies 
N = 150 
31.0% 
27.3% 
25.7% 
8.6% 
1.6% 
Source: Sun Jiaming and Lin Jianhong, "Daxuesheng zhengzhi shehuihua: xianzhuang. 
wenti ji duice" [The Political Socialization of University Students: Current Conditions, 
Problems and Countermeasures], Shehui Kexue [Social Science], No. 12, December 1989, 
p. 53. 
CONCLUSION 
Following the 1986-87 student demonstrations, Vice-director of 
the State Education Commission, He Dongchang, could note blithely 
that only 2 percent of China's college students had taken part. Thus, 
publicly at least, they were viewed as unrepresentative of the main-
stream of the student body. No such claim could be made in 1989. 
Official accounts noted that 2. 8 million students from 600 institutions 
of higher learning in 80 cities had taken to the streets. In the after-
math, many culprits had been found. The CYL was one of the first 
organizations to be blamed, with the league and its media arms, such 
as Chinese Youth Daily, scheduled for revamping even before the June 
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4 denouement. 33 In a post-mortem, entitled "Ten Weaknesses of Ideo-
logical Work for Young People," Chinese Youth reported on a survey 
of 86 CYL cadres. One finding was that 73 percent of the cadres saw 
youth work as only human relations (renqing gongzuo ). Thus, they 
won over their charges by being "good old boys," and joining the 
youth in such activities as playing mah jongg, gambling and drinking. 
Another problem was that the cadres simply did what the higher levels 
told them, reading out documents as needed. One survey found that 
more than 43 percent did not bother to prepare when teaching CYL 
courses (tuanke }, so there was little real discussion. 34 
This was part of a larger problem of recruiting and retaining 
young and capable political workers. Tang Shaoming, director of the 
Education Bureau under the Propaganda Department of the CPC 
Central Committee, told a reporter that it was virtually impossible to 
find anyone to do ideo-political work in universities who is around 30 
years old. Those of that age might be willing to work two or three 
years in such a post, but would then transfer to academic work or 
enroll as post-graduate students at universities, leading to high turno-
ver rates. 35 Partly because political work is seen as temporary, polit-
ical workers "have regarded their greatest achievements as when 
students do not cause trouble. " 36 Perhaps such defensiveness is not 
surprising. During the 1989 demonstrations, CYL cadres were "slan-
dered as 'traitors to students,' and denounced by big-character 
posters."37 
It is difficult to see how political work can improve under current 
conditions. Liu Zhengwei, party secretary in Guizhou province, sug-
gested CYL cadres and other youth need to "read more good 
books. " 38 He Dongchang, to his credit, seemed to have suggested the 
opposite, at least from the current Chinese viewpoint, when he argued 
that political workers would need to read and understand Western 
Marxism and other recent theories, if they wanted to have an influence 
on the students. Li Ruihuan, a member of the CPC Politburo Stand-
ing Committee responsible for ideological work, has likewise advo-
cated an enhanced role for political education, while admitting that 
the form and methods suitable for such work remain to be 
33. Daily Report, May 2, 1989, pp. 25-26 (South China Morning Post, May 2). 
34. Zhongguo qingnian, No. 8, August 1989, pp. 27-28; Zhongguo qingnian bao, No-
vember 6, 1989, p. 3. 
35. Daily Report, August 25, 1989, pp. 13-15 (Liaowang, August 14). 
36. Daily Report, August 30, 1989, p. 28 (Guangming Ribao, August 23). 
37. Daily Report, August 4, 1989, p. 22 (Guangming Ribao, July 23). 
38. Daily Report, July 24, 1989, p. 63 (Radio Guiyang, July 23). 
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discovered. 39 
In the meantime, more practical means for controlling student 
behavior are being used. The plan to allow a growing number of col-
lege graduates to find their own jobs has been suspended. Party and 
government organs at or above the provincial level have been told that 
they cannot, except in special circumstances, directly employ gradu-
ates or postgraduate students from institutions of higher learning. 
Marxist training on university campuses has been intensified, with 
clear indications that some Party and academic leaders are seeking to 
expand these measures and reimpose political tests as a criterion in 
university admissions, faculty hiring and selection of candidates for 
overseas study. Following the dramatic political changes in the Soviet 
Union, Chinese authorities announced stiff new regulations to control 
student activities, including the requirement that college graduates 
must work for five years before studying overseas, or else pay steep 
fines.40 
Interviewees report that student behavior is being controlled most 
effectively by the recentralization of the job assignment system. They 
describe a situation somewhat reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution 
when youth and their parents sought to avoid a posting to the rural 
areas. The enhanced role of political workers in making these assign-
ment decisions has contributed to the creation of a more compliant 
student body. Still, there are reports in the overseas press of the less 
than friendly questioning Chinese leaders have received when they 
have ventured on the campuses, with Yuan Mu's difficulties at Beijing 
University and Jiang Zemin's problems at Qinghua University most 
widely reported. 
The "craze" to go abroad has never been greater, although are-
cent Chinese regulation makes such overseas study increasingly diffi-
cult. The regulation divides students into three categories, according 
to family background. In category one are the children or direct rela-
tives of "the six kinds of people" (liulei renyuan ). These include: 
(1) Overseas Chinese who have returned to live in China; (2) Overseas 
Chinese residing overseas; (3) Hong Kong compatriots; (4) Macao 
compatriots; (5) Taiwan compatriots; and, (6) Chinese with foreign 
citizenship. Category two includes "non-direct" relatives of the "six 
kinds of people." Category three are those not related to the "six 
kinds of people." 
39. Daily Report, October 23, 1989, pp. 18-19 (Xinhua, October 21). 
40. Chronicle of Higher Education, October 4, 1989; Los Angeles Times, February 10, 
1990; New York Times, February 8, 1990; Far Eastern Economic Review, August 24, 1989, 
p. 13; Daily Report, August 22, 1989, p. 13 (Hong Kong Wen weipo, August 22). 
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Those in category three must work for five years after university 
graduation before applying to study abroad. Category two students 
can avoid this work requirement by paying an "education fee" 
(peiyang fez) as follows: 2,500 renminbi (rmb) per year for college stu-
dents; 4,000 rmb per year for master's students; and, 6,000 rmb a year 
for doctoral students. For the fortunate category one students, there is 
neither a five-year work requirement nor an education fee. Those who 
return to China within eight years can get a full refund of their educa-
tion fee.41 Interviewees report the craze to go abroad is now accompa-
nied by the craze to discover long-lost relatives. 
While these measures surely have affected overt behavior, regain-
ing a constituency among China's youth will not be easy. One recent 
survey conducted among Beijing University students by the Chinese 
Political Consultative Committee reportedly found that only 20 per-
cent expressed ideological accord with the current leadership; 40 per-
cent said they would not be won over; and, 40 percent did not 
respond.42 A recent State Education Commission delegation to the 
United States was unsuccessful in winning many converts among stu-
dents studying abroad. Reportedly, the group virtually abandoned its 
efforts after an abortive meeting with Chinese students at the Univer-
sity of Illinois. 
Indeed, the views of overseas students toward the current regime 
have been studied. Table 9 reports an intriguing, albeit highly un-
scientific, survey in which students currently abroad (the fifth genera-
tion) were asked to evaluate well-known figures who studied abroad in 
the first four generations. They were given 11 names and asked to rate 
each person from one to ten. Not surprisingly, Li Peng brings up the 
rear, the small standard deviation suggesting there was little ambiguity 
regarding China's premier. Deng Xiaoping, a far more controversial 
figure, elicited the largest standard deviation, with respondents vary-
ing from a minimum score of zero to a maximum score of nine. Sun 
Y at-sen, in a category by himself, was seen as making the greatest 
contributions to China, while T.D. Lee, Zhou Enlai and Qian Xuesen 
join Deng as "middle characters," with both supporters and 
detractors. 
41. IFCSS Liaison Office News Release, No. 63, March 14, 1990. 
42. Xingdao ribao, December 26, 1989. 
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TABLE 9 
EVALUATION OF ELEVEN INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD 
STUDIED ABROAD 
Name 
Sun Yat-sen 
Fang Lizhi 
Cai Yuanpei 
LuXun 
Hu Shi 
T.D. Lee 
Zhou Enlai 
Qian Xuesen 
Deng Xiaoping 
Jiang Zemin 
Li Peng 
Average Point Standard 
Total Deviation 
8.9 1.28 
7.6 1.57 
7.5 1.29 
6.9 1.95 
6.8 1.42 
5.7 2.13 
5.1 2.46 
4.5 2.30 
3.8 2.57 
2.2 1.89 
0.4 0.93 
N = "more than 80" 
Minimum Maximum 
Score Score 
4 10 
3 10 
4 10 
0 10 
3 10 
0 9 
0 10 
0 10 
0 9 
0 7 
0 5 
Source: Xinwen ziyou daobao [Press Freedom Herald], November 30, 1989, p. 4. 

12. CHINA AND AMERICA: BEYOND THE BIG CHILL* 
Winston Lord 
The Big Chill has descended over China. Sino-American rela-
tions are suffering. While we assess the ramifications, we must also 
look beyond the crisis and sketch blueprints for a warmer climate, for 
the present season will not long endure. 
For two decades, five American administrations, of both parties, 
have pursued positive relations with Beijing. They have done so with-
out illusions and with a firm grasp of the strategic and bilateral stakes. 
Only a small minority of Americans has opposed cooperation and they 
now point to recent events as vindication of their views. They have it 
exactly wrong. Not only has the United States derived enormous ben-
efits from this relationship, but in the process it has encouraged and 
strengthened the very forces for greater openness and freedom in 
China that shone so brightly last April and May. 
The fabric of our ties has shown impressive sturdiness since we 
first reopened the door in 1971. Both nations have weathered political 
earthquakes and tremors. Successive leaders in China and America, 
who have deeply disagreed among themselves on other issues, have all 
agreed it is in the national interest to expand bilateral bonds. 
Naturally there have been plateaus and detours during our jour-
ney. Now we are circling back as we confront the most treacherous 
terrain yet. It is to President Bush's great credit that he has sought to 
keep our longer-term interests in view even as we register our revul-
sion, as we must, at the sorry spectacle unfolding on the mainland. 
II 
Let me begin on a personal note of profound sadness, for the trag-
edy inflicted on the Chinese people, for the dimming of Deng Xiao-
ping's vision in the twilight of his remarkable odyssey, for the 
necessity to address these issues. I do so with the anguish both of a 
professional who has for 20 years promoted Sino-American relations 
and as a friend of China's leaders. 
I subscribe to the virtue of sticking by old friends, especially when 
they are in difficulty, as the Chinese did, for example, with President 
• Reprinted by permission of the Council on Foreign Relations, Inc., dated 
November 9, 1989, from Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No.4, Fall 1989, pp. 1-26. 
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Nixon and Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka of Japan. I have greatly 
admired the courageous, historic achievements of Deng and his associ-
ates. While I consider the encouragement of human rights an impor-
tant dimension of our foreign policy, I also weigh heavily the 
geopolitical and economic factors. As a former ambassador and hold-
ing many professional and personal ties to the Chinese, my strong nat-
ural impulse is to refrain from commenting on China's internal 
difficulties. 
Nevertheless I have spoken out strongly against the actions of the 
Chinese regime since the spring, as it proceeded from intransigence to 
massacre, from roundups to executions and repression, all cloaked in a 
most brazen display of the Big Lie. My condemnation has been harsh 
because I am appalled at what the Chinese government has done and 
continues to do--this is not merely scandal or corruption. I believe 
that especially those of us who have worked for Sino-American rela-
tions need to speak to-- and for-the vast legions of the Chinese peo-
ple, including not only those who are purged, vilified and silenced, but 
also those in leading positions who once more must swallow their con-
victions and regurgitate the current Party line. Surely these "old 
friends" deserve our loyalty more than the handful of those responsi-
ble for crushing Chinese spirits. I am persuaded that in the relatively 
near future there will once again be a Chinese regime composed of 
people with whom we can resume the forward march in our 
relationship. 
III 
The most cold-blooded observer would have difficulty justifying 
the Chinese government's policies since June. If the students and their 
broad phalanx of supporters had used violence or set out to overthrow 
the Party, one could have understood a firm response. But for weeks 
the Chinese people displayed truly extraordinary moderation, disci-
pline and goodwill. 
In Beijing and other cities throughout the nation, huge numbers 
demonstrated daily without causing a single death or committing an 
act of violence. The authorities, whether by design or paralysis, also 
showed great restraint. Those on the streets chose the only avenues of 
expression open to them. They wished to work within the system, 
seeking gradual reform in the context of communist rule, indeed pro-
moting the very goals the Party had proclaimed. They petitioned for 
rights set forth in the Chinese constitution. At the beginning no one 
attacked the leadership or called for Western-style democracy. For 
weeks the students' platform boiled down to two concrete requests: an 
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acknowledgment that the demonstrators were patriotic and a dialogue 
between genuine student leaders and the political leaders. 
Meeting these two requests, as then Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang 
and many other leading figures were willing to do, would have defused 
the crisis. It would also have ushered in a new, hopeful chapter for 
China. There could have followed serious attacks on corruption, a 
freer press, the initiation of genuine exchanges between the authorities 
and the intellectual elites who were prepared, as always in Chinese 
history, to serve their nation. The inevitable transition pains of mov-
ing from one economic system to another could have been better un-
derstood and tolerated by the people. Possible solutions to complex 
issues could have been better aired in the media and among the elites. 
There could have evolved a greater sense of participation in decisions 
by the urban population. And all could have felt a greater sense of 
Party accountability. 
Instead, a few elders-fearing chaos or at least a slippery slope 
toward a Chinese "Solidarity" movement, defining stability as the sup-
pression of dissent instead of gradual reform, clinging to power above 
all - chose to squash the peaceful demonstration, to "kill chickens to 
scare monkeys" and to haul China back 20 years to terror and Orwel-
lian groupthink. There have been sickening replays of the Anti-Right-
ist Campaign and the Cultural Revolution: wholesale fabrications; 
exhortations to tum on one's fellow citizens; brainwashing in schools, 
offices and factories; widespread fear of speaking one's mind; and-
somewhat scaled down-the cult of personality, studying the chair-
man's thoughts and blaming troubles on outside influence. 
In response to foreign condemnation, Beijing has started masking 
its reprisals. Executions and arrests are no longer trumpeted; foreign 
journalists are expelled; contacts for foreigners are frozen; the glare of 
the world's attention is all but extinguished. The regime strives to 
present a more benign face to the world through a controlled press, 
endless reiteration of lies and distortions and seizing upon technical 
errors in foreign reporting. Unfortunately, this has some effect in cer-
tain Western quarters. But for countless Chinese the nightmare of in-
terrogations, harassment, arrests, disappearances and indoctrination 
continues. The summer's events may not be as bloody as those in 
early June, but their range is wider, their effect more insidious. 
This is all the more tragic for having been unnecessary. There-
gime could have maintained, indeed enhanced, its authority and legiti-
macy through rather modest conciliatory gestures. Instead, an ossified 
leadership proved incapable of comprehending and adjusting to the 
social and political changes its own economic reforms had generated. 
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As a result, it has lost the "mandate of heaven" and radicalized some 
of the opposition. Former President Nixon-architect of the opening 
of China, a close friend of the Chinese leaders and no sentimentalist-
described the crackdown as not only "shockingly cruel" but also "in-
credibly stupid." 
As of this writing the regime's grip seems firm. But, as is seen so 
often in China and recently in other totalitarian states, the surface 
does not necessarily reflect reality. This spring [1989]'s movement 
was spontaneous and sweeping in its scope. It will be recorded as a 
major event in Chinese history. In cities throughout China not only 
students, workers and ordinary citizens, but Party and government of-
ficials, leading journalists, top think-tankers and innovative entrepre-
neurs joined in. These forces are the political cutting edge of China 
and precisely those sectors most crucial for reforms and the opening. 
The Chinese leadership cannot round up and shut up these people and 
at the same time hope to modernize the nation and obtain foreign 
assistance. The urban population may be temporarily cowed, but peo-
ple are angry, sullen and ready to tum to more enlightened leaders in 
the future. 
Furthermore, there are clear splits within the political leadership 
itself. Not only those who have been purged but many still holding 
official positions would have strongly preferred conciliation to crack-
down. Important elements of the Chinese military also spoke out 
against martial law and refused to move against the demonstrators. 
Some fell into line only out of personal loyalty to Deng. Many officers 
resented being dragged from their march toward professionalism back 
into politics; many harbor shame over the role of the People's Libera-
tion Army (PLA) in the June massacre. 
Economic pressures on the regime will intensify. Before this 
spring there were already serious problems: an overheated economy, 
inflation, unemployment, bottlenecks in energy, raw materials and 
transportation, and income disparities. Rampant nepotism and cor-
ruption were souring the populace. All of this has now been com-
pounded by the dislocation of recent months and the prospect of a 
more resentful, inefficient work force, spending long hours in sterile 
political sessions. Subsidies will be needed to keep urban workers and 
peasants quiet; in a nonproductive economy this will boost inflation 
even higher. We will see the stifling of initiative and the increased 
bucking of decisions to the top; normally cautious bureaucrats will be 
even more fearful of making politically incorrect decisions. Dealing 
with foreigners is riskier than ever. Key economic thinkers and actors 
have fled or are intimidated. 
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The crucial assistance provided by the outside world is being 
erased in reaction to what the communique of the recent economic 
summit in Paris referred to as China's "violent repression." Govern-
ment actions by the United States, Europe, Japan and others are sus-
pending military cooperation and slowing economic assistance, 
technology transfers and investment. International financial institu-
tions are postponing badly needed loans. There has been a severe im-
pact on the psyches as well as the wallets of Hong Kong, Taiwan and 
South Korea. Most important are the thousands of decisions by pri-
vate individuals around the world-businessmen cancelling or stretch-
ing out trade and investment projects; intellectuals freezing scientific, 
·cultural and academic exchanges; tourists staying away from China in 
droves; and Chinese students, scientists and scholars refusing to return 
to their homeland. China's balance-of-payments position will be ex-
tremely shaky as key sources of foreign exchange dwindle sharply-
exports, foreign investment, tourism and loans. 
In a few brief months the Chinese leaders have lost the respect, 
confidence and credibility they had garnered during the past decade. 
Their assurances on a whole range of issues will not be as readily ac-
cepted. They have squandered their special standing in world affairs. 
They have shaken the view that China's entry into the international 
economic, security and intellectual systems should be encouraged and 
facilitated. 
All these forces will build against the strange and fragile coalition 
in Beijing, consisting of central actors whose age will soon sweep them 
from the stage, elder gurus who resist both reforms and outside intlu-
ence, opportunistic figureheads and closet moderates. 
IV 
The best way to understand the reality in China today is to tum 
the official line upside down. For "the situation is stable" read the 
situation is precarious. For "broad consensus" substitute fierce disa-
greement. For "the people love the army" understand that the people 
hate the army units engaged in the suppression. "A small band" 
means massive numbers and "hooligans and ruffians" translates into 
law-abiding citizens from all walks of life. When a handful of people 
are shown on television turning in their neighbors to the authorities, 
millions of others are refusing to do so or are helping the hunted es-
cape. When Chinese are shown earnestly studying the chairman's 
speeches, they are really numb with boredom and cynicism. The au-
thorities vigorously proclaim the continuation of reforms and opening 
to the outside world. The reality is that ten years of heartening pro-
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gress has been shattered in a few weeks, and China's drive for modern-
ization has been dealt savage body blows that will take years to heal. 
No one can predict how the Chinese panorama will unreel in the 
near term. Much depends on the sequence in which key aging leaders 
depart. The current discredited regime is clearly a transitional one. It 
is not clear how fully it can extend its writ to all comers of China, 
especially in the south near Hong Kong. There may be some interim 
shuffling of the political deck among hard-line coalitions. There will 
probably be future power struggles. It is at least possible that, echoing 
Chinese history, central authority will disintegrate and some form of 
regionalism will take hold. 
But we can be confident that, however grim the interlude, a more 
enlightened leadership will emerge within a few years. And we can be 
absolutely sure that when that day comes, the official Chinese line will 
manage to rewrite history once again. 1 Next time it will approximate 
the truth. The true criminals and the true martyrs will then be recog-
nized in party pronouncements-as they are already known by Chi-
nese urban dwellers and people around the world. 
In short, what we see in China today is not what we will see 
within a few years. As the British historian R.H. Tawney noted in 
1931: "Political forces in China recall Chinese rivers. The pressure on 
the dam is enormous but unseen, and it is not till it bursts that the 
strain is realized." 
It may well tum out that the tragic events in China this year 
[1989] have foreshortened that great nation's march toward democ-
racy. The forecast had been for gradual, spasmodic progress toward a 
freer society, impelled by the demands of a more market-oriented 
economy and growing interaction with the world. Now, after exper-
iencing the giddy liberating weeks of last spring that preceded the 
great leap backward, the Chinese people may not settle for incremen-
tal advance. 
Once the hard-liners leave, we may see a more determined move 
toward pluralism and openness. To be sure, China will not become 
like a Western democracy. Like the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
it will face a perilous transition from one system to another. But by 
the end of the century the Chinese may well enjoy a freer press, a more 
highly developed legal system and a more open political process than 
would have been the case without the dark phase now being endured. 
As the current leaders themselves have said, the agony of the Cul-
l. In 1978 Deng himself insisted that the 1976 Tiananmen Square demonstrations 
supporting him be redefined as a popular uprising rather than as a counterrevolution. 
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tural Revolution made possible the decade of reform. It became clear 
that pragmatism and international cooperation had to replace ideolog-
ical frenzy and xenophobia. Chairman Deng, who together with his 
family was a victim of that madness, boldly led his nation on a new 
path. He himself repeatedly proclaimed the need for younger people 
to take over for the next phase of China's Long March. Sadly, he did 
not see this mission through. Had he succeeded, his historic legacy 
would not have been sullied by recent events. 
The current agony, like the Cultural Revolution, may well propel 
China forward again. It is clear that political reform must accompany 
economic reform. We now know that it is too much to expect the 
octogenarians to lead the country to new frontiers. It will require the 
fresh vision and flexibility of a younger generation. 
v 
What of the Big Chill's effect on relations with the United States? 
Certainly we are experiencing the most serious setback since 1971. 
American global diplomacy will be hampered, significantly in some 
areas. Many bilateral edifices, painstakingly constructed, have been 
tom down or left uncompleted. But since our mutual long-term inter-
ests remain and the bilateral foundations we have laid are broad, I 
believe the relationship will weather the shocks. 
Prudence, however, requires a careful assessment of the damage. 
On the international front, Moscow has predictably sought to make 
gains at Washington's expense by adopting a restrained attitude to-
ward China's brutal repression. On the heels of the May Sino-Soviet 
summit in Beijing, Mikhail Gorbachev has been deliberately currying 
favor with Chinese leaders, encouraging them to compare his "under-
standing" with the attitudes of the moralistic, meddlesome West, in 
particular the United States. 
The Middle Kingdom's prickly leaders are calibrating the tone of 
their relations with various countries according to their rhetorical and 
policy stances. Some key Chinese figures remain more comfortable 
with central planning than with market forces. Beijing may seek to 
unnerve the West by suggesting further movement toward Moscow. 
We will probably see more Sino-Soviet meetings, trade and exchanges, 
additional progress on their border negotiations and increased consul-
tation on regional conflicts. 
Such developments are not cost free, but neither should they be 
cause for undue concern. The same underlying limits to Sino-Soviet 
rapprochement that existed before the Gorbachev-Deng meeting will 
remain. The 4,500-mile Sino-Soviet border-the site of past clashes 
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and restless, overlapping ethnic minorities-will not disappear. The 
Pacific Ocean that reassuringly separates China and America will not 
shrink. 
Chinese authorities may be very adept at rewriting history but 
they will not blot out tsarist territorial grabs or Soviet perfidies. 
Under Gorbachev, direct threats and tensions have eased. But the 
long-term geopolitical pressures of neighboring Soviet proxies and 
friends in Vietnam, Afghanistan, India, Mongolia and North Korea 
will persist. Finally, Beijing's overwhelming preoccupation well into 
the next century will be economic development and modernization. 
Only the United States, Europe and Japan can provide the capital, 
technology, markets and managerial savvy that China urgently re-
quires. The Soviet Union's disastrous economy, lagging technology 
and limited barter trade provide no alternatives. 
Chinese leaders, of whatever stripe on domestic issues, are united 
in their basic world orientation. However intense their irritation with 
Washington, they will continue to take the long-range view toward 
security and development. The PLA is particularly suspicious of the 
Soviet Union; it will look forward to resuming cooperation with the 
United States and Western Europe. Beijing will not wish to further 
jeopardize Western cash and computers by excessive flirtation with 
Moscow. 
It is to the carefully built process of consultation on international 
issues that Washington's current estrangement from Beijing causes the 
most serious political damage. In recent years both countries have 
striven hard to broaden the scope of discussions, and both have reaped 
substantial dividends. America and China kept each other posted on 
their developing ties with the Soviet Union. Beijing provided constant 
reassurance, and Washington reflected Chinese (as well as Japanese 
and Korean) views in its final position on the Intermediate-range Nu-
clear Forces Treaty with Moscow, eliminating intermediate missiles in 
Asia as well as Europe. Due to America's energetic representations, 
China ceased sending Silkworm missiles to Iran and instilled confi-
dence that it would not ship intermediate ballistic missiles to others 
after its one-time deal with Saudi Arabia. 
For several years China has been shifting toward a responsible 
stance on nuclear nonproliferation. Despite significant commercial 
complexities, the United States agreed to launch American satellites 
on Chinese rockets. Both countries cooperated very closely on evict-
ing Soviet troops from Afghanistan. The Chinese moved somewhat 
toward the U.S. position that the Khmer Rouge be prevented from 
regaining power in Cambodia. They facilitated direct dialogue be-
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tween the United States and North Korea in Beijing and forged com-
mercial links with South Korea. For the first time in a century, 
Tokyo, Beijing and Washington have all enjoyed cordial relations with 
one another. At the United Nations, Chinese representatives were 
more cooperative on issues ranging from the Gulf War to Namibia. 
The Chinese showed restraint on Central America. They cultivated 
ties with Israel. 
Clearly Beijing made these various moves for its own reasons. 
Just as clearly, our exchanges at all levels have paid off in greater mu-
tual understanding and some adjustments in our respective positions. 
While the chill in our relations continues, we will lose the benefits 
of this process. Our direct influence on Chinese policies will shrivel. 
The pursuit of some of our international objectives will be more ardu-
ous. Problems on which we already have differences could become 
more acute and the tone of discourse could become nastier. 
Nevertheless Beijing will, as always, conduct an independent for-
eign policy based on hardheaded calculations. It will not alter its ap-
proach on key issues to spite the United States. The degree of Chinese 
warmth toward Moscow and Washington may shift- but not the fun-
damental geopolitical equations. History and geography will not 
change. 
Meanwhile, our two countries will continue to pursue compatible 
policies on certain issues, but generally in parallel, not in concert. 
They will result from independent assessments of respective national 
interests, not from steady consultations and mutual education. 
In the military sphere all sales, technology transfers, visits and 
exchanges are halted in their tracks. While some economic, commer-
cial and scientific exchanges continue, they decline sharply as trips and 
programs are cancelled or postponed. The suspension of all high-level 
government contacts aborts new official initiatives. 
Moreover, the great bulk of these activities are conducted in the 
private sector. Based on both practical and moral grounds, thousands 
of individual decisions every week are wiping out or stretching out 
trade deals, investment and scientific plans. In the cultural and aca-
demic areas, from ballet companies to art exhibits, from journalistic 
exchanges to student exchanges, a host of promising projects are dying 
or placed in cold storage. 
VI 
Such are the by-products-costly to both sides-of the Chinese 
authorities' actions. The Bush Administration was given no choice 
but to express national outrage and halt cooperation in various fields. 
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American values and practical considerations dictated this response. 
Public opinion was rightly incensed through television exposure, and 
the views of key allies matched our own. It was also important-a 
point not widely noticed-to paint a precedent to advise Moscow, as it 
fashions its own responses to the Soviet internal stresses. 
At the same time the administration has wisely chosen to suspend 
rather than dismantle relationships. For a decade we have spun an 
impressive web of legislation, umbrella agreements and consultative 
mechanisms under which a broad range of visits and projects go for-
ward. While many of these activities are frozen, the frameworks re-
main. Cabinet secretaries do not travel to Beijing but joint 
commissions remain intact, pending resumption of efforts to increase 
trade and investment. Specific scientific programs are temporarily 
shelved but the basic protocols remain valid. Cultural and academic 
exchanges are canceled but the broad bilateral agreements are pre-
served for a more auspicious climate. One day we will once again 
learn from each other. 
This is a difficult period for government and private deci-
sionmakers alike. There is no clear road map as we feel our way 
through an ambiguous passage. We cannot practice business as usual; 
nor do we wish to destroy all the structures in place. We do not seek 
to hurt the Chinese people, but we also do not want to hand the lead-
ers photo-opportunities depicting normalcy. 
In this context it is difficult to generalize; an ad hoc approach is 
unavoidable. We face a period of sanctions, holding actions, carrots 
and sticks and damage limitation. If a Stalinist-type regime persists 
over time, we will have no choice but to hunker down and wait it out 
as best we can. It is certainly appropriate to cease cooperation in areas 
that carry strong symbolism, such as the military. This holds as well 
for those commercial or scientific projects that benefit the Chinese 
more than us or in cases where we have solid alternatives. 
Many areas, however, pose complex choices. We cannot expect 
American businesses to write off years of hard work and hard cash 
when they are playing for the long run in any event. If, in principle, 
the U.S. government forgoes extending special help to its private sec-
tor's efforts in China, what if foreign competitors were to exploit this 
restraint to their advantage? 
Moreover, it is not simply a matter of our policies but also the 
practical results of Chinese policies. In general, I would like to see 
academic and cultural ties maintained. But how can there be produc-
tive conferences with Chinese intellectuals when they are not free to 
express their real views? If Washington seeks to continue bringing fu-
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ture Chinese leaders to the United States under auspices like the im-
mensely successful International Visitors Program of the U.S. 
Information Agency, will Beijing let them come? Should American 
scholars, such as those in the Fulbright program, continue to go to 
China, even if their access will be severely curtailed? Should cultural 
groups convey American art to eager audiences when they will be ex-
ploited by the Chinese media? 
The United States cannot fully restore ties with China until those 
responsible for the June debacle and its aftermath are no longer at the 
helm. In the meantime we face the practical question of how to con-
duct policy. The ingredients of U.S. policy should depend on the ac-
tions of the Beijing regime. It is impossible as well as unwise to draw 
up rigid standards or precise calibrations between actions by China 
and moves by the United States. Let me nevertheless sketch some cri-
teria to guide U.S. policy. Here are some suggestions of steps by the 
Chinese authorities that might invite positive responses: 
-[the] lifting [of] martial law in Beijing and Tibet;2 
-cessation and rollback of the imprisonment, persecution 
and execution of the peaceful demonstrators and their 
supporters; 
-conciliatory gestures, tolerance of debate and genuine dia-
logue with the disaffected; 
-termination of the ideological campaigns against foreign 
ideas; 
-reopening of access to foreign media, including the Voice 
of America; 
-revival of foreign exchanges of students and others; 
-resumption of the commitment to economic and political 
reform; 
-restoration of a climate in which Chinese and foreign pro-
fessionals (journalists, businessmen, scholars and such) 
can meet international standards in their dealings on Chi-
nese soil; 
-confidence that U.S. presence and access in China does not 
endanger Chinese friends; 
-serious efforts by the Chinese government to acknowledge 
the damage it has done to its international credibility, for 
example, by renegotiating aspects of the draft fundamental 
law on Hong Kong's governance after 1997 now being 
considered by the National People's Congress; 
2. Martial law in Beijing and Tibet was lifted in early 1990. 
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-evidence over a sustained time that China is honoring its 
previous statements on such issues as missile sales, nuclear 
nonproliferation, stability in Korea, progress toward a set-
tlement in Cambodia and patience on the Taiwan issue. 3 
While we must not condone what has happened and is happening 
in China, we must not totally isolate the Chinese and rip out all the 
roots that we have so carefully nurtured. We need to find a way to 
balance our objectives of expressing near-term censure and holding 
open long-term cooperation with an enlightened leadership. While 
salvaging the framework, we must sustain indignation. In this process 
we should maintain contact with those who don masks but share our 
concerns. We should try to lighten the gloom for the Chinese people. 
The impact of our policies may be modest, but it will be magnified if 
we can preserve unity between Congress and the administration at 
home and cohesion with our allies abroad. 
To be sure, the revival of broad cooperation will not be automatic 
or facile even with a moderate government in the future. Scars will 
remain. Trust will have to be rebuilt. The assumption of long-term 
political stability in China that has grown during the past decade has 
been rudely shaken. Traders and investors will be more prone to 
hedge their bets and to swerve to other markets. Cultural and aca-
demic leaders will harbor uneasiness about future winds of xenopho-
bia. And China may have forfeited its special status in certain U.S. 
government projects. 
I believe nevertheless that there are grounds for longer-term opti-
mism. A vast network of official, professional and personal contacts 
has been created. The key Chinese interlocutors are precisely those 
elements who supported-and will support-the aspirations for a 
freer, more open society. They are shackled now from expressing their 
views and dealing with foreigners, but they are eager to resume coop-
eration and will do so once a progressive regime takes hold. 
History is on their side. Gone forever is the time when the Mid-
dle Kingdom could shut out the barbarians behind great walls of indif-
ference or condescension. Too many doors have been opened. Even 
hard-line leaders understand China's desperate need for foreign capi-
tal, technology and markets (indeed they have been avidly seeking to 
regain lost ground by trying to project an image of business as usual). 
No nation can prosper in the age of information and technology with-
out opening up within and to the world outside. No government prop-
3. I am indebted to Professor Michel Oksenberg of the University of Michigan for his 
thoughts on these criteria. 
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aganda can erase years of images of relative progress elsewhere around 
the globe--conveyed by television sets reaching over 800 million Chi-
nese, by millions of tourists, including overseas Chinese, by tho?sands 
of businessmen, scientists and scholars, and by the elite of China re-
turning from more promising lands. 
Americans in turn have every incentive to resume progress with 
China when conditions allow. A more moderate government in Bei-
jing will need-and deserve--outside cooperation. We should then 
move vigorously to energize a wide range of contacts and programs 
that are now on hold. This will not be a favor to China but rather to 
ourselves. 
VII 
When this more hopeful time arrives, the fundamental chal-
lenges-and promises-that the United States and China faced in 
their relationship until the spring of 1989 will resurface: 
-to recast geopolitical cooperation in a more ambiguous 
world; 
-to expand economic links even while grappling with 
transitions; 
-to reap more fruit than friction from the mingling of two 
cultures. 
Let us look at the context and contours of a fully renewed rela-
tionship down the road, noting the transformation in the international 
landscape since the 1970s. 
After redressing the Soviet-American strategic balance in the 
early 1980s, Washington is now moving energetically with Moscow to 
reduce and stabilize arms across the spectrum. Facing immense 
problems at home and confronted by firmness abroad, Gorbachev 
seeks to cut the costs of Soviet foreign adventures. Both Washington 
and Beijing have taken advantage of these conditions to improve rela-
tions with Moscow. Triangular diplomacy is thus blurred. 
As the relative positions of the superpowers decline in the mili-
tary sphere, new centers of wealth and stability emerge. China has 
asserted itself forcefully on this new world stage: increasing trade, 
selling arms, launching satellites and projecting power. Its domestic 
trauma and the international reaction are cramping Beijing's diplo-
macy right now. But this is transitory. With a more benign regime, 
China's full weight will once again be felt. 
Other trends, mostly positive, have radically altered the interna-
tional context of Sino-American relations. There has been movement 
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on several regional conflicts, Afghanistan and Cambodia, for instance. 
On the Korean peninsula, economic contacts and tentative dialogues 
have begun among the major outside powers and between North and 
South Korea. Fragile cease-fires are in place in the Persian Gulf and 
southwest Africa. In Central America and the Middle East, there is at 
least more fluidity. Dramatic reforms unfold in Eastern Europe. 
Finally, historic forces are shrinking the globe and loosening up 
many of its societies. We ride a scientific and information revolution. 
Countries receptive to new ideas and technologies forge ahead, while 
closed, controlled societies fall behind. Democracy and the market 
economy are gaining everywhere, while totalitarianism and Marxism 
are fading fast. Most of these trends should continue into the next 
century. They will inevitably affect how China and America relate 
and react to one another. 
Conventional wisdom holds that stra~egic factors in the Sino-
American relationship are dwindling in importance. I strongly disa-
gree. To be sure, this dimension will be more muted and nuanced than 
it was in the 1970s. But references to "triangles" and "cards" were 
misleading even then. While Beijing and Washington will seek further 
improvement in ties with Moscow, both capitals will also continue to 
share a stake in preserving global and regional balances. As Chairman 
Deng made clear to President Bush last February, the history and ge-
ography of Sino-Soviet and Sino-Japanese relations will not change. 
Nor will the traditional Chinese approach of balancing near powers 
with far powers. Nor will America's convictions that no country, or 
set of countries, should dominate Asia or the world, and that China's 
integrity is essential for world equilibrium. 
In this context, the United States and China should keep each 
other informed once again on their respective dealings with the Soviet 
Union, to prevent miscalculations and increase the prospects for inter-
national stability. 
Indochina will remain an area of tension, if not conflict, for many 
years. China and the United States share a strong interest in prevent-
ing Vietnamese domination of the region. Together with the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations and other interested countries, the 
United States should ensure that the Vietnamese truly evacuate Cam-
bodia and do not rule it by proxy. Washington will need to continue 
encouraging Beijing to support the noncommunist factions led by 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk and to exert its influence to control the 
Khmer Rouge. This will entail an eventual halt of Chinese aid to the 
Khmer Rouge; the Chinese might also provide exile to some of its 
most murderous leaders. 
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No easing of tensions in the Korean peninsula will be possible 
without China's constructive role. Washington should seek Beijing's 
ongoing contributions: restrain the North Koreans, increase ties with 
the South Koreans and abet the U.S. embryonic dialogue with 
Pyongyang. 
The situation in the South Asian subcontinent is particularly 
fluid. For years Washington worked intimately with Beijing to drive 
Soviet forces from Afghanistan. China and the United States are mod-
estly improving relations with India, while maintaining close links 
with Pakistan. Nowhere is the risk of nuclear proliferation more acute 
than in the interplay among India, Pakistan and China. This complex 
terrain will require sustained Sino-American exchanges. 
Tokyo, Beijing and Washington have been building positive ties 
with each other. Japan will remain an important U.S. ally and most 
important friend in Asia. Washington should consult closely with To-
kyo about policy toward China so as to avoid shocks like those of the 
early 1970s. At the same time, it should strive to reduce suspicion and 
foster understanding among the three states. This process is crucial 
for regional stability, easing the transition that is being caused by Ja-
pan's economic juggernaut, emerging political influence and growing 
military clout. 
Chinese influence outside Asia is less central. It will demand at-
tention, however, given China's role in the United Nations, its more 
expansive diplomacy and its arms sales. Nowhere is this clearer than 
in the Middle East. China was moderately helpful in bringing about a 
cease-fire in the Persian Gulf. It has delivered huge amounts of weap-
ons, including ballistic missiles, to the area. It would play a part in a 
U.N.-sponsored Middle East peace conference. Other regional issues 
such as southern Africa and Central America would also benefit from 
steadier Sino-American dialogue. 
The most serious problem in bilateral relations during my tenure 
as ambassador was the sale of Chinese missiles to Third World coun-
tries. Beijing had its reasons for resisting our representations: it 
gained international influence from the sales; its profits helped finance 
an impoverished PLA. No country willingly gives another a veto on 
its arms policy; China charged us with double standards in our ap-
proach to various countries, and its global arms sales were very mod-
est compared to ours, the Soviets' and the Europeans'. Yet, largely as 
a result of our persistent demarches and discussions, the Chinese took 
constructive actions. I regard these as prime examples of the tangible 
benefits to be derived from serious exchanges with China on interna-
tional topics. 
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This issue is far from settled, however. Numerous questions re-
main about defining intermediate missiles, unstable regions and unsa-
vory recipients. We face very real dangers that these destabilizing 
weapons will find their way into volatile areas. The arms trade is em-
phatically a global problem; we must work with a host of potential 
suppliers and recipients. China is crucial to any successful effort to 
stem the tide of proliferation. 
When conditions permit, the United States should search for new 
areas of cooperation. We have been heartened by recent Chinese col-
laboration in halting the flow of drugs. Increasing these joint efforts 
would not only help meet this problem but earn Beijing some sorely 
needed goodwill in America where drugs are a rampant plague. So 
too would Chinese efforts to help attack the scourge of international 
terrorism. Still another potential new area for beneficial exchange 
would be cleaning up the world's environment. 
vm 
On the international scene, therefore, China and the United 
States have been friends but not allies. Both countries share parallel 
interests and pursue compatible, if not collaborative, policies on many 
issues, especially in Asia. On other questions they disagree, sometimes 
fundamentally, sometimes on tactical approaches toward similar ends. 
Against this backdrop the United States gradually developed mil-
itary ties with China. This dimension is a natural component of a 
relationship expanding across the board. Neither country threatens 
the other, and both have been building friendly links in other sectors 
of their societies. The United States and China share common percep-
tions on the necessity for Asian and global military balances. Wash-
ington has judged a secure, modernizing and humanely governed 
China to be a force for stability. The Chinese have looked to the West 
to help their defense modernization. To be sure, the United States 
must be sensitive to the perceptions of others, whether in southeast 
Asia or across the Taiwan Straits. Beijing and Washington have some 
diverging national interests. Their domestic systems profoundly differ. 
Thus the United States has measured its tread. Military coopera-
tion has proceeded carefully on three tracks: high-level visits, func-
tional exchanges and technology transfers. Trips by defense ministers, 
chiefs of staffs and heads of services provide opportunities to discuss 
the geopolitical scene, give impetus to ongoing programs and map out 
future cooperation. Functional military exchanges implement agree-
ments reached at higher levels. The United States has shared informa-
tion in many fields ranging from strategy to tactics, from systems to 
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equipment and from medicine to academic training. U.S. and Chinese 
ships have visited each other's ports, and U.S. Thunderbirds have 
soared in Chinese skies. These exchanges represent the most impor-
tant aspect of defense cooperation between the United States and 
China; they forge mutual understanding, personal ties and constituen-
cies for a strong bilateral relationship. 
The United States has not pushed arms on the Chinese. On the 
contrary, it has considered their requests on a case-by-case basis and 
has turned aside many inquiries because of concern over exporting ad-
vanced technology or projection capability. U.S. military sales are 
strictly limited to defensive weapons, and to date they add up to about 
$800 million in long-term programs. 
In response to the events of June, President Bush correctly sin-
gled out the military relationship as the leading area in which to halt 
Sino-U.S. cooperation. This action was appropriate symbolically, be-
cause of the PLA's role in suppressing the demonstrators. And it pro-
vides possible leverage for those Chinese, including those in the 
military, who wish to follow a more moderate course--they can point 
to the loss of U.S. cooperation in the modernization of the PLA as one 
of the costs of a repressive policy. 
Presumably, military ties will be one of the last parts of the Sino-
U.S. relationship to return to its previous course. But when the 
United States again advances with China on a broad front, they will 
clearly serve U.S. interests. 
IX 
High on the Chinese political agenda is the question of Taiwan. 
The most senior American officials in successive administrations have 
pledged to abide by the three joint Sino-American communiques of the 
past two decades and adhere to the principle of one China. 
For years Beijing has urged Washington to promote reconcilia-
tion between the mainland and Taiwan. The United States has de-
murred, stating that this is a process that must be worked out 
peacefully by the two sides themselves. While the United States will 
therefore not advocate specific avenues of reconciliation, neither will it 
obstruct them; it has explicitly welcomed the remarkable surge in 
trade and contacts that has occurred in the past two years across the 
Taiwan Straits. 
The soundness of the U.S. position has been evident. There has 
recently been little tension between Beijing and Washington on this 
question, although it remains a matter of fundamental principle to the 
Chinese. Taiwan, feeling secure, has continued its astonishing eco-
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nomic progress and initiated political reforms. There has been almost 
no debate in the United States. Meanwhile Taiwan and the mainland 
have been reaching out peacefully toward each other through the ex-
change of goods and people. 
It is still too early to assess the damage to Taiwan-mainland rela-
tions caused by the crackdown in China. Taipei has shown relative 
restraint. Beijing has made only modest attempts to accuse Taiwan of 
involvement in its turmoil. Nevertheless one could only expect the 
people of Taiwan to recoil from the ugly scenes they have witnessed on 
the mainland. It will be extremely difficult for future Chinese regimes 
to make close association appear inviting to those living elsewhere. 
The devastating impact on Hong Kong will cause further repercus-
sions in Taiwan. 
It would be a serious mistake to tamper with the balanced U.S. 
approach, which has enjoyed broad bipartisan support and has worked 
so well. For us to shift toward a two-China, or a one-China, one-
Taiwan policy could wreck our relations with the People's Republic. 
It could provide a dangerous situation in the Straits. It would undo 
the solemn undertakings of five presidents of contrasting ideologies. It 
would not find favor with the authorities in Taiwan who also subscribe 
to a one-China policy. Whether conservative or moderate, whatever 
their differences on other issues, the Chinese agree on one China-any 
Beijing leader would be obligated to downgrade, perhaps sever, rela-
tions with Washington were there a fundamental U.S. shift on the Tai-
wan question. To anyone who grasps the long-term importance of 
Sino-American relations the case for maintaining our successful pos-
ture on Taiwan is irrefutable. 
The events since June, however, pose fresh dilemmas for U.S. pol-
icy. Substantial numbers of understandably angry Chinese intellectu-
als and students are at war with their own government, seeking 
platforms in the United States, Europe, Hong Kong and elsewhere in 
Asia from which to pursue their struggle. The United States was able 
to reach a mutual accommodation with the Beijing government in the 
1970s by promising, in effect, to disengage itself gradually and respon-
sibly from the dispute between Taiwan and the mainland. In return 
we expected the Chinese to pursue reconciliation by peaceful means 
alone. That has been the thrust of American policy ever since. 
In the months ahead, the United States faces a difficult balancing 
act. On the one hand, we must offer refuge and moral support to the 
Chinese who are threatened with political persecution due to their be-
liefs, and we must adhere to our obligations toward the people in Tai-
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wan. On the other hand, we should not inadvertently become deeply 
engaged in Chinese domestic politics. 
X 
It is a melancholy irony that 1988, just before the Chinese great 
leap backward, was the most positive year ever in Sino-American eco-
nomic relations. Bilateral trade jumped forty percent to exceed $14 
billion. Agricultural exports from the United States doubled to $1.2 
billion. China was becoming our leading overseas market for wheat. 
The P.R.C. became our thirteenth-largest trading partner; the United 
States was China's second-largest export market. American invest-
ment leapt from 400 to 630 projects. With some $3.5 billion commit-
ted to China, the United States was the top outside investor after 
Hong Kong. 
Certainly there remained substantial obstacles to trade and in-
vestment, and Beijing's decisions in the summer of 1988 to cool the 
economy and postpone reforms were casting shadows. Nevertheless, a 
series of negotiations and agreements was laying the groundwork for 
further expansion. After being stalled for years, the United States and 
China broke through to a maritime agreement. Progress was made on 
updating our civil aviation accord. With our allies in the Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls, we were steadily easing 
controls over technology exports and were ready to extend a distribu-
tion licensing system to China. The Chinese were significantly im-
proving their investment climate and were at last beginning to move 
on protecting intellectual property rights. We were engaged in con-
structive talks concerning China's application for membership in the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
This very promising advance in our economic relations has been 
aborted for both practical and moral reasons. But as the United States 
waits for a more benevolent climate, we can already identify our 
longer-term objectives. 
When China resumes its difficult transition from central planning 
to market forces, we should encourage its reforms while recognizing 
that their ultimate success depends on the Chinese themselves. Our 
efforts in trade, technology and investment help China modernize and 
become stronger. 
Some question whether this bodes well for the United States. To 
be sure, a more powerful China will present fresh challenges, espe-
cially for its neighbors. But it is decidedly in our interest to participate 
in its development, and we should not leave the field to others. A 
prosperous and stable China will be less subject to outside pressures 
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and in a better position to help maintain a multipolar balance in Asia. 
A China engaged in international markets and institutions will have 
greater incentives to pursue a responsible foreign policy. 
With these considerations in mind-and when the Chinese make 
it possible--we will want to revive a broad economic relationship. For 
our part this will include keeping open U.S. markets to Chinese goods, 
transferring technology and encouraging China's participation in the 
global economy. 
For its part, a more enlightened Chinese regime will have to work 
hard to attract foreign technology, capital and management skills. 
The wounds of 1989 will not heal quickly. American companies will 
be looking hard before leaping into investments. Beyond meeting the 
necessary humane standards in their political system, Chinese authori-
ties will need to resume the momentum toward a pluralistic market 
economy and a trade and investment climate that is clear, fair and 
sure. To these ends key moves will be: reducing high tariffs and im-
port barriers; loosening controls over foreign exchange and import 
licenses; allowing competition in the services sector; streamlining bu-
reaucracy; ensuring consistent implementation of agreements. 
The most difficult requirement for the Chinese, especially for its 
elder leaders, may be to recognize that it cannot expect to attract and 
exploit international science while excluding outside ideas. For much 
of its recent history, China has attempted to gain foreign knowledge 
without being contaminated by foreign culture. During the past 150 
years this has proven to be very difficult. During the past decade of 
reforms and opening to the world, the Chinese leaders have sought to 
stamp out unsettling Western influences at three different times-the 
tearing down of Democracy Wall in 1979, the attack on "spiritual pol-
lution" in 1983 and the "anti-bourgeois liberalization" campaign of 
1987. Now they are at it again-banning books, shutting out the 
world media, hounding those "infected" by Western concepts, step-
ping up political "education" on campuses and in the work places. 
Today, in the age of information and telecommunications, gallop-
ing technology and increasing interdependence, such an approach is 
impossible. No country can prosper without opening up within its 
borders and to the outside world. It is not a question of "W esterniza-
tion" but rather the imperatives of modernization. China cannot sim-
ply import gadgets and boost productivity without applying modern 
management techniques. Students and scientists returning from 
abroad will carry back values as well as knowledge. The loosening 
and opening up of Chinese society will be essential not only for eco-
nomic progress but also for political stability. For as millions of Chi-
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nese so vividly demonstrated once again this past spring, men and 
women do not live by rice alone. 
XI 
The events of 1989 painfully illustrate that the most profound 
challenge in dealing with China will be in the cultural realm. For 
most of our history, Americans and Chinese viewed each other 
through veils of rhetoric and sentiment. During the past two decades 
expanded contacts between our societies began to increase mutual 
understanding. 
Artists and experts, teachers and tourists were crisscrossing the 
Pacific in increasing numbers. Thirty protocols on science and tech-
nology exchanges constituted the largest such program that either of 
us had with any other country. There were over 40,000 Chinese stu-
dents on American campuses by the end of 1988, more than half of all 
those sent abroad. Hundreds of American scholars and students were 
teaching and studying in China. Weekly Sino-American conferences 
examined a wide range of topics, ranging from law to the stock market 
to the U.S. Congress. We were rapidly increasing cultural exchanges, 
our access to Chinese television and radio and the publication of 
American books in Chinese. More than 300,000 American tourists 
visited China yearly. After years of effort, and just two weeks before 
leaving Beijing in April 1989, I signed an agreement with the Chinese 
that would have sent Peace Corps volunteers for the first time ever to a 
communist country. This project, like so many others, hangs in 
suspense. 
This extensive process, largely carried on by the private sector, 
was fostering a more enlightened appreciation of each other's histories, 
societies and systems. But it was highlighting some sharply different 
values as well. Cultural and academic exchanges have mutually en-
riched both countries. At the same time, closer scrutiny was spawning 
tensions and frictions well before Beijing's actions all but ruptured the 
growing links. 
Believers in freedom, Americans chafe at controls, whether on 
Tibetan monks, prospective mothers or outspoken dissidents. As a na-
tion of immigrants, our concern for human rights is natural and uni-
versal. We have never singled out China. Indeed there has been a 
rising chorus of complaints in the United States about an alleged 
double standard between our vigorous espousal of human rights in the 
Soviet Union and our more muted approach toward China. 
Presumably a more moderate government will allow intellectual 
"flowers" to bloom, tolerate dissent, move toward a freer press and 
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further develop a legal system to protect individual rights. Presuma-
bly its leaders will not create a major bilateral crisis when future visit-
ing American officials invite dissidents to banquets. Even under a 
more progressive regime, however, China will be very sensitive on 
human rights. The world's oldest, richest civilization does not take 
kindly to outside advice. Chinese leaders, who have always feared 
chaos, will be wary of a rapid rush toward democracy. As commu-
nists, they will fear loss of Party control. Some see crime, homeless-
ness and drugs as the costs of excessive freedom. The Chinese do not 
raise human rights in their dealings with any country. Since they do 
not seek to impose their concepts on the United States, they resent 
what they perceive as our attempt to do so on them. 
Human rights abuses and martial law in Tibet predated the Chi-
nese crackdown in Beijing and elsewhere. Lacking access to the area 
and without media coverage, we can only glumly imagine what has 
been transpiring in that remote region. Until recently Beijing had 
taken some positive steps to improve the religious and economic con-
ditions in Tibet, but there was also continuing cultural arrogance, 
harsh suppression of dissent and mistreatment of prisoners. 
Whatever our anguish for Tibetans, the United States will need to 
continue to recognize that Tibet is part of China. This is not only our 
long-standing policy but that of all governments in the world. En-
couraging Tibetan independence would be quixotic. There is a solid 
consensus among Chinese that they cannot and will not grant it be-
cause of sovereignty, security and the implications for other nationali-
ties in China. Fanning independence fever would also be a cruel 
incitement to the Tibetan people, given China's overwhelming power 
and control in the area. The Dalai Lama himself has stopped short of 
demanding independence. 
Thus adherence to the recognition of Chinese sovereignty over 
Tibet is a prerequisite for engaging the Chinese constructively on the 
broader issues. We must continue to press China for moderation in 
Tibet and for access to outsiders. Our best route will be to support 
negotiations between Beijing and the Dalai Lama. Progress toward 
greater autonomy under Chinese authority will be required for the 
Tibetans to enjoy a happier fate and for Sino-American tensions to 
subside. 
Beijing's population policy will be another continuing source of 
friction. Americans need to comprehend that China confronts the 
most dramatic Malthusian dilemma in world history: a young and 
mushrooming population, already more than a billion people weak, 
living on a land that is only one-tenth arable and three-quarters urban 
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sprawl, mountains and sand. Unrestrained population growth would 
doom China's future. 
The Chinese in turn need to understand that, while Americans 
disagree passionately on the subject of abortion, they find forced abor-
tions and sterilization abhorrent in any country. While Beijing's offi-
cial policy prohibits coercion, its infrequent punishment of abuses is 
far from credible or effective. A concerted Chinese effort to root out 
coercion will be necessary to regain American assistance. It will be 
difficult, but it should not be impossible, to find a way to help China's 
family-planning policy without either compromising our values or im-
posing them. 
The United States should encourage progress in these various ar-
eas of human rights with a judicious mix of policies. We can provide 
practical assistance through exchanges and conferences in certain ar-
eas, such as developing legal institutions and a more responsible press. 
We should welcome advances as well as censure backsliding. We 
should pursue policies, including quiet diplomacy, that promote real 
progress rather than mere visceral satisfaction. We should recognize 
that the Chinese face genuine problems of economic development, sta-
bility and balance of central control with local initiative. We should 
not expect instant breakthroughs or American models. We should 
gear our attitude to relative movement and not to snapshots that do 
not measure up to our ideals. And we must continue to consider our 
major geopolitical and economic interests with China in tandem with 
our pursuit of human rights. 
For their part, the Chinese must have surely learned this year 
that the violation of human rights is costly not only in terms of world 
opinion but also world cooperation. 
XII 
For the Chinese people above all, we must hope that the Big Chill 
is soon lifted. In my view the question is when, not whether. Former 
President Reagan put it· best: "You cannot massacre an idea." We 
witnessed China's future not in those grim nights in June but rather in 
the heady days of April and May. 
When those days return, Americans should be prepared fully to 
resume the journey with that great nation. It will not be easy to keep a 
balanced perspective; it never has been for Americans. George Ken-
n~ once observed that "If we a~e .to regard ourselves as a grownup 
natlon ... then we must, as the btbhcal phrase goes, put away childish 
things; and . . . the first to go . . . should be self-idealization and the 
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search for absolutes in world affairs: for absolute security, absolute 
amity, absolute harmony." 
That injunction captures the primary challenge in our China pol-
icy. The current course is full of ambiguities and tough decisions. 
Our strategic imperative is to preserve a long-term relationship. Our 
moral imperative is to project our principles as we survive this cold 
season of suppression. 
Even when a warmer climate returns, the journey will be com-
plex. Our two nations will share important security concerns, but we 
will not be allies, and we will differ on many international issues. We 
will strengthen ties of amity. But we will face inevitable tensions as we 
mesh two continental giants with vastly contrasting histories, cultures, 
stages of development and values. We will cultivate cooperation. But 
we can hardly hope for harmony. 
This may seem an obvious precept for relations with almost any 
country. It has not, however, been applied for most of America's past 
history with China. American perspectives toward that nation have 
swung between romance and hostility. We have held wildly fluctuat-
ing images-the evil Fu Manchu, the noble peasant of Pearl Buck. 
During just the past half century, the Chinese have appeared, succes-
sively, as beleaguered allies and implacable foes, as yellow hordes, red 
guards and blue ants, the angelic Maoist man and the diabolical Gang 
of Four, budding capitalists adorning magazine covers and beastly 
communists crushing students. 
We need a steadier vision. Both in our attitudes and in our poli-
cies, we must incorporate the Chinese yin and yang of opposites form-
ing a whole. 
In recent years, thanks to expanding links, we have traveled far. 
Americans were becoming more clear-eyed toward China, discarding 
both red herrings and rose-colored glasses. In recent months, thanks 
to television images, we have traveled farther. Americans have seen 
the two faces of China. Beyond the Big Chill, our challenge will be 
formidable. So will the stakes- for Chinese, for Americans, and for 
this planet's prospects in the 21st century. 
13. THE IMPACI OF TIANANMEN ON 
THE CHINESE ECONOMY 
Chu-yuan Cheng 
Economic conditions in the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
since the June 4, 1989, bloodshed in and around Tiananmen Square 
have rapidly deteriorated. Although the rampant inflation showed 
signs of subsiding, industrial output and the GNP slipped into stagna-
tion in the fourth quarter of 1989 and fell sharply in January 1990. 
The economic crisis is partly the result of the austerity policies pur-
sued by the hardliners since September 1988, but the events in 
Tiananmen Square exert profound impact on every aspect of economic 
life in China. 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS PRIOR TO THE 
TIANANMEN INCIDENT 
China's economy was in a shambles even before the pro-democ-
racy movement. China's economic problems, among others, contrib-
uted to the 1989 student uprising. Inflation rates kept rising in the 
latter part of 1988 and accelerated in the first half of 1989. The annual 
inflation rate of 1988 was officially reported at 18.5 percent. For food 
prices, the rate exceeded 50 percent. In September, 1988, the Beijing 
authorities adopted a retrenchment program, deciding to cut invest-
ment and the money supply in the hope that the inflation rate could be 
contained below 10 percent in 1989. However, in the first half of 1989, 
the rate soared another 25.5 percent over the preceding period. For 
major cities, the inflation rate exceeded 40 percent. Fixed income ur-
ban residents suffered the most from inflation. In 1988, 34 percent of 
urban dwellers found their real income declining. 
One pivotal barometer is the rising share of consumer expendi-
ture on food in recent years. In most advanced countries, food occu-
pies about 25 percent of consumer spending. In 1978, prior to the 
adoption of economic reforms, expenditure on food amounted to 60 
percent of the workers' total expenditure in China. Between 1979 and 
1985, as people's income rose while food prices remained stable, the 
share for food declined steadily to only 42 percent. Since 1985, the 
situation began to reverse with food prices climbing rapidly and real 
income falling. By 1987, the food share rose to 55 percent and by 1988 
to 60 percent again. This indicates that the benefits of the reform in 
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the earlier years have been completely negated. The return to the pre-
reform level of expenditure has frustrated most urban dwellers. 1 
Unemployment is another intractable problem. For years, the 
Chinese government used the term "awaiting employment" (dai ye) to 
refer to unemployed people. In recent years, official statistics began to 
report an unemployment rate which was so low (1.5 to 2 percent) that 
no one believed its reliability. In 1988, the official news media began 
publishing a series of surveys which showed that 30 million workers 
and employees were "latently unemployed." This refers to those peo-
ple who are officially employed but lacking job assignments. As 
China's new labor force increases at a rate of 20 million people per 
year, those who cannot get into the state enterprises can only be hired 
as temporary workers at low pay. Unemployed people travel from one 
city to another seeking job opportunities and creating a 50 million 
strong "fluid population," who possess neither job nor home. They 
generally sleep in railway stations, parks and urban slums, causing 
problems for public traffic and social order. 
In contrast to the misery of ordinary people, those with official 
connections can easily locate high-paying jobs. Once a person occu-
pies such a position, his family members and relatives will slip in and 
form a net of personnel who protect each other and engage in un-
checked corruption. This kind of corruption was facilitated by the 
economic reform which delegated control power from the central gov-
ernment to local authorities and set up a dual-price system. The coun-
try's privileged class took advantage of the relaxation of controls and 
the dual-price system to engage in illegal activities. Many Party, gov-
ernment and military institutions and cadres and their children 
swarmed forward to do business. In 1988 alone, some 180,000 specu-
lating companies were set up by government officials and their rela-
tives. These companies engaged in all sorts of criminal activities, such 
as speculation, smuggling and offering or taking bribes. One of these 
companies, the Kang-Hua Company, was managed by Deng Pufang, 
son of Deng Xiaoping. 
Moreover, under the dual-price system, people with special con-
nections can buy one ton of steel at the official price of 700 yuan and 
immediately resell it at the market price of 2, 100 yuan. The price sys-
tem created many instant millionaires. The prevalence of guan dao 
(official speculation) has significantly raised the price of raw materials 
1. Wu Hanzhi, "An Analysis of the Cause of Inflation and Its Control," Jingji yu 
Guan/i Yanjiu (Study on Economics and Management) (Beijing), No. 2, 1989, pp. 1-4. 
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and thereby injected an element of "cost-push" into the rampant 
inflation. 
As part of the reform, the government encouraged a segment of 
the population to enrich themselves, hoping that their affiuence might 
stimulate others to emulate them. The new policy led to the emer-
gence of many 10,000-yuan farm families (annual income exceeds 
10,000 yuan). The rise of an affiuent peasant class and the expansion 
of u new privileged class markedly widened the income disparities 
among various segments of the population and caused mounting social 
conflicts. 2 
The root of these social and economic problems lies in the one-
party authoritarian system. The popular demand for democratization, 
for curtailing the special privileges of the new class, was so strong that 
when the students in the Beijing area raised the banner of "Down with 
corruption," "Down with guandao," and called for freedom and de-
mocracy, they won the hearts of the people and formed a formidable 
united front confronting the regime. 
INITIAL IMPACT OF THE BLOODSHED 
When the Li Peng administration ordered the PLA to suppress 
the unarmed protesters, the reaction of the civilized countries was un-
precedented. The initial impact of the crackdown on the Chinese 
economy involved four major aspects: the suspension of foreign loans; 
the canceling of foreign direct investment; the loss of tourist revenue 
and the sharp rise of the budget deficit. 
The first major consequence was world-wide economic sanctions. 
Angered by the violence, Western governments and aid agencies 
delayed or restricted loans. The World Bank, China's major source of 
interest-free and low-interest loans since 1980, announced on June 27 
the suspension of $780 million in new loans to China. During the past 
9 years, the World Bank provided loans totalling $8.5 billion of which 
$3.44 billion was interest-free. One-third of these loans were used for 
agricultural and industrial development. The government of Japan 
also decided in mid-June to postpone a 7-year, $5.8 billion new loan to 
China. For a country starved for technical know-how and basic infra-
structure, the suspension of foreign loans has been a severe blow. 
Direct investment has also been suspended or canceled. Immedi-
ately after the crackdown, most American, European, and Japanese 
businessmen in Beijing and Shanghai opted to evacuate. By the end of 
2. For details see Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre: Social, Political 
and Economic Ferment in China, (Boulder, Col.: Westview Press, 1990), Chapter 2. 
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September, more than 50 percent of them had not returned. As a re-
sult, many new investment plans either were delayed or outright aban-
doned. For instance, Peugeot SA and Pepsi Co., Inc., postponed 
expanding their separate joint-venture factories in southern China. 
According to one Western trade official, five Fortune-500 companies 
had had plans to invest a total of $650 million in China operations, but 
because of the worsening economic and political outlook, only one of 
the five still plans to proceed. A Japanese trade official estimates that 
Japanese companies will invest less than half the $200 million they had 
committed in 1988.3 
The impact of Tiananmen on China's burgeoning tourist industry 
has been devastating. Before the massacre, China derived about $2.2 
billion a year from tourism. As a million Taiwanese and several mil-
lion Hong Kong and overseas Chinese visited their hometowns in re-
cent years, tourism became a crucial source of foreign exchange. The 
bloodshed in Beijing took a clear toll on travel-related business. Be-
tween July 1 and December 31, China had been expecting over a mil-
lion overseas tourists, but the violence frightened off foreign visitors. 
Figures released by the Chinese National Tourism Administration in 
early September, 1989, report an 81 percent decline in visitors.4 It was 
officially reported that the revenue of tourist business in 1989 was $1.8 
billion, $400 million less than the previous year and $1.2 billion below 
the original target for 1989. 
The massacre also increased government expenditures and raised 
the budget deficit. As the government now relies on the Army's sup-
port, military expenditures began to rise. Since 1979, the growth rate 
of the defense budget for each year has been below the expenditure for 
that year. The share of the defense budget in total government spend-
ing declined sharply from 26.1 percent in 1968 to 17.5 percent in 1979 
to only 8.6 percent in 1986. The yearly drops have incensed military 
leaders. Now as the army has resumed the critical role of king-maker, 
they have begun to demand a larger share of the budget be devoted to 
defense. In 1989, the share rose to 13.9 percent of total expenditure, 
up 11.2 percent. The defense budget showed another 15 percent in-
crease in 1990, reversing the decade-long decline. This will undoubt-
edly widen the budget deficit. 5 
Moreover, as the controlling of inflation is not as effective as 
promised, in order to calm the popular discontent, the government 
3. New York Times, July 3, 1989, p. 21. 
4. Anne T. Thurston, "Back to Square One?", China Business Review, Sept.-Oct. 
1989, pp. 36-41. 
5. China Times (Taipei), January 24, 1990, p. 9. 
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may have to raise food subsidies that now run at 40 billion yuan a year 
and constitute the biggest burden on the government budget. 
mE LONGER-TERM IMPACf ON mE ECONOMY 
The longer-term consequences are more profound. The far-
reaching effect is the destruction of the reform leadership. The purge 
of reform leader Zhao Ziyang and the entire group of his intellectual 
advisers signals the scrapping of most programs Zhao and his follow-
ers have pursued in the past several years. In the middle of August, 
the three influential "think tanks" of the reformers-the Rural Devel-
opment Research Center of the State Council; the Economic Struc-
tural Reform Research Institute of the State Council; and the 
Economic, Technical and Social Development Center of the State 
Council are all slated for abolition. Of the 130 members of the Eco-
nomic Structural Reform Research Institute, more than 20 went into 
exile, eight high-ranking officers were arrested, the remainder were 
either reassigned to other jobs or sent to labor camps. As Lee Kuan 
Yew, Prime Minister of Singapore observed: 
It took Zhao Ziyang ten years to build a team of economists 
who understood how the Western economies work and now 
that team is part in exile, part being rusticated and part miss-
ing. Rebuilding that team will take another 10 years. That's 
very sad for China and for Asia. 6 
Not only is the brain-trust of the reform camp lost, the entire 
reform program is halted. Although the leadership repeatedly stressed 
that there would be no change in the policies of reform, many reform 
programs were either suspended or preparing to be dismantled. In the 
second half of 1989 and early 1990, major changes could be discerned 
in four areas: 
(1) Price reform-In the October 1984 Decisions on Economic 
Reform, the reform of the irrational price system was touted as the 
key to institutional transformation. In May 1988, with Deng's en-
dorsement, Zhao proposed the bold solution of decontrolling prices. 
The populace responded with panic buying, which forced the govern-
ment to rescind the policy. Since then, economic decision-making 
power has fallen into the hands of Premier Li Peng and Vice Premier 
Y ao Yilin, two conservative leaders. Steps were taken to reimpose 
price controls for steel, copper, aluminum, and other basic materials. 
After the June 4 bloodshed, government officials reasserted centralized 
6. Wall Street Journal, November 1, 1989, p. A15. 
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control over major segments of the Chinese economy. Fan Weizhong, 
Deputy Director of the State Planning Commission, indicated that the 
important role of central planning would be restored in the process of 
retrenchment. 7 
(2) Stock Ownership-In fall 1988, the reformers tried to keep 
the reform program alive by proposing the sale of state enterprise 
stock to workers and employees. The plan was condemned by the 
hardliners as a betrayal of socialism. In fall 1989, Party newspapers 
even blamed proponents of the stock ownership idea for fueling the 
student unrest. The plan is likely to remain in abeyance. 
(3) Private Business-During the 1978-1988 period, the number 
of private businesses had grown rapidly, rising from 100,000 to 14.5 
million, employing 23 million people. It was one of the most dynamic 
sectors of the Chinese economy. After the conservatives took the 
helm, individual businesses began to dwindle. In the first half of 1989, 
they fell by 2.4 million. After the June 4 crackdown, the new leader-
ship has initiated an inspection program to regulate individual busi-
ness. The fate of the individual business is once again at stake. 
(4) Income Distribution-Under Mao's rule, the PRC adopted 
an egalitarian system of income distribution, which dampened individ-
ual incentive and motivation. When Deng launched the economic re-
form program, he initiated a policy that would allow some people to 
become affluent before others. The new policy was responsible for the 
emergence of many of 10,000-yuan families in the rural areas and tens 
of thousands of well-to-do businessmen in the cities. The rise of the 
new wealthy class inevitably increased disparities in income distribu-
tion. After Shanghai CPC Secretary Jiang Zemin replaced, in June, 
1989, Zhao Ziyang as CPC General Secretary, he vowed to remedy 
this situation. Not only did he avoid mentioning Deng's policy of en-
couraging enrichment of a few first, but he also identified self-em-
ployed traders and peddlers as the source of rising income disparities. 8 
From these new measures, it is quite clear that the reform policy, 
while continuously being upheld in official statements, bas lost its vi-
tality. In contrast, Deng's open-door policy has received support from 
the hardliners as the means to solve the country's capital shortage. Li 
Peng bas on many occasions emphasized the importance of the open 
7. Japan External Trade Organization China Newsletter, No. 84, Jan.-Feb. 1990, pp. 
S-6. 
8. Jiang Zemin, "Seriously Eliminating the Inequitable Distribution of Income," Qiu 
shi (Seeking Truth), No. 12, 1989, pp. 5-9. 
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door. However, the June 4 bloodshed dealt a severe blow to China's 
economic cooperation with foreign countries. 
One clear indication is the deterioration of relations with Hong 
Kong. In recent years, Hong Kong has been China's number one 
trade partner and the chief supplier of foreign exchange. In 1988, 
Hong Kong's trade with China exceeded $30 billion, surpassing 
China's trade with Japan ($19 billion) and with Western Europe 
($21.8 billion). More importantly, under China's new open-door pol-
icy, Hong Kong has in the past couple years invested $7 billion in 
Guangdong province, creating job opportunities for 1.5 million work-
ers. Prior to the unrest, Hong Kong businessmen had conceived sev-
eral major investment plans in South China, including electrical power 
plants, a super highway, and a new airport. The bloodshed near 
Tiananmen Square shattered these plans. Since the imposition of mar-
tial law in Beijing, the prices of stock and real estate in Hong Kong 
have dropped by more than 20 percent. The loss of confidence in Bei-
jing's "one country, two systems" formula for Hong Kong after its 
return to China in 1997 has accelerated the flight of capital and profes-
sional manpower. When businesses in Hong Kong lost their zeal, the 
injection of capital into South China was substantially reduced. 
The Tiananmen Incident also signalled an end to the boom in 
Western and Japanese direct investment in China that began in 1988 
and continued into the first half of 1989. Foreign direct investment 
interest was fueled by Zhao Ziyang's coastal development strategy and 
the decisions to raise Hainan to the status of a province and designate 
it a special economic zone. In 1988, foreign investors committed $5.3 
billion in direct investment to a total of 5,924 projects in China. These 
figures were 42.9 percent and 166.2 percent higher than the previous 
year. The June 4 massacre halted this advance. In the 3 months 
(July-September) following the Tiananmen Incident, there was a 20 
percent decline in direct investment. The halting of fresh foreign capi-
tal inflow reflects apprehension about China's debt situation and its 
economic health as well as fears of political instability. 9 
FUTURE PROSPECfS 
In view of these developments, the June 4 massacre has aggra-
vated those economic maladies existing before the turmoil and added 
other new ones. The new leadership is confronted with several thorny 
problems. 
9. "Direct Investment in China Losing Momentum," China Newsletter, No. 84, Jan.-
Feb. 1990, pp. 17-21. 
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First, the loss of foreign loans and revenue from tourism have 
drained the meager foreign exchange reserves. By the end of 1989, 
China had incurred foreign debts totalling $44 billion. About 50 per-
cent of the debt was financed by Japan and denominated in Japanese 
yen. As China's foreign trade is calculated in U.S. dollars, the 50 per-
cent appreciation of the yen against the dollar in the past four years 
has substantially increased the debt burden, which must be repaid in 
1992 and 1993. It is officially estimated that by 1993, the repayment 
of principal and interest on foreign debt will account for 25 percent of 
China's total exports, surpassing the 20 percent warning level set up 
by the International Monetary Fund. This will further limit China's 
capacity to invest in infrastructure. 
Second, since 1979, China's Central Government budget has suf-
fered deficits for almost every year, with an accumulated deficit of 160 
billion yuan. One of the major sources of deficit has been the increas-
ing state subsidies to prices and enterprises operating at a loss. In 
1989, these two items reached a record high of 106 billion yuan ($28 
billion), accounting for 32.6 percent of the total budget. 10 Increase of 
defense spending and price subsidies will further enlarge the deficit. 
The result will be the expansion of the money supply, making the con-
trol of inflation extremely difficult. 
Third, the repayment of foreign debts and the rising burden in 
subsidies will diminish the country's capacity to remove the bottleneck 
in the energy supply and transportation facilities, two limiting factors 
on the Chinese economy. Due to the critical shortage of electricity, 
many state enterprises presently operate only three or four days a 
week. 11 A recent official report indicates that the shortfall of electric-
ity now stands at 60 billion to 70 billion KWH per year, affecting one-
third of industrial capacity. The loss of industrial output value is esti-
mated at 200 billion yuan. 12 Power shortages also become a major 
detriment to foreign investors. In Shenzhen, the showcase of special 
economic zones, power failures have shut down factories as often as 
four times a week. 
Finally, the purge of hundreds of social scientists, particularly 
economists, has deprived the country of the service of its best brains. 
In the wake of the bloodshed, most of the measures announced by the 
new general secretary simply replay threadbare policies implemented 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Old slogans like "Learning from Lei Feng," 
10. International Daily News (Los Angeles), July 29, 1989, p. 13. 
II. China Daily News (New York), July 25, 1989, p. 6. 
12. Renmin Ribao, January 18, 1990, p. 3. 
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and "Industry learning from Daqing," which have been out of fashion 
for a decade, all returned to prominence again. Since September 1989, 
a new nationwide campaign to "learn from Lei Feng" has been in full 
swing. Lei Feng, an obscure soldier who died in an accident in 1962, 
was sanctified by Mao as a paragon of communist virtues in a cam-
paign to emulate him. After the economic reform, instead of praising 
hardship and suffering, the new Party policy was to promote competi-
tion and innovation, to let some people become rich first; pure self-
sacrifice like that of Lei Feng was no longer considered a virtue. How-
ever, after the pro-democracy movement, the old hardliners quickly 
restarted the "Learning from Lei Feng" campaign. All these factors 
indicate that, instead of carrying the reform program forward, the new 
leadership in Beijing is in fact trying to tum the clock back. 
If China's contradictory economic program is not untangled and 
if the people's incentive and productivity are not revived, stagnation, 
inflation and shortages will grow worse. The rising popular discontent 
may precipitate the downfall of the hardline government. 

14. TIANANMEN AND ITS IMPACf 
Winston L. Y. Yang 
Seton Hall University 
China's struggle for democracy had begun long before the 1989 
student movement. In December, 1978, a Beijing zoo electrician 
named Wei Jingsheng, a native of Anhui Province born in 1950, began 
an underground publication, Exploration (Tan Shuo ). 1 Originally a 
single sheet posted on Xidan Wall, known as "Democracy Wall" to 
the Chinese and later abolished by the Chinese authorities, Explora-
tion urged the Chinese Communist leadership to expand China's "four 
modernization" program to include "political modernization" 
designed to achieve democratization. 2 The mimeographed magazine 
published many articles that exposed serious and extensive human 
rights violations in China and advocated fundamental political re-
forms. Wei's activities, though well received by Chinese students and 
intellectuals, soon attracted the attention of the government, which 
arrested him on March 29, 1979. After a brief trial at a Beijing court, 
he was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for his alleged crimes of 
providing a foreigner with Chinese military intelligence and carrying 
out "counterrevolutionary agitation. "3 
Even though his conviction brought an end to this early democ-
racy movement, Wei's democracy drive had stimulated the Chinese 
people, especially students and intellectuals, and helped them develop 
a better understanding of China's need for political liberalization. 
After Wei's sentencing, however, China began a series of sweep-
ing economic reforms, including an "open-door" policy, which helped 
the Chinese, especially those in the rural areas, improve their standard 
of living. 
l. See Fox Butterfield, "Imprisoned Chinese Dissident Leader, Wei Jingsheng," The 
New York Times, October 20, 1979, p. 9. In preparing this article, I have consulted many 
Chinese sources even though few of them will be cited. Chinese sources published outside 
China seem too numerous to cite. My bibliographical review of Chinese sources will be 
completed and published soon. 
2. Ibid. Part of an article by Wei entitled "The Fifth Modernization-Democracy 
and Others," is translated in "China Clamps Down on Dissidents," The Asian Wall Street 
Journal Weekly, December 3, 1979, p. 10. See also Melinda Liu, "Wei and the Fifth Mod-
ernization," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 2, 1979, pp. 22-23. 
3. "Wei Jingsheng Sentenced," Beijing Review, Vol. 22, No. 43 (October 26, 1976), 
pp. 6-7. 
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China's expanding economic reforms led to growing cultural, 
educational, and economic exchanges and cooperation with the West. 
Despite extensive restrictions, Western political ideas and concepts 
rapidly found their way to Chinese students and intellectuals. Calls 
for political reform were voiced loudly by the educated Chinese, but 
the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China (PRC) made little or no effort to develop pro-
grams for democratization to parallel the extensive economic changes. 
The growing unrest of Chinese students had become quite obvi-
ous by the mid-1980s. The first extensive Chinese student demonstra-
tions for democratization and other reforms took place in December, 
1986. The growing movement eventually led to the dismissal of CPC 
General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January, 1987. Hu was dismissed 
for his liberal political views and sympathetic attitudes toward student 
demands and for his failure to halt student demonstrations.4 
Subsequent to Hu's removal, Premier Zhao Ziyang, an advocate 
of extensive economic reforms and limited political changes, was ap-
pointed Acting CPC General Secretary. Zhao was confirmed as Gen-
eral Secretary and First Vice Chairman of the CPC Military 
Commission at the 13th CPC Congress held in October, 1987. The 
Congress also adopted limited political changes, which were essen-
tially administrative reforms rather than genuine political liberaliza-
tion. The only significant change approved by the Congress was the 
adoption of the separation of different functions of the CPC and the 
PRC government. s 
The failure of the Congress to adopt sweeping political reforms 
and the CPC's failure to implement even limited political changes fur-
ther disappointed and angered Chinese students and intellectuals. 
Since the beginning of 1988, the growing corruption, inefficiency, eco-
nomic difficulties, especially the worsening inflation, contributed fur-
ther to popular unrest and resentment. Leading intellectuals, such as 
Fang Lizhi, a physicist dismissed as Vice President of the University 
of Science and Technology, and Liu Binyan, a well-known writer who 
4. For background information on the events of 1986-1987, see Victor C. Falkenheim, 
"The Limits of Political Reform," Cu"ent History, September, 1987, pp. 261-265, 279-281; 
Stanley Rosen, "China in 1987: The Year of the Thirteenth Party Congress," Asian Survey, 
vol. 28, no. 1 (January, 1988), pp. 35-50. 
5. For more details on the Congress, see Michael Oksenberg, "China's 13th Party 
Congress," Problems of Communism, November-December, 1987, pp. l-17. For a review 
of the 13th Central Committee, see Li Cheng and Lynn White, ''The Thirteenth Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party," Asian Survey, vol. 28, no. 4 (April, 1988), 
pp. 24-34. Zhao Ziyang's key-note speech is published in Beijing Review, November 9-15, 
1987, pp. 23-49. 
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energetically exposed the dark side of China's political and economic 
worlds, began to speak out more loudly against the Communist au-
thorities, forcefully demanding genuine political change. 6 The democ-
racy movement was thus given a powerful push forward by these 
intellectuals as well as by the worsening conflicts between the Commu-
nist authorities and Chinese students. By early 1989, relations be-
tween the CPC authorities and Chinese students and intellectuals had 
become fairly tense, and confrontations seemed inevitable. 7 
On April 15, 1989, Hu Yaobang, the deposed leader well known 
for his sympathy toward the young people and their call for demo-
cratic reforms, died of a seizure. His death soon set off a series of 
student demonstrations in the capital and other cities, including 
Shanghai, Chengdu, and Wuhan. The students were clearly angered 
by the CPC's failure to positively address Hu's support for democratic 
reform. 8 Thus, the demonstrations snowballed in the weeks that fol-
lowed. The momentum of the movement was soon accelerated by the 
support of the citizens of Beijing and the negative official reactions. 9 
As a prelude to China's 1989 student uprising, Hu's death on 
April 15 triggered weeks of massive protests in April and May when 
throngs of over one million people filled the streets of Beijing to pro-
test the growing official corruption and to demand democratization, a 
course with which Hu had been identified. The CPC refused to accept 
the original demands, put forth by representatives of the student 
protesters10, and imposed martial law in Beijing on May 20, 1989. Af-
ter seven escalating weeks, the protests came to a sudden end. In the 
early hours of June 4, the tanks of the People's Liberation Army 
(PLA) moved toward Tiananmen, Beijing's central square, and fired 
on the crowds, killing hundreds and wounding thousands to suppress 
the democracy movement. A shocking massacre had taken place in 
6. On Fang Lizhi, see Orville Schell, "China's Andrei Sakharov," The Atlantic 
Monthly, May, 1988, pp. 35-52, and "An Act of Defiance," New York Times, April 16, 
1989, pp. 27-30, 43. For a biography of Liu Binyan, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Liu 
Binyan," Encyclopaedia Britannica 1987 Book of the Year, Chicago, 1987, p. 89. 
7. For a discussion of the revolt of Chinese intellectuals against the CPC, see Perry 
Link, "The Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolt," New York Review of Books, June 29, 
1989, pp. 38-41. 
8. For a biography ofHu Yaobang, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Hu Yaobang," Encyclo-
paedia Britannica 1982 Book of the Year, Chicago, 1982, pp. 78-79. 
9. For information on Hu's life and the unrest stirred by his death, see Sheryl 
WuDunn, "Hu's Death is Stirring Unrest"; and Nicholas D. Kristof, "Hu Yaobang, Ex-
Party Chief in China, Dies at 73", New York Times, April 16, 1989, p. 38. 
10. Robert Pear, "Diplomats Say China Is In Crisis it Could Have Been Averted," New 
York Times, May 21, 1989, p. 6. 
266 CONTEMPORARY AsiAN STUDIES SERIES 
Beijing. 11 
The reasons for the crackdown are quite obvious. The aging Chi-
nese leaders, especially hardliners like Deng Xiaoping, despite their 
open-door policy and economic reform programs, did not intend to 
make fundamental political changes and rejected the Western demo-
cratic system as unsuitable for China. The growing student protests 
had posed serious challenges and threats to the CPC authorities. 
China's political stability, in the opinion of conservative elders, had 
been threatened by the democracy movement. 12 The crackdown was 
probably ordered by Deng with the support of his hardline colleagues, 
who had remained hopelessly out of touch with the democratic ideals 
of Chinese students and with the evident global trends toward greater 
democracy. 
The precise numbers of dead, wounded, those arrested, and those 
executed after June 4 remain unknown even today because the Chinese 
authorities have never released name lists and because official Chinese 
accounts have not been accepted at face value. Most Western report-
ers and sources stationed in Beijing estimate that several hundred were 
killed by the PLA troops, thousands were wounded, and many were 
arrested or executed. 13 Whatever the numbers may be14, the global 
reaction was uniformly negative. It is now time to examine 
Tiananmen's impact, especially the consequences of the brutal 
suppression. 
THE POLITICAL IMPACT 
One of the greatest casualties of the crackdown is, of course, the 
11. Since three articles on the student protests and the CPC's subsequent crackdown 
are included in this book, details of these events will not be discussed in this article. 
12. Richard Bernstein, "Why the Crackdown?," New York Times, June 27, 1989, p. 
A6. 
13. Estimates of the death toll range from 300 to as high as 5,000. See, for instance, 
Nicholas D. Kristof, "Artillery Firing in suburbs .. . ,"New York Times, June 7, 1989, p. 
AS. 
14. The Western media has begun to review some of their reports, attempting to cor-
rect unsubstantiated rumors. See David M. Lampton, China and U.S.-China Relations in 
the Wake ofTiananmen, New York: National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, 1989, 
p. 9. It is now believed that many were killed or injured on the streets far away from 
Tiananmen, especially in and around Muxidi, where government tanks opened fire on the 
crowds of people who had attempted to block the movement of troops toward Tiananmen 
Square. Nicholas D. Kristof points out, for instance, that there was no massacre in 
Tiananmen Square although there were many killings elsewhere. See his article "How the 
Hardliners Won," New York Times Magazine, November 12, 1989, p. 71. Hence, the term 
"Tiananmen Massacre" is quite misleading. A more accurate term should be, therefore, 
"Beijing Massacre.'' 
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fall of Zhao Ziyang, the refonn-minded CPC General Secretary who 
showed an unusual understanding of and sympathy for the student 
democracy movement, even though most of Zhao's supporters, such as 
Vice Premier Tian Jiyun, remain in power. During the intense debate 
and power struggle prior to the May 19 announcement of martial law 
(announced at a meeting at 10 pm May 19 and broadcast and imple-
mented May 20), Zhao had suffered a serious defeat because Deng 
Xiaoping, China's paramount leader, had thrown his support to the 
hardliners headed by Premier Li Peng and President Yang 
Shangkun. 15 Zhao was officially purged at the end of the Fourth Ple-
num of the 13th CPC Congress. A communique released on June 24, 
1989, announced the dismissal of Zhao from all his posts in the CPC 
"for supporting the tunnoil and splitting the Party"16, even though he 
was allowed to retain his CPC membership. 
Zhao's downfall meant not only the loss of a top leader of the 
refonn-minded faction in China but also the setback of China's refonn 
and modernization programs. 17 The hardliners, such as Li Peng and 
Yang Shangkun, clearly gained the upper hand. Li retained his premi-
ership and membership in the all-powerful Standing Committee of the 
CPC Politburo. Yang was promoted to First Vice Chairman of the 
CPC Military Commission and his half-brother, Yang Baibing, was 
elevated to the job of the Commission's Secretary-General and ap-
pointed to the CPC Secretariat. 18 
As a result, even the limited political refonns advocated by Zhao 
at the 13th CPC Congress in 1987 have failed to be implemented and 
received no mention at both the Fourth Plenum (in June, 1989) and 
the Fifth Plenum (in November, 1989) of the 13th CPC Congress. 
Zhao's fall has brought an effective end, at least for the foreseeable 
future, to China's political refonns, which was one of the fundamental 
demands of the student protesters. The economic development pro-
gram, adopted at the Fifth Plenum, stresses retrenchment, reorganiza-
tion, central planning, and the economic power of the Central 
Government. It makes no mention of new or old refonn programs 
15. Nicholas D. Kristof provides a vivid, though not well substantiated, account of 
how Zhao was defeated by the hardline leaders in his article, "How the Hardliners Won," 
New York Times Magazine, Nov. 12, 1989, pp. 39-41, 66-71. 
16. "Communique of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Commit-
tee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 27, July 3-9, 1989, pp. 13-14. 
17. For a discussion of Zhao's fall as a loss to China, see John Fincher, "Zhao's Fall, 
China's Loss," Foreign Policy, 16 (Fall, 1989), pp. 3-25. 
18. Adi Ignatius, "China's Deng Quits His Last Post, Names Jiang Zemin as His Suc-
cessor," Wall Street Journal, Nov. 10, 1989, p. A5. 
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even though it repeatedly renders lip service to the slogan, "deepening 
of reforms," with little practical significance.19 There is little doubt 
that economic reforms suffered serious setbacks. 
As for China's open-door policy, Chinese leaders have time and 
again stressed that it will continue, but cultural and educational ex-
changes and cooperation with the West have been noticeably cur-
tailed20 because of the Chinese policy of opposing Western "bourgeois 
liberalization." Yet, despite this, China's economic open-door policy 
continues because of its need for Western technology, equipment, and 
investment. 
Western economic sanctions, Chinese internal power struggle and 
turmoil, the decline of foreign loans and technology to and investment 
in China, and other relevant developments have also affected China's 
modernization drive. 
It is quite obvious that a decade of reform, initiated by Deng and 
implemented by Zhao and others, is now in shambles. The fall of 
Zhao Ziyang and the setbacks suffered by his reform programs led, in 
June, 1989, to the rise of Jiang Zemin, a technocrat and formerly the 
Shanghai CPC Secretary. Jiang apparently became Deng's chosen 
successor. He was first named CPC General Secretary to replace Zhao 
at the June, 1989 CPC meeting 21 and then Chairman of the CPC 
Military Commission at the Fifth Plenum to succeed Deng in Novem-
ber, 1989.22 Even though he now enjoys not only the full support of 
Deng but also holds two of the three most important posts (the third 
one being the Premiership currently held by Li Peng), Jiang remains 
very weak within the leadership for several reasons. First, as a techno-
crat, Jiang has no power base of his own and lacks strong factional 
support. Second, he has had neither military experience nor wide con-
nections within the PLA. Third, his two competitors, Premier Li 
Peng and President Yang Shangkun, enjoy the respective support of 
such conservative elders as Chen Yun and the military. Therefore, as 
long as Deng remains alive and healthy, Jiang will be secure in his 
position. After Deng passes from the scene, the real power struggle, 
19. For a summary of the economic retrenchment program, see "Communique of the 
Fifth Plenary Session of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 45, 
November 11-17, 1989, pp. 6-9. For comments on "deepening" of reforms and other ques-
tions, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Hopes to Stamp Out the 6 'Evils'," New York 
Times, Nov. 26, 1989, p. A9. 
20. Sheryl WuDunn, "China Weighs New Restrictions on Study Abroad," New York 
Times, Oct. 19, 1989, p. A13. In early 1990, however, China relaxed somewhat its restraint 
on cultural and educational exchanges with the West. 
21. See supra note 16. 
22. See supra note 19. 
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leadership split, and political crisis will inevitably begin. 23 The grad-
ual fall of Mao Zedong's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, whose polit-
ical situation in the late 1970s is similar to Jiang's today, is a painful 
reminder vis-a-vis Jiang's political future and problems. 
What is even more worrisome is the potential impact of the mili-
tary, whose guns were employed to suppress the democracy move-
ment. After the deaths of Deng, now 86, and Yang Shangkun, now 
82, no one will have sufficient power and authority to command the 
PLA, which has been plagued by factionalism. 24 The regional military 
commanders, along with provincial party and government leaders, 
may come to dominate China's political scene. Disunity and factional 
struggles, which Jiang, with his limited power base, will not be able to 
handle, may emerge. A divided China, tom by civilian or military 
factionalism, may come into existence after strongmen like Deng are 
gone.2s 
Long before the 1989 democracy movement, Deng had appar-
ently chosen Zhao as his successor. The crackdown led to the fall of 
Zhao and destroyed the possibility of an orderly succession. 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACI' 
Before the 1989 disturbance, China, in a period of slightly over 
ten years, had propelled itself from the bland egalitarian poverty of 
Maoism to the new-found consumerism of refrigerators, washing ma-
chines, and color television sets, much envied by many Soviets and 
Eastern Europeans. During the past ten years, the average Chinese 
income has more than doubled. After a decade of impressive growth 
induced by Deng Xiaoping's market-oriented reforms, however, China 
found itself, in early 1988, confronted with such serious problems as 
an acute credit shortage, growing inflation, declining industrial pro-
23. The author is now working on an article on China's factionalism since 1977, which 
will be completed and published in early 1991. 
24. For a discussion of the role of the PLA, see Nicholas D. Kristof, "Now the Peo-
ple's Army Has Few Friends, More Power,'' New York Times, Oct. 29, 1989, p. D2. See 
also China in Crisis: the Role of the Military, Surrey, England: Jane's Information Group, 
1989. 
25. Deng has made conflicting statements on his role after his resignation from the 
CPC Military Commission Chairmanship in November, 1989. See Sheryl WuDunn, 
"Deng Hints at Keeping a Large Role in China,'' New York Times, Nov. 11, 1989, p. 5; and 
Nicholas D. Kristof, "Deng, Retiring, Says He Won't Meddle in Politics," New York 
Times, Nov. 14, 1989, p. AS. It is unlikely that Deng will not wield his powerful influence 
while he remains healthy and clear-minded. See Nicholas D. Kristof, "Deng is Ex-Chair-
man But not Ex-Leader," New York Times, Nov. 12, 1989, p. D3; and Sheryl WuDunn, 
"Deng Warns Against Own Senility," New York Times, Nov. 12, 1989, p. A3. 
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ductivity and farm output, bottlenecks in transportation and energy, 
and severe inefficiency and corruption. The economic expectations of 
the Chinese, despite economic stagnation and official corruption, had 
risen substantially. All these factors contributed much to popular 
discontent. 26 
Even though most of these economic problems had existed before 
the repression of the student democracy movement, the brutal crack-
down made China's economic difficulties much worse for several 
reasons. 
First, the disruptions caused by the protests, demonstrations, and 
suppressions had a negative impact on China's orderly economic de-
velopment. Second, the Chinese leadership was preoccupied with fac-
tional infighting and power struggles and failed to focus on the 
growing economic problems. Third, the cost of mobilizing troops and 
tanks and bringing them to Beijing added much to China's budget 
problems. Fourth, the economic sanctions imposed by Western na-
tions deprived China of some of the much-needed foreign exchange 
and loans, as well as Western technology. Fifth, the growing inflation, 
inefficiency, corruption, poor economic planning, and overheated 
economy all contributed, in large measure, to China's economic diffi-
culties. Finally, foreign investments in China plummeted because of 
the declining international confidence in China's political stability. 
China's economic difficulties are reflected on many fronts. First, 
China's industrial output after the crackdown registered a much 
slower growth rate and even a decline. 27 In fact, the September, 1989 
drop was the first decline since China began economic reforms a dec-
ade ago. This is a clear sign of China's growing economic difficulties 
because as recently as early 1989, monthly output was rising at rates of 
10 to 15 percent above the previous year. 28 Such an industrial slow-
down was caused, in part, by the retrenchment and austerity pro-
grams, the unrest of industrial workers, unusually tight credit, project 
cancellations, and restrictions on domestic investment, all of which 
have rendered industrial expansion and modernization extremely diffi-
cult, if not impossible. 
26. Fox Butterfield, "China's Economy: Pushed and Pulled Toward the Edge," New 
York Times, June 25, 1989, pp. D1, DB. 
27. Adi Ignatius, "New China Statistics Signal Long Period of Recession," Asian Wall 
Street Journal Weekly, Oct. 23, 1989, p. 2; and Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Industrial Out-
put Declined 2.1% in October,'' New York Times, Nov. 20, 1989, p. DlO. China's eco-
nomic difficulties continued into mid-1990. See Sheryl WuDunn, "Debt is Squeezing 
Hotels in China," New York Times, May 28, 1990, p. 29. 
28. Ibid. 
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Second, with the disruption of the April-June period of 1989, 
China's exports fell, which created balance of payment problems. In 
the first five months of 1989 alone, for instance, China's trade deficit 
reached $4.6 billion, more than five times the unbalance in the same 
period of 1988.29 
Third, the greatly reduced number of foreign tourists, as a result 
of the crackdown, has compounded China's foreign exchange shortage 
problems. 30 Western economic sanctions (most of which remain in-
tact even today even though the Bush Administration has renewed 
China's most favored nation status and allowed the World Bank to 
approve a $300 million loan to China) and their delayed consideration 
of new loans, including those adopted by the United States, Japan, the 
World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank, have created even 
more foreign exchange shortage problems for China.31 On November 
9, 1989, Moody's Investors Service, Inc. downgraded China's long-
term credit rating from the favorable A3 to the medium grade Baa. 32 
This rating has had a very negative impact on China's foreign borrow-
ing and foreign investments in China. Foreign bankers have become 
much more cautious in lending to China. It will also cost much more 
for China to borrow from foreign banks. China is about to begin re-
paying larger amounts of its $43 billion foreign debt, and the higher 
interest rates brought about by a downgraded credit rating will un-
doubtedly increase the difficulties of refinancing China's foreign 
loans. 33 Several international bank syndicates, such as the Schroder-
led syndicate, have already cancelled loans, agreed upon earlier, to 
China.34 
Fourth, local and provincial economic autonomy, especially in 
the southeastern coastal region, has enabled some provinces, cities and 
special economic zones to invest money abroad, which has created a 
large capital flight and intensified the credit shortage. 35 
Fifth, China's cash and credit shortage worsened in late 1989. 
29. See supra note 26. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid. For the World Bank loan, see Clyde H. Farnsworth, "China Gets One Loan, 
but Another is Put Off," New fork Times, May 30, 1990, pp. D1, DS. For Bush's decision 
to renew China's most favored nation status, see R. W. Apple, "Bush Withholding Normal 
Trade Ties From the Soviets," New York Times, May 25, 1990, pp. A1, A12. 
32. Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Credit Rating Downgraded by Moody's," New York 
Time, Nov. 10, 1989, p. D2. 
33. Ibid. 
34. Julia Leung and Adi Ignatius, "Schroders-Led Syndicate Cancels Loan to Shanghai 
Property Project," Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly, Oct. 23, 1989, p. 2. 
35. See supra note 26. 
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Many workers were told by their employers that their take-home pay 
would be slashed by as much as two thirds for the coming one to four 
months, and they would be paid a new kind of three-year interest-
paying bond in place of the deductions. 36 This unprecedented move, 
which affects virtually the entire urban labor force, has revealed the 
seriousness of China's cash and credit shortage problems and will lead 
to more unrest of industrial workers, which, in turn, will likely cause 
more declines in industrial output. The central government also has 
cash problems in paying farmers for their crops and in paying off hold-
ers of a large number of treasury bonds that will become due in the 
coming months. Although the forced sale of bonds may provide tem-
porary relief for China's cash shortage, there seems to be no long-term 
solution, however, to the mounting crisis among state-owned factories 
and enterprises. 37 
Sixth, the rising unemployment rate, estimated to range from 2 
percent of the labor force to 8 percent, 38 has created more difficulties 
for China. Unemployed youths are believed to have played a major 
role in the spring, 1989 uprising, and there are few jobs available for 
them.39 
Finally, such existing problems as an inadequate transportation 
system, energy shortages, and poor quality controls have all com-
pounded China's economic development problems. 40 
In coping with its economic difficulties, the Chinese government 
has adopted extensive austerity and retrenchment programs.41 The 
November 1989 CPC Central Committee meeting adopted a lis~ of 39 
economic measures as part of the retrenchment program, most of 
which will likely be implemented.42 It is obvious that the CPC's em-
phasis has been placed on political repression, central planning and 
central economic authority and power. These approaches are unlikely 
36. Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Fears Strife During Hard Times," New York Times, 
October 8, 1989, p. AI. 
37. Ibid., p. A22. 
38. Ibid. 
39. Ibid. 
40. Ibid. 
41. For a summary of these programs, see "Communique of the Fifth Plenary session 
of the 13th CPC Central Committee," Beijing Review, vol. 32, no. 45, Nov. 11-17, 1989, pp. 
6-9. See also Nicholas D. Kristof, "Beijing Hopes to Stamp out the 6 'Evils'," New York 
Times, Nov. 26, 1989, p. A9. 
42. Sheryl WuDunn, "Deng Warns Against Own Senility," New York Times, Nov. 19, 
1989, p. A3. 
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to solve China's present economic problems. 43 
While the long-term effectiveness of the austerity and retrench-
ment programs, which began in 1988 with emphasis on consolidation 
rather than economic change or reform, and which will be maintained 
for at least two to three more years, remains to be seen, new statistics 
seem to signal a long period of recession. Despite the recent ease of 
inflation and a better 1989 grain harvest, 44 China registered the 
slowest growth rate in a decade according to an unusually frank report 
released by the official Statistical Bureau in September, 1989.45 The 
official statistics also indicate that retail sales were plummeting while 
consumer prices were still rising. 46 Some of these trends were also 
confirmed by later statistics.47 These disturbing developments 
prompted Chinese and foreign economists to predict a prolonged pe-
riod of stagnation characterized by low growth with continuing and 
even increased inflation. They are also concerned that a recession may 
be around the corner.48 The year 1990 may be characterized by flat or 
negative industrial growth, a widening budget deficit caused by further 
drains on the state treasury, severe hardships for urban workers, and 
growing unemployment.49 All these may enhance the potential for ur-
ban unrest, thus creating more political problems for the CPC. 
Even though not all these difficulties were caused by the 1989 
student democracy movement or its subsequent suppression by the 
CPC authorities, the major political events of 1989 certainly have ren-
dered China's economic problems much worse. The present health 
and immediate future prospects of China's economy are grim indeed. 
SETBACKS ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT 
The PRC has suffered serious setbacks on the international front 
as a result of the massacre in Beijing. Its relations with the West have 
been severely damaged and its pre-eminent position as the "sole legal 
43. Nicholas D. Kristof, "The People's Republic at 40, at Odds with the People," New 
York Times, October 1, 1989, p. D7. 
44. See supra note 36, p. A22. The 1989 grain crop may not be as good as originally 
expected. The latest official estimate is 400 million rather than 410 million metric tons. See 
Sheryl WuDunn, "In a Dry China, a Huge Grain Crop Is Not Enough," New York Times, 
Nov. 26, 1989, p. AS. 
45. Adi Ignatius, "New China Statistics Signal Long Period of Recession", Asian Wall 
Street Journal Weekly, October 23, 1989, p. 2. 
46. Ibid. 
47. Sheryl WuDunn, "China's Industrial Output Declined 2.1% in October," New 
York Times, Nov. 20, 1989, p. D10. 
48. See supra note 27. 
49. Ibid. 
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government of China" has been repeatedly challenged with some suc-
cess by the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. 50 
Within hours after the June 4th crackdown, the Bush Adminis-
tration began to ponder steps against China to demonstrate American 
criticism of China's use of force to end the student democracy move-
ment and the U.S. outrage over the killing of student protesters in 
Beijing.51 On June 4, 1989, the United States, Britain, France, West 
Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the Netherlands all issued state-
ments deploring China's use of force. 52 One day later, President 
George Bush, spurning a total break in relations and other drastic ac-
tions, announced the following sanctions against China: 
1. Suspension of all government-to-government sales 
and commercial export of weapons; 
2. Suspension of visits between U.S. and Chinese mili-
tary leaders; 
3. Sympathetic review of requests by Chinese students 
in the United States to extend their stay; 
4. Offers of humanitarian and medical assistance, 
through the Red Cross, to those injured during the assault; 
and 
5. A review of other aspects of bilateral relationship as 
events in China continue to unfold. 53 
The European Commission, the executive body of the European 
Community, cancelled high-level talks with Chinese leaders, deploring 
the "brutal repression in Beijing."54 At the United Nations, Secretary 
General Javier Perez de Cuellar expressed his sadness over China's 
action even though the Charter requires the United Nations to refrain 
from intervening in matters essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of member nations. ss Other Western nations, such as Belgium 
and Australia, also adopted some sanctions against China. 
50. Taipei has been planning offensives to achieve breakthroughs on the diplomatic 
front since early 1988, soon after President Chiang Ching-kuo's death. Taiwan's recent 
diplomatic victories are not, of course, the direct result of China's military crackdown, but 
Taipei has taken full advantage of Beijing's troubles on the international front to hasten its 
diplomatic breakthroughs. 
51. Thomas L. Friedman, "Administration Ponders Steps on China," New York Times, 
June 5, 1989, p. Al2. 
52. Ibid. 
53. Bernard Weinraub, "President Spurns Other Sanctions," New York Times, June 6, 
1989, pp. AI, Al5. 
54. Ibid., p. Al5. 
55. Ibid. 
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Japan, China's main foreign benefactor, though slow in its re-
sponse to the crackdown and unwilling to take immediate sanctions, 
finally took steps that cast doubt on the future of billions of dollars in 
aid projects generally deemed crucial to China's economic develop-
ment. The Japanese government announced, on June 7, 1989, the sus-
pension of economic development and cultural missions to Beijing in 
the coming weeks and case-by-case reviews of aid projects already un-
derway, especially those that might be affected by the upheaval.56 
On June 27, 1989, leaders of the 12-nation European Economic 
Community, after a two-day summit, condemned "the brutal repres-
sion" taking place in China, called for an embargo on arms sales to 
China and other sanctions, and urged the World Bank to postpone 
new loans to Beijing to protest the crackdown. 57 At the 15th annual 
economic summit meeting in Paris in mid-July, leaders of the world's 
most powerful democracies also condemned China for bloodily crush-
ing student-led protests with tanks and troops. 58 
Even though most Asian countries have been generally restrained 
in their condemnations of China, Southeast Asian allies of the United 
States expressed, on July 7, 1989, their strong support for the China 
policy of the United States at the 1989 annual meeting of the Associa-
tion of Southeast Asian Nations. 59 
.On August 31, 1989, a United Nations panel, a subcommission of 
the United Nations Human Rights Commission, voted 15 to 9, by se-
cret ballot, to have the full commission examine the charge that China 
brutally suppressed the student pro-democracy movement in violation 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Thus, China was 
placed on a list of countries accused of seriously violating their citi-
zens' human rights. The full commission will consider the charges at 
its annual meeting in 1990.60 Amnesty International, based in 
London, also issued a preliminary report to detail and criticize China's 
human rights violations since June 3, 1989.61 
As summarized above, foreign and international reaction to the 
56. Steven R. Weisman, "Japan, China's Main Foreign Benefactor, Puts Billions in Aid 
in Doubt," New York Times, June 7, 1989, p. AlO. 
57. "Beijing Refuses to be Intimidated by West," Hong Kong Standard, June 30, 1989, 
p. 10. 
58. R.W. Apple, "Leaders in Paris Argue Over China," New York Times, July 14, 
1989, p. A6. 
59. Steven Erlanger, "Asian Allies Back U.S. China Policy," New York Times, July 8, 
1989, p. 3. 
60. Paul Lewis, "UN Panel Puts China on List of Human Rights Defendants," New 
York Times, Sept. 1, 1989, p. AS. 
61. Amnesty International, "People's Republic of China: Preliminary Findings on 
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Beijing crackdown has been fairly strong. Even though different coun-
tries have adopted different responses, nearly all Western nations, 
some developing countries, and even a few communist nations, such as 
Hungary, have criticized or condemned China in one way or another. 
Some of the sanctions adopted by Western nations remain intact even 
today. China has indeed suffered serious setbacks on the international 
front. 
It is obvious that the Chinese leadership decided to ignore the 
international outcry at the time of the crackdown in order to consoli-
date its internal political position. China, of course, has refused to be 
intimidated by the West and has insisted that as a sovereign nation, it 
has "the right to handle its internal aft'airs,"62 thus ignoring the fact 
that human rights are a universal concern and that China has signed 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Never-
theless, Beijing, concerned with its diplomatic difficulties, has made 
great efforts to improve its international standing since July, 1989. 
Some changes have taken place. Japan, for instance, which has not 
been very consistent in its dealings with China, has gradually relaxed 
its restrictions on contact and exchanges with the PRC. The Foreign 
Ministers of Japan, the United States, France, and Great Britain did 
meet and talk with their Chinese counterpart, Qian Qichen, in Paris at 
the end of July, 1989, and again in late September when they gathered 
to discuss the Cambodian and other issues at the United Nations an-
nual meeting in New York. No changes in their respective policies 
toward China were made, however. China has also attempted to im-
prove its relations with Communist countries63 and developing nations 
by high-level contacts or aid programs. Premier Li Peng's 1989 state 
visits to Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh were designed to break Bei-
jing's diplomatic isolation. 64 
The United States, for its part, has also made some efforts to im-
prove its relations with China. Washington, for instance, repeatedly 
attempted to negotiate with Beijing to find a solution to the question of 
Fang Lizhi, an astrophysicist and China's best-known dissident who, 
along with his wife Li Shuxian, took refuge in the United States Em-
Killings of Unarmed Civilians, Arbitrary Arrests and Summary Executions Since June 3, 
1989," London, 1989. 
62. See supra note 57. 
63. China's relations with the Soviet Union and North Korea have significantly im-
proved. Growing protests and reforms in Eastern Europe have made it impossible for Bei-
jing to improve its relations with East European countries. 
64. Li Peng's state visits to the three Asian nations were prominently reported in 
China's official organ, People's Daily (Overseas edition), Nov. 15, 1989, p. 1. 
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bassy in Beijing after China labelled Fang a "traitor." On June 25, 
1990, China allowed Fang and his wife to leave the American Em-
bassy in Beijing for London for "medical treatment," apparently after 
an agreement was reached by Fang, China and the United States.65 
Despite Congressional criticism, the United States Government 
granted, in July, 1989, a waiver to Boeing to deliver four jetliners to 
China. 66 President Bush sent his National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft to Beijing, in July and again in December, 1989, to improve 
U.S.-Chinese relations. More recently he renewed China's most fa-
vored nation status against wide congressional opposition. Besides 
lifting martial law in Beijing and Tibet and the release of some dissi-
dents from jail, China has done very little to ease its policy of 
repression. 67 
In late October and early November, 1989, former President 
Richard Nixon and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, respec-
tively, visited Beijing with the blessing of the Bush Administration. 
Apparently neither made breakthroughs in the rebuilding of Chinese-
American relations. Beijing obviously expected Washington to take 
the initiative,68 and Washington was not yet ready to make a major 
change in its policy toward China.69 Kissinger, noting that both coun-
tries had an interest in stability and peace, urged both Washington and 
Beijing to "take steps together to put relations onto a smooth path. "70 
While the Bush Administration has been reaffirming the wisdom 
of a "measured response" to China by insisting on the importance of 
"maintaining open lines of communication" despite the Beijing crack-
65. The Fang Lizhi question is summarized in Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Names a 
Culprit Behind Student Unrest," New York Times, June 10, 1989, p. 5. See also Thomas L. 
Friedman, "U.S. and Chinese Seek to Resolve Rift on Dissident," New York Times, July 8, 
1989, pp. 1, 22. For a discussion of Fang's release, see Sheila Rule, "Chinese Dissident to 
Study in U.S. and to Speak Out," New York Times, July 14, 1990, p.5. 
66. For a summary of the U.S. response to China's crackdown on the democracy 
movement, see James D. Seymour, The International Reaction to the 1989 Crackdown in 
China, New York: Columbia University East Asian Institute, 1990, pp. 11-14. 
67. For China's release of 211 dissidents, see Nicholas Kristof, "China Announces Re-
lease From Jail of 211 Dissidents," New York Times, May 11, 1990, pp. AI, A7. For 
Bush's decision to renew China's most favored nation status see R. W. Apple, "Bush Hold-
ing Normal Trade Ties From the Soviets," New York Times, May 25, 1990, pp. AI, All. 
68. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Better Relations Depend on the U.S., Deng Tells Nixon," 
New York Times, Nov. 1, 1989, p. AS. 
69. Andrew Rosenthal, "Nixon Talks of China at White House Dinner," New York 
Times, Nov. 7, 1989, p. A13. 
70. Sheryl WuDunn, "Kissinger, in Beijing, Seeks to Mend Fences," New York Times, 
Nov. 9, 1989, p. A19. 
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down,71 Congress has moved to impose more sanctions on China than 
those President Bush is willing to accept. In late November, 1989, 
Congress approved a package that imposes two years of sanctions, in-
cluding a suspension of trade assistance and an end to insurance for 
American companies doing business in China. It also freezes the ex-
port of satellites, helicopters and certain nuclear materials and compo-
nents72. President Bush did not sign the proposed bill into law. 
Congress wants more sanctions written into law in view of China's 
massive human rights violations, whereas the Administration does not 
want to jeopardize the common U.S.-Chinese strategic interests.73 
Despite a slight improvement in China's international standing, 
Beijing's foreign relations remain in considerable trouble. The only 
bright spot is China's greatly improved relations with the Soviet Union 
as a result of the Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's summit meeting 
with Chinese leaders in Beijing on May 15-17, 1989 and Premier Li 
Peng's visit to Moscow in May, 1990. The summit meetings led to the 
normalization and strengthening of Sino-Soviet relations after a 30-
year rift. 74 The normalization has strengthened Beijing's position in 
the triangular relationship among China, the Soviet Union, and the 
United States. 
In the face of Western sanctions, moving closer to Moscow is now 
an official option for China but it is not a very realistic one. Conflict-
ing national interests still divide the two nations, and China is still 
very suspicious of the Soviet Union. The two Communist giants do 
not share similar views on political and economic reforms nor on how 
to respond to political unrest. Moreover, Moscow cannot provide Bei-
jing with the kind of investment funds and advanced technology that 
China needs for its modernization drive and that can be made avail-
able to China only by Japan, the United States and other Western 
countries. Moving closer to Moscow, therefore, is not a realistic op-
tion, and there are no indications that China has been moving in that 
direction. 75 In its modernization efforts, China still needs Western, 
71. Steven Erlanger, "Asian Allies Back U.S. China Policy," New York Times, July 8, 
1989, p. 3. 
72. Sheryl WuDunn, "China at Congress Sanctions," New York Times, Nov. 10, 1989, 
p. A6. 
73. Former U.S. Ambassador to China Winston Lord has suggested steps by China 
that might invite positive responses from Washington, including the lifting of martial law, 
termination of the ideological campaigns against foreign ideas, and better human rights 
protection. See his article, "China and America: Beyond the Big Chill," in this volume. 
74. For a discussion of the 1989 Sino-Soviet summit, see Henry A. Kissinger, "Seeking 
a New Balance in Asia," Newsweek, May 22, 1989, p. 51. 
75. For a discussion ofU.S.-China and China-U.S.S.R. relations, see Nicholas D. Kris-
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especially American, technology and investments very much despite 
better relations with the Soviets. After the crackdown, however, such 
Western technology and investment funds have become much less 
available to China. 
Besides setbacks in its relations with the West, China has also 
suffered setbacks in its competition with Taiwan on the diplomatic 
front. 76 
Pursuing a policy of "sole recognition" until recently, Taiwan be-
gan a campaign, in late 1988, to overcome its diplomatic isolation by 
getting countries to switch their diplomatic recognition from Beijing 
to Taipei or to recognize both governments at the same time. Taipei's 
offensives have succeeded in establishing diplomatic relations, since 
July, 1989, with such developing countries as Grenada, Liberia, and 
Belize, all of which had recognized Beijing as the "sole legal govern-
ment of China." Taipei has apparently taken full advantage of China's 
diplomatic difficulties created by the crackdown to strengthen Tai-
wan's international standing. 
With its huge foreign trade surplus, enormous foreign exchange 
reserves, and acknowledged expertise in economic development based 
on the "Taiwan model," Taipei has been in a good position to offer 
economic aid to developing countries and replace China as a powerful 
champion for the causes of the Third World. 
Taiwan's recent moves have led China to conclude that Taipei 
has adopted a "more flexible policy" that would allow dual recogni-
tion of both Beijing and Taipei, thus creating a "two-China" or "one 
China and one Taiwan" situation. Such a strategy is designed to allow 
Taiwan to remain separate forever from the Mainland in the view of 
Beijing. 
China's sense of urgency is not merely due to its recent defeats on 
the diplomatic front but also to its fear of Taiwan's true intention on 
the question of re-unification. In unequivocal terms, Beijing has stated 
that "there is no flexibility to speak of" on the question of "one 
China" and the "unification of the motherland. "77 
Besides verbal attacks on Taipei, Beijing has suspended its rela-
tof, "Relations with U.S. Seem Badly Hurt by Crushing Democracy Protests," New York 
Times, June 11, 1989, p. 16. 
76. For a discussion of the recent confrontations between Beijing and Taipei on the 
diplomatic front, see Winston L.Y. Yang, "Diplomatic Dilemma May Prompt Drastic 
Move," Hong Kong Standard, Nov. 4, 1989, p. 8. 
77. Sheryl WuDunn, "China Says Taiwan is 'Buying Hearts' Abroad", New York 
Times, Oct. 15, 1989, p. 10. 
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tions with Grenada, Liberia, and Belize to demonstrate its firm rejec-
tion of "dual recognition" by third countries. 
But the question remains: What else can or will Beijing do to 
punish Taipei besides the fierce verbal attacks? The following are 
thought to be steps likely to be taken by China against Taiwan: 
• Intensified actions to frustrate Taiwan's efforts to 
participate in certain international and regional organ-
izations; 
• Greater pressure on countries with which China has 
maintained diplomatic ties not to improve their relations or 
establish formal ties with Taipei; 
• Increased economic aid to Third World countries; 
and 
• Creating problems or difficulties in the people-to-
people exchanges between the two sides. 78 
None of the above, however, are easy or effective options for 
China except efforts to prevent Taiwan from joining or returning to 
certain regional or world organizations, which has already been 
China's official policy. China's recent successful move to block 
Taipei's membership at the International Management Society and its 
decision not to consider Taiwan's membership application at the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) until its acceptance of 
China as a member, are clear signs of Beijing's determination to fur-
ther isolate Taiwan internationally. 
China's recent economic difficulties and limited foreign exchange 
reserves have made it impossible for Beijing to offer more aid to devel-
oping countries. Pressure on countries with which China has main-
tained official relations will not be effective without extensive aid to 
match Taipei's substantial economic assistance plan. 
Moves designed to create difficulties in unofficial exchanges with 
Taiwan will greatly harm the improved relations between the two sides 
and damage prospects for more contacts and eventual re-unification. 
Thus, such moves clearly run counter to China's long-term interests. 
The only other option would be to create a. disturbance on the 
Taiwan Straits, which has enjoyed considerable peace and stability for 
many years. Such an action would create psychological pressure on 
Taiwan without the use of force. Taiwan's prosperity and growing 
economic strength have been maintained by many factors, including 
its people's confidence in the future of Taiwan. If such confidence 
78. See supra note 76. 
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were shaken by Beijing, more citizens would flee to foreign countries 
and investment in Taiwan would inevitably decline. Ultimately, Tai-
wan's foreign trade and prosperity would be affected. 
Such actions, if taken by Beijing, would force the United States, 
Japan, and other Western countries to condemn China, thus creating 
more diplomatic problems for Beijing. Such moves would also in-
crease Taiwan's determination to resist China's pressure and effort to 
move toward eventual re-unification with China. All these would, no 
doubt, harm China's long-term interests. 
Beijing's recent diplomatic setbacks in its confrontations with 
Taipei have thus placed China in a dilemma. Under Taipei's aggres-
sive diplomatic offensive, combined with huge aid projects, more de-
veloping countries may abandon China and establish formal ties with 
Taipei. Taipei, therefore, expects more diplomatic victories. There is 
not much China can do to effectively frustrate Taipei's diplomatic 
offensives. 
Beijing's diplomatic defeats by Taipei are not the direct result, of 
course, of the Chinese crackdown, but Taipei has taken full advantage 
of Beijing's weakened international position to hasten its diplomatic 
successes. 
Since late November, 1989, China has made some progress in im-
proving its foreign relations. Beijing has established diplomatic ties 
with Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and Singapore. There are no indications 
that Western countries, especially the United States, will be ready to 
lift all their sanctions against China soon. The brutal suppression has 
had, indeed, a great impact on China's foreign relations. Beijing paid 
a heavy price in terms of foreign relations for the crackdown, even 
though it remains to be seen how enduring the negative effects will be. 
IMPACI' ON HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND 
OVERSEAS CHINESE 
The impact of the massacre in Beijing in June, 1989, on Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and overseas Chinese has been so great that it is proba-
bly beyond the comprehension of the CPC leadership. The reaction of 
Chinese residing outside the Chinese mainland to the massacre was 
unusually strong. In Hong Kong, for instance, well over 10,000 peo-
ple gathered in Victoria Park on May 20, 1989, to support the Chinese 
student democracy movement.'9 On June 4, the residents of Hong 
Kong demonstrated in huge numbers to protest the massive killings in 
79. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Turns Out in Protest Against Its Once and Future 
Ruler," New York Times, May 21, 1989, p. A18. 
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Beijing while revealing their deep shock and distress over the violent 
crackdown. 80 On one occasion in May, approximately one million 
people, roughly a sixth of the entire population of Hong Kong, partici-
pated in demonstrations to support the democracy movement in 
China.81 Some Hong Kong protesters even called for the postpone-
ment of the British-Chinese negotiations on the details of the return of 
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty. 
But on June 7, 1989, plans for a series of rallies to mourn the 
victims of Beijing's military suppression of June 4 were cancelled after 
a violent confrontation between the police force and a group believed 
to be provocateurs from China. The organizers of the pro-democracy 
movement, however, continued their call for a token strike, and many 
Hong Kong residents observed a moment of silence for the Beijing 
protesters killed on June 4. 82 After the student democracy movement 
began in China in April, 1989, Hong Kong residents, 98 percent of 
whom are ethnically Chinese, held rallies at first to express their hope 
and support for the democratic aspirations of Chinese students and 
then to show their anger and sorrow after the crackdown. They were 
afraid that the Chinese government, after the return of the British col-
ony to Chinese control in 1997, would, as in Beijing in 1989, suppress 
political and economic freedoms in Hong Kong. 
Thus, the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, upon his 
arrival in Hong Kong on July 2, 1989, to restore the island's confi-
dence in its future but without concrete plans, was jeered by angry 
crowds. 83 The Hong Kong residents' fear of the approaching 1997 
reversion of the territory to China was quite obvious. 
All these reveal the profound concern of Hong Kong residents 
over the future of the island as a result of China's brutal killings in 
Beijing. A deep fear of China and a sense of distrust, uncertainty, and 
desperation soon emerged in Hong Kong. China's confidence crisis 
has become more serious than ever in Hong Kong and a smooth tran-
sition from British rule to Chinese sovereignty seems unlikely. 
Fear about the 1997 reversion led 46,000 people, mostly profes-
sionals, to emigrate in 1988, and the number intending to leave has 
skyrocketed since the massacre in Beijing. In 1990, residents are emi-
80. Richard Bernstein, "Vast Hong Kong Crowd Protests Beijing's Action,'' New York 
Times, June 5, 1989, p. A12. 
81. Ibid. 
82. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Cancels Mourning Rallies," New York Times, June 8, 
1989, p. A14. 
83. Fox Butterfield, "British Foreign Secretary is Booed by Angry Crowds in Hong 
Kong,'' New York Times, July 3, 1989, p. A6. 
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grating at the rate of over 1,000 a week, and the capital outflow soared 
in 1989 to nearly $5 billion. 84 · 
For those who are unable to leave, the CPC crackdown and 
China's confidence crisis sparked a new political :consciousness. 
Shaken and betrayed, Hong Kong residents demanded more guaran-
tees before 1997 and would like to speed up the timetable for Hong 
Kong's first direct elections, designed to insure some form of local de-
mocracy before 1997.85 A stronger democratic system is needed, it is 
widely believed in Hong Kong, to protect the territory after the 1997 
reversion to China. 86 
There is not much Hong Kong can do, of course, to insure its 
own future, even though Chinese leaders, such as CPC General Secre-
tary Jiang Zemin, have repeatedly pledged, since the June 4 crack-
down, that the Chinese policy towards Hong Kong remains 
unchanged. 87 Chinese pressure on the Hong Kong government not to 
allow the territory to be used as a base for "subverting" Chinese has 
grown in recent months.88 Officials of the New China News Agency 
(NCNA) cited some of the measures that the Hong Kong government 
had taken to "restrain the anti-PRC subversive activities."89 Soon af-
terwards, the Hong Kong government indeed took the necessary steps, 
such as its refusal to allow certain members of the Chinese student 
democracy movement organizations to enter Hong Kong90 and to re-
strain anti-Chinese activities. All these steps have painfully revealed 
Hong Kong's sense of hopelessness and helplessness in the face of 
China's growing pressure and the approaching reversion to Chinese 
controP1 Hong Kong has indeed become, since the June 4 massacre 
in Beijing, a city frightened of its future and obsessed with one date-
July 1, 1997- and tom between those who can leave and the 60 per-
84. Ibid. See also Nicholas Kristof, "Foreign Passports Tell of a Desperate Hong 
Kong," New York Times, May 16, 1990, p. Al2. 
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June 11, 1989, p. A17. 
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89. Ibid. 
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cent or so who cannot afford to leave.92 The mood of grim despera-
tion, as pointed out by Margaret Scott, a long-time Hong Kong 
resident and observer, is a far cry from the euphoria that engulfed 
Hong Kong before June 4, when crowds of close to a million jammed 
the streets in support of China's democracy movement. 93 Hong Kong 
is thus trapped between a looming Chinese motherland which the 
Hong Kong residents cannot change or democraticize and the depart-
ing British colonial rulers who they feel are betraying them by refusing 
to allow most of the local Chinese to emigrate to Britain. 94 The choice 
for those unable to leave seems to be either to beg London for protec-
tion or to participate in movements designed to change the Chinese 
motherland. Both are impossible and unrealistic choices. 
The enormous erosion of confidence is very apparent in Hong 
Kong. London has been under added pressure to negotiate stronger 
safeguards for Hong Kong before the 1997 reversion and to allow 
more Hong Kong residents to enter Britain. Both are impossible tasks 
for Britain to accomplish. 9s The future of Hong Kong has thus be-
come much grimmer after the 1989 massacre in Beijing. 
As for the impact of Tiananmen on Taiwan, it is equally profound 
but less dramatic. Like the Chinese in Hong Kong, the Taiwan Chi-
nese also participated in massive demonstrations after the June 4 
events in support of China's democracy movement, even though 
Taipei's official pronouncements remained very cautious. This caution 
is probably due to Beijing's allegation that Taiwan was involved in the 
democracy movement on the mainland. But there is very little that 
the Chinese in Taiwan, like those in the British colony, can do to influ-
ence developments on the mainland. 
In the immediate wake of the violent crackdown in Beijing, how-
ever, Taiwan established direct telecommunication links with the 
mainland96 in order to meet the growing demands of the people. Peo-
ple-to-people contacts and exchanges dropped sharply after June 4, 
1989 and the number of Taiwan's tourists and those who visited the 
mainland for family reunions also decreased considerably. Taiwan's 
investment in China and the two-way trade declined as well, even 
92. Margaret Scott, "Hong Kong on Borrowed Time," New York Times Magazine, 
October 22, 1989, p. 31. See also David Sanger, "As Hong Kong Elite Are Leaving, Japa-
nese Investors Are Moving In," New York Times, May 29, 1990, pp. AI, D6. 
93. Ibid 
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95. David M. Lampton, supra note 14, p. 9. The author points out that Hong Kong's 
project investment in China was immediately slowed by the 1989 massacre. 
96. Ibid. 
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though no official statistical reports have been released. A gradual in-
crease in various economic fields has been registered, however, since 
late 1989. 
Those in Taiwan who advocated an eventual re-unification with 
China were of course shocked by the brutal killings in Beijing. Their 
aspirations and hopes were inevitably dashed by the CPC action. 
China's attempts to woo Taiwan back to "the fold of the motherland" 
have been significantly damaged by the Chinese crackdown, 97 even 
though considerable progress had been made in contacts and ex-
changes since 1987. The "mainland fever" on Taiwan largely disap-
peared after June 4, 1989. 
Beijing's violent actions have also made Taiwan more determined 
than ever to resist Chinese pressures to move toward re-unification. 98 
The independence movement in Taiwan seems to have been strength-
ened by China's violent action. 
As discussed earlier, Taiwan has also taken advantage of China's 
weakened international position (created by the Chinese crackdown) 
by launching diplomatic offensives, which led to the establishment of 
official ties between Taipei and several developing countries, including 
Grenada, Liberia, and Belize. Beijing, in tum, suspended its relations 
with them in order to avoid the "dual recognition" situation and de-
nounced Taiwan for its "two China" or "one China and one Taiwan" 
policy. Rejecting Beijing's charges, Taiwan has since stepped up its 
efforts designed to expand its foreign relations. Thus, renewed tension 
on the diplomatic front has appeared in Beijing-Taipei relations since 
late 1989.99 
There have been some casualties of the worsening relations 
caused by the massacre in Beijing and by the Taipei-Beijing diplomatic 
rivalry. Plans for allowing ships to travel directly between Taiwan 
and the mainland have been put aside, and direct transport is likely to 
be delayed. 100 
Whatever the impact of the 1989 Chinese massacre on Taiwan 
may be, Beijing's goal of an eventual re-unification with Taiwan has 
now become more remote than ever. The brutal killings have also re-
inforced a growing sense of self-confidence in Taiwan in its own polit-
ical and economic system. 101 The widening gaps in various fields 
97. Ibid. 
98. Winston L.Y. Yang, supra note 76, p. 9 .. 
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100. Nicholas D. Kristof, ''Taiwan Pulls in a Hand Extended to the Mainland," New 
York Times, August 20, 1989, p. D2. 
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between the two sides have made many in Taiwan more skeptical 
about reunification. They have become more distrustful of the CPC 
and skeptical of the prospects for political links. 102 The violent Chi-
nese actions in 1989 have widened considerably the differences and 
gaps between the two sides. 
As for the overseas Chinese, they were equally disturbed and an-
gered by Beijing's military crackdown. Shortly after June 4, 1989, 
overseas Chinese in many countries, especially those in the United 
States and Western Europe, organized huge rallies in support of the 
Chinese student democracy movement and to protest the violent ac-
tions of the government. For the first time since Deng Xiaoping began 
his modernization and reform drives in the late 1970's, overseas Chi- . 
nese were united in their condemnation of China's brutal killings. On 
May 20, 1989, for instance, thousands of Chinese marched on the Chi-
nese Embassy in Washington to support Beijing's student democracy 
movement.l03 Rallies were also held on June 10, 1989 in a number of 
American cities to support the pro-democracy movement and to pro-
test the brutal killings in Beijing. 104 In addition, overseas Chinese 
have contributed financially to funds established to assist the pro-de-
mocracy movement. 
Overseas Chinese have also strongly supported organizations 
formed by leaders of the democracy movement who fled to the West 
soon after the crackdown. Y an Jiaqi, Wuer Kaixi, Wan Runnan, 
Chen Yizhi and others formed, in Paris on September 24, 1989, the 
Federation for a Democratic China (FDC), which is dedicated to the 
promotion of democracy in China. The FDC aims at "safeguarding 
basic human rights, upholding social justice, promoting a private 
economy, and terminating the one-party dictatorship in China." 105 
Large numbers of overseas Chinese in Europe, the United States, and 
elsewhere, have shown their support for the FDC and other pro-de-
mocracy organizations. Overseas Chinese residents and Chinese stu-
dents and intellectuals abroad seem to have formed a unified front in 
their struggle for democracy in China. 106 Support for the CPC regime 
has decreased drastically in the wake of the massacre in Beijing. 
After the oppression, the democracy movement has been carried 
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106. For a brief report on the resistance movement after the crackdown, see Russell 
Watson and others, "Underground in China,'· Newsweek, July 10, 1989, p. 26. 
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on by underground leaders in China and by overseas Chinese and ex-
iled Chinese intellectuals and students abroad. "The seeds of democ-
racy and freedom," as pointed out by Yan Jiaqi, Chairman of the 
FDC, "have been planted, and as long as there is an underground, the 
government will not be able to stamp all of them out." 107 
FUTURE PROSPECTS 
As discussed above, the impact of the 1989 student democracy 
movement and the subsequent crackdown by the CPC authorities has 
been profound. China's political stability and orderly succession plans 
have been disrupted. The reform faction, headed by the purged for-
mer CPC General Secretary, Zhao Ziyang, has suffered a serious set-
back, if not a complete defeat. The new, divided leadership headed by 
Jiang Zemin is confronted with crises on many fronts and can hardly 
deal with them in any effective way despite Deng Xiaoping's personal 
support of Jiang, a newly emerged technocrat who has no power base 
of his own within either the CPC or the PLA. After the death of 
Deng, now 86, an inescapable crisis will begin. Deng's passing may 
lead to a party split and an intense power struggle. Today's policies, 
programs, and power alignments may very well wither. China's future 
has become more uncertain than ever. 
In fact, long before the 1989 student uprising, the CPC's power 
and authority had been eroding. The CPC has been further weakened 
by the brutal killings because public support for the CPC has signifi-
cantly declined. In fact, the CPC has become extremely unpopular 
with the masses. 
As a result of Tiananmen, China's economic reforms and mod-
ernization drive have suffered serious setbacks and political reforms 
have come to a virtual end. Today China still attempts to carry on 
normal cooperation with the West, but has greatly reduced its cultural 
and educational exchanges with Western nations. The scale of the 
open-door policy has obviously been significantly reduced. 
China's economic problems have escalated due to the democracy 
movement, the CPC's military suppression, and Western economic 
sanctions imposed after the crackdown. Beijing is now confronted 
with mounting economic difficulties on many fronts. 
On the international front, Beijing's setbacks are starkly appar-
ent. Western economic and diplomatic sanctions have driven China to 
an inevitable isolation. International support for China has declined 
sharply; it now comes mainly from small developing countries. 
107. Ibid. 
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The crackdown has also reinforced China's confidence cnsts 
among the overseas Chinese and the Chinese in Hong Kong and Tai-
wan. The reaction of overseas Chinese and those in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan to China's brutal killings was uniformly negative. Overseas 
Chinese support for the CPC and PRC has declined sharply; large 
numbers of them have organized to oppose the CPC. China's 
problems in Hong Kong, especially its confidence crisis, have become 
even more serious as Hong Kong moves toward the 1997 reversion. 
The violent PLA actions in Beijing have greatly weakened the reunifi-
cation movement in Taiwan and reinforced Taiwan's resistance to 
more cooperation with Beijing. The prospects for the re-unification of 
China have now become more remote than ever. 
Even though the CPC authorities have successfully suppressed 
the student movement, the democracy drive is now being carried on by 
underground organizations. The effectiveness of this underground 
resistance movement can be gauged by its ability to help hundreds of 
the leaders of the democracy movement, such as Chai Ling in April, 
1990, escape arrest or flee to the West. Thousands of Chinese students 
and intellectuals abroad have formed organizations to carry on the 
unfinished task of the 1989 student democracy movement. In due 
time, these underground and overseas movements could present a seri-
ous political challenge to the CPC and openly renew the democracy 
movement in China. 
Our discussion of Tiananmen's aftermath has shown its great im-
pact on many fronts. Having celebrated the 40th anniversary of the 
founding of the PRC on October 1, 1989, China is now confronted 
with grave political, economic, and other problems and crises. Even 
though martial law has been lifted, and a sense of stability has re-
turned, at least on the surface, the People's Republic, approaching 41, 
remains at great odds with the people. A decade of reform is now in 
shambles. 
Hundreds of Beijing University students marched, defying a huge 
display of police and security forces, around the campus, in the pre-
dawn hours of June 4, 1990, to mourn the student democracy protes-
ters killed precisely one year earlier. About 2000 students and faculty 
members roamed the campus from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m. Elsewhere Bei-
jing was generally peaceful, as the government displayed huge security 
forces in many parts of the capital. The police set up many roadblocks 
throughout the city and sealed off the entire university district to pre-
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vent demonstrations and protests. 108 Chinese authorities obviously 
tightened security and closed Tiananmen Square in an effort to head 
off any commemoration of last year's June 4th army attack on student 
protesters. 109 
In Hong Kong, more than 100,000 people, most of them dressed 
in the mourning colors of white and black, participated on June 3, 
1990 in a march to honor the pro-democracy protestors who were 
killed in the military crackdown in Beijing last June 4th. The huge 
crowd proves beyond doubt that the Chinese policy of trying to intimi-
date Hong Kong has failed. While China has made many promises to 
Hong Kong in view of the approaching 1997 transfer of the territory 
to Chinese control, few have faith in those pledges anymore. More 
than 1,000 educated, talented entrepreneurs and professionals are leav-
ing Hong Kong each week, and more local firms have moved their 
bases to foreign countries and are looking for investments outside 
Hong Kong. 110 The confidence crisis in Hong Kong has worsened one 
year after the military crackdown in Beijing. 
In New York, Washington, Boston, and many other cities in the 
world, demonstrations commemorating the first anniversary of the 
suppression of the democracy movement in China were held on June 
3, 1990.111 President Bush and Congressional leaders also criticized 
China. 112 
On the economic front, business is in a deep slump for most for-
eign firms with offices in China on the first anniversary of the 1989 
bloody suppression of the democracy movement. The hard times stem 
from China's austerity and economic retrenchment programs, curbs 
on imports and credits, and uncertainties in China's economic reforms 
and policies. The foreign business community in China has been filled 
with pessimism on China's trade. 
On the political front, the Chinese political system is widely re-
garded today as in a deadlock. Mixed signals show that the rival fac-
tions have only succeeded in blocking each other instead of initiating 
new policies. There is no clear sign of China's direction. All policy 
108. Nicholas Kristof, "Hundreds March in a Protest at Beijing University," New York 
Times, June 4, 1990, p. A7. 
109. "China Beefs up Security on Tiananmen Eve," (AP dispatch), Sunday Star-Ledger, 
June 3, 1990, Section 1, p. 2. 
110. Barbara Basler, "Hong Kong Honors Beijing's Victims," New York Times, June 4, 
1990, p. A7. 
111. Ibid. 
112. Susan F. Rasky, "Bush Nudges China on Anniversary of Crackdown," New York 
Times, June 5, 1990, p. A9. 
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and personnel changes seem to have been postponed to avoid the im-
pression of instability as China is still being remotely controlled by a 
"gang of elders." China's future is on hold with elders like Deng 
Xiaoping in power. 113 China's political uncertainty is clear. 
As for the Chinese people, a bitter memory has turned into disil-
lusionment and indifference. Passive resistance from a sullen popula-
tion has been apparent. 114 As widely reported, people do not seem to 
have any confidence in the CPC or the PRC government. us Nor do 
people believe in anything. The sense of emptiness and purposeless-
ness has become particularly acute since the 1989 crackdown. 116 As 
of mid-1990, China's future prospects remain grim indeed. 117 
113. Sheryl WuDunn, "Pessimism on Chinese Trade," New York Times, June 4, 1990, 
pp. Dl, D6. 
114. Nicholas Kristof, "China's Future on Hold With a 'Gang of Elders'," New York 
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116. Nicholas Kristof, "Marxism Died and Left a Big Hole in Their Lives," New York 
Times, May 18, 1990, p. A4. 
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